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PREFACE
For almost three-quarters of a century, the countries of Western Europe have 
abandoned national sovereignty as an ideal. Nation states are being disman-
tled – by supranationalism from above, by multiculturalism from below. Both 
supranationalism and multiculturalism undermine the territorial jurisdiction 
and the shared national culture of the nation state. Moreover, they partake of 
the same vision of the future. !eir vision is one of a world beyond borders 
and beyond the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that these borders entail. 
Whether perceived to be causing wars, to be impractical, unnecessary or merely 
small-sided, borders, demarcating the end of one jurisdiction and the beginning 
of another, the end of one way of life and the beginning of another, are actively 
being annulled.
It is the purpose of this book to reconsider the signi"cance of borders. 
!e book argues that representative government and the rule of law can exist 
only within a nation state. And it suggests that, paradoxically as it may seem, 
the social and economic advantages that globalization brings about can only 
be realized through strong, sovereign nation states – however internationally 
orientated and open to newcomers they may be, and notwithstanding intensive 
cooperation with one another.
!e dominant view in much of modern political and legal theory is that free 
trade, cooperation between states and internationalism require supranational-
ism, and that being open to newcomers should entail multiculturalism. !is, I 
contend, is an inversion of reality. For supranationalism thwarts a state’s options 
for free cooperation and internationalism, and takes away the very foundations of 
classical international law, whilst multiculturalism encourages the Balkanization 
of sensibilities and the narrowing – rather than the widening – of minds and 
sympathies, eclipsing the perspective on the national whole. 
From the facts of globalization, including mass-migration, multinational 
corporations, electronic communication and world spanning means of trans-
portation, the conclusion has been drawn that ‘the idea of national culture 
makes little sense, and the project of cultural uni"cation on which many past 
societies and all modern states have relied for their stability and cohesion is no 
longer viable today’.1 Because we can easily cross borders, or because there are 
problems that transcend borders, we needn’t have them at all. 
1 Bikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism. Cultural Diversity and Political theory. Second 
edition (London: Palgrave, Macmillan, #%%&) ).
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But I argue precisely the opposite: because of these phenomena that transcend 
borders, there is in fact a need for strong nation states. Only in nation states can 
newcomers be welcomed and made part of the collective ‘we’ that is necessary 
for political representation and a shared rule of law. And it is only through 
nation states that international cooperation can e+ectively be brought about. 
For only when decisions are made by national representatives – who can also 
be held accountable for these decisions –, such international cooperation can 
be experienced as legitimate. 
I call the open nationalism that I defend multicultural nationalism – as opposed 
to multiculturalism on the one hand, and an intolerant, closed nationalism on 
the other. !e international cooperation on the basis of accountable nation states 
that I propose, I call sovereign cosmopolitanism – as opposed to supranationalism 
on the one hand, and again a closed, isolated nationalism on the other. Both 
multicultural nationalism and sovereign cosmopolitanism place the nation state 
at the heart of political order, while recognizing the demands of the modern, 
internationalized world.
Historically, the nation state arose out of the con8ict between worldly and 
spiritual leadership – a con8ict which, although present already in the early 
Middle Ages, became untenable in the time of the Reformation. As a result of 
the religious civil wars that followed in the $&th and $,th century, it became 
generally acknowledged that states should be sovereign in their internal a+airs 
and that in order to ensure this, the most fundamental obligation of states should 
be respect for the territorial jurisdiction of other states – in other words: for their 
borders. !e Medieval organization of politics, characterized by overlapping 
jurisdictions, thus gradually made way for centralized sovereignty.
To legitimize increased political power and overcome religious and ethnic 
tensions, the idea that those subjected to this developing sovereign should have 
the same political loyalty, the same allegiance, was self-consciously developed 
in this era as well. !us Richelieu, for example, as early as $&$,, had already laid 
down in an instruction to a minister that in matters of state, no French Catholic 
should prefer a Spaniard to a French Protestant.2
But the state under the ancien régime was not yet a nation state. Government 
was not representative of its people in the way that it is taken to be in nation 
states. And whatever rule of law was in place in the ancien régime, it was not a 
shared law, as groups and regions had their own sets of rights and duties, and 
di+erent laws applied depending on personal status.
Symbolized by the American and French Revolutions ($,,& and $,)( respec-
tively), the idea of representative government and territorial equality before the 
law had been developed throughout the $)th century and became common in 
2 J.C.L. Simonde de Sismondi, Histoire des Français. Vol. XXII (Paris: Treuttel et Würtz, $)*() *)).
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the $(th. Implied in the notion of representation is the idea that a collective body 
of people exists that can be represented not just in terms of separate classes or 
individual interests, but also as a whole. Democracies presuppose the existence 
of a demos in order that parliament be considered the legitimate forum of 
deliberation and of ultimate decision-making. 
But the rule of law equally implies a demos. Not only should the judge that 
administers the law be recognized as an impartial authority by both parties to a 
con8ict, and thus draw upon a shared idea of legitimacy. Even more importantly, 
the content of the law itself is mostly congealed culture. !ere can be no shared law 
without a shared sense of morality, without shared customs and shared manners. 
No matter how much e+ort the legislative assembly might put in formulating 
promulgated laws as clear as possible, precisely what should be understood by 
essential legal concepts such as ‘equity’, ‘good faith’, ‘grave reasons’ and so on, 
or how the weighing of con8icting constitutional rights should be conducted 
(e.g. the freedom of religion against the principle of non-discrimination), is 
always a matter of interpretation. !e question of legitimate legal judgments 
thus becomes ultimately a question of social authority and that is precisely what 
lacks at the supranational level.
Moreover, as the courtroom is never more than an ultimate remedy, the ‘rule 
of law’ really implies that the individuals in a society generally have a shared, 
internalized idea of what the law is and that they live more or less according to 
it. Properly understood, the rule of law is only the tip of the iceberg of social 
cohesion.
!e nation-building operations and national uni"cation movements of the 
$(th century were undertaken with these considerations in view. !e course of 
these events, while not entirely arbitrary, was not inevitable either: there was 
no historical inevitability that, for example, the Italian uni"cation should have 
succeeded, or that the German should have failed until as late as $),$. While it 
is unlikely, for reasons of language and history, that Spain and France should 
have merged into one nation state, it was not a settled matter that the Basques, 
the Bretons or the Catalans should have been included in either. Nor should we 
consider these processes of national uni"cation as forever "xed. Nations are, 
like every social phenomenon, always in 8ux, and it is well possible that in the 
future, di+erent nation states with di+erent borders will develop.
Nor is there any doubt that too strong an a9rmation of national identity can 
have a dark side. !e First and Second World Wars provide terrible examples 
of this. !ough the political leaders at the time did not attempt to create nation 
states but rather multinational empires, nationalism proved an extraordinary 
way to channel and increase bellicose collective identity.
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But we should not judge a virtue by its excesses – as recklessness is not the 
essence of courage.3 Moreover, the fading of national identity would not abolish 
the human need for a collective identity. Nor would it e+ace mankind’s capacity 
to resort to violence on the basis of antagonisms drawn from such distinctions. 
Indeed, there is no reason to assume that the particular expression of collec-
tive identity through nationality should not have prevented or assuaged more 
con8icts than it has actually caused, or that other forms of collective identity, i.e. 
religious, tribal, or racial ones, have a better track record in this "eld. Moreover, 
there is no reason to assume that a de"ciency of national identity would bring 
about consequences necessarily less dangerous or destructive than those of an 
over-a9rmed, aggressive nationalism. !e lack of internal cohesion may make 
the formation of government not only utterly di9cult, as the case of Belgium 
illustrates, it may also cause a civil war, as the events in the former Yugoslavia 
in the $((%s – as well as those in America between $)&$ and $)&' – have most 
bitterly shown.
Nationality, expressed as patriotism in its normal form, can degenerate into 
aggressive nationalism or imperialism if it is not su9ciently accommodated. 
German nationalism was born in $)%&, the year that the French revolutionary 
army triumphantly marched underneath the Brandenburg Gate. !e French, 
in turn, were humiliated by the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in $),$, 
and in the years following this defeat, the French third republic saw the rise of 
a violent and anti-Semitic nationalism that sought to ‘purify’ the nation and so 
restore its pride. !ere can be no doubt either, that the enormous reparations 
Germany had to pay a:er the First World War, while having lost a third of an 
entire generation of young men, contributed to the rise of an aggressive form 
of nationalism amongst the population in the $(#%s and *%s. It is not unlikely 
that respect for national identities rather than the scorn they currently receive, 
could prevent (rather than, as is feared, incite) the pathological imperialisms 
that so terribly dis"gured the #%th century.
At present, European national governments are still, in the last instance, 
sovereign in validating the treaties that bind them – and they could still withdraw 
from those treaties, or demand reforms. Nor has multiculturalism, exceptions 
aside, replaced formal equality before the law or the authority of national judges 
to administer national law. Sharia courts are still rare and not broadly desired 
by immigrant populations. !is means that there still is a choice. Even though 
in past decades, much has been done to eliminate borders, the keys to the gates 
are still in national hands.
3 Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Is Patriotism a Virtue?’, in: R. Beiner (ed.), !eorizing Citizenship 
(New York: State University of New York Press, $((') #%(-##).
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!is is not unimportant. !roughout Europe, politicians with a signi"cantly 
nationalist agenda have had considerable – and increasing – electoral success in 
recent years. Indeed, the fact that European elites have taken step a:er step to 
dismantle the nation state does not mean that the native European populations 
are enthusiastic about that. ‘Populist’ politicians such as Berlusconi in Italy, Le 
Pen in France, Fortuyn and Wilders in the Netherlands, Klaus in the Czech 
Republic, Haider in Austria, Timo Soini in Finland, and many more, have all 
made a9rmations of the national culture an important part of their political 
campaigns, and have consciously demonstrated pride in representing their 
respective nations. In referenda on the Constitutional Treaty of the European 
Union, large numbers have expressed disapproval of granting supranational 
institutions powers that were formerly entrusted to national governments. And 
on November #(th, #%%(, the Swiss voted against the right of Muslim immigrants 
to manifest their religion in an ostentatious way by building minarets. It is 
not unlikely that holding such referenda in other European countries, would 
produce similar results.
If large percentages of native European populations do not wish their 
political sovereignty to be given away, and their national culture to disappear, 
should this not cause us to doubt the legitimacy and indeed the very rationale of 
supranationalism and multiculturalism? If the chances of success of a borderless 
world do not seem very high, would it not be wise to consider alternatives to 
the currently dominant trend?
!is book is, like Gaul, divided into three parts. !e "rst part seeks to analyze 
the nation state, both historically and analytically, and I will argue that its two 
primal characteristics are the shared loyalty of its population proceeding from 
their sense of social cohesion, and the capacity for centralized decision-making. 
In other words: nationality and sovereignty.
In the second part, I will show the extent to which we have le: this reality 
behind and how, over the past decades, supranationalism and multiculturalism 
have constituted what could be called an ‘assault on borders’. It gives a 8avor 
of the six supranational institutions that have been installed and explains how 
they infringe their member states’ own legal traditions and self-government. A 
distinction is made between supranational courts – the International Criminal 
Court, the European Court of Human Rights, and the International Court of 
Justice – on the one hand, and supranational organizations – the World Trade 
Organization, the United Nations Security Council, and the European Union 
– on the other. !e second part also takes multiculturalism into consideration. 
I discuss its two elements separately: the tendency towards legal pluralism on 
the basis of cultural or religious backgrounds, and the applauding of the di+er-
ent cultures and loyalties within the state, rather than emphasizing the shared 
national identity.
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Why supranationalism and multiculturalism are inimical to representative 
government and the rule of law forms the argument of part three. I will show 
that both representative government and the rule of law can exist only within a 
nation state – i.e. only when they are embedded in a sovereign framework with 
su9cient social cohesion. As it follows that supranational and multicultural 
developments are incompatible with two essential institutions of a free society, 
the "nal conclusion takes into consideration some practical alternatives to the 
current situation.
!e main thesis of this book is that representative government and the rule 
of law require nation states. By dismantling national sovereignty, the countries 
of Western Europe are thus undermining those institutions. Supranationalism 
and multiculturalism are incompatible with representative government and the 
rule of law because they e+ace the sense of overarching loyalty and ultimate 
centralized sovereignty that are necessary preconditions for them. Without 
borders, there can be no ‘we’ – and ‘without a “we”, it won’t work’.4
4 Paul Sche+er, Het land van aankomst (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, #%%,) -%$.
PART I
THE RISE OF BORDERS
National Sovereignty
What right have you, a foreigner, to come to me and tell me what I must do?
From: Ernest Hemingway, For Whom the Bell Tolls ($(-%)

INTRODUCTION
Borders de"ne jurisdictions. To uphold borders is to claim jurisdiction; to claim 
the right to decide on the law. !e nation state makes such a claim. It seeks 
jurisdiction over a particular territory. By implication, the nation state also 
acknowledges that other jurisdictions may apply beyond that territory. Borders 
work two-ways, and while they grant the nation state exclusive jurisdiction, they 
also limit the nation state’s claims to the designated territory.
Supranationalism and multiculturalism undermine the idea of exclusive 
territorial jurisdiction. Supranationalism grants institutions the power to break 
through national borders and to overrule the nation state’s territorial arrangements. 
In this way, borders become increasingly porous. Multiculturalism, meanwhile, 
not only deligitimizes the nation state’s borders by weakening the collective 
identity of the people living behind them; it also encourages religious sub-groups 
to invoke rules from beyond the nation state’s borders, thereby undermining the 
very idea of territorial jurisdiction. ‘God’s heart has no borders’, to put it bluntly.1
Supranationalism and multiculturalism are thus antithetical to national 
sovereignty and to the borders therein implied. Supranationalism dilutes 
sovereignty, and so brings about the gradual dismantling of borders from the 
outside; multiculturalism weakens nationality, thus delegitimizing their existence 
altogether from the inside.
!e idea of political organization that fundamentally opposes supranation-
alism and multiculturalism – the idea of the nation state – has been declared 
‘outdated’ and ‘irrelevant’ by an overwhelming number of commentators. Yet while 
supranationalism and multiculturalism have dominated politics and academia 
over the last several decades, their popularity is questionable and debates about 
national identity divide most European countries at present.
1 Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, God’s heart has no borders. How religious activists are working 
for immigrant rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, #%%)) $*': ‘!ere is a spirit that 
transcends the border’.
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Politicians playing the nationalist card have had indisputable electoral success: 
Le Pen and Sarkozy in France,2 Fortuyn and Wilders in the Netherlands,3 Filip 
Dewinter and Bart de Wever in Flanders,4 Lech Kaczynski and his twin brother 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski in Poland,5 Klaus in the Czech Republic,6 Haider in Austria,7 
2 Jean-Marie Le Pen (*$(#)) founded the euro sceptic and patriotic (anti-immigration) Front 
National in $(,#. !e party increased its vote during every election from $()* onwards till #%%#, 
when Le Pen opposed Jacques Chirac in the presidential elections. At the elections of #%%,, Nicolas 
Sarkozy (*$('') was able to steal the Front National’s clothes by taking over much of its patriotic 
rhetoric, such as declaring that one is to love France or to leave it. In January #%$$, Jean-Marie Le 
Pen’s daughter Marine Le Pen took over the leadership of the party, continuing its emphasis on 
French national identity, while Sarkozy pursued a more pro-European line.
3 Pim Fortuyn ($(-)-#%%#) founded the LPF (List Pim Fortuyn) in #%%$ and would have 
been a candidate in the national elections of May $'th, #%%#, but Volkert van der Graaf, an 
environmental activist who feared that Fortuyn would threaten Dutch society because of his 
‘stigmatizing political views’, murdered him a few days before, on May &th. Fortuyn’s political 
agenda was one of national patriotism, stressing that the European Union should not take over 
national sovereignty, and calling for drastic changes in Dutch immigration policies. A:er his 
death, much of his agenda was adopted by Geert Wilders (*$(&*), a former prominent member 
of the liberal party, who, while posing as an outcast in the media, has scored signi"cant successes 
in national and municipal elections. At the elections for the European parliament in June #%%(, 
Wilders’ party reached the same number of seats (') as the largest party in the Netherlands, the 
Christian Democrats. In #%$%, Wilders’ party increased its in8uence by giving parliamentary 
support to a minority coalition of Liberals and Christian Democrats.
4 Filip Dewinter (*$(&#) became leader of the Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Blok in $((# 
(currently renamed as Vlaams Belang). Under his leadership, the party grew until it was the biggest 
party in Flanders for a time. Yet, partly as a result of the cordon sanitaire of the other parties, 
it has not achieved governmental responsibility. !e Vlaams Belang strongly opposes Muslim 
immigration to Belgium and to Europe in general, and is highly skeptical of the European Union. 
Bart de Wever (*$(,%) founded the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie in #%%-, and strongly emphasized 
Flemish identity. In the elections of #%$%, the party won over *%; of the votes.
5 Lech Kascynski ($(-(-#%$%) was mayor of Warsaw between #%%# and #%%', and since then 
President of Poland until his death in a plane crash in April #%$%. He was very skeptical of Poland 
entering into the Euro currency zone, and had vowed to guard ‘Polish morals’ from Brussels. He 
also defended Pope Benedict XVI a:er his Regensburg address, by stating that Muslims ‘are a 
little too easily o+ended’. 
6 Vaclav Klaus (*$(-$) was prime minister of the Czech Republic between $((# and $((,, and 
has been president of the Czech Republic since #%%*, being reelected in #%%). He is a euro sceptic 
who did not want to sign the European Lisbon Treaty in #%%(. He also criticized the ‘excessive 
openness’ of the West to immigrants ‘from other cultural environments’.
7 Jörg Haider ($('%-#%%)) became a member of the FPÖ (Austrian Freedom Party) in $(,%. 
He was a member of Parliament from $(,( till $()*, and became president of the party in $()&. 
From $()( onwards, he was also elected as governor of Carinthia (which he remained, with an 
interruption between $(($ till $((', until his death). Under the leadership of Haider, the FPÖ 
achieved a high score in the elections of $((- (##,, ;), and another victory in $(((, leading to 
a government coalition with the Christian Democrats from #%%% onwards. In #%%', Haider co-
founded a new political party, the Bündnis Zukun: Österreich (League for the Future of Austria). 
Haider was strongly opposed to multiculturalism and to non-Western immigration.
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Berlusconi in Italy,8 Aznar in Spain,9 and so on. Also, in referenda on the Consti-
tutional Treaty of the European Union, considerable numbers of voters expressed 
resistance towards granting supranational institutions powers that were formerly 
entrusted to national governments.10 !e examples are legion. In June #%%(, the 
French government banned the burqa. Later that same year, on November #(th, 
the Swiss voted against the right of Muslims to erect new minarets. In Sweden, 
Muslim leaders called the results of the elections of September #%$% a ‘catastrophe’ 
because of the gains of the Swedish Democrats, an anti-Islamic party. In April #%$$, 
the nationalist ‘True Finns’ party won by a landslide success in Finland. And so on.
But what is in fact this ‘nation state’ that so many popular (or ‘populist’) 
politicians now profess to restore? To be sure, in an attempt to provide a sense of 
home to its inhabitants, whilst at the same time realizing political organization 
on a scale far exceeding the possible social circle of each individual inhabitant, 
the nation state consists of two in principle contradictory elements. !e need to 
realize social cohesion on a national scale has brought nation states to defend 
and indeed actively foster a particular cultural heritage – o:en at the cost of 
regional identities – and the application of strict territorial sovereignty has made 
tremendous injustices possible. 
At the same time, however, national sovereignty has also enabled peoples to 
govern themselves in accordance with their values and preferences. !e nation 
state has made self-government possible. And it di+ers from supranationalism 
and multiculturalism on two points: "rstly, on the e+ort to retain ultimate ter-
ritorial jurisdiction instead of multilevel competencies such as supranational 
organizations bring to life; and secondly, on the emphasis on the need for a shared 
nationality within that framework of territorial jurisdiction, as is underminded 
8 Silvio Berlusconi (*$(*&) founded his own political party in $((*, Forza Italia. He became 
prime minister in $((-, forming a coalition with the Allianza Nazionale (National Alliance) and 
the Lega Nord (Northern League), both nationalistic, eurosceptic parties. A:er losing the elections 
in $((& to the pro-European Romano Prodi, Berlusconi won the elections again in #%%$. In #%%&, 
Berlusconi lost again to Prodi, but a:er the rapid fall of Prodi’s administration, Berlusconi was 
restored to power a:er the elections of May #%%) until his step-back in #%$$.
9 José Maria Aznar (*$('*) was Spanish prime minister between $((& and #%%-, leading the 
Partido Popular. He is well known for his anti-multiculturalism and called his le:-wing successor’s 
‘Alliance of Civilizations’ a stupid initiative, while also being highly skeptical of ‘Moors’ (i.e. 
Muslims) in Spain.
10 !e referendum held in France on May #(th, #%%' resulted in a ‘no’ of '-,),;, while the 
main political parties and the main newspapers had been in favor. !ree days later, &$,&; of 
the Dutch rejected the constitutional treaty, even though all major newspapers and journals 
had supported the treaty, and of the Dutch parliament, only #% of the $'% members had been 
against it. Following these two referenda, the British decided not to hold the referendum that 
was scheduled for spring #%%&. !e Czech government cancelled their planned referendum as 
well, and the scheduled Danish, Portuguese, and Polish referenda were postponed. Sweden put 
rati"cation on hold. !e only countries in which a referendum has actually led to a positive result 
have been Luxembourg, Spain and Ireland.
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by multiculturalism. It is the purpose of the "rst part of this book to examine 
these points, the core points of the nation state, in more depth.
CHAPTER ONE
THE STATE
$.$. T"# R$%# &' ("# S()(#
To understand national sovereignty, it is "rst necessary to examine the institution 
that upholds it: the state.
States of the kind we are familiar with today have certainly not always 
existed. !ey gradually gained shape over a period of several centuries, leaving 
behind the multi-layered organization of power that characterized the Middle 
Ages. It is, however, not easy to draw a sharp line between feudal and modern 
statehood: rather, the distinction is ideal-typical. !e development towards 
modern statehood consisted in the slow undoing of feudal structures and in 
the diminution of the power of the church, in favor of the central political force 
commonly associated with the monarch.1 As Samuel Finer writes:
!e Middle Ages were regulated, shaped, and permeated by two great institutions: 
Christianity and Feudalism. (…) If the cathedral is the stone symbol of the Middle 
Ages, so, equally is the castle. Feudalism and the feudality embraced them both.2
!e replacement of the power of the ‘stones’ of the Middle Ages, the cathedral 
and the castle, by the paperwork of bureaucratic central administrations, marks 
the coming of the modern state.3 Ernest Gellner has written about the in8uence 
of modernization on ‘the replacement of diversi"ed, locality-tied low cultures by 
standardized, formalized and codi"ed, literacy-carried high cultures’. He noted 
that ‘the Reformation universalized the clerisy and uni"ed the vernacular and 
the liturgy, and the Enlightenment secularized the now universalized clerisy and 
the now nation-wide linguistic idiom, no longer bound to doctrine or class’.4 
1 In republics, this increase in power was naturally not brought about by a monarch, but by 
another central political "gure. In the United Provinces, for instance, political power increasingly 
concentrated in the person of the Stadtholder.
2 S.E. Finer, !e History of Government, Volume II. !e intermediate ages (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, $((,) )',.
3 It is against this background that Edmund Burke wrote: ‘Nothing is more certain, than that 
our manners, our civilization, and all the good things which are connected with manners, and 
with civilization, have, in this European world of ours, depended for ages upon two principles; 
and were indeed the result of both combined: I mean the spirit of a gentleman, and the spirit 
of religion. !e nobility and the clergy …’, in: Edmund Burke, Re*ections on the Revolution in 
France. A Critical Edition. Edited by J.C.D. Clark (Stanford: Stanford University Press, #%%$) #-$.
4 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, $()*) ,&-,).
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!is, however, was a process that di+ered signi"cantly from region to region,5 
and a great number of elements of feudalism can still be found in Europe well 
into the $(th and #%th centuries (for example in the continuation of certain 
privileges for aristocracy and church, as well as culturally, for instance in the 
English idea of the ‘o9cer class’6).
Moreover, a pivotal institution in the political organization of nation states, 
parliament, originated in the counsel that vassals rendered to their overlords 
– and thus has its roots in feudalism.7 !e same goes for the ‘estates’ idea – as 
in ‘Estates General’ – which originally referred to the di+erent feudalities, 
summoned by the King.
In addition, while the theory of the modern state developed in the $&th and $,th 
centuries, it was only in the $)th and $(th centuries that states actually acquired 
the means to administer central political powers even remotely resembling 
those of today. Powers concerning taxation and legislation remained mostly 
decentralized until the breakdown of the ancien régime in Europe following 
the French Revolution. An illustration of this fact is that in the years directly 
preceding the Revolution, Louis XVI tried in vain to increase taxation when 
government de"cits rose to unacceptable levels following the French support for 
the American War of Independence ($,,'-$,)*): the nobility, however, prevented 
the state from taking such measures.8 From the modern perspective, all states 
5 As did the rise of feudalism, which certainly did not exist all through Europe in the same 
amount. Finer writes: ‘!e German Kingdom in the tenth century was not feudal. Feudalism was 
introduced there in the twel:h century. !e kingdom started o+ with a powerful but primitive 
personal type of monarchy. By the fourteenth century this kingship was reduced almost to nullity 
and the kingdom itself was an almost nominal confederacy of independent units. !e kingdom of 
the Franks, on the other hand, was in the tenth century in a similar condition to what Germany 
would come to be in the fourteenth, a largely nominal confederation of some half-dozen great 
territorial duchies and counties under a shadowy kingship; whereas by the thirteenth century it had 
been pulled together as the paradigm feudal kingdom, under a kingship which exploited to the full 
all the advantages it could extract from feudal law. England in the tenth century was non-feudal, 
like Germany, and it too possessed a powerful personalized kingship. Reinforced by the e+ect of 
the Norman Conquest, this kingship, a blend of Anglo-Saxon and feudal characteristics, ended up 
as the most e+ective and wide-reaching central government of the time, but one whose activities 
were balanced and controlled by the equal and opposite growth of increasingly institutionalized 
restraints.’ Finer ($((,) vol. II, )((.
6 !is was expressed, for instance, by the aristocrats who led in war and who were the "rst to be 
killed in the First World War. Cf. David Cannadine, Class in Britain (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, $(()), and Martin Gilbert, !e Somme. Heroism and Horror in the First World War (New 
York: Henry Holt and company, #%%&), or, from the perspective of "ction, R.C. Sherri+, Journey’s 
End (New York: Bretano’s Publishers, $(#().
7 J.H.A. Lokin and W.J. Zwalve, Hoofdstukken uit de Europese Codi+catiegeschiedenis. Derde, 
geheel herziene druk (Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, #%%&) $%*.
8 Attempts to increase taxation were for instance undertaken by Turgot, minister of Louis XVI, in 
$,,-. Cf. Joël Felix, ‘!e "nancial origins of the French Revolution’, in: Peter R. Campbell (ed.), !e 
Origins of the French Revolution. Problems in Focus (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, #%%&) *'-&#.
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that may have been in place in Europe before the French Revolution, with the 
possible exception of Britain since $&)), were at best ‘failed states’.9
A central characteristic of the Middle Ages was the feudal organization of 
power. Feudalism had come up when local communities and peasants sought 
a new bond to provide for their security as the pax romana collapsed.10 During 
the several centuries usually denoted as ‘dark ages’, this security was found in 
di+erent local princes and potentates, who o+ered protection in exchange of 
their counsel and military support.11 !ey became their vassals.12 Vassals who 
had pledged allegiance to an overlord, could in turn establish their own "ef 
over parts of their territories. !rough this process, a hodgepodge of regional 
nobles and local lordships arose upon the collapse of the Roman Empire, each 
with their own means of the enforcement of order.13
During the Middle Ages, society thus became structured as a long hierarchi-
cal chain of mutual obligations and duties. And whoever stood at the top of 
this pyramid (a King and, in the German case, an Emperor) had a role much 
di+erent from that of current heads of state. An old feudal principle was that 
vassallus vassalli mei non est meus vassallus (a vassal of my vassal is not my vassal), 
severely limiting the power of the king to interfere in matters on the ground.14 
As a consequence, the relationship of the monarch with his noblemen was one 
of mutual dependence. !is is illustrated by the fact that until the $'th century, 
there were in principle no standing armies at the disposal of the King.15 As a 
result, the monarch, lacking easy means of enforcement, usually had to rule 
9 Another exception may be Sweden since Charles XII ($&(,-$,$)). Tilly uses a broader 
de"nition of the term ‘state’, however. In contrast, I am speci"cally referring to the comparison of 
the modern state with whatever previous types of states may have existed in the past. Cf. Charles 
Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD ,,--.,,/ (Oxford: Blackwell, $()() especially -'+. 
I also touch upon the notion of the ‘failed state’ in chapter #, section #.# on ‘internal sovereignty’.
10 Lokin en Zwalve (#%%&) $%*. Finer writes: ‘“Feudalism” and “feudal system” may be ill-
chosen terms – most medievalists agree on that – but they have acquired a connotation which 
we still have to use because we can avoid it only at the cost of a tedious and, indeed, obfuscating 
circumlocution. !e fact is that in the West and central parts of Europe between the tenth and 
fourteenth centuries the form of polity was sharply di+erent from any we have met with so far, 
and “feudal” is the best name we can give it’, in: Finer ($((,) vol. II, )&-.
11 !e auxilium and consilium of the vassal. Lokin and Zwalve (#%%&) $%*, fn#*.
12 Cf. Stuart Hall, ‘!e state in question’, in: McLennan, Held and Hall (eds.), !e idea of the 
modern state (Philadelphia: Open University Press, $()-) --,; Hendrik Spruyt, ‘!e origins, 
development, and possible decline of the modern state’, in: Annual Review of Political Science, 
Volume ' (#%%#) $#,--(.
13 Hall ($()-) --,.
14 Cf. W.F. Church, Constitutional thought in sixteenth-century France. A study in the evolution 
of ideas (New York: Octagon Books, $(&() $)%+.
15 Spruyt (#%%#) $#,--(.
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with the consent of his noblemen, for instance concerning taxation.16 He was 
primus inter pares, not supreme executive.17
Nor were any powers in place remotely resembling those of a modern 
legislature. Law in the Middle Ages was primarily customary law, gradually 
supplemented with more uniformly applied Roman and Canonical law.18 John 
Maitland emphasizes that in England, from the time of Henry II ($$'--$$)(), ‘a 
rapid development of law common to the whole land’ came into existence, where 
‘local variations are gradually suppressed’.19 Finer likewise notes that ‘the great 
leap forward in expanding royal justice at the expense of the feudatories took 
place under Henry II’. As a result, ‘[English] kingship, a blend of Anglo-Saxon 
and feudal characteristics, ended up as the most e+ective and wide-reaching 
central government of the time’.20 
Government in England nevertheless remained ‘by any modern standard 
quite appallingly incoherent, clumsy, crime-ridden, and corrupt (…) violence 
was endemic: small private wars, the destruction of manor houses, the breaking 
of enclosures and rustling of livestock, as well as the crop of robberies, murders, 
burnings and the:s’. !us, ‘even what passed as the best of its kind for that era’ had 
to go far ‘to reach even the minimal standards of justice, fairness, and security’.21
It was in the $,th and $)th century, that administration became signi"cantly 
centralized in most other European countries,22 and only a:er the French Revolu-
tion that national codi"cations were realized.23 Although the rediscovery of the 
‘Digest’ – a compendium of writings of important classical jurists, elucidating the 
tenets of Roman law –, contributed to some increase in legal uniformity from 
the $*th century onwards; the law remained mostly a matter of customs and 
privileges.24 On the European continent, cities were signi"cantly independent 
16 Illustrative in this context is the fact that the French Revolution followed on the bankruptcy 
of the French state, which had come about because of the King’s failed attempts to raise taxes 
from the local potentates in the provinces. (See also above, footnote ).)
17 Cf. Hall ($()-) --,.
18 Lokin and Zwalve (#%%&) $##-$#*.
19 John Maitland, !e constitutional history of England (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, $(&$) $*.
20 Finer ($((,) vol. II, )((-(%#.
21 Finer ($((,) vol. II, )((-($(.
22 Tocqueville writes for instance in l’Ancien Régime et la Révolution ($)'&): ‘Je soutiens que 
[la centralisation] n’est point une conquête de la Révolution. C’est, au contraire, un produit de 
l’ancien régime, et, j’ajouterai, la seule portion de la constitution politique de l’ancien régime 
qui ait survécu à la Révolution, parce que c’était la seule qui pût s’accommoder de l’état social 
nouveau que cette révolution a créé.’ Tocqueville, op. cit. (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, $('*) $%,: 
book #, chapter II. Cf. Lokin and Zwalve (#%%&) $)%+.
23 Lokin and Zwalve (#%%&) $)#+. Some German states had already commenced with codi"cation 
projects in the years preceding the Revolution. As a consequence, Prussia for example presented 
its codi"cation as early as $,(#.
24 !e Corpus Iuris Civilis was issued by Eastern Roman Emperor Justinianus I between '#( and 
'*-. It consists of three books: the ‘Institutions’ (a handbook for students), the ‘Digest’ or ‘Pandects’, 
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to pass and uphold their own legislation, and so enjoyed an amount of politi-
cal independence far beyond the scope of municipalities today. As social and 
economic life was deeply regional, moreover, no e+ective standardization of 
measures and weights existed, which could therefore di+er signi"cantly from 
one region to another.25
Di+erent rules applied to noblemen, clergymen, students or farmers, and 
guilds and other intermediary institutions were to a large extent able to make 
and act according to their own rules and trading decisions.26 !e predominant 
jurisdictional principle of modern states is territorial equality before the law; 
this did not exist in the Medieval system, in which there was no overarching 
law that applied equally throughout the territory. Instead, the principle of 
personality applied: rights and obligations followed from personal status, not 
territorial coordinates.27
In addition, the connection of nobles with their territories was loose. Titles 
were inherited, or passed through marriages from one family to another. As the 
principle of primogeniture did not always apply, "efs were sometimes divided 
among the di+erent sons of monarchs or nobles as well.28 Borders were thus 
subject to constant change and the connection between rulers and ruled, while 
depending almost entirely on the personal entitlements of the lord, was weak.29
John Gerard Ruggie approaches the matter from another angle: ‘the Medieval 
ruling class’, he writes, ‘was mobile in a manner not dreamed of since, able to 
assume governance from one end of the continent to the other without hesitation 
and the ‘Codex’ (a collection of imperial laws). Cf. Paul Koschaker, Europa en het Romeinse Recht. 
Nederlandse editie verzorgd door !eo Veen (Deventer: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, #%%%) ',+ [''].
25 Andreas Kinneging, Aristocracy, Antiquity, and History, Classicism in political thought 
(New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, $((,) (: ‘Apart from the purely physical 
restrictions on royal authority due to the poor network of communications – it took a courier a 
week to travel from Nice to Paris -, and the traditional dependence of the French kings on the 
advice of their counselors – Louis XV constantly reiterated Louis XIV’s advice to take counsel in 
all things -, there was a wide range of formidable checks upon the exercise of monarchical power. 
!e many municipalities, law courts, guilds, provincial estates, and other corporate bodies, all 
with a di+erent historical background, a di+erent culture, and a di+erent legal code, together 
formed a profound barrier against royal despotism.’
26 Cf. Robert Nisbet, !e quest for community. A study in the ethics of order and freedom (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, $('*).
27 !e same goes for the Roman Empire until the Constitutio Antoniniani of #$# AD, when all 
inhabitants of the Empire became Roman citizens, and hence subjected to the same, territorially 
instead of personally applying law. It is true that most modern states still apply some jurisdiction 
based on the principle of personality; criminal acts committed by subjects abroad are an example.
28 !is was especially the case in the Holy Roman Empire, as will be discussed more in depth 
below. Cf. Paula S. Fichtner, Protestantism and Primogeniture in Early Modern Germany (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, $()() )+.
29 Under feudal law, vassals retained the formal right to di0datio as well: to renounce their 
allegiance to the king. Robert of Gloucester did this, for instance, in $$*), to King Stephen ($$*'-
$$'-). ‘In France’, writes Finer, ‘if a vassal “de"ed” the king and levied war, his vassals had to follow 
him, even against the king’, in: Finer ($((,) vol. II, (#$. Cf. Spruyt (#%%#) $#,--(.
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or di9culty’. He quotes the French historian Georges Duby, who ironically wrote 
of the already mentioned Henry Plantagenet (i.e. King Henry II, $$**-$$)(): 
!is was Henry, count of Anjou on his father’s side, duke of Normandy on his 
mother’s, duke of Aquitaine by marriage, and for good measure – but only for 
good measure – king of England, although this was of no concern to the country 
in which he spent the best part of his time.30
A "nal aspect of Medieval political organization that contrasts sharply with modern 
statehood is the role of the church in society. For besides the fragmentation of 
political power through the mutually dependent and layered power structures 
of feudalism and decentralized administration, there was unity in Medieval 
Europe too – the unity of religion. !e ‘universal’ church31 provided not only 
spiritual like-mindedness, but also dealt with a wide range of everyday matters 
of a legal and practical nature, including civil administration, education, and 
charity – roles that churches to a high extent, if not entirely, have abandoned 
in modern states.
!is involvement of the church with political matters was certainly not always 
experienced as harmonious. In fact, the power struggle between lay rule and 
clerical rule – between worldly and spiritual leadership – was one of the major 
causes of political (and ultimately, armed) con8ict in the Middle Ages. !is 
con8ict was already a reality by the time pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne 
as Emperor in )%%, and was given a new impulse when, later in the (th century, 
the Vatican declared that Papa caput totius orbis (the Pope is the master of the 
world). !e struggle for the highest power never le: the scene, sometimes more 
slumbering and indirect, at other times right on the surface: for example at the 
end of the $*th century, when Pope Boniface VIII claimed worldly sovereignty 
and the right to levy taxes. !is claim was endorsed in his Unam Sanctam bull 
of $*%#, in which he stated that he, the Pope, was superior in power over Kings.32 
!e French King Philip IV responded to this bull by assembling the council of 
30 John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations’, in: International Organization, Vol. -,, No. $. (Winter, $((*) $*(-$,-, there $-(-$'%. !e 
quote from Duby is from: George Duby, !e !ree Orders: Feudal Society Imagined, translated by 
Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, $()%) #)&. 
31 !e word Catholic comes from the Greek Katholikos, meaning ‘throughout the whole’, or 
‘universal’.
32 !e bull is known by its incipit: ‘Unam sanctam ecclesiam catholicam et ipsam apostolicam 
urgente "de credere cogimur et tenere, nosque hanc "rmiter credimus et simpliciter con"temur, 
extra quam nec salus est, nec remissio peccatorum …’ (In translation: ‘We are compelled to believe 
that there is one holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, and our faith urges us to hold – and we do 
"rmly believe and simply confess – that outside of this there is neither salvation nor remission 
of sins …’).
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Bishops and a council of nobles to reject it, and consecutively sent the knight 
Guillaume de Nogaret on an expedition to Italy to imprison Boniface in $*%*.33
As mentioned before, the development of more centrally organized polities 
went slowly, and di+ered in each region.34 However, as Finer writes, 
In all feudal [realms] without exception (…), the political process boils down to a 
struggle between king and feudatories, and is marked by what are tritely referred 
to as periods of royal ‘expansion’ and feudal ‘reaction’.35
In England, the year $#$' marked such a feudal ‘reaction’ against the expansion 
of central power. By the end of the tenth century, its ruling aristocrats had 
recognized England as one indivisible realm, and William ‘the Conqueror’ of 
Normandy recon"rmed this in $%&&.36 Besides some &,%%% armored knights,37 
he had brought with him a new bureaucratic language (French),38 had declared 
the entire country to be royal property,39 and had installed a feudal system 
loyal to him.40 It was in the $$th century as well that primogeniture appeared in 
England, facilitating the accumulation of wealth from generation to generation.41 
Despite his attachment to his French duchies, as we saw above, King Henry II 
‘Plantagenet’ (r. $$'--$$)() signi"cantly increased the central imposition of law 
through the institution of a royal court.42
33 !e history of the reign of Philip IV ($#&)-$*$-) clearly illustrates how decentralized political 
power was in the Middle Ages. His constant e+orts to centralize power and attempts to have 
his jurists install new ways of central government are an insightful illustration. His biographer, 
Joseph R. Strayer, concludes his !e Reign of Philip the Fair (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, $()%) -#*: ‘Philip drew heavily on the political capital accumulated by his ancestors, but 
he also replenished it. He was king of all France in a way that none of his predecessors had been. 
He had forced the most independent lords – the king-duke of Aquitaine, the counts of Flanders 
and of Bar, the southern bishops – to recognize his superiority. His courts, and especially the 
High Court that was the Parlement, retained their reputation for justice and made that justice 
available to more subjects than ever before. Provincial loyalties were still strong, but some men 
were beginning to see a vision of a patria that was the kingdom of France’.
34 W.G. Grewe, Epochen der Völkerrechtsgeschichte (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellscha:, 
$()-); J.R. Strayer, On the medieval origins of the modern state (Princeton: University Press, #%%'); 
A. de Jasay, !e State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, $()'); McLennan, Held and Hall (eds.), !e idea 
of the modern state (Philadelphia: Open University Press, $()-); Held, Political theory and the 
modern state (Cambridge: Polity Press $()().
35 Finer ($((,) vol. II, (%-.
36 Finer ($((,) vol. II, )((.
37 Finer ($((,) vol. II, (%%.
38 Cf. Jean-Benoît Nadeau and Julie Barlow, !e Story of the French (London: Anova Books, 
#%%&) *$+.
39 William did not keep all the lands for himself. As Finer writes: ‘[William declared] about 
about one-sixth to himself alone, about two-":h to his soldiers, and about one-quarter as church 
lands; the remaining one-":h stayed in the hands of the petty freemen’. Finer ($((,) vol. II, (%%.
40 John Gillingham and Ralph A. Gri9ths, Medieval Britain. A very short introduction, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, #%%%) *.
41 Fichtner ($()() )+.
42 Finer ($((,) vol. II, (%#.
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But when the opposition of the nobility succeeded in having King John 
($$((-$#$&) sign the Great Charter (the Magna Carta Libertatum) in $#$', they 
in fact already accepted considerable powers in the hands of the monarch. For 
acknowledging the central government’s right to punish criminal o+enses, 
which the Magna Carta does, was already a signi"cant dilution of feudalism 
(and a power that certainly did not exist in France at the time, for instance43). 
!e nobles only managed to mitigate this power through provisions concerning 
fair trial and due process.44 !e Charter further contained several limitations 
on the King’s powers of taxation as well as provisions for the participation of 
nobles in important decisions, and was reissued several times: in $#$&, $#$,, 
$##', and again in $#(,,45 but bureaucratic organization nevertheless continued 
to grow over the years. !is increasingly demanded the active participation of 
the King’s o9cials who took seat in a ‘great council’ – more and more frequently 
to be called a ‘parliament’,46 which could also issue ‘statutes’: modi"cations in 
the ‘common’ law of the land.47
Step by step, then, the level of organization of the royal administration in 
England increased. When two centuries later, King Henry VII ($-)'-$'%() 
succeeded in ending the civil wars known as the Wars of the Roses, the crown 
managed signi"cantly to increase its demesne revenues; to rely on lower (and 
thus more dependent and loyal) aristocrats for administrative tasks; and to 
preside over a kingdom with an aristocracy with smaller estates and ‘smaller 
[armies] (…), "rmly subordinated to the Council [of the King]’.48 !e son of 
Henry VII, Henry VIII, would even defend the Tudor sovereignty against the 
religious claims from Rome.
Centralization of governing tasks in England in the $'th century had closely 
been connected to the fact that the Hundred Years’ War ($**)-$-'*) had provided 
opportunities for both the English and the French king to increase their hold over 
the realm. !is is not surprising, as Finer writes: ‘the verdict of history – at least 
European history – is that war calls out a superabundance of military, adminis-
trative, and "scal overkills which largely remain in place when peace returns’.49 
43 Cf. Finer ($((,) vol. II, (#$.
44 An example is Clause *(, reading that ‘No Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be 
disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other 
wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of 
his Peers, or by the Law of the Land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man 
either Justice or Right’. !e clause was numbered #( at the restatement of $#(, and can be found 
online at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw$cc$(#(/#'/(/contents.
45 Gillingham and Gri9ths (#%%%) *'.
46 Finer ($((,) vol. II, ($%-($*.
47 Finer ($((,) vol. II, ($%-($-.
48 Finer ($((,) vol. III, $#,$.
49 Finer ($((,) vol. III, $#,,.
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Indeed, ‘war is revolution, and revolution is war’, as Robert Nisbet observed.50 
When Hugh Capet became King of the Franks in (),, he presided over people 
speaking ‘German in the extreme north-east, Celtic in western Brittany, Basque 
in the south-east, while the two main branches of the lingua populare  – French 
and Occitan51 – were mutually unintelligible’, with weak resources and very little 
administrative power over his realm.52 
By that time, primogeniture had become common practice in France,53 
ensuring that the estates of the Gallic nobility stayed intact. !e position of the 
French king remained – when compared to the English monarchy – relatively 
powerless until the late $#th century.54 Finer writes that ‘between $$,( and $**, 
the Crown won the centralization race against the principalities. In $*-(-'$ and 
intermittently till $--' the process went into reverse’.55 Duchhardt, on the other 
hand, still discerns the following trend:
Considered within the category of the longue durée one might say – very coarsely 
and roughly – that the period from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century was 
shaped by the decline and erosion of both of the universal powers, Empire and 
Papacy, from which national states and churches and new confessions became 
more and more emancipated.56
One way in which the French kings managed to increase their in8uence was 
through the establishment of increased tax administration through a system of 
prevôts: ‘directly salaried and removable agents, drawn from the lesser nobility, 
and so dedicated to the royal cause’.57 !e French King found another way to 
enhance his power in his alliance with the Church, enabling him, through 
hospitality at abbeys and bishoprics, to travel the country more easily.58 But the 
third and most important way of increasing his power, the French king found in 
the establishment of parallel courts, parlements, as well as the establishment of 
an appeal to the king ‘if a seigneurial court failed to do justice’59 (a comparable 
institution existed in England in the form of the court of Chancery). 
50 Robert Nisbet, Prejudices: A philosophical dictionary (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press) ##'.
51 Hence the region Pays d’Oc.
52 Finer ($((,) vol. II, (#%.
53 Fichtner ($()() )+. Cf. H. Rowen, !e King’s State: Proprietary dynasticism in Early Modern 
France (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, $()%).
54 Finer ($((,) vol. II, (##.
55 Finer ($((,) vol. II, (#*.
56 Heinz Duchhardt, ‘Münster/Osnabrück as a short-lived peace system’, in: A.P. van Goudoever 
(ed.), Great Peace Congresses in History .123-.,,-, Utrechtse Historische Cahiers: issue #, year 
$- ($((*) $*.
57 Finer ($((,) vol. II, (#-. Cf. A. Luchaire, Histoire des institutions monarchiques de la France 
sous les premiers Capétiens (,34-..3-) (Paris: Alphonse Picard, $)($) ##$+.
58 Finer ($((,) vol. II, (#'-(#,.
59 Finer ($((,) vol. II, (#'.
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Subjects who appealed to a king’s court were under the king’s protection until 
the matter was settled. ‘!e royal court now swarmed with lawyers versed in 
Roman law and these légistes were to press the royal prerogative against strict 
feudality; in particular, they would use (for instance) the notion of utilitas, the 
king’s overriding duty and right to take any measures whatsoever in the cause 
of the “public weal”. But (…) the legists were equally skilled in turning feudal 
law itself against the feudatories’.60
It was thus through law that bit by bit, the king succeeded in increasing his 
central in8uence61 (and the comparison with the way the European Court in 
Luxembourg has increased the powers of Brussels in the #%th century is strik-
ing – see part II).
!e feudal lords attempted to counter these successful attempts of the French 
king to increase his power at their cost, and this was the most important cause 
of the Hundred Years’ War – a kind of civil war indeed (if it is not anachronistic 
in itself to speak of such a thing before the advent of modern statehood in the 
"rst place). !e great feudatories Aquitaine, Burgundy, Brittany and Flanders, 
in any case, rebelled, in alliance with England, against the French king.62 !is, 
however, proved ultimately unsuccessful and at the end of the war, the French 
king began to manage the upkeep of the "rst standing army in Western Europe 
since the fall of Rome.63 
Louis XI moreover, acceding to the throne in $-&$, successfully managed to 
maintain the increased military, "nancial and administrative powers that the 
loyal feudatories had granted him to "ght the war. He succeeded in appropriat-
ing Burgundy in $-,,, and in $'$-, future king Francis I ($'$'-$'-,) married the 
Duchess of Brittany, thus acquiring that territory for the French monarchy as well.
In the Spanish peninsula, the marriage between Ferdinand of Aragon and 
Isabella of Castille, and the completion of the ‘reconquista’ in $-(#, meant that 
the government of the whole of Spain came in the hands of one crown and this 
60 Finer ($((,) vol. II, (#,.
61 !e example of Aquitaine is telling. It was a "ef of the King of France, but the Duke was the 
King of England. Robin Neillands writes: ‘… the exact boundaries of the duchy had been neither 
fairly settled nor mutually agreed, which provided (…) cause for argument.’ He goes on to point 
at the nobility of Aquitiane, ‘who were perfectly placed to play one king o+ against the other, and 
did so at every opportunity. On the one hand, they much preferred to be ruled loosely, and at one 
remove, by the King of England, who usually resided in his misty northern island and provided 
a rich market for wine. On the other hand, if there were disputes with their lord the Duke, it was 
useful to appeal over his head to his suzerain, the King of France, and to the parlements of Paris, 
and not simply face the Duke again, in a higher court, when wearing his crown of England’. Robin 
Neillands, !e Hundred Years War, revised edition (London and New York: Routledge, $((%) #).
62 Finer ($((,) vol. III, $#,,. Jonathan Sumption writes in the preface of his three-volume history 
of the Hundred Years War: ‘I have written about England and France together, almost as if they 
were a single community engaged in a civil war as, in some respects, they were’. Jonathan Sumption, 
!e Hundred Years War, Volume I. Trial by Battle (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, $((%) ix.
63 Finer ($((,) vol. III, $#)#.
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signi"cantly increased the possibilities for centralized government. Neverthe-
less, the regions conquered from the Moors, most notably those in Andalusia, 
were quickly claimed by the ‘conquistadores’ as their feudal territories, and it 
was di9cult for the Spanish throne to keep a hold over them. At the same time, 
Catalonia was reluctant to surrender more powers to the central government. 
!ese circumstances made Spain ‘a loose confederacy held together purely by 
the personal union of the monarchs of its two great constituents’.64 Neverthe-
less, Isabella of Castille had great ambitions. She desired ‘one king, one faith, 
one law’65 – and set out to centralize political power by increasing taxation, by 
placing governors in cities who were involved with the administration of justice, 
and by use of the Inquisition, which could try such crimes as blasphemy, and 
was employed to destroy political opponents as well as ful"lling its religious 
mission.66 !e discovery of the New World meant an enormous boost for the 
power of the state as well, as colonial revenues 8owed directly into the treasury.67 
It was also in the $'th century, with the conquest of the North African city 
of Ceuta in $-$', that the 8ourishing of the Portuguese kingdom commenced. 
In $-)-, Bartolommeo Diaz reached the Cape of Good Hope, opening a sailing 
route to the treasures of Asia. !e treaty of $-(- with Spain divided the colonial 
world into two parts: west of current Brazil for Portugal, east of it, for Spain,68 
enabling Lisbon to increase its revenues and power, and so develop a stronger 
grip over the country as well.
!e history of the Holy Roman Empire runs along rather di+erent lines from 
the general picture of increased centralization, especially in the $'th century. 
For the German attempts at centralization of powers experienced many more 
drawbacks than in the other parts of Europe, creating a sharp contrast with 
France and Britain. In the $$th century, when the German emperor Henry IV 
dismissed the claims to political power of Pope Gregory VII, but had to make 
his infamous walk to Canossa to beg for mercy, the problematic con8ict between 
pope and emperor over ultimate sovereignty had le: deep traces in the political 
awareness of the empire. !e relationship between the emperor and his vassals, 
the princes of the di+erent Länder, moreover, remained rather unsettled until 
the beginning of the $'th century. !at is to say, the relationship was constantly 
rede"ned, depending on the personality of the emperor and the vassals. When 
in $-)&, emperor Frederick III asked the nobles for additional taxes to pay for 
64 Finer ($((,) vol. III, $#($.
65 W.H. Atkinson, A History of Spain and Portugal (Harmondsworth: Penguin, $(&%) $$%.
66 Finer ($((,) vol. III, $#(&.
67 Finer ($((,) vol. III, $#(,.
68 In $')%, Portugal entered into a personal union with Castile, but it broke away again in $&-%.
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his military con8ict with Hungary,69 they united to demand more formal rights 
of participation, especially in the form of an Imperial Court. !e assembly of 
the electors and other dukes was called Reichstag, and it was "rst assembled by 
Maximilian ($-(*-$'$() in $-('. At this gathering, a series of bills was passed, 
denoted together as the Reichsreform. In this same year, the Empire also received 
its new title, the Heiliges Römisches Reich Deutscher Nation.70 From then on the 
beginnings of more formalized administrative institutions started to take shape. 
Nevertheless, the Empire remained the least centrally administered political 
entity in early modern Western Europe.71 While the ‘golden bull’ of $*'&, issued 
by Emperor Charles IV, had reinforced the principle of primogeniture that had 
been introduced in the $#th century concerning the titles of those princes who 
held a "ef directly from the king (the Golden Bull "xed these "efs to a total 
of seven),72 partible inheritance remained common practice amongst lower 
aristocrats until as late as the eighteenth century, and Paula S. Fichtner observes 
that ‘few aspects of political life in Germany before the eighteenth century seem 
as remote from current views of the state as partible inheritance’. She continues:
With this willful redistribution of lands, both private and public, and o:en the 
dignities associated with them (…), the German princes of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries confound our views of rational administrative behavior.73
Moreover, under the Emperor Maximilian, who had attempted to increase cen-
tralized rule, the Swiss Confederacy saw its de facto independence recognized in 
the treaty of $-((. !e Low Countries had been brought under more centralized 
administrative control by Charles the Bold of Burgundy in the ":eenth century 
and it was determined at the ‘pragmatic sanction’ of Charles V that they would 
stay together and not be divided again. From $'&) onwards, the Dutch successfully 
fought Habsburg rule and gained de facto independence in $&%(, and de jure in 
$&-), establishing a confederate commonwealth of ‘Seven United Provinces’.74 
69 !e King of Hungary at the time was Matthias Corvinus ($-')-$-(%). He declared war on 
the Emperor in $-)$, and conquered Vienna in $-)'.
70 !e empire was called Holy Roman from the $*th century onwards, and the addition ‘of 
the German nation’ (Deutscher Nation) was made in the $'th century, in part to emphasize its 
separateness from the French.
71 Finer ($((,) vol. II, (*'-(*&.
72 !is was introduced by Frederick Barbarossa in $$'). Cf. Fichtner ($()() )+.
73 Fichtner ($()() -. See also: H. Schulze, Das Recht der Erstgeburt in den deutschen Fürstenhäusern 
und seine Bedeutung für die deutsche Staatsentwicklung (Leipzig: Avenarius und Mendelsohn, $)'$).
74 !e Italian peninsula saw a fading of its city-state decentralization and the necessity to organize 
itself along larger political lines a:er its defeat at the battle of Marignano in $'$' by Francis I of 
France, who was able to a+ord much heavier artillery because of his centralized military apparatus. 
With the peace of Cateau-Cambresis in $''(, though formally still consisting of di+erent states, 
most of Italy fell under Habsburg rule or its sphere of in8uence. East of Venice lay the countries 
that were heavily a+ected by the fall of the Eastern Roman Empire in $-'* and the subsequent 
raids of the Ottomans. !e kingdoms of Austria, Hungary, and Serbia struggled with rather 8uid 
borders, but the continuing battles necessitated more centralized political organization as well. 
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!e German empire thus presents the least clear picture of increasing centraliza-
tion. Indeed, the con8ict between worldly and religious authority – and thus of 
ultimate jurisdiction – brought about an opposite development resulting in the 
birth of the theory of the modern state exactly at the cost of German imperial 
ambitions. !e exploitation of their con8ict took place in the reformation, which 
began when a German monk nailed, as was common practice at the time, the 
announcement of a debate on the door of the Schlosskirche of Wittenberg. !e 
announcement read:
Out of love for the truth and with the object of eliciting it, a discussion will be 
held in Wittenberg under the presidency of the reverend father Martin Luther, 
master of the liberal arts and of the sacred theology as well as professor in the 
same matter, about the following theses:75
!e theses that would be debated, (' in total, contained fundamental criticism 
of the practices and teachings of the Catholic Church, most notably concern-
ing indulgence.76 From this followed an internal struggle within the Catholic 
Church, creating occasions for Luther to express further criticism – for instance 
concerning the alleged infallibility of the pope, celibacy, and the hierarchy of 
the church. !e papal bull Exsurge Domine, in which Luther was summoned 
to recall his views, was burnt by him in public.77 !e con8ict was picked up by 
some ambitious feudal leaders to play out their own power struggles: with the 
pope but likewise with the emperor. !is certainly contributed to the escalation. 
What ultimately followed was a bitter war in which the German Lutheran princes, 
united in the Schmalkaldic League, eventually managed to establish in $''' the 
75 !e German text reads: ‘Aus Liebe zur Wahrheit und in dem Bestreben, diese zu ergründen, 
soll in Wittenberg unter dem Vorsitz des ehrwürdigen Vaters Martin Luther, Magisters der freien 
Künste und der heiligen !eologie sowie deren ordentlicher Professor daselbst, über die folgenden 
Sätze disputiert werden.’ Available online at http://www.e+ekt-erfolgsplanung.de/ron/freenet/site/
de/normal/gothik/bibel/('/('.html.
76 !is also illustrates the remarkable freedoms that could exist in the feudal system. As 
Tocqueville writes: ‘Si Luther avait vécu dans un siècle d’égalité, et qu’il n’eût point eu pour 
auditeurs des seigneurs et des princes, il aurait peut-être trouvé plus de di9culté à changer la face 
de l’Europe’, in: Alexis de Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérque, vol. II, book *, chapter XXI: 
‘Pourquoi les grandes revolutions deviendront rares’. He also writes in tome I, deuxieme partie, 
chapitre VII: ‘Du pouvoir qu’exerce la majorité en Amérique sur la penséee’, that ‘En Amérique, 
la majorité trace un cercle formidable autour de la pensée. Au dedans de ces limites, l’écrivain est 
libre; mais Malheur à lui s’il ose en sortir. Ce n’est pas qu’il ait à craindre un autodafé, mais il est 
en butte à des dégoûts de tous genres et à des persecutions de tous les jours. La carrière politique 
lui est fermée: il a o+ensé la seule puissance qui ait la faculté de l’ouvrir. On lui refuse tout, jusqu’à 
la gloire. Avant de publier ses opinions, il croyait avoir des partisans; il lui semble qu’il n’en a plus, 
maintenant qu’il s’est découvert à tous; car ceux qui le blâment s’expriment hautement, et ceux 
qui pensent comme lui, sans avoir son courage, se taisent et s’eloignent. Il cede, il plie en"n sous 
l’e+ort de chaque jour, et rentre dans le silence, comme s’il éprouvait des remords d’avoir dit vrai’.
77 Cf. Paul Cliteur, Moreel Esperanto. Naar een autonome ethiek (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 
#%%,) $-)-$-(.
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recognition by the emperor that a ‘new religion’ – denoted as ‘augsburgian’ – 
existed on German soil in such clauses as, for instance:
§ $'. In order to bring peace to the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic Nation 
between the Roman Imperial Majesty and the Electors, Princes and Estates, let 
neither his Imperial Majesty nor the Electors, Princes, etc., do any violence or 
harm to any estate of the empire on the account of the Augsburg Confession, but 
let them enjoy their religious belief, liturgy and ceremonies as well as their estates 
and other rights and privileges in peace; and complete religious peace shall be 
obtained only by Christian means of amity, or under threat of punishment of the 
Imperial ban.
§ $&. Likewise the Estates espousing the Augsburg Confession shall let all the 
Estates and Princes who cling to the old religion live in absolute peace and in the 
enjoyment of all their estates, rights, and privileges.78
In later years, historians have concluded that what in fact this agreement amounted 
to, was the principle of cuius regio, eius religio: whose realm, his religion. And of 
78 !e German text reads: § $' Und damit solcher Fried auch der spaltigen Religion halben, wie 
aus hievor vermelten und angezogenen Ursachen die hohe Nothdur@ des H. Reichs Teutscher 
Nation erfordert, desto beständiger zwischen der Röm. Rayserl. Maj., Uns, auch Churfürsten, 
Fürsten und Ständen des H. Reichs Teutscher Nation angestellt, aufgericht und erhalten werden 
möchte, so sollen die Kayserl. Maj., Wir, auch Churfürsten, Fürsten und Stände des H. Reichs 
keinen Stand des Reichs von wegen der Augspurgischen Confession und derselbigen Lehr, 
Religion und Glaubens halb mit der !at gewaltiger Weiß überziehen, beschädigen, vergewaltigen 
oder in andere Wege wider sein Conscientz, Gewissen und Willen von dieser Augspurgischen 
Confessions-Religion, Glauben, Kirchengebräuchen, Ordnungen und Ceremonien, so sie aufgericht 
oder nochmals aufrichten möchten, in ihren Fürstenthumen, Landen und Herrscha@en tringen 
oder durch Mandat oder in einiger anderer Gestalt beschweren oder verachten, sondern bey 
solcher Religion, Glauben, Kirchengebräuchen, Ordnungen und Ceremonien, auch ihren Haab, 
Gütern, liegend und fahrend, Land,. Leuthen, Herrscha@en, Obrigkeiten, Herrlichkeiten und 
Gerechtigkeiten ruhiglich und friedlich bleiben lassen, und soll die streitige Religion nicht anders 
dann durch Christliche, freundliche, friedliche Mittel und Wege zu einhelligem, Christlichem 
Verstand und Vergleichung gebracht werden, alles bey Kayserl. und Königl. Würden, Fürstl. 
Ehren, wahren Worten und Pön des Land-Friedens. § $&. Dargegen sollen die Stände, so der 
Augspurgischen Confession verwandt, die Röm. Kays. Mai., Uns und Churfürsten, Fürsten und 
andere des H. Reichs Stände der alten Religion anhängig, geistlich und weltlich, samt und mit 
ihren Capituln und andern geistlichs Stands, auch ungeacht, ob und wohin sie ihre Residentzen 
verruckt oder gewendet hätten (doch daß es mit Bestellung der Ministerien gehalten werde, wie 
hie unten darvon ein sonderlicher Articul gesetzt,) gleicher Gestalt bey ihrer Religion, Glauben, 
Kirchengebräuchen, Ordnungen und Ceremonien, auch ihren Haab, Gütern, liegend und fahrend, 
Landen, Leuthen, Herrscha@en, Obrigkeiten, Herrlichkeiten und Gerechtigkeiten, Renthen, 
Zinsen, Zehenden unbeschwert bleiben und sie derselbigen friedlich und ruhiglich gebrauchen, 
geniessen, unweigerlich folgen lassen und getreulichen darzu verhol+en seyn, auch mit der !at 
oder sonst in ungutem gegen denselbigen nichts fürnehmen, sondern in alle Wege nach Laut 
und Ausweisung des H. Reichs Rechten, Ordnungen, Abschieden und aufgerichten Landfrieden 
jeder sich gegen dem andern an gebührenden, ordentlichen Rechten begnügen lassen, alles bey 
Fürstl. Ehren, wahren Worten und Vermeidung der Pön, in dem u+gerichten Land-Frieden 
begri+en.’ ‘Augsburger Reichsabschied (‘Augsburger Religionsfrieden’), #' September $'''. !e 
translation is provided by Emil Reich (ed.), Selected Documents Illustrating Mediaeval and Modern 
History (London: P.S. King & Son, $(%') #*%-#*#. Available online at http://pages.uoregon.edu/
sshoemak/*#*/texts/augsburg.htm.
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course, deciding in matters of religion meant in fact deciding a variety of political 
and legal questions: it meant, in other words, whose realm, his law: a dramatic 
increase in independent government. !is treaty of $''' thus symbolizes a break 
with the Medieval conception of rulers as ‘local embodiments of a universal 
authority’79 (church or emperor), a conception that had been inherent in the 
very idea of the ‘respublica christiana’. 
With Christianity ceasing to be a single creed, rulers necessarily became 
representatives of a particular locality, independent from other localities. !e 
birth of the modern state thus coincided with the abandonment of universal 
jurisdiction, and comes down to the raising and upholding of borders.
But with the Augsburg agreement, the religious unrest in Europe had by no 
means been brought to an end. !roughout the second half of the $&th and most 
of the $,th century, the Holy Roman Empire, but France, the Low Countries, 
Denmark, Sweden and England as well, continued to struggle for internal 
unity and for religious and political independence. !e Holy Roman Empire 
for instance descended into the devastating !irty Years’ War in $&$), of which 
historians estimate the death toll over #%; of the entire population.80 A:er the 
English King Henry VIII broke with the Catholic Church in $'*-, England faced 
more than a century of severe internal con8ict culminating in a civil war and 
the execution of King Charles I in $&-(, only to be resolved a:er the accession 
to the throne of the Dutch stadtholder William III in $&)). 
!e Netherlands, in the meantime, had been struggling for eighty years with 
the Spanish rule, in part over their right to religious freedom. In doing so, they 
also experienced one of the "rst successful acts of religious terrorism of modern 
times, when Balthasar Gérard murdered their prince William of Orange in 
$')-, claiming to act in the name of the Catholic Church. France faced similar 
challenges in these years. A high point was reached in $',#, when throughout 
the kingdom several thousands of French Protestants, including many lead-
ing "gures, were murdered. !e massacre had a deeply divisive e+ect on the 
aristocratic class, and the attempts of King Henry IV to bring reconciliation to 
79 Jeremy A. Rabkin, Law without nations? Why constitutional government requires sovereign 
states (Princeton: Princeton University Press, #%%,) '$.
80 Geo+rey Parker writes: ‘Earlier estimates that the war destroyed half or two-thirds of the 
German population, are no longer accepted. More recent estimates are much more conservative, 
suggesting that the population of the Holy Roman Empire may have declined by about $' to #% per 
cent, from some #% million before the war to about $& or $, million a:er it’, in: Geo+rey Parker, 
!e !irty Years War (New York: Routledge, $((,) $)). Other historians have made di+erent 
estimations. Norman Davies estimates the loss to have been about ) million, in: Norman Davies, 
Europe. A History (Oxford: University Press, $((&) '&). C.V. Wedgwood con"rms this, when he 
estimates that the German Empire probably numbered about twenty-one million people in $&$), 
and thirteen and a half million in $&-) (a loss of *';), in: C.V. Wedgwood, !e !irty Years War 
(New York: !e New York Review of Books, $(*)). Alan McFarlane con"rms these "gures in !e 
Savage Wars of Peace: England, Japan and the Malthusian Trap (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, $((,). 
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this internal strive resulted in his assassination in $&$% by the Catholic fanatic 
François Ravaillac (see also chapter $.#).
!e year $&-) marks a crucial moment in all these con8icts. In that year, two 
treaties were signed in Münster, one between the Low Countries and the Empire 
(and its constituting estates), another between France and the Empire (again 
together with its constituting estates). A third treaty was signed in Osnabrück, 
between the Empire (and its estates) and Sweden. Altogether, these treaties are 
generally referred to as the ‘Peace of Westphalia’.81 
Heinz Duchhardt observes that ‘the $&-) order of peace consists of two 
components, the one regulating and balancing the circumstances within the 
complex organism of the Holy Roman Empire and proving extraordinarily 
enduring and stabilizing, the other being a rather vaguely perceivable political 
philosophy which was hoped to bring about a long-term European peace’.82 
!is consisted in:
Particularly Richelieu’s conception of a security system of all European states based 
upon the principle of the inviolability of frontiers and thus upon the settlement 
of the territorial status quo.83
!e agreements concerning the internal sovereignty of the German states, 
however, were especially signi"cant. While the Treaty of Osnabrück explicitly 
recon"rmed the religious peace that was concluded in $''',84 and declared such 
things as that adherents to the Augsburgian religion would receive rights and 
justice in the same way (…) as Catholics,85 it also determined that states would 
have the right to administer their own schools and churches, and so on.86 ‘Taken 
together’, Lesa+er writes, ‘the constitutional and religious settlement amounted 
to the construction of a highly federative Empire based on the principles of 
territorial sovereignty and sovereign equality of the Stände’ (i.e. the estates).87 
!is was applied to the relations between European states more generally in 
81 !e signi"cance of ‘Westphalia’ has been disputed in recent studies: A. Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, 
International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth’, in: International Organization, vol. '', issue # 
(Spring #%%$) #'$–#),; Randall Lesa+er, ‘!e Westfalian Peace Treaties and the Development of 
the Tradition of Great European Peace Settlements prior to $&-)’, in: Grotiana NS $) ($((,) ,$-(&; 
Karl-Heinz Ziegler, ‘Der westfälische Frieden von $&-) in der Geschichte des Völkerrechts’ in 
Meinhard Schröder (ed.), 56- Jahre westfälischer Friede (Berlin, $((() ((-$$,; Karl-Heinz Ziegler, 
‘Die Bedeutung des westfälischen Friedens von $&-) für das europäisches Völkerreht’, Archiv des 
Völkerrechts 54 ($(((), $#(-'$; Benno Teschke, !e Myth of .123: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making 
of Modern International Relations (London: Verso, #%%*).
82 Durhhardt ($((*) $&.
83 Durhhardt ($((*) $&.
84 ‘Die im Jahre 1555 geschlossene Religionsfriede’. Osnabrücker Friedensvertrag (Instrumentum 
Pacis Osnabrugensis), #- October $&-), article V, § $.
85 ‘Recht und Gerechtigkeit in derselben Weise und ohne Unterschied (…) wie den Katholiken.’ 
Ibidem, article IV, § '&.
86 Ibidem, article V, § ,.
87 Lesa+er ($((,) ,$-(&, there ,#.
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later years, and accounts for at least one reason that $&-) is so signi"cant in 
the development of modern sovereigns states. ‘!ough [it] was not present 
in the text’, Lesa+er continues, ‘the treaties introduced the idea of sovereign 
equality among the states of Europe. !is was however a broad extension of the 
recognition of the equality of the German Stände regardless of their religion’.88 
!e Westphalian treaties taken as a whole, moreover, contained agreements 
among several European powers; while the treaty of Münster was between 
the Empire and France, and the treaty of Osnabrück between the Empire 
and Sweden, both contained references to the other treaty, and thus implied 
a ‘société des nations’  between them, as scholars have concluded.89 Moreover, 
the presence of third parties implied a guarantee by such a ‘society of nations’, 
which became common from then on in the course of the $,th century (and 
still is regular practice today).
Recent scholarship has argued plausibly that a nuanced understanding 
of the signi"cance of the treaty of Westphalia is necessary, and that it is only 
with hindsight that it can be regarded as the ‘moment of birth’ of the modern 
state. Osiander even goes so far as to speak of the ‘Westphalian myth’.90 It may 
nevertheless safely be contended that with the end of the !irty Years’ War and 
the signi"cant decrease of the idea of an overarching, Christian unity within 
Europe, the modern state system received an important impulse.91
But while the powers of central governments increased, and the power 
of the pope decreased, Europe in the age of ‘absolutism’ remained politically 
decentralized and monarchs did not remotely have the powers to in8uence the 
life of their inhabitants in the way governments do today. Nevertheless, as one 
scholar put it, the monarchy always sought ‘a supreme, independent, secular 
authority’. Rivalry with the Vatican and with the papacy’s claim for ultimate 
jurisdiction ‘was the germ of the modern conceptions of sovereignty’,92 and it 
was the persisting desire of ‘nie wieder Krieg’ – never again so destructive a 
civil war – that inspired scholars all through Europe to draw up the contours 
of the sovereign state and defend the need for a shared allegiance to it. 
88 Ibidem.
89 Lesa+er ($((,) ,$-(&, there ,*.
90 Osiander (#%%$) #'$–#),.
91 !e term ‘Concert of Europe’ was introduced at the Vienna peace congress in $)$'; before 
that, the formula ‘balance of powers’ was used, which had been introduced with the peace of 
Utrecht of $,$*. Durchhardt ($((*) $&+. 
92 Hall ($()-) ,.
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In many respects, these ‘modern conceptions of sovereignty’ were "rst voiced by 
Niccolò Machiavelli ($-&(-$'#,).93 Although credit should be given to Marsilius 
of Padua for having introduced, some two centuries earlier, several key concepts 
of modern political thought in his Defensor Pacis, Machiavelli applied the idea of 
political and legislative power as a corporate body, not as a personal privilege, to 
political doctrine.94 He thus broke with the Medieval tradition of understanding 
power in terms of an eternal chain of mutual obligations,95 dependent upon 
reciprocal personal favors instead of institutions, and had defended in Il Principe 
a political realism, to be conducted by the prince of Florence but generally ap-
plicable to all rulers at all times, justifying political means from an autonomous 
ragion di Stato (raison d’état), namely in terms of their ends.
Yet Machiavelli did not ask the question, as M.J. Tooley puts it, ‘what a 
state is and how it is constructed’.96 His main subject was how political power 
functions, how it could be used and maximized. Nor was the specter of a civil 
war, of the kind that all of Europe went through, as we have seen, by the end 
of the Middle Ages, predominant in his mind. A more general and systematic 
93 !e dominant view is that the rediscovery of Roman law formed a "rst impulse for this 
development. !e Roman conception of the state as a corporate body possessing permanent as 
well as ultimate authority, independent of its temporary occupants (a notion known as plentitudo 
potestatis), as well as the monopoly of legislation, however, also formed a major inspiration for 
papal ambitions. William D. McCready writes: ‘When the term plenitudo potestatis (…) came 
to be used in connection with the papacy, it did not necessarily imply a claim to complete 
temporal sovereignty, but simply spiritual sovereignty with temporal consequences, plus temporal 
sovereignty in the Papal States and certain other special areas. But by the late $*th and early $-th 
centuries the term had taken on a wider signi"cance, at least for the papal hierocratic theorists. 
(…) What was meant was that the pope had a supreme authority in temporal a+airs, and that he 
had this supremacy, not because of the bene"cence of any temporal ruler, but simply because of 
the authority inherent in the papal o9ce itself ’. W.D. McCready, ‘Papal Plenitudo Potestatis and 
the Source of Temporal Authority in Late Medieval Papal Hierocratic !eory’, in: Speculum, Vol. 
-), No. - (Oct., $(,*) &'--&,-. Cf. Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise history of the law of nations (New 
York: !e Macmillan Company, $(&$) *(+; B. Holland, ‘Sovereignty as Dominium? Reconstructing 
the Constructivist Roman Law !esis’, in: International Studies Quarterly, vol. '-, issue # (June 
#%$%)A--(–-)%.
94 Cf. Harvey C. Mans"eld jr., ‘On the impersonality of the modern state: a comment on 
Machiavelli’s use of Stato’, in: !e American Political Science Review, Vol. ,,, No. -. (Dec., $()*) 
)-(-)',.
95 Bertrand de Jouvenel speaks of the ‘ladder of commands’ that was typical for the Medieval 
political worldview. In: Sovereignty. An inquiry into the political good (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
$((,) #%-. Cf. Arthur O. Lovejoy, !e great chain of being. A study of the history of an Idea (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, $(*&).
96 Jean Bodin, Six books of the Commonwealth. Abridged and Translated by M.J. Tooley (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, $('') $&. David Held writes: ‘Bodin was not the "rst to make [the case for a central 
authority]; for example, Machiavelli ($-&(-$'#,), a signi"cant in8uence on Bodin, had done so 
earlier. But unlike Machiavelli, Bodin developed this notion into what is commonly regarded as 
the "rst statement of the modern theory of sovereignty’, in: Held, Political theory and the modern 
state. Essays on state, power and democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, $()() #$(.
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discussion of statehood, as a concept, and of the great danger of civil war that it 
should prevent, was "rst taken up by Jean Bodin ($'*%-$'(&) in France, and then 
continued by Johannes Althusius ($',,–$&*)) in the Holy Roman Empire, and 
!omas Hobbes ($'))-$&,() in England. !e consequences of the international 
state system that emerged out of the peace agreements of the seventeenth century 
were "rst analyzed by Hugo Grotius ($')*-$&-') in the Republic, by Samuel 
Pufendorf in the Holy Roman Empire ($&*#-$&(-), and were synthesized in the 
middle of the $)th century by the Swiss diplomat Emer de Vattel ($,$--$,&,).97 
It would strike later commentators that the leading authors in this "eld since 
the $,th century were mostly Protestants.98 Karl von Kaltenborn-Stachau, the 
signi"cant $(th century historiographer of international law, even went so far as 
to denote international law as ‘a Protestant science’.99 It is not hard to see why: as 
international law implies sovereign states, it inevitably meant a diminution of the 
power of the Vatican and a diminishing of the unity of Europe (is it surprising, 
then, that the major Eurofederalists in the #%th century were Catholics?100).
Despite persistent rumors at the time that he had become a protestant, as 
were most other theorists of sovereignty, Jean Bodin always claimed to be an 
adherent to the Catholic faith.101 Systematic thinking about modern statehood 
begins with him.102 His starting point was the war of all against all that has 
become commonplace in political theory ever since (and that was no doubt 
inspired by the religious con8ict France went through at the time). Breaking 
with the Aristotelian notion that because man is a social animal, ‘the state exists 
by nature’,103 Bodin wrote in his main work, Six livres de la République ($',&), 
that ‘reason and common sense alike point to the conclusion that the origin and 
foundation of commonwealths was in force and violence’.104 He continued: ‘the 
"rst generations of men were unacquainted with the sentiments of honor, and 
their highest endeavor was to kill, torture, rob, and enslave their fellows (…) 
Force, violence, ambition, avarice, and the passion for vengeance, armed men 
97 Vattel was baptized as ‘Emer’. Modern commentators have mistakenly Germanized his 
name as ‘Emerich’.
98 Nussbaum ($(&$) $*&.
99 Quoted and discussed in Nussbaum ($(&$) $*&.
100 For instance Jean Monnet, Alcide de Gasperi, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, and 
Jacques Delors. Apart from the di+erent religious traditions, the Northern European states also 
had another legal inheritance from that of Roman law. Both the anglo-saxon common law and 
the Germanic tribal law may have rendered the inhabitants of Northern Europe di+erent instincts 
than the former subjects of the Roman empire.
101 Cf. S. Baldwin, ‘Jean Bodin and the League’, in: !e Catholic Historical Review, Vol. #*, No. 
# (July $(*,) $&%-$)-.
102 J.H. Franklin, ‘Introduction, An outline of Bodin’s career’, in: Bodin, On Sovereignty. Four 
chapters from the Six books of the Commonwealth. Edited and translated by Julian H. Franklin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, $((#) ix-xv.
103 Aristotle, Politics (London: Penguin Classics, $((#) book I.
104 Bodin ($('') '& (Book I, chapters VI and VII concerning the citizen).
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against one another (…) !e result of the ensuing con8icts was to give victory 
to some, and to reduce the rest to slavery’.105
!is being the origin of man’s political existence, ‘we can say then that every 
citizen is a subject since his liberty is limited by the sovereign power to which 
he owes obedience’.106 Bodin goes on to, in his own words, ‘carefully de"ne’ the 
term ‘sovereignty’, which, being ‘the distinguishing mark of a commonwealth’, 
and while ‘an understanding of its nature [is] fundamental to any treatment of 
politics, no jurist or political philosopher has in fact attempted to de"ne […]’.107
Bodin identi"es two essential characteristics of sovereignty: the perpetual 
character of the sovereign power, and its absoluteness. It is ‘the distinguishing 
mark of the sovereign that [it] cannot in any way be subject to the commands 
of another …’.108 !e prince (or sovereign) can therefore not even be bound by 
his own rules, and the autonomy of communities existing within the sovereign 
state should be regarded as fundamentally limited. !is included thus the power 
to legislate at will.109
It is this element of Bodin’s thought that critics called his ‘absolutism’, and 
Bodin inspired the attempts of both Richelieu and Louis XIV to centralize state 
power.110 Moreover, Bodin claimed that no ‘right to revolution’ existed, not even 
if the monarch usurped his power:
If the prince is sovereign absolutely, as are the genuine monarchs of France, Spain, 
England, Scotland, Ethiopia, Turkey, Persia, and Moscovy (…), then it is not the 
part of any subject individually, or all of them in general, to make an attempt on the 
honor or the life of the monarch, either by way of force or by way of law, even if he 
has committed all the misdeeds, impieties, and cruelties that one could mention.111
!e Vindiciae contra tyrannos, published by an anonymous author under the 
pseudonym Stephen Junius Brutus in $',(, emphasized this point of Bodin’s 
theory in contradicting it, and claimed that the sovereign was only the guardian 
of rights he could not break or alter himself, and that the ultimate source of 
authority was not the state, but the people.
Another critic of Bodin, the German scholar and Calvinist Johannes Althusius 
($',,-$&*)) argued in the same vein. In the preface to the "rst edition of his main 
work, the Politica methodice digesta, or Politics, he stated that: 
105 Ibidem.
106 Ibidem.
107 Bodin ($('') '& (Book I, chapter VIII concerning sovereignty).
108 Ibidem.
109 Bodin ($('') )%+ (Book I, chapter X).
110 !ough it seems fair to say that these were the aims of the absolutist regimes, in practice, 
they stayed far behind on them. 
111 Bodin ($((#) $$' (Book II, chapter ').
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I maintain the exact opposite [from Bodin], (…) I concede that the prince or 
supreme magistrate is the steward, administrator, and overseer of these [sovereign] 
rights. But I maintain that their ownership and usufruct properly belong to the 
total realm or people.112 
Althusius argues, while laying out a systematic bottom-up approach of ‘the com-
monwealth’ (i.e. the state), that while society consists of the individual citizen and 
the state, it also has a wide variety of intermediary bodies, such as guilds, cities, 
and provinces with their own prerogatives. In this sense, Althusius remains near 
to the medieval idea of society, and clearly con8icts with Bodin (and later with 
Hobbes). Nevertheless, Althusius concedes to the Bodinian notion of supreme 
authority – the notion of sovereignty, separating the medieval idea of politics from 
modern statehood. !eir dispute is not over the question whether sovereignty 
ought to be centralized, but rather over the question who ultimately possesses 
it. ‘If law and freedom from law by a supreme power, are accepted in this sense, 
I concede to the judgment of Bodin (…). But by no means can this supreme 
power be attributed to a king or optimates, as Bodin most ardently endeavors 
to defend’, Althusius repeats. ‘Rather it is to be attributed rightfully only to the 
body of a universal association, namely, to a commonwealth or realm, and as 
belonging to it. From this body (…) every legitimate power 8ows to those we 
call kings or optimates.’113 
!us while the Frenchman had emphasized a top-down étatist approach to 
political power, the German Althusius took a bottom-up approach, in which 
sovereignty derives from the people. A di+erence that would also divide the 
French and the Germans in discussions over nationality, about two hundred 
years later (and two paragraphs further down this book).
For both Bodin and Althusius, however, modern political organization 
required the precedence of secular law over religious law. As Jean Bodin wrote, 
it is central to citizenship to submit to the ultimate authority of one sovereign, 
and as long as this is done, di+erent ‘communities’ may exist, enjoying a degree 
of toleration and self-government.114 It is the plurality of the law, the overlapping 
of jurisdictions; indeed the prevalence of personal ties over institutional arrange-
ments, and therefore the 8uidness of competencies which was characteristic of 
the feudal order,115 that had to give way to the more centralized, institutionalized, 
112 !e "rst edition of the book appeared in $&%*, but a later and revised edition was published 
in $&$-.
113 Johannes Althusius, ‘Politics’, in: F.S. Carney, !e politics of Johannes Althusius. An abridged 
translation of the !ird Edition of Politica Methodice Digesta, atque exemplis sacris et profanes 
illustrata and including the prefaces to the First and !ird editions (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 
$(&') &,.
114 Bodin ($('') '(+ (Book I, chapter VI).
115 Robert Cooper, !e breaking of nations. Order and chaos in the twenty-+rst century (London: 
Atlantic Books, #%%-) ): ‘In the particular circumstances of medieval Europe, empire had become 
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and hierarchical legal order of the modern state. Even though it would take until 
well into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for national codi"cations to 
emerge: these legal systems themselves were the logical and ultimate expression 
of ideas born two centuries earlier.
Bodin and Althusius indeed both seem to have been permeated with the 
insight that Europe, especially on matters of religion, would never regain its 
unity – indeed, for a Calvinist like Althusius, this was not even an attractive 
idea. Attempting to prevent political entities from descending into civil wars or 
breaking up into weak localities, the aim was to conceive of political authority 
in a way that enabled it to stand above the di+erent factions of society. Political 
power thus became more abstract, yet also more pervasive. 
An example of the con8ict France went through around this time is formed 
by the events following the early morning of August #-th, $',#, when about a 
hundred Parisian noblemen undertook the royally sanctioned116 assassination 
of one hundred protestant noblemen. !is marked the beginning of the St. 
Bartholomew’s Day massacres, which were to sweep through the country and 
take at least several thousands of lives.117 France was seriously threatened with 
civil war, and it was prevented certainly in part by the religious and political 
virtuosity of King Henry IV, who, a:er converting from Protestantism to 
Catholicism,118 issued the edict of Nantes in $'(), granting religious tolerance 
to Protestants. Jean Bodin, when writing his treatise on sovereignty, was well 
aware of the con8icts dividing France at the time. Himself having been under 
suspicion of Calvinist sympathies several times,119 Bodin also wrote a series of 
imaginary conversations between adherents of seven di+erent beliefs: a propo-
nent of natural religion, a philosophical skeptic, a Jew, a Muslim, a Catholic, a 
Lutheran, and a Zwinglian,120 who in the end agreed to cohabitate peacefully.121 
!e morale was that political authority can exist independently of, and indeed 
stand above all these di+erent faiths and these di+erent people adhering to them.122 
Cardinal Richelieu – as we have seen before – argued in the same vein, when 
in $&$,, he laid down in an instruction to a minister that no Catholic should be 
loose and fragmented. A tangled mass of jurisdictions competed for control: landowners, free cities, 
holders of feudal rights, guild of the king. Above all the Church, representing what remained of the 
Christian empire, still held considerable power and authority, competing with the secular powers.’
116 !at is King Charles IX ($'&%-$',-).
117 T.F.X. Noble et al., Western Civilization. !e continuing experiment (Boston: Houghton 
MiBin Company $(()) '-,+.
118 Famously declaring that “Paris vaut bien une messe”. Cf. Heinrich Mann, Die Jugend des 
Königs Henri Quatre (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch, $(&-).
119 Franklin ($((#) ix-xv.
120 Ulrich Zwingli ($-)--$'*$) was a priest who was important in the Swiss reformation. 
121 Franklin ($((#) ix-xv.
122 A comparable argument is developed by Cliteur (#%%,).
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so blind ‘to prefer, in matters of state, a Spaniard to a French Protestant’:123 on 
the contrary, the national loyalty of the citizen had to take clear primacy over 
whatever religious loyalties he might feel.
Johannes Althusius insisted on the distinction, well known from Augustine, 
and reformulated by Aquinas, between the universality of morals and the 
particularity of temporal legal arrangements. In the words of !omas Hueglin: 
‘Althusius claimed (…) that the distinction of what is general moral law and 
what is particular temporal provision was a political one and therefore a mat-
ter of secular government’. Although Althusius emphasized the importance 
of religion as a general moral code, the purpose was, ‘not to turn back to the 
medieval duality of church and state (…).’ Hueglin continues:
On the contrary, it seems to me much more plausible to see in the Politics an 
attempt of excluding the church as an unwanted interloper in secular matters. 
Even though, or perhaps precisely because the staunch Calvinist and church elder 
Althusius was convinced that the Christian religion, particularly in its Reformed 
version, was the only true religion, he might have understood that the place which 
this religion could occupy in his political theory was that of a civil moral code.124
123 J.C.L. Simonde de Sismondi, Histoire des Français. Vol. XXII (Paris: Treuttel et Würtz, $)*() 
*))-*)(: ‘L’instruction contient un résumé rapide de ce qu’avoit fait la reine pour maintenir la paix 
du royaume, de ce qu’avoit fait le prince pour la troubler; elle rappelle les nombreux marriages 
qui de siècle en siècle avoient uni les familles royales de France et d’Espagne; elle declare “que 
nul Catholique n’est si aveugle d’estimer, en matières d’État, un Espagnol meilleur q’un Français 
Huguenot”.’ Sismondi notes a page before that ‘Richelieu, qui avoit dressé lui-même avec beaucoup 
de soin l’instruction de Schomberg …’. !is episode is also discussed in Henry !omas Buckle, 
History of Civilization in England. #nd edition, vol. $ (New York: D. Appleton and co., $)'() *),-
*)): ‘It might have been expected that when Richelieu, a great dignitary of the Romish church, 
was placed at the head of a+airs, he would have re-established a connexion so eagerly desired by 
the profession to which he belonged. But his conduct was not regulated by such views as these. 
His object was, not to favour the opinions of a sect, but to promote the interests of a nation. His 
treaties, his diplomacy, and the schemes of his foreign alliances, were all directed, not against 
the enemies of the church, but against the enemies of France. By erecting this new standard of 
action, Richelieu took a great step towards secularizing the whole system of European politics. 
For, he thus made the theoretical interests of men subordinate to their practical interests. Before 
his time, the rulers of France, in order to punish their Protestant subjects, had not hesitated to 
demand the aid of the Catholic troops of Spain; and in so doing, they merely acted upon the old 
opinion, that it was the chief duty of a government to suppress heresy. !is pernicious doctrine 
was "rst openly repudiated by Richelieu. As early as $&$,, and before he had established his 
power, he, in an instruction to one of the foreign ministers which is still extant, laid it down as a 
principle, that, in matters of state, no Catholic ought to prefer a Spaniard to a French Protestant. 
To us, indeed, in the progress of society, such preference of the claims of our country to those 
of our creed, has become a matter of course; but in those days it was a startling noverly.’ As 
will be discussed in chapter &, Richelieu’s view nowadays becomes increasingly rare again as a 
consequence of multiculturalism.
124 !omas O. Hueglin, ‘State and Church in the Political !ought of Althusius’, available online 
at http://polis.unipmn.it/seminari/calvino#%%(/"les/Hueglin,_%'_%(.pdf. !e quoted chapter 
from the Politics that Hueglin refers to is XXX+.
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!omas Hobbes likewise defended the state’s political supremacy over religious 
claims. When he wrote his main contribution to political theory, Leviathan 
($&'$), it was in many respects a logical follow-up of earlier works scrutinizing 
the relation of man to nature, and man to man,125 working in the tradition 
Machiavelli had set out. Hobbes had therefore already built an intellectual 
structure, rationalizing all phenomena, in the typical Enlightenment manner, 
ab initio. For Hobbes, the most devastating political situation was the anarchy 
in the state of nature. In the "rst part of Leviathan, Of Man, Hobbes sets out his 
view of greedy human nature and the state of war of all against all when there 
is no su9ciently powerful state.126 In the second part, Of Common-wealth, he 
then proceeds to sketch the outlines of what would have to be required to let 
man step out of this state of nature and into the civilized condition. Essential 
in this would be to renounce all claims to natural rights, as none exist in the 
state of nature anyway. More powerful than any other organization on the 
state’s territory, the Leviathan of state power could then truly stand above its 
subjects and bring order to them through its laws.127 Concerning the relationship 
between church and state, Hobbes argued plainly that since revelations can only 
be convincing to those who have received the revelation themselves, it should 
be the political power that is allowed to determine what the church should, in 
the last instance, teach.128 
125 Most notably his book !e elements Law. Natural and Politic ($&-%) Edited with a preface 
and cirtical notes by Ferdinand Tönnies (London: Frank Cass & Co, $(&().
126 !omas Hobbes, Leviathan ($&'$). Edited with an introduction by C.B. Macpherson 
(London: Penguin Books, $()') $)*+: Part I, Ch. XIII, ‘Of the Naturall Condition of Mankind, as 
concerning their Felicity, and Misery’.
127 !e commonwealth in fact begins already to be formed in Part I, especially Ch. XIV, ‘Of the 
"rst and second Naturall Lawes, and of Contracts’, but goes on in more depth in Part II.
128 Hobbes ($()') -%(+: Part III, Ch. XXXII, ‘Of the Principles of Christian Politiques’: ‘When 
God speaketh to man, it must be either immediately; or by mediation of another man, to whom 
he had formerly spoken by himself immediately. How God speaketh to a man immediately, 
may be understood by those well enough, to whom he hath spoken; but how the same should 
be understood by another, is hard, if not impossible to know. For if a man pretend to me, that 
God hath spoken to him supernaturally, and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily 
perceive what argument he can produce, to oblige me to believe it. (…)’. And -#): Part III, Ch. 
XXXIX, ‘Of the Signi+cation in Scripture of the word Church’: ‘… a Church, such a one as is capable 
to Command, to Judge, Absolve, Condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with a Civil 
Common-wealth, consisting of Christian men; and is called a Civill State, for that the subjects 
of it are Christians. Temporall and Spirituall Government, are but two words brought into the 
world, to make men see double, and mistake their Lawfull Soveraign. It is true, that the bodies 
of the faithfull, a:er the Resurrection, shall be not onely Spirituall, but Eternall: but in this life 
they are grosse, and corruptible. !ere is therefore no other Government in this life, neither of 
State, nor Religion, but Temporall; nor teaching of any doctrine, lawfull to any Subject, which 
the Governour both of the State, and of the Religion, forbiddeth to be taught: And that Governor 
must be one: or else there must needs follow Faction, and Civil war in the Common-wealth, 
between the Church and State (…)’.
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!e mutation, then, of the medieval to the modern conception of statehood, 
could be signi"ed as the breaking of the ‘great chain of duties’129 into several 
smaller yet stronger chains, attached, at least theoretically, to a "nal zenith 
point – the sovereign. As Bertrand de Jouvenel summarizes it in his book On 
Sovereignty: ‘In the Middle Ages, men had a very strong sense of the concrete 
thing, hierarchy; they lacked the idea of that abstract thing, sovereignty’.130 
Indeed, the Europe of the Middle Ages had, because of feudal decentralized 
rule and religious uniformity, been both essentially regional and uni+ed.131 
Europe was o:en referred to as the respublica Christiana, a religious-political 
unity, without clear jurisdictional demarcation lines.132 In the $&th and $,th 
centuries, Europe lost this religious unity, while the di+erent regions gradually 
developed into more centralized political entities. And even though these new 
‘states’ have o:en recognized their shared interests, the idea of forming a single 
political unity with the pope at its top, was de"nitely lost. A clear example of 
how political power took ultimate privilege over religious leadership was the 
England of Henry VIII. In a dramatic attempt to realize the desired annulment 
of his marriage, which the Vatican denied him,133 he declared himself head of 
the Church of England in $'*-. Other states made comparable arrangements. 
With the claim to universal rule abandoned, it was replaced with a claim to a 
monopoly on territorial jurisdiction and ultimate political power in the capital 
of that territory, and it is this transition that marks the fundamental divide 
between the feudal order and modern statehood. !e British diplomat and 
former advisor to Javier Solana, Robert Cooper, is right to write in his book 
on supranationalism: ‘!us Europe changed from a weak system of universal 
order to a pattern of stronger but geographically limited sovereign authorities 
without any overall framework of law’.134 It seems indeed that Tocqueville was 
right when he said that ‘in running over the pages of our history, we shall scarcely 
"nd a single great event of the last seven hundred years that has not promoted 
129 In the words of Augustin !ierry, as quoted by Jouvenel ($(',) $,$. 
130 Jouvenel ($(',) $,$.
131 Rabkin (#%%,) -,--): ‘… medieval Europe surely could not sustain any notion of sovereign 
states. (…) Feudal conditions made it impossible to distinguish sovereign powers from other 
kinds of authority. (…) !ere were di+erent peoples, speaking di+erent languages, but no distinct 
nations or territorial states to de"ne their boundaries.’
132 Randall Lesa+er, ‘Peace treaties from Lodi to Westphalia’, in: Randall Lesa+er (ed.), Peace 
treaties and international law in European History, From the Late Middle ages to World War One 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, #%%-) $$.
133 Pope Clement VII ($'#*-$'*-) was under control of Charles V, who opposed the annulment 
as Henry VIII’s wife was Charles’ sister Catherine.
134 Cooper (#%%-) ). See also: Hall ($()-) --,; and Spruyt (#%%#) $#,--(.
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equality of condition’135 – and, we may add (entirely in Tocquevillian spirit), the 
likewise increase in the power of the state.
Essential, however, to the character of the modern state, is its power ultimately 
to make, administer and execute the law.136 While in general these powers 
increased, it is not before the end of the ancien régime and the introduction of 
democratic politics, that states fully assumed these powers.
Voltaire was still able to ridicule the legal diversity that existed up until the 
$)th century: ‘we [in France] have more laws than the whole of Europe taken 
together; almost every village has its own’.137 Whomever had to travel from 
Bretagne to the Languedoc, Voltaire wrote satirically, ‘changes laws more o:en 
than he changes horses’.138 And indeed,
Is it not absurd and dreadful that what is true in one village may be found false in 
another? By what strange barbarity is it possible that fellow countrymen do not 
live under the same law?139
It was because London had been destroyed and rebuilt a:er the great "re, Voltaire 
contended, that it had become ‘worthy of being inhabited’. ‘Observe in Paris 
the area of les Halles, of Saint-Pierre-aux-Boeufs and of the rue Brise-Miche or 
Pet-au-Diable, and contrast that with the Louvre or the Tuileries: then you get 
an impression of our laws’. Voltaire saw chaos in the old neighborhoods of Paris 
and admired the newer quartiers symbolized by the Louvre. He confronted the 
French with the following choice: ‘If you want good laws; burn the ones you 
have and make new ones’.140 
Opposing the Enlightenment vision thus expounded by Voltaire, stands 
the Medieval view, expressed by Montesquieu when he emphasized in his De 
l’esprit des lois that cultural diversity was such that uniform laws would result 
135 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. !e Henry Reeve Text as revised by Francis 
Bowen, Volume $ (New York: Vintage Books, $((%) '.
136 As will be further discussed in chapter #.
137 ‘Nous avons plus de lois que toute l’Europe ensemble; presque chaque ville a la sienne’. 
Voltaire, ‘Dialogue entre un plaideur et un avocat’ ($,'$), in: Ibidem, Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire, 
vol. XXIII, ‘Mélanges II’ (Paris: Garnier Frères, $),() -(*--(&.
138 ‘Change de lois plus souvent qu’il ne change de chevaux’. Voltaire ($,'$) -(*--(&: ‘… il en est 
ainsi de poste en poste dans le royaume: vous changez de jurisprudence en changeant de chevaux’.
139 ‘N’est-ce pas une chose absurde et a+reuse que ce qui est vrai dans un village se trouve faux 
dans un autre? Par quelle étrange barbarie se peut-il que des compatriots ne vivent pas sous la 
meme loi?’ Voltaire ($,'$) -(*--(&. !e ‘avocat’ in the "ctional dialogue that this quote is from, 
goes on to explain how the di+erent regions of France belonged to di+erent ‘barons’, and that it 
is impossible ‘que la loi soit partout la meme, quand la pinte ne l’est pas’.
140 ‘Digne d’être habitée’ (…) Voyez à Paris le quartier des Halles, de saint-Pierre-aux-Boeufs, la 
rue Brise-Miche, celle du Pet-au-Diable, contraster avec le Louvre et les Tuileries: voilà l’image de 
nos lois’. (…) ‘Voulez-vous avoir de bonnes lois; brûlez les vôtres, et faites-en de nouvelles’. Voltaire, 
‘Dictionnaire Philosophique: Lois’ ($,&'), in: Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire, vol. **. ‘Dictionaire 
Philosophique – Tome I’ (Paris: Antoine-Augustin Renouard, $)$() $,%.
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in despotism.141 Montesquieu’s ‘"nal emphasis was on a pluralist conception of 
society’, Norman Hampson writes in his study of $)th century French political 
thought,142 and Montesquieu praised ‘the prodigious diversity’ of the laws and 
customs within the French kingdom.143 
!e very idea of the social contract, enabling the members to design from 
scratch the laws they intend to live under, not only contends with the Medieval 
view as voiced by Montesquieu, but is also uniquely suitable for centralized 
codi"cations of the kind propounded by Voltaire. Several interpretations have 
been given to this idea, of course (as will be discussed further in chapter )). 
John Locke emphasized, for instance, the inalienable rights of the individual 
citizens including their right to be represented. Rousseau, in his $,,$ advise to 
the Polish kingdom, underlined the importance of the duties of citizenship, in 
order that the defense of particular social or class interests ‘does not penetrate 
society at the cost of its patriotism, and that the Hydra of hair-splitting does 
not destroy the nation’.144 
Rousseau further argued that the kingdom of Poland needed three codes of 
law only, ‘l’un politique, l’autre civil, et l’autre criminel’ – all three ‘as clear, short 
and precise as possible’.145 It was essential that these codes should be taught in 
schools and universities, and that what remained of customary and Roman law 
would be discarded: ‘we have no need of other bodies of law. (…) When it comes 
to Roman law and its customs, whatever still exists of it must be removed from 
the schools and the tribunals. People should not recognize any other authority 
than the laws of the state; these laws ought to be uniform in all provinces’.146
Without the French Revolution, these ideas would never have been real-
ized, and Napoleon marked the de"nitive breakthrough thereof, when he 
141 Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois ($,-)) (Paris: Éditions Garnier Frères, $(&$), for instance 
Vol. II, Book XXIX, chapter $), Des idées d’uniformité: ‘les memes mesures dans le commerce, 
les memes lois dans l’État, la même religion dans toutes ses parties. Mais cela est-il toujours à 
propos sans exception? Le mal de changer est-il toujours moins grand que le mal de sou+rir? Et 
la grandeur du genie ne consisterait-elle pas mieux à savoir dans quell cas il faut l’uniformité, et 
dans quell cas il faut des di+erences? A la Chine, les Chinois sont gouvernés par le ceremonial 
chinois, et les Tartares par le ceremonial tartare: c’est pourtant le people du monde qui a le plus la 
tranquillité pour object. Lorsque les citoyens suivent les lois, qu’importe qu’ils suivent la même?’
142 Norman Hampson, Will and Circumstance. Montesquieu, Rousseau and the French Revolution 
(London: Duckworth, $()*) #*.
143 ‘La prodigieuse diversité’. Lokin and Zwalve (#%%&) $)$.
144 ‘(…) ne s’enracine dans les corps aux dépens du patriotisme, et que l’hydre de la chicane 
ne dévore une nation’. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne 
et la réforme projetée en avril $,,#’ ($,,#), in: Oeuvres Choisies de J.J. Rousseau. Contrat Social 
ou Principes du Droit Politique. Nouvelle édition (Paris: Garnier Frères, no year of publication 
mentioned) *)&-*),: ‘Chapitre X – Administration.
145 ‘Tous trois clairs, courts et précis autant qu’il sera possible’. Ibidem.
146 ‘… on n’a pas besoin d’autres corps de droit. (…) A l’égard du droit romain et des coutumes, 
tout cela, s’il existe, doit être ôté des écoles et des tribunaux. On n’y doit connaître d’autre autorité 
que les lois de l’Etat; elles doivent être uniformes dans toutes les provinces’. Ibidem.
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launched a single, uni"ed, Code Civil in $)%-. And he was perhaps right, when 
he remarked that:
My glory is not that I have won some forty battles or that I have submitted kings 
to my will (…) Waterloo will e+ace the memory of all those victories (…) But 
what will never be e+aced and will live forever, that’s my Code Civil.147
!e example set by Napoleonic France was in any case followed by all Western 
European states. In the decades to come, they all developed their own national 
legal codes, completing the development of the modern state.
$.*. I9(#89)($&9); R#;)($&9%
It is not surprising that with the gradual appearance of modern states, and with 
the development of a philosophical legitimation for them in the form of social 
contract theory, some system of ‘international law’ was called for, too. Parallel 
with the gradual emancipation of modern statehood from the medieval ‘chain of 
duties’, an autonomous doctrine of international relations emerged. !e Dutch 
thinker and jurist Grotius can be counted among the very "rst to have embarked 
on this path. Although still with one foot clearly in the Medieval system, with 
his $&#' De jure belli ac pacis, Grotius could, in the words of James Madison, 
be counted as ‘in some respects, the father of the modern code of nations’.148 
Grotius starts o+ from the new, sovereign state as it had emerged from the late 
Middle Ages in the course of the $&th and $,th centuries. ‘!at power is called 
sovereign’, Grotius writes in Book I, ‘whose actions are not subject to the control 
of any other power, so as to be annulled at the pleasure of any other human will’.149
Following Bodin, Grotius a9rmed that a sovereign cannot be bound by his 
own actions, and that there is no right to revolt. What is more, a whole people 
can agree to give up all their rights to an absolute ruler.150 !is said, Grotius 
introduces principles of ‘natural law’, which, he argued, would apply to subjects 
as well as states, even if they have not been formulated or could not be enforced. 
He goes on to accept a limited number of universal crimes, against which it 
is the right of other states to act – even militarily.151 Among the principles of 
147 ‘Ma gloire n’est pas avoir gagné quarante batailles et d’avoir fait la loi aux rois (…) Waterloo 
e+acera le souvenir de tant de victoires (…) Mais ce que rien n’e+acera et qui vivra éternellement, 
c’est mon Code civil’. Charles-Tristan de Montholon, Récits de la captivité de l’empereur Napoléon 
à Ste Hélène I (Paris, $)-,) -%$. Quoted in: Lokin and Zwalve (#%%&) #$%.
148 James Madison, ‘Examination of the British Doctrine which subjects to capture a neutral 
trade not open in time of peace’, in: Gaillard Hunt (ed.), !e writings of James Madison, vol. / 
(!e Rnickerboch Press, $(%$) #*-.
149 Hugo Grotius, !e rights of war and peace, including the law of nature and of nations ($&#') 
Translated by David J. Hill (New York: M. Walter Dunne, $(%$) &#: Book I, chapter III, par. ,.
150 Grotius ($(%$) &*: Book I, chapter III, par. ).
151 Grotius ($(%$) #-,: Book II, chapter XX, par. -%+.
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natural law that Grotius deduces from reason are for instance that pacta sunt 
servanda, promises are to be kept, and that no entity could claim sovereignty 
over territories it could not possibly hope to control – hence the mare liberum, 
the free seas.152 Grotius’ work, in the words of Arthur Nussbaum, ‘certainly does 
not form an integrated whole. !e show of erudition is far overdone, and the 
reasoning is o:en ponderous and discursive.’153 !ere is a con8ict in Grotius 
between universal morals and sovereignty, and he is unwilling or unable to 
fully resolve it (i.e. the con8ict between universal morals and temporary legal 
arrangements in Augustine and Aquinas, as discussed above). Nevertheless, his 
analysis that the jus gentium of the coming age would have to be on the basis 
of equality and on secular principles has been of paramount importance and 
in8uence. In this context it is worthwhile to note that he argued that treaties 
with Christian peoples had the same standing as those made with non-Christian 
peoples, for instance the Saracens.154
Samuel Pufendorf ($&*#-$&(-), seen at his time, despite signi"cant di+er-
ences, as ‘the son of Grotius’,155 advanced from the Grotian starting point to 
develop his systematic account of natural and international law. ‘Like Grotius 
and Hobbes’, James Tully writes, ‘Pufendorf took the religious di+erences over 
which the wars had been fought to be irreconcilable. Hence, a new morality able 
to gain the consent of all Europeans […] would have to be independent of the 
confessional di+erences which divided them […]’. While the former two had 
written in the midst of European civil and religious wars, Pufendorf was the "rst 
to re8ect on the emerging state system in the second half of the $,th century. 
As Tully writes: ‘In the speci"c sense, therefore, of being the "rst to present a 
comprehensive theory of the existing European state system, Pufendorf is the 
"rst philosopher of modern politics’.156
In Book II, chapter &, of his On the Duty of Man and Citizen ($&,*), Pufen-
dorf describes ‘the internal structure of states’. He analyses this as a series of 
agreements, between individuals, to form a union and to organize this union 
in a particular way. Most important for our purposes is the "nal agreement 
Pufendorf describes, that which establishes sovereignty and subjection to it. 
‘By this agreement’, Pufendorf writes, ‘he or they bind himself or themselves 
to provide for the common security and safety, and the rest bind themselves to 
152 Which was also clearly in the interest of his native country, the Republic, of course, as was 
his claim that treaties concluded with the Ottoman Empire should be upheld in the same way as 
treaties with Christian powers. Grotius ($(%$) #'*: Book II, chapter XX, par. -)+. Cf. Nussbaum 
($(&$) $$%.
153 Nussbaum ($(&$) $$*.
154 Nussbaum ($(&$) $$%.
155 Nussbaum ($(&$) $'%.
156 James Tully, ‘Introduction’, in: Samuel Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, $(($) xx.
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obedience to him or them. By this agreement, too, all submit their will to his or 
their will and at the same time devolve on him or them the use and application 
of their strength to the common defence’.157 Pufendorf concludes: ‘Only when 
this agreement is duly put into e+ect does a complete and regular state come 
into being’. !is state, then, lives in a state of nature with other states, as states 
always primarily care for their self-interest.158
!e Swiss diplomat Emer de Vattel ($,$--$,&,), who brought together theo-
retical re8ections as well as his personal experiences, analyzed the new reality 
in a profoundly encompassing way. In $,',, he published Le droit des gens, ou 
principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux a<aires des nations 
et des souveraines: ‘!e law of nations or the principles of natural law, applied 
to the conduct and a+airs of nations and of sovereigns’. In this work, Vattel 
criticizes Grotius and Pufendorf for allowing too much leeway for princes to 
govern the people as they may please, and defends restraints on royal power 
and the importance of an elected legislature. In Book I, chapter IV, par. *(, for 
instance, he writes: ‘It is evident that men form a political society, and submit to 
laws, solely for their own advantage and safety. !e sovereign authority is then 
established only for the common good of all the citizens; and it would be absurd 
to think that it could change its nature on passing into the hands of a senate or 
a monarch. (…) A good prince, a wise conductor of society, ought to have his 
mind impressed with this great truth, that the sovereign power is solely intrusted 
to him for the safety of the state, and the happiness of the people, – that he is 
not permitted to consider himself as the principal object in the administration 
of a+airs, to seek his own satisfaction, or his private advantage’.159 In this, he 
clearly follows the Lockean amendments to the Hobbesian doctrine.160 
However, Vattel sees no possibilities for arranging supranational powers to 
ensure the just conduct of the several sovereign entities. ‘Nations being free 
and independent’, Vattel writes, ‘though the conduct of one of them [may] be 
illegal and condemnable by the laws of conscience, the others are bound to 
acquiesce in it, when it does not infringe upon their [own] perfect rights. !e 
liberty of that nation would not remain entire, if the others were to arrogate to 
themselves the right of inspecting and regulating her actions; – an assumption 
157 Pufendorf ($(($) book II, chapter &, par. (.
158 Pufendorf ($(($) Book II, chapter $, par. $$.
159 Emer de Vattel, !e Law of Nations, or principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the 
Conduct and A<airs of Nations and Sovereigns, with !ree Early Essays on the Origin and Nature 
of Natural Law and on Luxury. Edited and with an introduction by Béla Kapossy and Richard 
Whatmore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, #%%)) book I, chapter IV, par. *(. Cf. Francis Stephen 
Ruddy, International Law in the Enlightenment. !e background of Emmerich de Vattel’s Le Droit 
des Gens (New York: Oceana Publications, $(,').
160 Cf. Vattel (#%%)) Book I, chapter IV, par. '$ and '-, and Book I, chapter V, par. $&.
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on their part, that would be contrary to the law of nature, which declares every 
nation free and independent of all the others’.161
Vattel acknowledges that every state ought ‘to labour for the preservation 
of others, and for securing them from ruin and destruction’,162 but goes on to 
explain that no nation can be obliged to ful"ll duties towards others.163 Nor does 
Vattel support punitive wars in the name of violations of natural law. He writes 
that ‘it is strange to hear the learned and judicious Grotius assert, that a sover-
eign may justly take up arms to chastise nations which are guilty of enormous 
transgressions of the law of nature, which treat their parents with inhumanity like 
the Sogdians, which eat human *esh as the ancient Gauls, etc.164 In opposition 
to Grotius, Vattel states that ‘men derive the right of punishment solely from 
their right to provide for their own safety; and consequently they cannot claim 
it except against those by whom they have been injured’.165 He goes on:
Could it escape Grotius, that, notwithstanding all the precautions added by him in 
the following paragraphs, his opinion opens a door to all the ravages of enthusiasm 
and fanaticism, and furnishes ambition with numberless pretexts? Mahomet and 
his successors have desolated and subdued Asia, to avenge the indignity done 
to the unity of the Godhead; all whom they termed associators or idolaters fell 
victims to their devout fury.166
In addition to these observations, Vattel distinguishes between two types of 
international ‘law’: a ‘necessary’ law of nations, and a ‘positive’ law. Necessary 
international law amounts to the natural law principles applying between states, 
and is, since it is ‘founded on the nature of things (…) immutable’.167 Under 
‘positive’ law of nations, nations may dra: treaties between them. But those 
treaties can never override the eternal principles of the ‘necessary’ (or ‘natural’168) 
law – the most fundamental of them being the right to non-intervention. ‘Every 
treaty, every custom, which contravenes the injunctions or prohibitions of the 
necessary law of nations, is unlawful’.169 
161 Vattel (#%%)) preliminaries, par. (.
162 Vattel (#%%)) Book II, chapter I, par. -.
163 Vattel (#%%)) Book II, chapter I, par. '-$-.
164 Italics by Vattel himself. Here, a footnote is included in the text, where Vattel refers to Grotius’ 
De Jure Belli et Pacis, book II, chapter XX, par. II, that I have also discussed above. 
165 Vattel (#%%)) Book II, chapter I, par. ,.
166 Vattel (#%%)) Book II, chapter I, par. ,.
167 Vattel (#%%)), preliminaries, par. ,.
168 As Vattel writes about the necessary law: ‘!is is the law which Grotius, and those who 
follow him, call the internal law of nations, on account of its being obligatory on nations in point 
of conscience. Several writers term it the natural law of nations’, Vattel (#%%)) preliminaries, par. ,.
169 Vattel (#%%)) preliminaries, par. ,.
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With Vattel, the sovereign state of the kind we have become familiar with 
today, has been thought out in its entirety.170 It became the dominant model 
of jurisdiction, and was a9rmed for instance by Immanuel Kant in his treatise 
Zum ewigen Frieden ($,('):
!e idea of the law of nations presupposes the distinction between independent 
states. Although this is a state of war … it is still, according to reason, better 
than the fusion of those states by means of a hierarchy of power culminating in 
a universal monarchy. Laws which are passed for a large area lose their vigour, 
and such a soulless despotism, a:er it has hollowed out the germ of goodness, 
ultimately collapses into anarchy.171
170 !e principle of statehood was recon"rmed at the important peace treaties of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century. It was also re-emphasized through the ideas concerning legal uni"cation 
that the French philosophes articulated. A:er the disorder Napoleon had caused, the Vienna 
Congress restored the European State system and established the Holy Alliance to strengthen it. 
!e Holy Alliance was a coalition set up in $)$' by Tsarist Russia, Austria and Prussia, the three 
major continental powers a:er the battle of Waterloo. Later, France and most other European 
nations joined, the common aim of the organization being to maintain the continental status quo. 
However cohesive its social results were, the political record of the organization is poor, and the 
di+erent member States largely continued to set out for themselves their own political agendas, 
even if that would result in military confrontation (e.g. the Crimean war).
171 Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 
#%%') *#: zweiter abschnitt, erster zusatz, par. #: ‘Die Idee des Völkerrechts setzt die Absonderung 
vieler voneinander unabhängiger benachbarter Staaten voraus; und obgleich ein solcher Zustand 
an sich schon ein Zustand des Krieges ist (…) so ist doch selbst dieser nach Vernun:idee besser 
als die Zusammenschmelzung derselben durch eine die andere überwachsende und in eine 
Universalmonarchie übergehende Macht, weil die Gesetze mit dem vergrösserten Umfange der 
Regierung immer mehr an ihrem Nachdruck einbüssen, und ein seelenloser Despotism, nachdem 




‘!ere exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is more controversial 
than that of sovereignty’, wrote the renowned German-British jurist Lassa 
Oppenheim.1 Indeed, in discussions on statehood the controversy frequently 
focuses on that particular word, sovereignty. Much debated and disputed, its 
usage has o:en been thought to be ‘inherently problematic’,2 and sovereignty has 
been identi"ed as ‘the most glittering and controversial notion in the history, 
doctrine and practice of public international law’.3 It is therefore not surprising 
that every now and then someone proposes to discard the word altogether. Louis 
Henkin writes, for instance:
Sovereignty is a bad word (…) it is o:en a catchword, a substitute for thinking and 
precision. (…) For legal purposes at least, we might do well to relegate the term 
sovereignty to the shelf of history as a relic from an earlier era’.4 
As of today, however, sovereignty remains a key concept in the relations between 
states, as well as in the understanding of modern statehood. In this chapter, we 
will have a closer look at it.
!e word ‘sovereignty’ "nds its origin in the Middle-Latin superanus, which 
means ‘above’ or ‘elevated above others’.5 One of the oldest recordings of it is in a 
French charter, dated around $%%% AD, but the development into Early French, 
as souverain, is found from the twel:h century onwards – denoting geographical 
qualities of higher and lower,6 as in: mountain A is souverain over mountain B. 
!e "rst record where the word ‘souverain’ was used in a political sense, was 
1 Lassa Oppenheim, International law. A treatise. -th Edition by A.D. McNair (London: 
Longmans, $(#)) &&.
2 Roger Scruton, !e Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political thought. *rd edition (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, #%%,).
3 H. Steinberger, ‘Sovereignty’, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law. 
Volume Four (Amsterdam: Elsevier, #%%%) '%%.
4 L. Henkin, International Law: Politics and values (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijho+ Publishers, 
$((') (-$%.
5 Gerard Kreijen, State Failure, Sovereignty, and E<ectiveness. Legal Lessons from the Decolonization 
of Sub-Saharan Africa (Leiden: Martinus Nijho+ Publishers, #%%-) #,.
6 Kreijen (#%%-) #,.
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allegedly in the principal work of the French jurist Philippe de Beaumanoir,7 
entitled les Coutumes de Beauvaisis, in which he wrote that ‘chacuns barons est 
souverains en sa baronie …’8 – every baron is the highest in his own barony. 
From then on, ‘sovereignty’ is more o:en recorded as meaning ‘there is no higher 
political power’ over a political unit. 
But it is exactly this principle of ‘no higher power’ that causes confusion. For 
it may refer to external relations, establishing a rule of non-intervention; but 
it also implies that internally, the sovereign has e+ectively established himself 
as the highest power. In order to have an e+ective ‘community of sovereign 
states’ – in order for external sovereignty to make sense –, it is self-evidently 
necessary that those sovereign entities actually exercise e+ective governmental 
control over their territory. One cannot do business with sovereigns if they 
cannot enforce agreements at home.
A discussion of sovereignty therefore inevitably leads to an analysis of the 
internal qualities of the modern state. Indeed, sovereignty and statehood are 
inextricably linked, doubling the complexity of the picture. !ere can be no 
international system of sovereign entities, without those entities possessing the 
e+ective governmental control associated with statehood.
!e general consensus is that four criteria determine sovereign statehood. 
!e "rst and most important criterion was already mentioned, which is the 
exercise of ‘e+ective and independent governmental control’ ($). !is implies a 
‘population’ (#), and a ‘territory’ (*), culminating in what is generally referred 
to as ‘internal sovereignty’. 
But then, there is the international component to sovereignty. !is is ‘the 
capacity to enter into relations with other states’ (-),9 and is encapsulated in 
the notion of external sovereignty. External sovereignty leads to questions over 
recognition and legitimacy that we will have a closer look at further down. But 
"rst we will examine the meaning and scope of ‘internal sovereignty’.10
7 Philippe de Rémi, sire de Beaumanoir lived presumably from $#-, until $#(&. He was a 
French administrative o9cial and nobleman. His main work is Coutumes de Beauvaisis, written 
in $#)*, and printed in $&(%. 
8 Kreijen (#%%-) #).
9 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Droit International Public (Paris: Editions Dalloz-Sirey, $((#) #*: ‘une 
population (…) que l’état stabilise à l’intérieur de ses limites; c’est ainsi qu’a l’époque contemporaine, 
l’idée d’un Etat nomade est dé"nitivement abolie’; Joe Verhoeven, Droit International Public 
(Louvain: Larcier #%%%) '#+; Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford: University 
Press, #%%*) #$,+.
10 For a classic de"nition in international legal discourse, see the case of the Permanent Court 
of International Law, in the Lighthouses on Creta and Samos case, available online at http://www.
worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/$(*,.$%.%)_lighthouses.htm; for a discussion of its terms, see 
Pablo Mendes de Leon, Cabotage in International Air Transport Regulation (PhD thesis, Leiden 
University Press, $((#) $&#. See also the $(-( Corfu Channel Case of the ICJ, judgment of April 
(th, $(-(. Available online at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/"les/$/$&-'.pdf. Cf. J.W. Rees, !e 
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As said, internal sovereignty consists in the exercise of e+ective and independent 
governmental control, over a population, on a generally marked-out territory. !e 
most problematic aspect of this is the "rst criterion: e+ective and independent 
governmental control. Questions related to de"ning a population and a territory, 
more importantly, are outside the remit of this chapter and will therefore not 
be taken into account. 
We will thus focus on e+ective and independent governmental control. !e 
"rst thing that may come to mind when discussing this is Albert Venn Dicey’s 
famous de"nition of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliament, as the highest 
institution of a state, embodies sovereignty when any of its acts, ‘or any part of 
an Act of Parliament, which makes a new law, or repeals or modi"es an existing 
law, will be obeyed by the courts.’11 Dicey continues:
!e same principle, looked at from its negative side, may be thus stated: there 
is no person or body of persons who can, under the English constitution, make 
rules which override or derogate from an Act of Parliament, or which (to express 
the same thing in other words) will be enforced by the courts in contravention 
of an Act of Parliament.’12
In Dicey’s de"nition, however, there is no mention being made of existing power 
realities on the ground; his understanding of sovereignty is institutional. What 
will actually happen with verdicts of the courts – whether their magistrates 
have any bearing on the population or not – is not part of his concern. !is 
leaves Dicey’s de"nition open to the obvious objection that while parliament 
and courts may o9cially be fully sovereign, e+ective governmental control may 
be entirely lacking.13 
Now, governments are o:en incapable of enforcing compliance with all 
their laws, and sometimes incapable of enforcing most of them. Courts may be 
unable to make sure that judgments are actually carried out. !e most extreme 
examples of this are formed by a number of mostly post-colonial (predominantly 
African) states that have not succeeded in enforcing their laws and maintaining 
order within their territory. !ese states have, in recent years, come to be called 
‘failed states’, rendering the notion of sovereignty in Dicey’s institutional sense 
a dead letter.14
theory of sovereignty restated, in: Peter Laslett (ed.), Philosophy, Politics and Society. First series 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, $(,').
11 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution (London: Macmillan, 
$(*() -%.
12 Dicey ($(*() -%.
13 As Dicey himself acknowledges as well. Dicey ($(*() )#+.
14 Cf. Kreijen (#%%-).
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!at is why Dicey’s understanding of sovereignty in fact already presup-
poses e+ective governmental control. His approach helps to locate, within the 
governmental structure, the ultimate sovereign point. But he does not de"ne 
what it is that constitutes e+ective governmental control itself. 
Another de"nition of sovereignty that may therefore be considered, is the 
de"nition provided by Black’s famous Law Dictionary. According to this work, 
sovereignty is to be understood as the ‘supreme political authority’.15 For several 
reasons, however, this de"nition is also problematic.
For the word ‘authority’ can mean two things. Authority may refer to the 
individual or the institution that has the power of decision in a given dispute 
(call it authority-$). !e umpire of a tennis game, for instance, may be identi"ed 
as the ‘authority’ in determining whether a ball was in or out. A teacher is the 
‘authority’ in the classroom. One may point at the police as the ‘authority’ on 
the streets (the examples are endless). In that sense, authority (as authority-$) 
is relative to the power to decide or to act.
However, authority also refers to a feeling of respect or esteem that people 
may feel for others (call it authority-#). In this sense, the Pope may be indenti"ed 
by Catholics as an ‘authority’ in religious matters.16 Or the Dalai Lama may be 
regarded as an ‘authority’ in practical ethics. Both could lose their ‘authority’ – as 
authority-# – over their followers if they were seen to make wrong decisions. 
For instance, the sex abuse scandals of #%%( within the Catholic Church have 
a+ected the ‘authority’ of the Pope. In #%%), the Dalai Lama was criticized in 
an article in !e Guardian that posed the question whether ‘there [has] ever 
been a political "gure more ridiculous than the Dalai Lama’. In the article, the 
Buddhist leader was reproached for being ‘a product of the crushing feudalism 
of archaic, pre-modern Tibet, where an elite of Buddhist monks treated the 
masses as serfs and ruthlessly punished them if they stepped out of line’.17 !is, 
if true, might cause his ‘authority’ over his admirers to diminish.
15 Bryan A. Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary, )th edition (Los Angeles: West Group, #%%-) 
$-*%, and Scruton, Dictionary (#%%,) &''.
16 Of course, the Vatican has a long history of claiming political sovereignty as well, apart from 
moral or religious ‘authority’. As indeed happened with the Regnans in Excelsis bull of $',%, which 
‘released’ all the subjects of Queen Elizabeth of England from their allegiance to her. As will be 
argued below, states confronted with such rival claims would not lose their sovereignty, as long as 
they maintain e+ective control. It is clear that Richelieu, when declaring that in matters of state, 
no French catholic should prefer a Spaniard to a Huguenot, took position against the idea of 
papal sovereignty, too. !is contrasts sharply with the lack of such a strong defense of territorial 
sovereignty amongst present-day political elites, for instance a:er Khomeini issued a fatwa with 
universal validity for all Muslims to assassinate Salman Rushdie, in $()(. Cf. Cliteur (#%%,). 
17 Brendan O’Neill, ‘Down with the Dalai Lama. Why do western commentators idolise a 
celebrity monk who hangs out with Sharon Stone and once guest-edited French Vogue?’, in: !e 
Guardian, May #(th, #%%).
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Now, the complexity commences as such ‘authority’ in the sense of being 
respected or held in high esteem (authority-#) may also be vested in the umpire, 
the teacher and the policeman. If the umpire is suspected of being biased against 
one of the players; or if the teacher appears not to know the matter he is teach-
ing; or if the policeman beats up or arbitrarily arrests an innocent civilian; in 
such cases their authority in the sense of being respected or held in high esteem 
(authority-#) may crumble. Nevertheless, their authority as agents endowed 
with the power to make decisions or to act (authority-$), is not a+ected. !e 
authority in the sense of the ‘right to decide’ (authority-$) of the umpire, the 
teacher or the policeman is not dependent on the recognition of their authority 
in the sense of being respected (authority-#) by those subjected to their power. 
!e tennis player who feels wronged may submit a complaint, the students 
may write to the school board, or the citizen may sue the police o9cer – but 
whether their complaints will a+ect the authority-$ of the umpire, the teacher 
or the policeman, is not up to them.
!is applies to sovereignty generally as well. Naturally, it is very di9cult to 
imagine a state that does not have any authority in the sense of being respected 
(authority-#) by its population. E+ective governmental control is extremely 
di9cult to maintain without the consent of at least part of the population. Even 
dictatorships have a need for a loyal class of custodes to carry out orders and 
support the regime. Moreover, in rare cases only have governments possessed 
the ability to directly intervene with all matters happening on their territory, 
usually rendering them dependent on benevolent cooperation by other institu-
tions and groups. 
However, should governments rule unjustly and undermine their ‘authority’ 
in the sense of being respected or held in high esteem (authority-#), they would 
nevertheless retain their ‘right to decide’ (authority-$) as long as they maintained 
e+ective control.
!is confusion that Black’s de"nition of sovereignty gives rise to, stemming 
from the semantic ambiguity of the word ‘authority’, is perhaps overcome 
through the claim by the legal positivist John Austin that the sovereign is the 
one or the institution whose ‘commands are habitually obeyed’. !ough we could 
again disputate over the several ways in which ‘habitually’ could be understood, 
this de"nition is less ambiguous. Yet we could also accept Black’s de"nition of 
sovereignty as the ‘ultimate authority’ if authority is understood as authority-$: 
the ultimate power to decide.
To identify the sovereign as such, however, must mean that our understanding 
of internal sovereignty is not connected to any considerations of natural law. 
!e eternal question whether unjust laws can still be properly called ‘laws’ – and 
whether unjust government can still be properly called ‘government’ – is beside 
the point when trying to identify e+ective and independent governmental 
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control.18 For whichever normative position one chooses to defend in this debate, 
it is irrelevant if the internal sovereign’s commands continue to be habitually 
obeyed (when it comes to external sovereignty, by contrast, our assessment of 
the relevance of this debate may turn out di+erently, as will be discussed in the 
next paragraph). 
In establishing obedience to its commands, then, as Max Weber argued, 
the sovereign must monopolize the use of force. In WirtschaA und GesellschaA 
($(##), he analyzed that 
A compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called 
a ‘state’ insofar as its administrative sta+ successfully upholds the claim to the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.19 
!e use of the word ‘legitimate’ again confronts us with the confusing double 
meaning also encountered in the word ‘authority’. Legitimacy may mean ‘in 
accordance with its own rules’ (call it legitimacy-$), or it may mean ‘being 
experienced as rightful’ (call it legitimacy-#). It is to legitimacy-$ that Weber 
intended to refer to, when identifying the monopoly to the use of force in this 
case.20 !is means that it is not relevant for the existence of a state whether the 
force is experienced as ‘rightful’, but only whether the rules laid down permit it.
!is also means, ultimately, that there is no conceptual di+erence between 
a state and a concentration camp. !e guards and rulers of the camp form a 
government, and the prisoners a population. In such a concentration camp 
case, then, the guards have a monopoly to the use of force in accordance with 
the rules laid down by themselves (but may be bound by certain limitations too, 
in which case the concentration camp has an element of the rule of law – see 
chapter &). When a "ght breaks out between two prisoners, for example over 
18 !omas Aquinas was already occupied with this problem in his quaestiones, most notably 
the quaestiones (%-(' of the Summa !eologiae ($#&'), and it was famously taken up once again 
by Hart and Dworkin in the #%th century. Indeed, as one scholar describes it: ‘For the past four 
decades, Anglo-American legal philosophy has been preoccupied – some might say obsessed – 
with something called the “Hart-Dworkin” debate’, the core question of which seems to be the 
relationship between law and morality – and the question of the extent to which unjust laws are 
still proper ‘laws’. Steven J. Shapiro, ‘!e “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed’, 
University of Michigan Public Law Working Paper No. 44 (February #, #%%,). Available online at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=(&)&',.
19 Max Weber, Economy and Society. An outline of interpretive sociology. Edited by Guenther 
Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, $(,)) '- (§ $,). !e original 
German text reads: ‘Staat soll ein politischer Anstaltsbetrieb heißen, wenn und insoweit sein 
Verwaltungsstab erfolgreich das Monopol legitimen physischen Zwanges für die Durchführung 
der Ordnungen in Anspruch nimmt’. Max Weber, WirtschaA und GesellschaA, Grundriss der 
Verstehenden Soziologie. Studienausgabe herausgegeben von Johannes Winckelmann. Band I 
(Köln & Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, $(&-) *& (§ $,). 
20 Cf. Weber ($(,)) '&: ‘the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either 
permitted by the state or prescribed by it’. Weber’s strict empiricism has o:en been discussed 
(and criticized), for example by Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, $('*).
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food, they have no right to use force against one another, unless this is explicitly 
permitted by the rules of the camp (as modern states for instance usually allow 
some form of self-defense).AIf the camp guards fail to suppress the use of force 
by the prisoners e+ectively, some prisoners may come to develop a parallel 
power center, challenging the power of the guards. It may come to be that the 
one whose orders are habitually obeyed over time becomes the leader of a gang 
of prisoners, if the guards continue to fail to take e+ective action. Ultimately, 
such a situation could result in a revolt, which is the same as a ‘civil war’. 
At such a moment, the internal sovereign becomes divided. !e situation in 
Libya in #%$$ exempli"ed this. Colonel Khada", who had ruled the country for 
several decades and had maintained a strong autocratic rule, was challenged 
by rebels from the East of the country. A:er some Western military support, 
the rebels managed to establish a power base around Benghazi, e+ectively 
upholding a new sovereign power (again, this has consequences for external 
sovereignty as well, as will be discussed below). By contrast, as long as failure 
of the guards or the state to monopolize the use of force remain exceptions, and 
their commands thus continue to be habitually obeyed, the internal sovereignty 
continues to reside with them.21 
Black’s de"nition of sovereignty also contained the word ‘political’, as in: 
‘supreme political authority’. !is refers to the power of the state as the ultimate 
expression of the government of the polity. But it puts us on track of at least 
three problems related to internal sovereignty. !e "rst is that most states at 
present have decentralized many governing and legislative tasks; the second 
is that they have some separation of powers; and the third is that they have 
committed themselves to supranational organizations; the word ‘political’ in 
our de"nition of internal sovereignty as ‘supreme political authority’ therefore 
leads to new confusions; however, as we shall see, it also provides the umbrella 
concept that enables us to solve these problems.
Let us "rst address the decentralization of governing and legislative tasks. 
Most states have, to some extent, decentralized governing and legislative tasks, 
and therefore, the central – ‘sovereign’ – government o:en does not possess all 
the means to govern as it may please. 
!e most striking example of such decentralization is perhaps a federation 
such as the United States, where powers not delegated to the federal government 
are ‘reserved to the states respectively or to the people’ (Amendment $%). Some 
have argued that the whole concept of sovereignty is for this reason altogether 
fraudulent. Should this be the case, then indeed, supranationalism would not be 
at odds with the state at all, but rather present an additional layer of governance, 
21 See also: Maurice Joly, Dialogue aux enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu ou la politique 
de Machiavel au XIXe siècle (Bruxelles, A. Mertens, $)&').
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not fundamentally di+erent from the already existing layers such as county, 
state, province or municipality.22
At "rst sight, this view may seem attractive. However, whether we deal with 
a unitary or a federal state, however di+erent these two types of states may be,23 
and regardless of how many governing tasks may reside within the member 
states of a federal union, a number of fundamental attributes of statehood are 
always – and necessarily so – centralized. !ese are the ultimate command 
over the army, and the common defense of borders. !is has consequences for 
external sovereignty too, as will be discussed below, because common defense 
of borders implies the common conduct of foreign a+airs. 
Ultimate command over the army, moreover, requires the capacity to pay 
for it, and therefore implies the "nal say of the central government in (some 
of) the taxes to be paid as well. !ere exists no state, as logically there cannot 
exist a state, neither unitary nor federal, in which the command over the army 
is not centralized, and connected with that the conduct of foreign relations and 
the administration of (some of the) taxes. !is is illustrated by confederacies. 
A confederacy is nothing more than an organized structure of unenforceable 
cooperation between sovereign states. Even the United Nations (the Security 
Council not taken into account) could be denoted as such: a form of cooperation 
between states, which ultimately cannot enforce anything. A confederacy can 
never be a state, which is why a ‘confederate state’ is a contradiction in terms 
(and why, for instance, the American confederacy was denoted as ‘Confederate 
States’ in the plural). Another typical example of a confederacy is the Republic 
of the Seven United Provinces, which existed between $')$ and $,('. In this 
political structure, the seven provinces deliberated on matters of common 
interest, most importantly their common defense, yet all of them retained the 
right to veto every proposal for collective action, and the central deliberative 
body, the Estates General, had no direct legislative powers over the citizens of 
the seven provinces. Moreover, the provinces retained a right to withdraw, and 
22 Cf. W.J.M. Mackenzie, and B. Chapman, ‘Federalism and Regionalism. A Note on the Italian 
Constitution of $(-)’, in: !e Modern Law Review, Vol. $-, No. # (Apr., $('$) $)#-$(-. See also 
Part II, Introduction.
23 In unitary states all decentralized (local or regional) administrative units derive their powers 
from the central sovereign authority, which ultimately holds the power to retain them. In these 
types of states the decentralized competencies are typically enacted in a centralized law which the 
centralized legislative is capable of broadening or narrowing. In a federal state, on the contrary, 
the central sovereign power recognizes that the decentralized administrative entities (usually 
indicated as ‘states’) have their own "elds of competence that the federal government has no 
right to interfere in. !e invention of this type of state is typically associated with the summer of 
$,), when the representatives of the thirteen former colonies gathered in Philadelphia to found 
the United States.
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no common direct taxation existed.24 !us, the variation of decentralization is 
not in"nite. A state ceases to exist if it decentralizes or devolves the fundamental 
attributes necessary for ultimate control.25 
!ere is also another reason why the argument that supranationalism is just 
another layer on an already layered structure of the state, is untenable. For the 
rationales of centralization and decentralization are completely opposed. To 
devolve governing and legislative tasks to a lower level, enabling the di+erent 
regions within a state to choose di+erent arrangements, is not the same as to 
transfer those tasks to a higher level, e+ectively compelling the di+erent regions 
to accept uniform arrangements. Precisely why decentralization exists, namely 
to distinguish legitimate state rule on fundamental activities, from "elds of 
minor importance, is denied by supranationalism; the logic of decentralization 
is diversity, while that of centralization is uniformity. !e larger the centralizing 
unit, the more oppressive the uniformity will be.26
In addition to the problems posed by decentralization, there is a second prob-
lem related to internal sovereignty: the separation of powers. No constitutional 
democracy at present has a monarch whose powers even remotely resemble those 
Jean Bodin or !omas Hobbes envisaged for the head of state. !is means that 
the single sovereign individual or institution, not only symbolizing the whole 
of the state, but actually acting as its only ultimate agent, may not even exist. 
As Mackenzie and Chapman write: 
!ere may be a constitutional division of functions between legislature, executive 
and judiciary: or between central legislature and local legislatures: or there may 
(as in the U.S.A.) be both divisions. In such cases one may be puzzled to say where 
true sovereignty lies: does it lie with ‘We, the people of the United States’ or with 
‘we, the nine old men of the Supreme Court’?27
If sovereignty in modern states, then, is in practice ‘divided’ amongst three 
branches of government, what meaning does it still have? Where is sovereignty 
ultimately to be found?28 
In most states, a division of powers indeed exists, and since these powers 
cannot be reduced to one another, it is sometimes argued that there is no central 
24 See for instance M. Huizer, Hoofd en hoogste overheid. De soevereiniteit in Nederland sinds .625 
(Amsterdam: J.M. Meulenho+, $(&,) and Ernst Kossmann, ‘Soevereiniteit in de Zeven Verenigde 
Provinciën’, in: !eoretische Geschiedenis, vol. $), issue - (dec. $(($) -$*--##. For a comparative 
perspective: T.F.X. Noble et al. ($(()) '').
25 !is is also why the ‘Confoederatio Helvetica’ – i.e. Switzerland – is really not a Helvetian 
confederation but a federation.
26 As discussed in chapter $, section #, this applies to the state itself as well. States are compromises.
27 Mackenzie and Chapman, ‘Federalism and Regionalism. A Note on the Italian Constitution 
of $(-)’, in: !e Modern Law Review, Vol. $-, No. # (Apr., $('$) $)#-$(-.
28 !is discussion was also touched upon in the previous paragraph.
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sovereignty anyway. !is could mean that it does not matter anymore where for 
instance the judiciary is located (in- or outside the state): separation is separation.
!is was the argument that Carl Schmitt disagreed with by stating that 
sovereignty lies with that person or institution that has the power to bring about 
the state of exception which even in federations lies with the federal executive.29 
Whichever view one takes on the question of where exactly the essence of state-
hood (i.e. ‘sovereignty’) is to be located, separation of powers is always much 
more a dialectic of powers than truly a separation. While it is true that three 
separate ‘functions’ of the state can be discerned, the executive, the legislative and 
the judiciary are never strictly divided among the di+erent organs of the state. 
Many legislative tasks reside with the executive (and the immense bureaucratic 
apparatus presently at its disposal), while modern parliaments primarily form 
a check on the power of the executive. Parliaments are sometimes burdened 
with some judicial tasks as well, for example trying members of the executive. 
Moreover, the members of the judicial branch are usually appointed by the 
executive or by parliament. !ey are expected to be nationals of the state, and 
can be held in check by the national legislator if their interpretation of the law 
is felt to exceed its intended margins. 
Internal sovereignty consists in the exercise of all these functions.30 To 
remove one of these functions from the state, as is done for instance through 
‘human rights courts’, is to remove it from the control of the other powers and 
so to upset the established balance.31 Moreover, the three powers recognized by 
Montesquieu cannot decide di+erently on any single issue. In that sense, they are 
inextricably linked, and such a linkage can only harmoniously continue where 
there is a similarity of cultural and historical assumptions.32 !erefore, those 
29 ‘Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet’. Carl Schmitt, Politische !eologie, 
Vier Kapitel zur lehre von der Souveränität (München und Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & 
Humboldt, $(*-) $.
30 As Laughland writes, when discussing H.L.A. Hart’s understanding of sovereignty (who in 
turn drew on John Austin): ‘If there were legal limits on a sovereign’s power, then he would not 
be a sovereign. !is is not to say, of course, that a government cannot be subject to the law as 
laid down in the courts. On the contrary, a state may well have such mechanisms as part of its 
constitution, and no doubt this is a desirable thing. But sovereignty is not an attribute of one body 
within a state but instead of the state as a whole. !e theory of sovereignty does not state at what 
level – national or international – nor in what form – dictatorial or democratic – it is desirable to 
embody sovereignty: it simply states that the buck always stops somewhere’, in: John Laughland, 
A History of political trials. From Charles I to Saddam Hussein (Oxford: Peter Lang, #%%)) #,.
31 Many commentators have suggested that a fourth branch of government power exists: the 
power of the public opinion. !is will be discussed in Part II and Part III, where it will be argued 
that on the supranational level, public opinions cannot really exercise this power – at least not to 
the extent that they can do this at the national level.
32 A clear example of how the judicidial branch can clash with the other branches of government 
is the Dred Scott v. Sandford case of the United States Supreme Court of $)',. In this case, the 
Supreme Court, dominated, as Robert Bork notes, ‘by Southeners’, ruled that the Missouri 
Compromise of $)#%, in which it was determined that new States would not allow slavery, was 
 3/D252=E01F -(
who demand that a single sovereign point be indicated before they are prepared 
to accept that such a thing as sovereign statehood exists, would probably be best 
contented with Schmitt’s de"nition of it as the one who ultimately decides on 
the state of exception and thus commands the army (which leads us back to 
e+ective governmental control).
But what then of already existing supranational entanglements, one may 
ask, do they make the states that are part of them, less sovereign? States became 
members of them out of their free will – and could withdraw from them if they 
so wished. How could those organizations then be an infringement of their 
sovereignty? I will try to "nd my way out of this dilemma by distinguishing 
two meanings of the word sovereignty: a formal or ‘ultimate’ meaning, and a 
material or ‘practical’ meaning.
!e "rst, the formal meaning of sovereignty, denotes the constitutional 
independence of a state. !e power of supranational organizations is ultimately 
based on their recognition by the national member states, which retain their 
right to withdraw and thereby retain their ultimate, ‘formal’ sovereignty. !e 
second, the material meaning of sovereignty, denotes the location where political 
decisions are being taken. !ough not sovereign in the ultimate, ‘formal’ sense, 
supranational organizations have acquired a signi"cant amount of this second, 
‘material’ sovereignty. 
Take as an example of this distinction the articles (* and (- of the Dutch 
constitution, which concern the direct e+ect of international treaties on Dutch 
law. Article (* reads: 
Provisions of treaties and of resolutions by international institutions which may 
be binding on all persons by virtue of their contents shall become binding a:er 
they have been published.
And article (- reads: 
Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such 
application is in con8ict with provisions of treaties that are binding on all persons 
or of resolutions by international institutions.33 
!ese articles declare the supranational obligations of the Netherlands superior to 
the national law, thus limiting the material or practical sovereignty of the Dutch 
parliament. Nevertheless, the Dutch parliament retains the ultimate sovereign 
right to scrap or amend these articles of the constitution, to cancel treaties, or 
a violation of the Constitutional right to have property (following from the 'th Amendment). 
As Bork notes, ‘!ere is something wrong, as somebody has said, with a judicial power that can 
produce a decision it takes a civil war to overturn’. Robert Bork, !e Tempting of America. !e 
political seduction of the Law (New York: !e Free Press, $((%) #)-*-.
33 Text taken from the o9cial translation of the Dutch constitution, to be found on the website 
of the Ministry of Foreign A+airs, www.minbzk.nl/contents/pages/&$'&/grondwet_UK_&-%#.pdf.
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to withdraw from supranational organizations, and so annul the international 
obligations of the Netherlands. Hence, the formal or ultimate sovereignty continues 
to repose with parliament. Formally, the Netherlands remain entirely sovereign, 
and would only cease to be so if the country lost its power to withdraw from 
the supranational organizations of which it is a member, or, what amounts to 
the same thing, loses its right to abolish or amend those articles that declare 
international obligations superior to national considerations.
!is formal or ultimate sovereignty is what people refer to when they say 
that sovereignty is by its nature indivisible. When John Laughland for example 
writes that ‘the theory of sovereignty (…) simply states that the buck always 
stops somewhere’,34 he means this formal sovereignty. !is kind of sovereignty 
is indeed like being pregnant: there is no intermediate stage possible. Either a 
state has the right to withdraw from treaties, or it does not have that right. Either 
parliament may amend the relevant constitutional commitments, or it may not. 
As implied, however, in the previous example, to recognize that sovereignty 
(in the formal or ultimate sense) is by nature indivisible is not to say that states 
cannot engage in far-reaching teamwork. It should only be noted that a state will 
not cease to be sovereign until it loses its right to resign from its supranational 
entanglements. !is was ultimately the question that the American civil war 
($)&$-$)&') was fought over, when the southern American states attempted to 
secede from the union.35 !e Southern American states fought for their formal 
or ultimate sovereignty – their right to withdraw from entanglements –, but 
did not succeed.
Indeed, if, as a sovereign political unit, a state decides to coordinate parts of 
its government’s policy (for example its trade tari+s) with those of other states, 
this can result in close cooperation. A state may even become a member of an 
institution that may, by majority vote, decide upon the policy to be followed 
by its members (in this case, the permitted trade tari+s), without losing its 
sovereignty as such, understood in the formal or ultimate sense.36 !ere is, 
however, still a fundamental di+erence between these two situations; between 
treaties between states as such, and an international body deciding by majority 
vote on policy regulations for its members. !ey are not exactly the same thing. 
And that brings us to sovereignty in the material or practical sense.
For while formal or ultimate sovereignty is the principal authority from 
which, in the last resort, all powers derive, and is, indeed by de"nition, indivis-
ible, material or practical sovereignty is the competency to decide as long and 
34 Laughland (#%%)) #,.
35 !e very fact is illustrated by the di+erent names for the war: the south called it the ‘war 
between the states’, the north called it the ‘civil war’.
36 ‘In the last resort, the US might walk away from the WTO. !at is an ultimate safeguard of 
sovereignty …’. Rabkin (#%%,) ##).
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as far as the ultimate sovereign permits it. !us material or practical sovereignty 
is there, where the political process is happening – which can be very much 
divided between organizations. When a state is a member of a supranational 
institution, apart from the question of its right to withdraw from it, it is, as long 
as it is a member of that organization, bound by its decisions, even to those with 
which it may not agree. !ough in the formal or ultimate sense, the member 
state is sovereign as it may still withdraw, as long as it has not done so it has lost 
elements of its material or practical sovereignty. !is distinction is important 
for the rest of this book, and it will return later on.
#.*. EB(#89); S&7#8#$:9(@
!is chapter opened with the observation that part of the reason why sovereignty 
is such a controversial concept is the fact that internal and external sovereignty 
are inextricably linked. External sovereignty – the acceptance of a state by 
others – is linked with the question whether that state successfully upholds 
internal sovereignty. Whether or not internal sovereignty is successfully upheld, 
moreover, may be disputed. States may deny an entity its external sovereignty, 
as many Arab states do with Israel, for instance; they may also grant external 
sovereignty to new entities, as happened with Kosovo in #%%(.
!is brings us to the fourth criterion for statehood, which is ‘the capacity to 
enter into relations with other states’. On this subject, two di+erent approaches 
exist. !e descriptive or declarative or realist, and the normative or constitutive 
or idealist. 
!e descriptive (or ‘declarative’ or ‘realist’) view starts from the observation 
that when an organization succeeds in establishing internal sovereignty, it has 
gained a de facto capacity to enter into relations with other states. !is de facto 
capacity is then viewed as the only criterion in international law, and so the 
entity is viewed as a sovereign state. You do business with whomever you can 
make deals with. 
!is approach echoes the authority as-the-power-to-make-rules (authority-$) 
approach that we associated in the previous section with Austin and Weber.37 
No matter how wildly unjust the rule of that organization may be or by what 
ruthless acts of aggression territorial control has been realized, once this e+ective 
control has been established, we can speak of a state, period. !e descriptive 
approach thus focuses on e+ectiveness.38
37 Weber ($(&-) *&.
38 Cf. James Crawford, !e Creation of States in International Law. Second Edition (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, #%%&).
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!e normative (or ‘constitutive’ or ‘idealist’) view, by contrast, holds that the 
capacity to enter into relations with other states is dependent on the general 
recognition by those other states, and that therefore, sovereignty is depend-
ent upon a signi"cant number of other states recognizing one as such. It is 
typically associated with the Congress of Vienna of $)$--', where the great 
powers determined what entities would be granted the status of statehood in 
post-Napoleonic Europe, despite demands of many more regions and groups 
to be recognized as such at the time.39 !e normative approach takes the inter-
national community’s recognition of a political entity as a state as the ultimate 
test, regardless of existing aspirations or even power realities on the ground. 
It thus focuses on legitimacy (to be granted or withheld by ‘the international 
community’), not on e+ectiveness.
Carl Schmitt may be identi"ed as a primary defender of the descriptive ap-
proach; Hans Kelsen as a defender of the normative approach.40 While Schmitt 
stressed the fact that norms cannot enforce anything by themselves, and that 
thus, ultimately, power determined the order of things; Kelsen concluded that 
‘sein’ did not say anything about ‘sollen’: whatever was the case, according to 
Kelsen, could never determine what ought to be the case – and law was the realm 
of ought, not of is.41 Kelsen argued that Schmitt’s approach was not ‘realist’ but 
‘apologist’, because it assumed that, in the words of Martti Koskenniemi, ‘might 
makes right’.42 
In practice, these two views are brought into play in turns, depending at 
least partly on the political interests that are served by them; when they can, 
states may prefer to act by the normative approach, but ultimately, legitimacy 
always follows power and the descriptive approach is indeed the more ‘realist’, 
the constitutive the more ‘idealist’ – a luxury states cannot always a+ord.43
A good example of how ambivalent states have been in their choice for 
either of these two approaches is the declaration dra:ed at the International 
Conference on Rights and Duties of States at Montevideo (Uruguay) in $(**. 
39 Cf. Adam Zamoyski, Rites of Peace. !e fall of Napoleon & !e Congress of Vienna (London: 
Harper Perennial, #%%,) xiii: ‘!e Congress of Vienna (…) determined which nations were to have 
a political existence over the next hundred years and which were not …’; also: N. Rosenkrantz, 
Journal du Congrès de Vienne .3.2-.3.6 (Copenhague: G.E.C. Gad, $('*).
40 Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. !e structure of international legal argument 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press #%%') ch. $ and -.
41 Kelsen defended a strict monism between the national legal order and the international order. 
In other words: international law formed an integral part of national law, in his view. Cf. Hans 
Kelsen, ‘Sovereignty and International Law’, in: !e Georgetown Law Journal, vol. -) ($(&%) &*,.
42 Koskenniemi (#%%') ##,. An insightful account of the debate between Schmitt and Kelsen 
can be found in Gelijn Molier, ‘De soevereine staat en het international recht’, in: Gelijn Molier 
and Timo Slootweg (eds.), Soevereiniteit en Recht, rechts+loso+sche beschouwingen (Den Haag: 
Boom Juridische Uitgevers, #%%() $-%+.
43 Cf. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, #%%*).
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A:er recon"rming the three criteria for internal sovereignty (or statehood) in 
the "rst article (e+ective control, territory, people), article * of the declaration 
reads: ‘the political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the 
other states’.44 Article ) seems consistent with this descriptive approach: ‘No 
state has the right to intervene in the internal or external a+airs of another.’ Yet 
article $$ then reads:
!e contracting states de"nitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise 
obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which 
have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in 
threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other e+ective coercive measure. 
!e territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation 
nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or 
for any motive whatever even temporarily.
!us article $$ establishes the legitimacy of the status quo at that speci"c moment 
in time, while, in an apparent contradiction, articles * and ) seem to give both 
to minorities within states as to states themselves the freedoms respectively to 
declare their own state or to adjust their borders according to their own assess-
ment of what their ‘external a+airs’ demand from them.
An example of policy based on such normative ideas as expressed by article 
$$ of the Montevideo declaration, is the memorandum that the American 
Secretary of State Henry Stimson had written to India and China in $(*$ stating 
that the United States would not recognize international territorial changes 
that were brought about through force (thereby implying support for India 
and China against rising Japanese imperial threats).45 An example of policy 
based on realist ideas expressed by article ) is the seizure by the United States 
of several former Axis territories following the end of the Second World War, 
such as the Ryukyu Islands o+ the Japanese coast.
Another example of the normative policy of the kind endorsed by article $$ is 
the message that the United States, with eighteen other (Latin) American states, 
sent to the governments of Bolivia and Paraguay in August $(*#, when hostilities 
over their (i.e. the Bolivian and Paraguayan) border dispute concerning the 
Chaco region were increasing. !e message contained the following passage:
!e American nations further declare that they will not recognize any territorial 
arrangement of this controversy which has not been obtained by peaceful means 
44 Rights and duties of Statehood, Montevideo convention $(**. Available online at http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/#%th_century/intam%*.asp.
45 !is memorandum turned out to be the starting point of what would become the ‘Stimson 
doctrine’, see on this: Kisaburo Yokota, ‘!e Recent Development of the Stimson Doctrine’, in: 
Paci+c A<airs, Vol. ), No. # (June, $(*') $**-$-*.
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nor the validity of the territorial acquisitions which may be obtained through 
occupation or conquest by force of arms.46
Yet when a cease-"re in $(*' brought an end to the full-blown war into which 
Bolivia and Paraguay, despite American attempts to downplay the con8ict, had 
entered, and most of the disputed Chaco boreal region was awarded to Paraguay, 
the United States supported the $(*) truce con"rming this new division of land.47 
Again political realities rather than high principles determined the choice of 
either approach. When this truce was "nally con"rmed in a treaty signed in April 
#%%(, the United States was present as one of the guarantors of the new borders.
Many more examples could be given of how descriptive and normative 
approaches are brought into play in turns, depending on political opportunity. 
Northern Cyprus forms a recent case in which the normative approach seems 
to have prevailed. !e region declared its independence from Cyprus proper 
in $()* and has since – with the strong support of Turkey – realized e+ective 
governmental control. Even though Northern Cyprus has now been a de facto 
state for almost *% years, the fact that it originated from a violent coup d’état (as 
well as the fact of Greek-Turkish animosity and Greece’s power as a member 
of the EU) still stands in the way of recognition by other states, and Turkey is 
the only state to have recognized Northern Cyprus to this day. When Kosovo 
declared itself independent from Serbia in #%%), however, it was instantaneously 
recognized by most Western states. Yet when later that same year the provinces 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia declared independence from Georgia, their inde-
pendence was met with skepticism and recognitions were not forthcoming.48
!us, there is no general rule as to how the fourth criterion for sovereign 
statehood – the capacity to enter into external relations – is to be interpreted, and 
as a result, it is interpreted according to political interests. Indeed, the distinction 
between the descriptive and the normative approach is more of theoretical than 
of practical relevance. For in practice, international recognition will always follow 
power. As long as disputes are still not settled, states may uphold principles of 
legitimacy to press for their desired outcome of the con8ict; but when they are 
settled, and principle becomes a denial of reality, states will, ultimately, always 
46 Yokota ($(*') $**-$-*. Yokota is right to write: ‘Like its predecessors, however, the Chaco note, 
in so far as it does not represent a formal treaty among States, cannot be regarded as possessing 
the force of international law nor as other than a simple declaration of policy’ – it is exactly this 
which is marks the distinction between the descriptive and the normative approach. 
47 F.O. Mora and J.W. Cooney, Paraguay and the United States: Distant Allies. !e United States 
and the Americas (Athens: University of Georgia Press, #%%,).
48 Of course, there is the distinction in international law between granted and withheld internal 
self-government. It has been argued, in this respect, that Kosovo was su+ering from such a lack 
of internal self-government, while this self-government had su9ciently been granted to South-
Ossetia and Abkhazia. But the question becomes then: who gets to make these analyses? Such 
criteria therefore do not solve the problem, but merely transpose it.
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adjust to the new status quo and accept that they will have to live with it. We 
will also see this later on when discussing the dispute over Alsace-Lorraine a:er 
the Franco-Prussian war.
!e "nal argument for the view that the di+erence between the descriptive 
and the normative approach is not essential is that when invoked by states, the 
normative approach "nds itself in a circular argument: ‘We do not recognize 
this political entity as a state, because it is not being recognized as a state’. !e 
opposite is also true: when the descriptive approach is invoked by states, they 
already implicitly recognize the existence of a state, and therefore comply with 
the demands of the normative approach: ‘We recognize this state, therefore 
it has been recognized’. To conclude, recognition by other states is ultimately 
dependent upon existing power realities. E+ectiveness, therefore, always trumps 
legitimacy (which is also why, in the last instance, classical international law is 





It is at this point that the question arises what kind of social bond, what kind 
of shared values, culture or loyalties, if any, are necessary within a sovereign 
state, to make the exercise of power democratically legitimate and indeed even 
possible. !is brings us to the concept of the nation.
Self-conscious ‘national’ thinking did not arise much before the downfall of 
feudalism. As a result of the Reformation and the increased power of monarchs, 
as discussed in the previous chapters, the "rst manifestations of national identity 
became visible during the ancien régime, o:en in conjunction with attempts 
by sovereigns to increase such national awareness. A particular example is the 
English case, where historians have identi"ed the rise of a signi"cant ‘national’ 
identity already in the $&th century under the house of Tudor.1 !is is expressed 
in some of Shakespeare’s plays, for instance, where proud reference is made to 
England and Englishness.2
1 Cf. G. R. Elton, England under the Tudors. !ird Edition (London: Routledge, $(($) $&%+. 
!e same may be true of Sweden since the times of Charles XII ($&)#-$,$)).
2 In Shakespeare’s Richard II ($'('), for instance, Gaunt says in act II, scene I: ‘!is royal throne 
of kings, this sceptred isle, !is earth of majesty, this seat of Mars, !is other Eden, demi-paradise, 
!is fortress built by Nature for herself, Against infection and the hand of war, !is happy breed 
of men, this little world, !is precious stone set in the silver sea, Which serves it in the o9ce of 
a wall, Or as a moat defensive to a house, Against the envy of less happier lands, – !is blessed 
plot, this earth, this realm, this England’. And in Henry V ($'((), act III, scene I, Henry says on 
the eve of the Battle of Agincourt: ‘Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more, Or close 
the wall up with our English dead!, In peace there’s nothing so becomes a man, As modest stillness 
and humility:, But when the blast of war blows in our ears, !en imitate the action of the tiger; 
Sti+en the sinews, conjure up the blood, Disguise fair nature with hard-favoured rage; !en lend 
the eye a terrible aspect; Let it pry through the portage of the head, Like the brass cannon; let the 
brow overwhelm it, As fearfully as doth a galled rock, Overhang and jutty his confounded base, 
Swilled with the wild and wasteful ocean. Now set the teeth, and stretch the nostril wide, Hold 
hard the breath, and bend up every spirit, To his full height! On, on, you noblest English, Whose 
blood is fet from fathers of war-proof! Fathers that, like so many Alexanders, Have in these parts 
from morn till even fought, And sheathed their swords for lack of argument. Dishonour not your 
mothers; now attest, !at those whom you called fathers did beget you! Be copy now to men of 
grosser blood, And teach them how to war. And you, good yeomen, Whose limbs were made in 
England, show us here, !e mettle of your pasture; let us swear, !at you are worth your breeding, 
which I doubt not; For there is none of you so mean and base, !at hath not noble lustre in your 
eyes. I see you stand like greyhounds in the slips, Straining upon the start. !e games afoot! Follow 
your spirit, and upon this charge cry, God for Harry, England, and Saint George!’. Stanley Wells 
and Gary Taylor (eds.), !e Oxford Shakespeare. !e Complete Works (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, $(((). Cf. Roger Scruton, England: an elegy (London: Chatto & Wandus, #%%%).
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With the beginning of the age of industrialization and democracy, national 
awareness signi"cantly increased.3 But before we continue, a caveat seems 
appropriate. For to locate the emergence of national awareness from the $,th 
century onwards is not to say, of course, that the cultural identity of European 
states came into existence only in that period. Nor does situating the rise of 
nationalism in these centuries imply that particular cultural regions may not 
have had a chauvinistic attitude towards what they would regard as their tradi-
tions; or that rising states, as discussed in chapter $, may not have attempted 
to increase social unity.4 With national thinking in this respect is meant the 
defense of a shared national identity by all inhabitants of a given territory; and 
thus, in the last instance, the understanding of the state as an expression of that 
constituting – pre-political – element.
!e reasons for the rise of this idea from roughly the $,th century onwards are 
not di9cult to see, since it was also around this time, that the exercise of political 
power moved away from the regional on the one hand, and the imperial or papal 
on the other, to the level of the state. We have already discussed the rise of the 
modern state and the ongoing centralization of its governing powers. !is also 
meant that closed regions slowly began to open up to larger units. !e beginning 
of industrialization, the growth of cities, dawning secularization, increase in 
grand oversees projects and trade, were all part of this development. Another 
development was the use of vernacular as an instrument of literary and o9cial 
communication. !e foundation of the Académie Française by Richelieu in $&*' 
symbolizes the responsibility the state began to take up to unify the ‘national’ 
language of communication.
But these developments coincided with an increased participation of the 
people in their governments. !e very idea of ‘representative government’, as 
3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Re*ections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
Revised Edition (New York: Verso, $(($) &-,.
4 !e European idea is, moreover, at least as old as the Early Middle Ages, and it might even be 
argued that rough cultural distinctions between what we presently regard as French and German 
cultural spheres, "nd their origin already in the division of the Empire of Charlemagne in the (th 
century. Cf. Reginald Dale, ‘!inking ahead: Old lines appear on Europe’s map’, in: International 
Herald Tribune, $, January $((', who writes: ‘It is true that Bonn’s ‘hard core’ – Germany, France 
and the Benelux countries – bears an uncanny resemblance to Charlemagne’s German-based 
empire. Anyone who thinks that such ancient history is no longer relevant should ponder this. 
!e two countries that most stoutly resisted Charlemagne’s attempts to introduce a common 
European coinage – England and Denmark – are still the toughest holdouts against a single 
currency nearly $,#%% years later.’ Another example is N. Grant, Oxford Children’s History of the 
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, #%%%) '&: ‘Between the 'th and $%th centuries, European 
tribes formed Christian kingdoms ruled by warrior kings. !e most successful were the Franks. 
!eir king Charlemagne created an empire that was the foundation of some of the nations of 
Europe today’. See also chapter -.,.
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implied in most if not all forms of democratic theory,5 presupposes the "ction of 
a common identity that can be represented as a collective whole. Ever since the 
American and French Revolutions,6 the democratic ideal has gained momentum 
and modern sovereign states, at least in Europe, all profess to adhere to it (even 
if they may su+er from serious democratic de"cits7).
!e democratic ideal brought about changes in virtually all aspects of life 
(simultaneously giving rise to an attempt to conserve what was le: of pre-
industrialized, pre-egalitarian life: romanticism8). !e growth of cities, the growth 
of the population, the increased division of labor, and so on, all contributed to 
this. !e "rst steam engine railway became operational in $)*%, dramatically 
opening up isolated regions to a larger whole. Another radical change occurred 
in the "eld of warfare. While armies had mainly consisted of noblemen and 
mercenaries in the ancien régime, universal conscription now arose9 – resulting 
in an enormous enlargement of the scale of social awareness. !e individual 
peasant or farmer became aware of himself as part of a state, not just as an 
inhabitant of a particular region or province.10 !ere can be no doubt that this 
in8uenced the experience of social membership and the political awareness of 
the people dramatically, starting with the "rst mandatory national conscription 
in world history following the French Revolution.
Indeed, all these elements of the increased in8uence on our lives of the modern 
state pose the question of membership. What is it that I share with you, from an 
entirely di+erent region, with perhaps di+erent beliefs and a di+erent ethnicity, 
that our votes are brought together in the same parliament? !at we have to live 
under the same law? And that ultimately, we may have to stand side by side in the 
defense of a perceived ‘national’ interest concerning again another region that 
forms a part of our state, but that we may have no particular relationship with?
5 !e idea of direct democracy being by de"nition opposed to the concept of representation, 
it has proved extremely hard if not impossible to realize it. Cf. Meindert Fennema, De Moderne 
Democratie. Geschiedenis van een politieke theorie (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, #%%$) ,+.
6 !e classical accounts on this are of course Tocqueville’s De la Democratie en Amérique 
($)*'-$)-%) and L’ancien régime et la Révolution ($)'&).
7 As, through the undemocratic legislation imposed by the EU, all European states now do. 
See for instance part II, chapter ', section *.
8 Cf. Maarten Doorman, De Romantische orde (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, #%%-); Rüdiger 
Safranski, Romantik. Eine deutsche A<äre (München: Hanser, #%%,); H.G. Schenk, !e Mind of 
the European Romantics: An Essay in Cultural History, (London: Constable, $(&&).
9 See on this for instance Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution? Military Change and European 
Society, .66-–.3-- (London: Macmillan education, $(($).
10 ‘Omnis determinatio negatio est’. Every a9rmation implies a negation, and this seems to 
be the same with national identities, which have o:en gained shape in the face of a ‘national’ 
enemy. As Carl Schmitt notices the re8ections of the economist and sociologist Emil Lederer: 
‘Wir können sagen, dass sich am Tage der Mobilisierung die GesellschaA, die bis dahin bestand, 
in eine GemeinschaA umformte’. ‘Der Begri+ des Politischen’, in: Frieden oder Pazi+smus? (Ducker 
& Humblot, Berlin, #%%') #%-n,.
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It is in the light of this question, the ‘what do I share with you’-question, 
that ‘national thought’ and the much despised ideal of ‘nationalism’ ought to 
be understood.
*.#. IC):$9#= T#88$(&8$); C&CC>9$($#%
But before we continue our inquiry into national loyalty, however, it is worthwhile 
to make some preliminary comments about the word ‘nation’, as it is the cause 
of wide confusion. !is is partly so because it is regularly used as a synonym for 
‘state’. An example is its usage in United Nations, an international organization 
that deals with states, not nations.11 Another confusing usage is International 
Law, which deals with legal associations between states, not nations. And so 
on. ‘Nation’ and ‘State’ are o:en muddled up. 12
Another impure usage of the word ‘nation’ is to denote an ethnic, a religious, 
or a lifestyle community. !is happens for instance when we speak of the ‘na-
tion of Islam’, a Chicago-based organization that seeks to unite and foster the 
interests not of a nation but of an ethno-religious group. ‘Nationality’ is used as 
synonymous with ‘ethnicity’ in much everyday talk. And a third example is the 
‘universal zulu nation’, an organization that brings together people who enjoy 
and produce hip hop music, world wide.
If the word nation has a meaning of its own, not as a synonym for state, 
religion, ethnicity, or lifestyle, it is to denote a form of political loyalty stemming 
from an experienced collective identity, and would thus be of a sociological, 
rather than a legal, credal, or ethnic nature. Although a sense of political loyalty 
is a given of our – settled, political – existence, the expression of this loyalty 
in terms of nationality is not. Governments are always in need of the political 
loyalty of their subjects, but this loyalty is not always national in nature. Indeed, 
national loyalty is in fact a rather recent form of political loyalty, which has not 
been common throughout most of political history.
Many people have been troubled with nationalism as a historical, political 
and ideological phenomenon, and have disagreed on its proper de"nition. 
Literally thousands of books have been written about the subject.13 Not discour-
aged by this, nor by the conclusion of the historian Eric Hobsbawm that ‘no 
11 It is true that the United Nations also has many ‘Non-governmental organizations’ (NGO’s) 
participating in its debates, but the core of the organization remains to be formed by states; 
illustrative for this is that to this date, only states have voting rights within the UN bodies. 
Moreover, NGO’s are not coterminous with nations either.
12 See also: Paul Belien, ‘Why Belgium is an arti"cial state’, in: !e Brussels Journal, August #,, 
#%%,. Available online at http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/#*&(.
13 For an instructive, general overview, see Kenneth R. Minogue, Nationalism (Maryland: 
Penguin Books, $(&)) $(+. 
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satisfactory criterion can be discovered for deciding which of the many human 
collectivities should be labeled as a nation’,14 I will in the following try to further 
the understanding of nationality not through identifying particular qualities 
that may de"ne membership – e.g. shared language, history, and so on – but 
through de"ning it as a speci"c type of membership. I suggest de"ning a nation 
as a community that is both imagined and territorial. As such, I will contrast 
it with unimagined-territorial or ‘tribal’ communities on the one hand, and 
imagined-nonterritorial or ‘religious’ and ‘universal’ communities on the other.15
Understanding the nation as an ‘imagined community’ was "rst done by the 
political scientist Benedict Anderson (*$(*&). In his book Imagined Communities, 
Anderson focused on the rise of nationalism in former colonies, and he de"ned 
nations as ‘imagined communities’ because people experience themselves to be 
part of a community of which they do not know most of the members.16 It is 
certain that an element of imagination is necessary for any national experience, 
because it is impossible to be personally acquainted with every other member of 
your nation (let alone to feel sympathy for each single one of them). However, 
not all imagined communities are also national communities. !is is because 
it is also possible to experience oneself as part of an imagined, non-territorial 
community.
Joseph Stalin, the future Soviet leader, had pointed at the territorial element in 
his $($* book entitled Marxism and the national question. In the book, he observed 
that ‘a nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed 
on the basis of common language, territory, economic life, and psychological 
make up manifested in a common culture’.17 It is remarkable that Stalin wrote 
about nationalism,18 as Marxism, of course, emphasized the horizontal loyalty of 
class and market position, unbound by borders, as contrasted with the vertical 
loyalty of upper and lower classes as joined under a common allegiance to the 
sovereign. ‘National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and 
more impossible’, the Communist Manifesto declares,19 and it continues:
14 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since .43-, programme, myth, reality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, $((%) ', quoted in: Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter (eds.), !e national 
question in Europe in historical context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, $((*) xvii.
15 !is is not an exhaustive classi"cation, and no doubt other loyalties could be identi"ed: 
professional loyalty is an example.
16 Anderson ($(($) #+.
17 Joseph V. Stalin, Works .,-4-.,.5 (Moscow, $('*) vol. II, *%,, quoted in: Teich and Porter 
(eds.), !e national question in Europe in historical context (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, $((*) xvii.
18 And a di+erent interpretation of the national di+erences was one of the main reasons for 
his con8ict with Trotsky.
19 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party ($)-)). Authorised 
English translation of $))), edited and annotated by Frederick Engels (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, $)))). Cf. Max Eastman, ‘!e Manifesto of the Communist Party’, in: Max Eastman (ed.), 
Capital. !e Communist Manifesto and other Writings (New York: !e modern library, $(*#) *$'+.
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!e proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no 
longer anything in common with the bourgeois family relations; modern industry 
labor, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America 
as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character.
!e worker, it is assumed, has no nationality; he ‘has no country’.20
Despite Marxist resistance to nationality, Stalin’s understanding of nationality 
contains an interesting complement to Anderson. For besides the fact that it 
implies an imagined community, the experience of nationality, I propose, indeed 
encompasses a notion of territoriality. A nation claims a particular piece of land 
and declares that it belongs to her. As such, it permits a social and political 
order that is also a relation among strangers who may have di+erent ethnicities 
and religions – united as they are in their common commitment to their land. 
Depending on the many manifestations of nationality, membership of this 
social order can be more or less open to newcomers, welcoming them or chasing 
them away. !ese approaches to the criteria for national membership, which 
may di+er from one nation to another,21 will be discussed in the next section. 
For now, we may safely contend that nationality, or the experience of national 
belonging, consists essentially in a shared political loyalty among a group of 
people, with two de"ning characteristics:
 $. Its scale is imagined, allowing membership to be extended to a large group 
far exceeding the size of the family or tribe; 
 #. Its claim pertains to a particular territory, contrasting with those forms of 
membership – for example religious ones –, that are essentially universal 
(instead of territorial).
As mentioned before, national loyalty contrasts with at least two other forms of 
loyalty: tribal or ‘unimagined’ loyalty, and religious or ‘non territorial’ loyalty.
!e tribal loyalty I called ‘unimagined’ to juxtapose it to the national, ‘im-
agined’ loyalty of a group larger than one may ever know (attaching to ideas 
rather than to kinship).22 Tribal loyalties take shape in groups that are more or 
less knowable and thus have no need to be ‘imagined’ like a nation. It might 
seem tempting to argue that they form the infancy of man’s political existence, 
yet tribal loyalty still seems to be predominant in many parts of the world. 
Many African people do not primarily experience a national – imagined and 
territorial – membership, and their loyalties tend to reach more towards their 
20 Marx and Engels ($)))).
21 Cf. Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States. An enquiry into the origins of nations and the 
politics of nationalism (Colorado: Westview Press $(,,) -&,--&(, Teich and Porter (eds.) ($((*), 
and Margaret Canovan, Nationhood and political theory (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, $((&).
22 And indeed modern technology such as TV plays an important role in fostering the national 
awareness, as national newspapers have done in the nineteenth century.
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village, their tribe or family, and political life is o:en divided along lines set by 
these sentiments.
Tribal loyalty also seems to be the form of loyalty of nomadic people, like, 
traditionally, Native Americans and Bedouins. Instead of settling on a speci"c 
territory, they wander from place to place, their communities are usually small 
in size, and they o:en live with strict rules of cohesion, which are also necessary 
for them to survive in frequently harsh conditions (typically, punishment is 
severe, as deviant behavior may threaten the entire tribe’s survival).23 Also, the 
tribe is almost everywhere found to be ethnically homogeneous.24
A religious loyalty, in contrast with tribal loyalty, may be very imagined and 
may therefore pertain to a large group of people, yet it is di+erent from national 
loyalty in that it is not bound to a territory, nor even essentially about a territory.25 
While the tribe tends to limit itself to a close group, religious membership can be 
experienced wholly separated from others. What is characteristic for a religious 
loyalty, moreover, is that while it is imagined, it can easily result in placing 
religious rules above the rules of the actual political community. Europe at the 
time of the Reformation, for example, went through a con8ict between religious 
and national loyalty, expressed through the dispute on ultimate legal authority.26 
!e papal bull Regnans in Excelsis is a good illustration of this con8ict. Issued in 
$',%, this bull declared the Protestant Queen Elizabeth I of England an unlawful 
ruler and charged ‘the nobles, subjects, peoples and others (…) that they do 
not dare obey her orders, mandates and laws’.27 Another example is formed by 
the Catholic Spanish King Philip II, who proclaimed in $')% that ‘everyone 
is authorized to harm, or kill’ the Protestant leader of the Dutch Republic, 
William of Orange. !is order was the leading pretext for the devout Catholic 
Balthasar Gérard to assassinate the Dutch prince in his house in Del: in $')-.28 
23 !ere are of course tribes consisting of so large a population that their identity must to some 
extend be ‘imagined’ too. Still, however, the experience of loyalty on the basis of ethnic kin is 
fundamentally di+erent from the loyalty on the basis of shared nationality.
24 Cf. M. Banton, West African City. A Study of Tribal Life in Freetown (London: Oxford 
University Press, $(',).
25 Neither of these ideal-typical distinctions are without exceptions, of course. !e Anglican 
Church, for instance, promotes a religious loyalty, yet connected to the English nation. !ere would 
be many more examples of overlapping loyalties. !e purpose here is, however, to distinguish 
ideal-typical types of loyalty.
26 See on these and other examples Cliteur (#%%,) and Cliteur, !e Secular Outlook (London: 
Wiley Blackwell, #%$%).
27 !e entire text of the bull can be found, in translation, on http://www.papalencyclicals.net/
Pius%'/p'regnans.htm.
28 See on this, for instance: Cliteur (#%%,) $&-+, and: Lisa Jardine, !e Awful end of Prince 
William the Silent. !e +rst Assassination of a head of state with a Handgun (London: HarperCollins, 
#%%'), who writes on page '$: ‘!is act of assassination was, it appeared, the deed of a solitary 
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Arguably, the questions of the allegiance of Catholic citizens to their Protestant 
rulers in the age of the Reformation are comparable to current questions related 
to Islamic terrorism. Indeed, to several observers, they can only be explained 
properly with this problem in mind, which is also known as the problem of the 
divine command theory.29
National loyalty di+ers from these other forms of loyalty, in that the primary 
object of its loyalty is not a tribe or a faith, but a territory and its patrimony. 
A national loyalty enables a dramatic enlargement of the scale of political 
organization as compared to a tribal loyalty. It also enables people of di+erent 
religious beliefs – indeed of every possible di+erent background, be it ethnic, 
racial, cultural, or religious – to overcome their di+erences and accept the same 
sovereign state, given that this state succeeds in attaching its authority to the 
nationality of its population (hence the packing together of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ 
in the normative conception of the nation state).
*.*. W#;?&C$9: N#F?&C#8%
In this section I will develop three idealtypical forms of national membership in 
order to further our understanding of it. !e "rst I would call the universalist-
enlightened approach, which is that it is not – or hardly – necessary. According 
to this approach, political organization can entirely be borne by institutions, 
and the social experience of membership is at best a useful by-product of this, 
but is certainly not a constituting element.
!en, there is the approach that I would call particularist-romantic, reminding 
us of the great nationalisms in history. According to this view of nationality, it 
is necessarily a closed condition; it is impossible to switch from one nation to 
another, and as a result, foreigners, even those who desire to assimilate, could 
not be accepted.
!e third approach, "nally, is that national identity is necessary, but that it can 
be an open condition; that in principle, nations are indeed closed communities, 
but that those who wish to belong can become part of the nation through their 
e+ort: through integration and assimilation.
For analytical purposes, it may be helpful to associate the "rst approach 
with the Enlightenment and the universalist ideals typically connected with 
the French Revolution; the second approach, then, can easily be associated 
with Romanticism, emphasizing the element of determinism in life. And "nally, 
fanatic, a loner with an intense commitment to the catholic Church and a faithful upholder of 
the legitimacy of the rule of Philip II in the Netherlands …’.
29 See on this: Cliteur (#%%,), and Roger Scruton, !e West and the Rest. Globalization and the 
terrorist threat (Delaware: ISI Books, #%%#).
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there is the way out of the dilemma between these two extremes, provided by 
the concept of patriotism. As the word nation originally comes from the Latin 
nascor, meaning ‘I am born’, the word patriotism is derived from the Latin patria, 
meaning ‘fatherland’. !e Latin root also returns in words like ‘patrimony’ and 
‘patrimonium’, referring to something that has been inherited from ancestors, 
but may also be acquired independently from birth.
!e universalist-enlightened model of nationality developed in the eighteenth 
century, and found an obvious expression in the French Revolution. While it 
was in part the cry for the sovereignty of the ‘nation’ that fueled the French 
revolutionaries,30 they were not occupied with the question of cultural or ethnic 
components inherent in this collective. On the contrary: in revolutionary 
writings, for instance the $,)( essay Qu’est ce que le Tiers-Etat?, written by the 
clergyman Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, emphasis is placed on liberating people 
from their social context: their inherited social position, their class and their 
ancestors, all had to give way to the new ideal of equality.31 Indeed, Sieyès argued 
that a nation is nothing but ‘a body of associates living under common laws 
and represented by the same legislative assembly’.32 Stressing the need for just 
laws and nothing else, we see that in the thinking of Sieyès, ‘state’ and ‘nation’ 
are used as synonyms.33
!e political regime that took power a:er the revolution attempted to govern 
in accordance with this view. It had the ideal to de"ne individuals ‘by their 
humanity, not by their place of birth’: their race or their class.34 As Finkielkraut 
notes:
!is revolutionary project had no intention of trying to create a collective identity 
(…). On the contrary: by setting [the people] free of all de"nitive ties, it radically 
a9rmed their autonomy.35 
In his Préliminaire de la constitution, written in $,)(, Sieyès derives the desired 
structure of the French constitution entirely from man’s universal qualities and 
30 Alain Finkielkraut, !e defeat of the mind. Translated by Judith Friedlander (New York: 
Columbia University Press, $((') $).
31 On the French Revolution’s abolition of privilege, see: W.H. Sewell jr., Work and revolution 
in France: the language of labor from the Old Regime to .323 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, $()%) ,)-)-.
32 Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes, Qu’est-ce que le Tiers état? (Geneve: Libraire Droz, $(,%) $#&: ‘un 
corps d’associés vivant sous une loi commune et représentés par la même législature …’.
33 It is true that Sieyès’ thinking is much more complex and layered than can be discussed here; 
his pleas for a national education in order to instill in all citizens a love of France, for instance, is an 
interesting example of this. Nevertheless, the focus in his work was hardly on the cultural factors 
that made French subjects into French nationals. See on this: !omas Hafen, Staat, GesellschaA 
und Bürger im Denken von Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes (Wien: Haupt, $((-) ,$-)).
34 Finkielkraut ($((') $#.
35 Ibidem.
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inalienable rights.36 !e approach to society is straightforwardly universalist – 
attempting to deal only with man, not men. !is naturally provoked a reaction. 
!e philosopher Joseph de Maistre answered the ‘universal declaration of the 
rights of man’ with the observation (in $,(&) that no such thing as ‘man’ exists: 
‘il n’y a point d’homme dans le monde’. He continued:
I have seen, in my life, Frenchmen, Italians, Russians, et cetera, and I even know, 
thanks to Montesquieu, that one can be Persian: but a man, I declare that I have 
never run into one in my life: if he exists, it is certainly without my knowledge.37
Maistre did not stand alone. In response to the universal ideals of the Enlighten-
ment, many di+erent thinkers began to de"ne the nation expressly in contrast 
with the state: as an organic soul, grown through an historical process, entirely 
disconnected from political organization – of which only those who shared in 
its blood could be a part. !is happened most notably in the German states, 
which indeed did not even form such a uni"ed political entity at the time.
!e publication of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Auch eine Philosophie der 
Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit ($,,-)38 is o:en marked as the starting 
point of this particularist-romantic nationalism. In this work, Herder criticizes 
the all too universal outlook on mankind that the Enlightenment thinkers, for 
example Voltaire, had chosen. He reproaches ‘den Philosophen von Paris’ that 
they want to educate ‘toute l’Europe und tout l’Univers’,39 because that must 
inevitably lead to a grey, meaningless, sterile society. Making his argument 
mostly by ironical observations, Herder writes:
With us, God be praised!, all national characters have been extinguished! We love 
all of us, or rather no one needs to love the other. We socialize with each other; 
are completely each other’s like – ethically proper, polite, blissful!; indeed have 
no fatherland, no our-people for whom we live, but are friends of humanity and 
citizens of the world.40
36 Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, ‘Préliminaire de la Constitution. Reconnoissance et exposition 
raisonnée des droits de l’homme et du citoyen. Lu les #% et #$ juillet $,)(, au comité de constitution’, 
in: Ibidem, Ecrits Politiques. Choix et presentation de Roberto Zapperi (Paris: Editions des Archives 
Contemporaines, $()') $(#+.
37 Joseph de Maistre, ‘Considérations sur la France’, in: Oeuvres complètes (Lyon: Vitte, $))-, 
reprinted: Genève, Slatkine, $(,() tome I, ,': ‘J’ai vu, dans ma vie, des Français, des Italiens, des 
Russes, etc., je sais même, grâce à Montesquieu, qu’on peut être Persan: mais quant à l’homme, 
je déclare ne l’avoir jamais rencontré de ma vie: s’il existe, c’est bien à mon insu’.
38 Translated as: ‘!is too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity’, in: Johann 
Gottfried von Herder, Philosophical Writings. Translated and edited by Michael N. Forster 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, #%%#) #,#-*&%. Ioannis D. Evrigenis and Daniel 
Pellerin (eds.), Another Philosophy of History and Selected Political Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, #%%-).
39 Johann Gottfried Herder, Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit. 
Nachwort von H.G. Gadamer (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, $(&,) )*.
40 Herder (#%%#) *#(. In German, the text reads: ‘Bei uns sind Gottlob! alle Nationalcharaktere 
ausgelöscht! wir lieben uns alle, oder vielmehr keiner bedarf ’s, den andern zu lieben; wir gehen mit 
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In Auch eine Philosophie, Herder argues for the uniqueness of each nation as a 
cultural entity. ‘Each nation’, he writes, ‘has its center of happiness in itself, like 
every sphere its center of gravity!’41 And in later work, as Isaiah Berlin cites, he 
calls on the Germans: 
Let us follow our own path (…) let men speak well or ill of our nation, our literature, 
our language: they are ours, they are ourselves, and let that be enough.42 
For Herder, ‘the plurality of collective souls’ is formed through the historical 
reality of ‘nationhood’.43 Although Herder recognized that in God’s perspective, 
all humans are alike, a human perspective on mankind should not pursue such 
an abstract viewpoint, he believed.44 
It is important to note that Herder was, when he published his ideas in $,,-, a 
pioneer of romantic nationalism, and one of the "rst to voice the particularities 
of the di+erent nations.45 But a:er the defeat and humiliation of the German 
states by Napoleon in $)%&, it became a general vogue to search for a ‘true’ Ger-
man identity. Take for example the Grimm brothers, who from $)%& onwards 
roamed the country to collect German folk tales, the "rst collection of which 
was published in $)$%; or Des Knaben Wunderhorn, a similar collection of 
tales made available by Achim von Arnim and Clemens Brentano in the same 
period.46 No doubt partly in order to compensate their military – and indeed 
political – powerlessness, the Germans ‘embraced everything Teutonic with a 
passion’, as Finkielkraut puts it.47
It is also with this atmosphere in mind that Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Reden 
an die Deutsche Nation should be read. In the winter of $)%,-$)%), in French-
occupied Berlin, Fichte declared that Germany could only defend itself against 
foreign powers by uniting politically. In that way, the romantic idea of an organic 
national identity entirely separate from political organization was reconnected 
again to a political structure:
It is solely by means of the common trait of Germanness that we can avert the 
downfall of our nation threatened by its con8uence with foreign peoples and 
einander um, sind einander völlig gleich – gesittet, hö8ich, glückselig! haben zwar kein Vaterland, 
keine Unsern, für die wir leben; aber sind Menschenfreunde und Weltbürger’. Herder ($(&,) (-.
41 In German, the text reads: ‘Jede Nation hat ihren Mittelpunkt der Glückseligkeit in sich wie 
jede Kugel ihren Schwerpunkt!’ Herder ($(&,) -'. !e phrase is also discussed by Isaiah Berlin, 
in: Vico and Herder (London: !e Hogarth Press, $(,&) $)&.
42 Isaiah Berlin ($(,&) $)#.
43 Finkielkraut ($((') )-(.
44 Herder ($(&,) $%'.
45 Cf. R. Safranski, Romantik. Eine deutsche A<äre (München: Hanser, #%%,), chapter $.
46 See on this: M. Tatar, ‘Reading the Grimm’s Children’s Stories and Household Tales: Origins 
and Cultural e+ects of the Collection’, in: !e Annotated Brothers Grimm (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, #%%-) xxvii and further.
47 Finkielkraut ($((') (.
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once more win back a self that is self-supporting and incapable of any form of 
dependency.48
!us two positions, the universalist and the particularist, the former typically 
associated with the French Revolution and the Enlightenment, the latter with 
the German defeat by Napoleon and Romanticism, stood radically opposed 
to each other. And it was more than half a century later before the debate on 
nationality made further progress.
!is was triggered by the Franco-Prussian war. Commencing on July $(th, 
$),%, this war would last a year, and at the "nal peace treaty, signed on May 
$%th, $),$, a united Germany emerged, seizing Alsace and the northern part of 
Lorraine (la Moselle). German political philosophers concluded that the conquest 
was legitimate, because, inspired by the Herderian approach to the nation, the 
territories – fondly denoted as ‘unsere Rheinlande’49 – were identi"ably of Ger-
man cultural origin, and the inhabitants spoke mostly German. Two of the most 
notable participants in defending this seizure were the German philosophers 
David Friedrich Strauss and !eodor Mommsen.50 Two Frenchmen, Ernest 
Renan and Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, o+ered them a reply.51 
David Friedrich Strauss, in an open letter he wrote to Ernest Renan in the 
opening months of the war – when France still possessed Alsace-Lorraine –, 
spoke of the French ‘robbery of the fruits of our 8esh’;52 the fact that ‘a few rooms 
of our house’ had been appropriated ‘by the violent neighbor in earlier times’ 
had already been almost forgotten, he claimed53 – but now, when France had 
48 Johann-Gottlob Fichte, Addresses to the German nation. Edited with an introduction and 
notes by Gregory Moore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, #%%)) $$. !e original German 
reads: ‘Es [ist] lediglich der gemeinsame Grundzug der Deutschheit, wodurch wir den Untergang 
unsre Nation im Zusammen8ießen derselben mit dem Auslande, abwehren, und worin wir ein 
auf ihm selber ruhendes, und aller Abhängigkeit durchaus unfähiges Selbst, wiederum gewinnen 
können’. Ibidem, Reden an die Deutsche Nation (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, $(,)) $*.
49 David Friedrich Strauss, Krieg und Friede .34-. Zwei Briefe von David Friedrich Strauss 
an Ernst Renan und desen Antwort, mit einem Anhang: Carlyle an die Times (Leipzig: Im Insel 
Verlag, $),%) -(. !e "rst letter appeared in the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung on August $)th, 
$),%, the second on October #nd.
50 David Friedrich Straus ($)%)-$),-) is best known for his theological works, especially his $)*' 
Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet, in which he is searching for a new (demystifying) approach 
to the New Testament. Christian Matthias !eodor Mommsen ($)$,-$(%*) is best known for his 
research in classics. He was also awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature, for his $)'--$)'& Römische 
Geschichte.
51 Ernest Renan ($)#*-$)(#) was a writer, philosopher, orientalist, theologian and mathematician. 
Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges ($)*%-$))() was an historian.
52 David Friedrich Strauss, Krieg und Friede .34-. Zwei Briefe von David Friedrich Strauss an 
Ernst Renan und desen Antwort, mit einem Anhang: Carlyle an die Times (Leipzig: Im Insel Verlag, 
$),%) -(: ‘Beraubung der Früchte unseres Fleisches’.
53 !e region had been part of the Holy Roman Empire roughly since (#$. France has throughout 
its history always been envious of it. By conquest upon conquest, it succeeded to gradually take 
possession of the region from the mid-$&th century onwards, completing this e+ort in $,(), when 
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again taken up arms against the Germans, ‘these old questions wake up once 
more as well’.54
!e French, arguing for the illegitimacy of the announced German oc-
cupation of Alsace and Lorraine, were drawn to devising another conception 
of nationality than the previously predominant universalist one (because that 
would not help them to argue that any region ever belonged to anyone, whilst 
only recognizing abstract individuals under a neutral state). In doing so, these 
Frenchmen developed the conception of nationality that I consider the most 
helpful for us today.
Renan’s answer to David Friedrich Strauss appeared shortly a:er the battle of 
Sedan, which had in fact practically decided the Franco-Prussian war.55 Renan 
acknowledged that Alsace was German in origin, as Strauss had stressed, but 
noted that ‘it is indisputable that, if we would put the question to the people of 
Alsace, an immense majority would declare itself in favor of staying together 
with France’.56
A day later, !eodor Mommsen published a letter in the Florentine newspaper 
Il Diritto. !e letter was addressed to the political director of that newspaper, 
Clemente Maraini. In this letter, he argued that the only way to solve the 
centuries-old con8ict with the French would be to turn to ‘the sacred principle 
of nationality’ and take back the old German provinces, rendering any possible 
outcome of a referendum irrelevant:
the only solution is to stand by the sacred principle of nationality, and to rejoin 
the regions of German nationality to Germany.57
Mommsen admitted that ‘the majority of the inhabitants would prefer to stay 
under French government’, but held that a part of a nation may not decide all by 
itself to leave the nation, as Sicily would not be allowed to leave the Italian union.58 
‘We lay claim to the Germans of Alsace and Lorraine because they are Germans, 
the city-state of Mulhouse in a referendum voted to become part of the French revolutionary 
republic. Mulhouse was also the place of birth of Alfred Dreyfus ($)'(-$(*').
54 Strauss ($),%) -(: ‘Einige Zimmer (…) unseres Hauses’ (…) ‘der gewalttätige Nachbar in 
früheren Zeiten’ (…) wachen auch diese alten Fragen wieder auf ’.
55 At the battle of Sedan, which took place on September #nd, $),%, the French emperor Napoleon 
III was captured by the Prussian and Bavarian armies, which thenceforth marched on to Paris.
56 Ernste Renan, ‘Lettre a M. Strauss’, in: Ibidem, Histoire et parole. Oeuvres diverses (Paris: 
Robert La+ont, $()-) &*(-&-(, there &---&-': ‘Il est incontestable que, si on soumettait la question 
au peuple alsacien, une immense majorité se prononcerait pour rester unie à la France’.
57 !eodor Mommsen, ‘Lettere al sig.Clemente Maraini’, in: Il Diritto (September $,th, $),%). 
Available online at http://www.mommsenlettere.org/Letter/Details/*#*: ‘l’unico salvamento è 
attenersi ai santi principi della nazionalità, riunire i distretti di nazionalità tedesca alla Germania’.
58 !e Italian uni"cation had been brought about in $)&$, and comparable discussions were 
held about the Italian national identity at the time. Cf. Adrian Lyttelton, ‘!e national question in 
Italy’, in: Teich and Porter (eds.), !e national question in Europe in historical context (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, $((*) &*-$%'.
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and because today an immense majority of the German nation wants to reunite 
them with the common fatherland; I think that makes them good democrats’.59
Fustel de Coulanges wrote his réponse à M. Mommsen in October $),%, enti-
tled L’Alsace est-elle allemande ou française?.60 ‘You believe’, Fustel de Coulanges 
recapitulated, ‘that Alsace is a German land; and that therefore, it should belong 
to Germany.’ He continued:
She speaks German, and as a consequence, you believe that Prussia can take pos-
session of her. In virtue of this reasoning you ‘revindicate’ her; you want that she 
be ‘restored’. She is yours, you say, and you add: ‘we want to take all that is ours, 
nothing more, nothing less’. You call this the principle of nationality’.61
But the question was, of course, what it was that constituted that ‘principle of 
nationality’. Why would Alsace and Lorraine be ‘German’ instead of ‘French’? 
Fustel de Coulanges comes to his conclusions:
What singles out nations is not race, nor language. People feel in their hearts that 
they are the same people when they have a community of ideas, interests, a+ec-
tions, memories and hopes. !at is what makes a fatherland. (…) One’s fatherland 
is the land one loves.62 
Renan argued in practically the same manner. In a second letter written to David 
Friedrich Strauss, a year later, he stated: ‘!e individuality of every nation is no 
doubt constituted by race, language, history, and religion, but also by something a 
lot more tangible, by actual consent, by the will of the several provinces of a state 
to live together.’ He admitted that Alsace was German in language and race, but, 
She does not want to be part of the German state; that settles the matter. We speak 
of the right of France, and the right of Germany. But these abstractions touch us 
much less than the right of the Alsatians, living beings of 8esh and bone, not to 
obey to a power not agreed upon by themselves.63 
59 Mommsen (September $,th, $),%): ‘la maggioranza degli abitanti preferirebbe di rimanere 
sotto il governo francese’ (…) Noi rivendichiamo i Tedeschi dell’Alsazia e della Lorena perché 
sono Tedeschi, e perché ora l’immensa maggioranza della nazione Tedesca vuol riunirgli alla 
comune patria; e penso che in ciò siano buoni democrati’.
60 Nouma Denis Fustel de Coulanges, ‘L’Alsace, est-elle allemande ou français?’, in: Ibidem, 
Questions Historiques (Paris: Libraire Hachette $)(*) '%'.
61 Fustel de Coulanges ($)(*) '%': ‘L’Alsace, à vous en croire, est un pays Allemand; donc elle 
doit appartenir à l’Allemagne. (…) Elle parle allemande, et vous en tirez cette conséquence que 
la Prusse peut s’emparer d’elle. En vertu de ces raisons vous la ‘revendiquez’A; vous voulez qu’elle 
vous soit ‘restituée’. Elle est vôtre, dites-vous, et vous ajoutez: ‘nous voulons prendre tout ce qui 
est nôtre, rien de plus, rien de moins’. Vous appelez cela le principe de nationalité’.
62 Fustel de Coulanges ($)(*) '%(: ‘Ce qui distingue les nations, ce n’est ni la race, ni la langue. 
Les hommes sentent dans leur cœur qu’ils sont un même peuple lorsqu’ils ont une communauté 
d’idées, d’intérêts, d’a+ections, de souvenirs et d’espérances. Voilà ce qui fait la patrie. (…) La 
patrie, c’est ce qu’on aime.’
63 Renan, ‘Nouvelle lettre à M. Strauss’, in: Ibidem, Histoire et parole. Œuvres diverses (Paris: 
Robert La+ont, $()-) &-,-&'', there &'%-&'$: ‘L’individualité de chaque nation est constituée sans 
doute par la race, la langue, l’histoire, la religion, mais aussi par quelques chose de beaucoup plus 
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Once more, Renan stated this de"nition in $))#,64 in his famous pamphlet 
Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?. He answers the question posed as follows:65 
A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by a feeling of sacri"ces 
one has made and of those one is still prepared to make. It presupposes a common 
past; it presents itself nevertheless in the present by one concrete fact: the consent, 
the clearly expressed desire to continue the common life. !e existence of a nation 
is (excuse me for the metaphor) a daily plebiscite’.66
With the French intellectual debate in the direct a:ermath of the Franco-Prussian 
war, counterweight was thus provided to both the romantic view of the nation 
as a somehow historically determined, ethnic and static union, as well as against 
the enlightened-universalist concept. !is approach "nds connection with 
both the points emphasized by the two extreme positions, yet reduces each of 
them to proportions where they can be compromised, and so enters a middle 
ground. Abstract concepts of ‘man’ and ‘humanity’ were, in the last instance, 
too general, while the determinist – ethnic – conception of nationality gave too 
little room for man’s freedom.
!is French approach changed, it must be noted, in the course of the $))%s 
and $)(%s.67 No doubt in part as an expression of the great national trauma of 
losing the war against Prussia (as German determinist nationalism had risen 
as a result of the defeat against Napoleon), a new, determinist and bellicose 
tangible, par la consentement actuel, par la volonté qu’ont les di+érentes provinces d’un État de 
vivre ensemble. (…) Elle ne désire pas faire partie de l’État allemande; cela tranche la question. 
On parle du droit de la France, du droit de l’Allemagne. Ces abstractions nous touchent beaucoup 
moins que le droit qu’ont les Alsaciens, êtres vivants en chair et en os, de n’obéir qu’à un pouvoir 
consenti par eux.’
64 Finkielkraut reminds his readers that Renan has also contributed to the development of 
racist ideas, together with the former assistant and friend of Alexis de Tocqueville, Arthur de 
Gobineau. !e ‘scienti"c’ concepts of race and culture, however, ‘lost their use for Renan a:er 
the Franco-Prussian war. (…) To the triumphant ideology of Pan-Germanism, Renan responded 
with another theory of the nation – insisting on the distinction between national culture and 
human culture’. Finkielkraut, !e defeat of the mind ($((') *#-**.
65 A good article on Renan’s national thinking is: M. Zenner, ‘Die Nation im Denken Ernest 
Renans’, in: K. Kluxen and W.J. Mommsen, Politische ideologen und Nationalstaatliche Ordnung. 
Studien zur Geschichte des .,. Und /-. Jahrhunderts (München: R. Oldenbourg, $(&)) #$(-#*).
66 Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?, in: Philippe Forest, Qu’est-ce qu’une Nation? (Paris: Pierre 
Bordas et "ls $(($) -$: ‘Une nation est donc une grande solidarité, constitué par le sentiment des 
sacri"ces qu’on a faits et de ceux qu’on est disposé à faire encore. Elle suppose un passéA; elle se 
résume pourtant dans le présent par un fait tangibleA: le consentement, le désir clairement exprimé 
de continuer la vie commune. L’existence d’une nation est (pardonnez-moi cette métaphore) un 
plébiscite de tous les jours.’
67 Cf. R. Tombs (ed.), Nationhood and Nationalism in France. From Boulangism to the great war 
.33,-.,.3 (London: Harper Collins Academic, $(($); Or the wonderful description of the French 
national identity by Fernand Braudel in: Braudel, L’identité de la France. Espace et histoire (Paris: 
Arthaus-Flammarion, $()&), who starts with: ‘Je le dis une fois pour toutes: j’aime la France avec 
la même passion, exigeante et compliquée, que Jules Michelet …’, and further down: ‘En outre, 
toute identité nationale implique, forcément, une certaine unité nationale, elle en est comme le 
re8et, la transposition, la condition …’. (pages ( and $, respectively).
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nationalism emerged. French philosophers and historians following Georges 
Vacher de Lapouge started measuring what was called the ‘cephalic index’ of 
skulls, found on the graveyards of the Hérault and other regions of France,68 to 
determine the essential racial characteristics of the French nation. Vacher de 
Lapouge described in his book l’AryenG: son rôle sociale ($)(() in fact exactly the 
approach to nationality that the French had rejected a mere twenty years before: 
One neither decides to become a member of a family nor a nation. !e blood one 
carries in his veins when one is born, one keeps that all his life. !e individual is 
dominated by his race, he is nothing. !e race, the nation is everything.69
Nationality thus became once more a question not of choice or culture, but of 
nature.70 Consider the in8uential Charles Maurras ($)&)-$('#), who wrote in Mes 
idées politiques ($(*,) that ‘it is not our choice which makes us French. (…) We 
do not choose our fatherland, any more than we choose our father and mother’.71 
!is deterministic way of thinking, the nation as ethnicity, judging the man 
instead of his culture, his inherited past rather than his chosen future, culminated 
in the Dreyfus A+air, a con8ict that commenced in $)(- and deeply divided 
French society for more than a decade. !e originally German-speaking Alfred 
Dreyfus ($)'(-$(*'), who had moved from the Alsace region (he was born in 
Mulhouse) into France a:er it was annexed by Prussia in $),$, had recently 
become a captain in the French army. Yet in $)(-, he was convicted for treason, 
as he was found guilty of passing French military secrets to Germany. It quickly 
became clear, however, that it was unlikely for Dreyfus to have committed this 
crime, and that the reason for him being convicted lay more in anti-Semitism, 
as Dreyfus had Jewish roots. Moreover, Dreyfus spoke French with a suspicious 
German accent, having been raised in the Alsace region. 
!e anti-Dreyfusards wanted to defend the infallibility of the French army, 
and to clear France of what they regarded as impure in8uences. Finkielkraut 
summarizes their standpoint as ‘Dreyfus was guilty, as the inhabitants of the 
provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were German, by virtue of ethnicity’.72
68 !e Hérault is a region near Bordeaux.
69 George Vacher de Lapouge, l’Aryen et son rôle sociale (Paris: $)(() '$$, as quoted in: Zeev 
Sternhell, La droite révolutionnaire: les origines françaises du fascisme, .336-.,.2 (Paris: Editions 
du Seuil, $(,)) $&): ‘On n’entre par décret ni dans une famille ni dans une nation. Le sang qu’on 
apporte dans ses veines en naissant, on le garde toute sa vie. L’individu est écrasé par sa race, il 
n’est rien. La race, la nation sont tout’.
70 Cf. Tzvetan Todorov, Nous et les autres, la ré*exion française sur la diversité humaine (Editions 
du Seuil, $()() ***.
71 Charles Maurras, Mes idées politiques (Paris: Arthème Fayard, $(*,) #'#: ‘Ce n’est pas notre 
volonté qui nous a faits Français. (…) On ne choisit pas plus sa patrie – la terre de ses pères – que 
l’on ne choisit son père et sa mere’.
72 Finkielkraut ($((') -&.
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Although Dreyfus was eventually rehabilitated in $(%&, the a+aire had a 
deeply divisive in8uence on French society, and the belief in a predetermined 
Volksgeist as well as its racist and determinist companions had conquered a 
strong position in French life. Informal leader of the anti-Dreyfusards was 
the in8uential intellectual, writer and member of parliament Maurice Barrès 
($)&#-$(#*). His reasoning was: 
If we prove that Dreyfus is guilty, the french army as a whole will be strengthened: 
that is good for France. If on the contrary it will turn out that he is innocent, that 
would discredit the army and harm the nation. Conclusion: whatever may be the 
‘absolute’ truth, justice for France demands that Dreyfus be condemned.73
Note that the word absolute is placed between brackets: as if to symbolize that 
every form of ‘objective truth’ is always in the eye of the beholder.74 According to 
Barrès, then, even if Dreyfus was found to be ‘objectively’ innocent (but what is 
‘objective innocence’?), those who had defended him – the Dreyfusards – would 
be guilty. Because, as Barrès writes in his Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme,A‘their 
conspiracy divides and disarms France, and they are rejoiced by that. Even if their 
client would be innocent, they would remain criminals’.75 Indeed, the argument 
of the anti-Dreyfusards seems to be that the French nation could not accept 
any infringements of its prestige a:er the defeat of $),$, and that the individual 
interest in ‘justice’ was subordinate to that objective of paramount importance.
Anti-Semitism, moreover, was to continue to play a dominant role in French 
national contemplations. What was the reasoning behind anti-Semitic national-
ism? Again Maurice Barrès: 
!e jews have no fatherland in the sense that we understand it. For us, our 
fatherland is the soil and the ancestors, it is the land of our dead. For them, it is 
the place where they "nd their greatest interest.76 
A man who certainly disagreed with him was !eodor Herzl, who wrote in his 
$)(& pamphlet Der Judenstaat that the only thing that determines the Jew is 
73 Quoted in: Todorov, Nous et les autres, la ré*exion française sur la diversité humaine (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, $()() ($: ‘Si on prouve que Dreyfus est coupable, l’armée française en sort 
renforcée: cela est bon pour la France. S’il s’avère au contraire qu’il est innocent, cela discrédite 
l’armée et nuit à la nation. Conclusion: quelle que soit la vérité «AabsolueA», la justice française 
exige que Dreyfus soit condamné.’
74 Cf. Leo Strauss, Natural right and history (Chicago: Chicago University Press, $('*) especially 
chapter $, and Allan Bloom, !e closing of the American mind. How higher education has failed 
democracy and impoverished the souls of today’s students (New York: Simon & Schuster, $(),) 
especially part II. 
75 Maurice Barrès, Scènes et doctrines du Nationalisme (Paris: Émile-Paul, $(%#) Tome I, $*): 
‘leur complot divise et désarme la France, et ils s’en réjouissent. Quand bien même leur client 
serait un innocent, ils demeureraient des criminels’.
76 Barres ($(%#) Tome I, &,: ‘Les juifs n’ont pas de patrie au sens où nous l’entendons. Pour 
nous, la patrie, c’est le sol et les ancêtres, c’est la terre de nos morts. Pour eux, c’est l’endroit où ils 
trouvent leur plus grand intérêt’.
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anti-Semitism: ‘Only necessity makes us cling to the old tribe, only the hatred 
of our environment makes us di+erent. (…) We are a people – our enemies 
have made us one against our will, as it has always been throughout history’.77 
But whatever may precisely be the case, one thing is certain: the Dreyfus 
a+air contributed greatly to the explosive warlike atmosphere that arose in 
Europe, especially between Germany and France, that led to the First World 
War. Herzl drew his conclusions from this situation, and went down in history 
as the founder of a new sort of Jewish nationalism – which has culminated, of 
course, in a particularly remarkable nation state today, Israel.78
To conclude, we may – as has been outlined above – distinguish three ap-
proaches to the ‘nation’. !e "rst is the radical Enlightened, a9rming people’s 
equality and rights whatever their background and culture. !e second is the 
radical Romantic, putting all emphasis on historical determinism and race. 
And the third is the open yet conditional conception, trying to "nd a middle 
road between radical equality and determinist inequality: membership is in 
principle open to everyone, but requires an e+ort. In his history of European 
nationalism, Tzvetan Todorov distinguishes between on the one hand ‘a com-
munity of “blood”, that is to say a biological entity, over which the individual 
has no hold at all’, and on the other a community based on ‘an act of the will, 
on subscribing to an arrangement to live together by adopting common rules, 
by envisaging a common future’.79
It is indeed a complicated distinction we have to make to understand the 
debate rightly. Of course, the theorists of the sovereign state, as discussed above, 
like Bodin and Hobbes, had some concept of national unity in mind. !ey were 
not drawing the map for a world-government. But they were preoccupied mainly 
with the organizational apparatus needed to restore political order in times of 
great social divergence. 
!e great Enlightenment project was to map out what was reasonable for man 
in general. It focused on mankind’s nature, and not so much on men in their 
cultural variety. In doing so, the Enlightenment had a propensity to overlook 
people’s roots and their inclination towards the ‘little platoons’ that Burke thought 
were the foundation of civil society. !e French Revolution symbolized these 
77 !eodor Herzl, Der Judenstaat (Osnabrück: Otto Zeller $(&), neudruck der Erstausgabe 
$)(&) #&: ‘Nur der Druck presst uns wieder an den alten Stamm, nur der Hass unserer Umgebung 
macht uns wieder zu Fremden. (…) Wir sind ein Volk – der Feind macht uns ohne unseren Willen 
dazu, wie das immer in der Geschichte so war.’
78 Cf. B. Evron, Jewish state or Israeli Nation? (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, $((') -$+.
79 Todorov ($()() '%): ‘une communauté de «AsangA», c’est-à-dire une entité biologique, sur 
laquelle l’individu n’a aucune prise’, accomplir un acte de la volonté, souscrire à un engagement 
de vivre ensemble en adoptant des règles communes, en envisageant donc un avenir commun’.
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universalist ideals, thereby creating, amongst other things, a $%-day week and 
a cult of humanity, while expropriating the Catholic Church.80 
!is was not the focus of the theorists of the nation in the romantic age. 
!ey argued that the nation consisted of a homogeneous population and that 
this homogeneous population had to be the basis of the political organization 
of the state. !e debate over Alsace-Lorraine clearly illustrates this.
As has been shown above, in the late $(th century and "rst half of the #%th 
century, the Romantic approach to the nation became increasingly important in 
political discourse. Moreover, the idea that it was the German state that ought 
to bring the German Nation Heim ins Reich, and the need as perceived by the 
French to ‘purify’ the nation during the third republic (e.g. the Dreyfus a+air), 
were in fact extreme excrescences of the Romantic conception of nationality.81
!is is certainly the main reason why ‘nationalism’ and the word ‘nation’ 
grips our conscience and provokes negative associations. !e term brings about 
not only intellectual discussion, but also highly in8amed emotions. Words are 
not really important, however, and there is no intrinsic reason why we should 
continue to use that contaminated word for the patriotic kind of political loyalty 
that we associated with Renan and Fustel the Coulanges in the course of the 
last section of this chapter.
Some would thus distinguish here between nationalism and patriotism. !e 
Germans are inclined to call the open idea of nationality ‘StaatsbürgerschaA’. Fol-
lowing Ernst Cassirer, Jürgen Habermas has spoken of ‘Verfassungspatriotismus’.82 
John Stuart Mill emphasized the importance of ‘the principle of cohesion among 
members of the same community or state’.83 Hegel, too, suggested a form of 
national identity when he wrote about the need of societies for some set of 
essential values that generate a certain minimal point of reference for all,84 a 
‘Selbstgefühl’,85 without which a civil society cannot interact harmoniously with 
the state. Tocqueville, "nally, wrote not about nationality but about ‘a certain 
uniformity of civilization’ that he believed to be ‘not less necessary (…) than a 
80 Scruton, ‘Man’s second disobedience: re8ections on the French Revolution’, in: !e Philosopher 
on Dover Beach (Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, $(()) $(&.
81 Naturally, there were other sorts of romantic nationalism too. For example the nationalism 
of Charles Péguy, which cultivated the memory of Jeanne d’Arc, and was not anti-Semitic.
82 Cf. Deniz Coskun, ‘Constitutioneel patriottisme voor Europa. Wat Ernst Cassirer bepleitte 
in Weimar’, in: Ernst John Kaars Sijpesteijn (ed.), Het Volk en Europa (Amsterdam: Vereniging 
Democratisch Europa, #%%-) )*-(#.
83 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on representative government ($)&$) (New York: Prometheus 
Books, $(($) chapter -.
84 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts ($)#$) (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, $(,%) § $,-.
85 Hegel ($)#$) § *##.
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uniformity of interests’ for political society to endure,86 ‘un certain nombre de 
conditions d’union’.87 Without such ‘homogénéité dans la civilisation’, he thought 
a political system could not survive long.88 
All these ways of expression are variations on the theme of the ‘nation’, 
nationality, nationhood. An example of a state that seems to have been able to 
develop and sustain such an ‘open’ nationality is the United States of America. 
Its unifying principle is not race, or ethnicity, but the ‘civic religion’ that is 
sometimes expressed as the American Dream, and which is symbolized by the 
‘constitution’ (which almost bears a ‘sacred’ status), the 8ag, the anthem and 
the ‘dollar’ (though admittedly, that one may have lost some of its credit, lately). 
!us it was possible in January #%%( for a man of a minority race to become 
the president of this nation – because Barack Obama was before everything 
else an American. 
It is important not to lose our way in semantic discussions: what the Germans 
mean by StaatsbürgerschaA, or what some other authors refer to as ‘patriotism’, 
is what Renan and Fustel de Coulanges meant by nationality: the middle-road 
between universal citizenship (radical Enlightened thought) and pre-determined 
ethnic membership (radical Romanticism). Both inherently local, as well as open 
to people from all di+erent backgrounds, it forms the synthesis of Enlightened 
universalism and Romantic determinism, and it is realized in the ideal of the 
tolerant and open nation states based on what I call a multicultural nationalism.
86 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. I, chapter VIII, ‘why the Federal system is not 
practicable for all nations, and how the Anglo-Americans were enabled to adopt it’ (New York: 
Vintage Books, $((%) $&(.
87 Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique, vol. I, chapter VIII ($)*'), ‘Ce qui fait que le 
système fédéral n’est pas à la portée de tous les peuples, et ce qui a permis aux Anglo-Américains 
de l’adopter’ (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, $()&) #',.
88 Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique, vol. I, chapter VIII, ‘Ce qui fait que le système 
fédéral n’est pas à la portée de tous les peuples, et ce qui a permis aux Anglo-Américains de 
l’adopter’ (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, $()&) #').
CONCLUSION
We have now examined the three elements that together make up national sover-
eignty. We have de"ned the ‘state’ as the political apparatus that structures political 
power and enforces the law. We have seen that sovereignty can be understood 
in a formal and a material sense: the formal sense denoting the constitutional 
independence of a state, the material sense denoting the location of the political 
process: the actual place where decisions are made. Both are implied in every 
serious understanding of self-government. And we have identi"ed the ‘nation’ 
as an imagined and territorial loyalty, providing an experience of membership, 
a collective ‘we’. Nationality contrasts with tribal loyalty on the one hand, and 
religious loyalty on the other; the former territorial yet unimagined, the latter 
imagined but non-territorial.
A question that lies before us today may be what kind of e+ort should be 
demanded from immigrants, and what kind of cohesion should be striven for. 
What are the factors that create national loyalty, or national identity, and how 
wide-ranging may the di+erences between citizens be, before national loyalty is 
abandoned and replaced with tribal or religious loyalties? Can Western culture as 
a whole provide such a loyalty – and is a European nationality therefore feasible?
An argument in favor of this idea is that nation states of today have to a great 
extent been created and ‘socially engineered’ as well.1 One obvious example is 
Italy (which did not even have a uniform language in the $(th century), another 
is Belgium (which could be described, in many respects, as a disintegrating 
nation2). Since it can hardly be said that the Europe of today consists of natural, 
unchanging and unchangeable nation states, why not create a new one for the 
whole continent?
On the other hand, even though radical secessionist minorities have continued 
to exist in many European states, the experience of national membership of the 
general population seems to remain rather unproblematic in most Western-
European countries. If the Vienna peace treaty, the Versailles peace treaty, or the 
formation of Eastern Europe a:er the Second World War had been di+erent, then 
no doubt there would have been di+erent nation states from the ones we have 
1 An example is James B. Minahan, One Europe, many nations. A historical dictionary of European 
national groups (Greenwood Press, London, #%%%), which discerns approximately #%%% di+erent 
ethnic groups which form the built-up of the original European population.
2 Others have said that Belgium never even formed a nation at all, for instance Paul Belien, 
A throne in Brussels. Britain, the Saxe-Coburgs and the Belgianisation of Europe (Exeter: Imprint 
Academic, #%%').
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now: with di+erent borders. France would perhaps be smaller, the Netherlands 
would perhaps still include Flanders, and Germany might have stretched deeper 
into the east and southeast, perhaps including Alsace-Lorraine as well. 
But the fact that nations are historical contingencies does not mean that 
people also experience their nationality as a mere coincidence, interchange-
able with any other. Nor even that such an experience may be interchangeable 
over a course of several generations. !e fact is that our identity – the identity 
of each one of us – is formed by a series of coincidences, but that this identity 
nevertheless de"nes who we are. !e nations of today are inherited identities, 
and most have been formed under centuries of aristocratic rule. Not only may 
there be a natural boundary to the scale on which the experience of national 
identity may be extended; nation-building on a European scale may also be a 
form of social engineering that needs pressures from above that are impossible 
to sustain under democratic regimes. Nations, then, may be a bit like fossil fuels: 
formed under centuries of incredible pressures from above, they are with us as 
relicts of an age past, but necessary nevertheless for the 8ourishing of modern life.
But we will return to this issue in part III – as it is "rst necessary to discuss 
the antitheses to national sovereignty, which have gained shape in the past three 
quarters of a century: supranationalism and multiculturalism.
PART II
THE ASSAULT ON BORDERS
Supranationalism and Multiculturalism
Imagine there’s no countries  
It isn’t hard to do  
Nothing to kill or die for  
And no religion too  
Imagine all the people  
Living life in peace
From: John Lennon, Imagine ($(,$) 

INTRODUCTION
Opposed to national sovereignty stand supranationalism and multiculturalism. 
!e borders that have been constructed over a period of hundreds of years, to 
separate one jurisdiction from another, to settle the problem of political loyalty 
and avoid further civil wars, have been broken down. !e idea of national 
sovereignty has been considered to belong to the past.
In a concerted assault on borders, Western European states in the second 
half of the twentieth century have adopted a policy of dilution both of national 
identities and of sovereignty. !e nation state has been seriously undermined, by 
a policy of multiculturalism from the inside, and by supranationalism from the 
outside. It is the purpose of this part of the book to outline the extent to which 
those developments have infringed national sovereignty, by discussing them 
separately, commencing with supranationalism, followed by an examination 
of multiculturalism. 
Supranationalism is entirely di+erent from internationalism. !e two are o:en 
muddled up, but while internationalism is an expression of sovereignty – and 
indeed only became possible, as discussed in chapter $, with the rise of sovereign 
states –, supranationalism entails an inversion of classical international law and 
stands at odds with the very foundation of cooperation between states, which 
is sovereignty. As a synonym to supranationalism, the terms transnationalism 
or ‘transnational jurisdiction’ are sometimes used.1
One explanation for the confusion over the meaning of international and 
supranational resides in the confusing use of the word ‘nation’ (as has been 
discussed in chapter *). For what is meant by supranationalism2 is in fact supra-
statism: the setting up of institutions that function supra the state: higher than 
the state. Supranational are those developments that create legal structures that 
stand above the state. Precisely because of this characteristic, supranationalism is 
something quite di+erent from internationalism, which creates, as we will observe 
in more detail, legal a9liations among and between states. Internationalism is 
an expression of sovereignty, supranationalism undermines sovereignty, or, as 
John Laughland puts it: 
One of the greatest intellectual faults is to confuse cooperation between States, 
with their political integration, and to defend the latter in the name of the former.3
1 As it is used, for instance, by Scruton (#%%#) $--.
2 Or, of course, by transnationalism.
3 John Laughland, !e Tainted Source. !e undemocratic origins of the European Union (Boston: 
Little Brown & Company, $((,) #((. !e $(() edition says: ‘It is dishonest for European federalists 
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Political integration occurs when the free choice to cooperate is taken from the 
member states, and having a choice to cooperate or not thus implies that no 
political integration has occurred. Cooperation and integration are mutually 
exclusive.
Nor does a supranational organization relate to the state as the state does to 
its provinces. Supranationalism is not an attempt at enlarging the scope of the 
state. It is not merely a continuation of the concept of sovereign statehood on 
a larger scale, like federalism. On the contrary: supranationalism is an entirely 
di<erent approach. Let us "rst discuss the di+erences between supranationalism 
and internationalism, and then those between supranationalism and federalism.
States have never existed in a vacuum. As discussed in chapters $ and #, the 
autarkic state has never truly existed. States have always made agreements, alli-
ances, have set up trade conferences and drawn up covenants, and will probably 
always continue to do so. !at is ‘internationalism’ (or ‘intergovernmentalism’), 
and is profoundly distinct from ‘supranationalism’. While any interaction or any 
agreement between states is a form of internationalism, supranationalism is the 
establishment of an organization that may, by some form of non-consensual 
voting or internal judicial procedure:
 (a) amend the agreed provisions, or
 (b) execute these provisions, or
 (c) interpret these provisions,
  thereby binding the member states to terms not formally agreed upon by 
their legislature (which is charged with ratifying treaties).
Perhaps the clearest way to illustrate the distinction between supranationalism 
and internationalism, is through an example that could easily be confused with 
supranationalism, but is in fact a model-example of internationalism: NATO. 
!e North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded on April -th, 
$(-(, with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, DC. !e 
member states agreed to regard an attack on one of them, as an attack on all, as 
article ' of the treaty reads:
!e Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right 
of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article '$ of the Charter of 
the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
to have peddled the idea of a single market – which could have united the peoples of Europe by 
means of free and spontaneous interaction – when what was in fact being hatched was not a free 
market at all. On the agenda instead is a self-contained and centrally directed economic space 
which is intended to serve as the basis for a political union. !e one cannot be defended in the 
name of the other, any more than integration can be defended in the name of cooperation’. In: 
Ibidem (London: Warner Books, $(()) *#&.
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individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems neces-
sary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic area.4
!is simple clause marks the essence of NATO, which is therefore in fact nothing 
more than an ordinary defense alliance, comparable to any other in history, from 
the defense alliance Germany had with Austria in the $($%s, to the one France 
had with Britain in the Crimean War of $)'*-$)'&, and so on.
NATO does not have the power to amend, execute, or interpret elements of 
its charter by some form of majority vote, or by some form of court decision. If 
they no longer adhere to its principles, member states can withdraw (as, indeed, 
France partially did in $(&&). As all its decisions necessarily have to be taken 
by consensus, article $% concerning the extension of NATO membership reads:
!e Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a 
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security 
of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.
!erefore, membership of NATO does not a+ect any of the powers attributed 
to statehood of any of its members but, quite the contrary, it is an expression of 
those powers. !e state remains in place and is only bound by duties explicitly 
agreed upon. Indeed, the NATO treaty does not even prescribe the type of 
assistance states are obliged to o+er one another in case of armed attack. Once 
again article ':
!e Parties (…) agree that (…) each of them (…) will assist the Party or Parties 
so attacked by taking (…) such action as it deems necessary.
‘Such action as it deems necessary’: the decision is in the hands of the member 
state itself, not in the hands of NATO.5 
For NATO to have supranational powers, a board would be required that, by 
majority vote or executive decision, could determine whether or not there has 
been an attack on any of its members; as well as what would be the appropriate 
assistance demanded from other members. !is, in turn, would also imply that 
NATO would have instruments to enforce its decisions, for instance imposing 
"nes or even the possibility of assuming direct control over a reluctant member 
state’s military forces. It is clear that this requires an amount of trust that NATO’s 
member states are not prepared to grant each other, and realizing this helps us 
anticipate the question of what it is, that makes us comfortable with our own 
4 Available online at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/o9cial_texts_$,$#%.htm.
5 As was shown in #%%*, when Turkey asked for military support from its NATO allies, and 
France, Belgium and Germany opposed any such assistance, on the ground that providing it 
would seem to endorse an attack on Iraq. See on this Jeremy A. Rabkin, !e case for Sovereignty. 
Why the world should welcome American independence (Washington, DC: AEI Press, #%%-) $)%+.
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governments exercising these powers, but uneasy about the thought of other 
governments exercising them over us. 
Two other organizations that can be described as international (or inter-
governmental) instead of supranational are the United Nations (the Security 
Council not taken into account6) and the OECD, the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. What is typical for them as international and 
not supranational organizations, is the following. 
!e United Nations (not taking into account the Security Council), can only 
pass resolutions that suggest things or set up again new organizations or commit-
tees that make recommendations or organize conferences to enhance support for 
a certain cause. Even the payment of a contribution cannot be enforced by the 
General Assembly, and the only thing it can do when member states fail to pay, 
is suspend their right to vote. !e UN – apart from the Security Council – is an 
instrument of international lobbying and policy making, of coordinating inter-
national development aid, and a facilitating device for diplomacy. Without the 
endorsement of the Security Council, the UN cannot enforce any of its decisions. 
!e same goes for the OECD: established in $(&$, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development7 functions as an important means to 
achieve agreement on proposed international trade and entrepreneurial regula-
tions: as an organization it cannot force its resolutions on its members should 
they, a:er extensive rounds of negotiations, not "nd their interests satisfactorily 
recognized by the forthcoming resolutions or recommendations.
So much for the di+erence between supranationalism and internationalism. 
Now let us have a look at the di+erences between supranationalism and the 
attempt to enlarge statehood in some federal form. As previously stated, the 
supranational organization does not relate to its member states as the state relates 
to its provinces. It is not the aim of any supranational organization to form a new 
state (neither on a European, nor on a global level). Supranational organizations 
undertake a replacement of the entire concept of statehood by something that in 
fact resembles more the medieval organization of power.
Whatever the di+erent ways and forms in which states may have centralized 
or decentralized their government (which range from a centralized unitary state 
such as France, to a decentralized unitary state such as the Netherlands, to a 
federal state like the US, to name a few examples), there are always a number 
of unique attributes of the state that place it above its decentralized elements. 
6 While other bodies of the UN can occasionally dra: resolutions that demand direct action, 
these require a9rmation by the Security Council to take e+ect.
7 !e OECD is the successor to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 
that was established in $(-, to coordinate the Marshall plan. In $(&%, the United States and Canada 
joined, and the organization attained its new name and adjusted mission in $(&$. Presently, the 
OECD has *- member states, from all regions of the world.
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As discussed in the "rst part, a state necessarily retains control over the army, 
the maintenance of foreign relations, and, correspondingly, the power of direct 
taxation.
Supranational organizations do not desire to take over all these attributes 
of the sovereignty of their member states: they merely desire to take over a 
particular element of it. ‘Multilevel jurisdiction’ is the key-word for supranational 
thinking.8 Indeed, supranationalism is an attempt to siphon o+ any claim for 
centralized decision-making the state could make. Supranationalism entails – as 
Jean Monnet put it when he spoke of European integration – ‘the abnegation of 
sovereignty on a limited, but decisive "eld’.9
In the course of the past decades, six supranational institutions have been 
erected, namely, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations Security Council (SC) and 
the European Union (EU). !ese institutions take over, in their several ways, a 
limited aspect of the sovereignty of their member states, binding them by rulings, 
compelling them to follow policies they might not have accepted or pursued had 
they retained veto power, or by interpreting existing rules through some form 
of executive or judicial process. We will examine them in turn, and map out 
how they take over elements of the self-government of states attached to them.
But before we do so, it may be useful to make two general comments on 
the supranational philosophy. We can discern in principle two arguments for 
supranationalism.
8 ‘Multilevel jurisdiction’ is also the well-chosen name of a research department of the faculty of 
law at Leiden University in the Netherlands, as the literature using this terminology is almost endless. 
Cf. I. Bache, Europeanization and multilevel governance. Cohesion policy in the European Union and 
Britain (Maryland: Rowman & Little"eld Publishers Inc., #%%,); G. Baldacchino and D. Milne (eds.), 
!e Case for Non-sovereignty: Lessons from Sub-national Island Jurisdictions (London: Routledge, 
#%%)); A. Benz and C. Zimmer, ‘!e EU’s competences: !e “vertical” perspective on the multilevel 
system’, in: Living Reviews in European Governance, Vol. * (#%%)) available online at: http://www.
livingreviews.org/lreg-#%%)-*; O. Budzinski, Mehr-Ebenen-Governance, Leitjurisdiktionskonzepte 
und globaler Wettbewerb (April $-, #%%() available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=$*,(&%); 
G.B. Doern and R. Johnson (eds), Rules, Rules, Rules, Rules: Multi-Level Regulatory Governance 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, #%%&); H. Yamamoto, ‘Multi-level Governance and Public 
Private Partnership: !eoretical Basis of Public Management’, in: Interdisciplinary Information 
Sciences, Vol. $*, No. $ (#%%,) &'-)); A. van Hoek et al. (eds.), Multilevel governance in enforcement 
and adjudication (Antwerpen: Intersentia, #%%&.); L. Hooghe and G.Marks, ‘Unraveling the central 
state, but how? Types of Multi-Level Governance’, in: !e American Political Science Review, 
Vol. (,, No. # (May, #%%*) #**-#-*; F.C. Mayer, ‘Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction’, in: A. von 
Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Oxford and München: 
Hart Publishing and Verlag C.H. Beck, #%$%); R. Münch, European Governmentality. !e Liberal 
DriA of Multilevel Governance (London: Routledge, #%$%).
9 Jean Monnet, Mémoires (Paris: Fayard, $(,&) *$&. !e quote is discussed by Neill Nugent, !e 
Government and Politics of the European Community (London: Macmillan, $(($) *'+.
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!e "rst argument is that the decisions that are made on the supranational 
level are ‘universal’ or stem from a strict economic rationale, and that they are, 
therefore, ‘nonpolitical’. !ose who argue this o:en add that issues that require a 
political choice remain within the competence of the member states. An example 
of this is the European Court of Human Rights, which claims to administer only 
universal, nonpolitical standpoints. As clearly many of the Court’s rulings and 
rules (such as the prohibition of the death penalty) go against the views of large 
minorities and even majorities in many European states, cursory observation 
already shows the tension this universal appearance brings about. We also see 
this idea of the supposed ‘universality’ of decisions in the policies of the EU’s 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), establishing a common European 
currency, in which the interest rate would be set, and the in8ation rate would be 
aimed for along ‘nonpolitical’ lines. It is thus widely assumed by those defending 
supranational developments that a large number of decisions that were formerly 
entrusted to the national political authorities, can now be made by application 
of universal laws of economics or ethics, and therefore that many economic or 
ethical questions are somehow non-political. As John Laughland puts it:
Above all, it is the economist or unpolitical assumptions underlying the European 
construction which threaten democracy and the rule of law. It is widely assumed 
in Europe (and not just at a European level) that politics is simply the administra-
tion of the economy, and that it is su9cient to do this well, even in the absence of 
democracy. (…) To holders of such views, statehood and the activity of politics 
appear messy and illogical. Far better, it seems, to organize the world rationally, to 
overcome division and squabbling, and to put in place politico-economic systems 
which encourage harmony rather than con8ict.10
‘!e language of economics has displaced the language of politics’, Larry Siedentop 
notes in his book Democracy in Europe.11 !is is as clear in the EU as it is in the 
World Trade Organization, as will be shown in depth below. !e question that 
supranationalists avoid by presenting arrangements in such a ‘universal’ way is 
where the political authority for these arrangements comes from, because what 
is beyond the political obviously doesn’t stand in need of political legitimation.
!e second argument that is generally advanced to support supranational 
developments is made by those who, while acknowledging the political implica-
tions of these supranational developments, argue that the loss of sovereignty 
and (thereby of) political independence is somehow compensated by economic 
growth or other bene"ts. !is is most clearly seen in defenses of the World Trade 
Organization, which is supposedly in the self-interest of all of its members, even 
though in individual cases it may nevertheless act against certain members’ 
10 Laughland ($((,) $-(.
11 Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (London: Penguin Press #%%%) $%#.
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interests or wishes. !e same argument is plain in discussions on the EU, the Euro 
currency, and the common market, which, as the proponents of the EU’s current 
supranational direction continue to stress, are to the advantage of everyone, no 
allowance being made for the possibility of this being to the disadvantage of 
some of its member states. 
Let us begin our examination of the workings of the six supranational 
institutions. For the purpose of clarity, I have divided them into two groups: 
supranational courts on the one hand, and supranational organizations on the 
other. Under the "rst fall the International Criminal Court, the International 
Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human Rights; under the second 
the WTO, the Security Council, and the European Union.
I will present the institutional structure and some emblematic examples of 
the workings of each of these institutions, not to provide an exhaustive account, 
but to give a 8avor of their implications. What follows, thus, is a bird-eye’s view 
of them. All these organizations have developed fairly recently and as yet, their 
powers are relatively limited. But altogether they form a network of decision 
making institutions, creating multilevel jurisdiction, constituting the "rst element 
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!e International Criminal Court (ICC) is the "rst supranational tribunal with a 
permanent mandate, devoted to trying individuals, not states. As such, it has the 
power to start, upon state or Security Council request, or upon its own initiative, 
a procedure for the trial and conviction of individuals who are nationals of any 
of its member states, or that have committed acts in any of its member states.
Although the idea of a permanent international court which could try 
individuals and not states was already proposed in the $(*%s,1 and again in the 
$(-%s and $('%s,2 still ‘in the early $((%s’, as Michael Struett notes, ‘the possibility 
of establishing a permanent ICC seemed remote and fanciful’.3 A:er a few years 
of negotiations, however, a conference in Rome led to the Rome Statute on July 
$,th, $((), in which it was agreed to establish the ICC as of July $st, #%%#.
It is widely assumed that the International Criminal Court is the natural 
successor of ad hoc war crimes tribunals, ‘like that of Nuremberg’.4 But the ICC, 
though super"cially resembling the Nuremberg tribunal, is in many ways not 
comparable with it, and di+ers on crucial issues of sovereignty.5 Not that even 
the Nuremberg trials themselves were uncontroversial at the time. Harlan Fiske 
Stone, the chief justice of the United States Supreme Court, ‘who viewed the 
International Military Tribunal with great suspicion’,6 refused, as Jeremy Rabkin 
notes, ‘to take part in a swearing-in ceremony for the US-appointed judges to 
the IMT’. He was said to have argued in private that the whole undertaking 
1 !e Council of the League of Nations approved the Convention for the creation of an 
International Criminal Court in $(*,; see John Laughland, A History of Political Trials. From 
CharlesGI to Saddam Hussein (Oxford: Peter Lang, #%%)) $$#.
2 Cf. M.J. Struett, !e politics of constructing the International Criminal Court. NGOs, discourse, 
and agency (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, #%%)) -(+.
3 Struett (#%%)) &).
4 As has been done by, amongst many others, Costas Douzinas, !e end of Human Rights 
(Portland: Hart Publishing, #%%%) $#$ and further, Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford: 
University Press, #%%$) #'%, and Peter H. Kooijmans, Internationaal Publiekrecht (Deventer: 
Kluwer, #%%%) *-.
5 Comparable considerations apply to the Tokyo tribunals. See on this: Michael P. Scharf, ‘!e 
ICC’s jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party states: a critique of the U.S. position’, in: Law & 
Contemporary Problems, vol. &-, issue $ (Winter #%%$) &,-$$), there $%&; B.V.A. Röling, !e Tokyo 
trial and Beyond. Re*ections of a peacemonger, edited and with an Introduction by Antonio Cassese 
(London: Polity Press, $((*); Laughland (#%%)) $&*+: ‘Politics as conspiracy: the Tokyo trials’.
6 R.E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, $()*) &*.
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was ‘a high-grade lynching party’.7 Winston Churchill was well-known for his 
opposition to the idea of an allied trial of Axis war criminals as well,8 as were 
many others, such as the US Senator Robert Ta: and US Supreme Court Justice 
William O. Douglas. 
John F. Kennedy, the future President, noted: ‘!ese conclusions [that the 
tribunal was based on ex post facto law and that its legitimacy was questionable] 
are shared, I believe, by a substantial number of American citizens today. And 
they were shared, at least privately, by a goodly number in $(-&’.9
!e main crime for which the Nazi-leaders were tried was not the holocaust 
nor even ‘crimes against humanity’. Indeed, Telford Taylor confesses in his 
memoir that when he accepted his position as the United States Deputy Chief 
prosecutor at Nuremberg a:er the surrender of Germany, ‘I remained ignorant 
of the mass extermination camps in Poland, and the full scope of the Holocaust 
did not dawn on me until several months later, at Nuremberg’.10 !e main aim of 
the tribunal was to try ‘crimes against peace’, and the ‘crimes against humanity’ 
were only actionable if understood in the context of waging an ‘aggressive war’.11 
As the judges ruled:
With regard to crimes against humanity, there is no doubt whatever that political 
opponents were murdered in Germany before the war, and that many of them 
were kept in concentration camps in circumstances of great horror and cruelty. 
!e policy of terror was certainly carried out on a vast scale, and in many cases 
was organised and systematic. !e policy of persecution, repression and murder 
of civilians in Germany before the war of $(*(, who were likely to be hostile to 
the Government, was most ruthlessly carried out. !e persecution of Jews during 
the same period is established beyond all doubt. 
 To constitute crimes against humanity, the acts relied on before the outbreak 
of war must have been in execution of, or in connection with, any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. !e Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting 
and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved 
that they were done in execution of, or in connection with, any such crime. !e 
Tribunal therefore cannot make a general declaration that the acts before $(*( 
were crimes against humanity within the meaning of the Charter, but from the 
beginning of the war in $(*( war crimes were committed on a vast scale, which 
were also crimes against humanity; and insofar as the inhumane acts charged in 
the Indictment, and committed a:er the beginning of the war, did not constitute 
7 Jeremy A. Rabkin, ‘Nuremberg Misremembered’, in: SAIS Review, !e Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Vol. $( no. # ($((() )$-(&, there )$-)#.
8 Cf. Laughland (#%%)) $$*.
9 John F. Kennedy, Pro+les in Courage (New York: Harper & Row, $(&*) $)-, chapter (.
10 Telford Taylor, !e anatomy of the Nuremberg trials. A personal memoir (New York: Alfred 
J. Knopf, $((#) xi.
11 Cf. Judgment of the International military tribunal for the trial of German major war criminals: 
!e Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Available online at http://avalon.
law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.asp.
 3H457071=/07G ./H513 ($
war crimes, they were all committed in execution of, or in connection with, the 
aggressive war, and therefore constituted crimes against humanity.12
In contrast with the great resonance of the term ‘crimes against humanity’ today, 
the Nuremberg tribunal thus understood by them solely those crimes which were 
committed in the context of an aggressive war – and for that reason, the judges 
refused to assert jurisdiction over crimes committed before the outbreak of the 
war, September $st, $(*(. It is not surprising then to note, as Rabkin does, that 
‘not one of the twenty-four defendants was indicted solely for “crimes against 
humanity”’.13
Moreover, the Nuremberg tribunal was set up with explicit reference to the 
sovereign legislative power of Germany – executed, at the time, by the four 
major allied powers.14 !e charter of the Nuremberg tribunal – formally called 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) – explicitly stated that:
!e making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by 
the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the 
undoubted right of these countries to legislate for the occupied territories has 
been recognised by the civilised world.15
For the same reason – that it was ‘the exercise of the sovereign legislative power 
by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered’ –, 
the accusations were not brought forward by an entity denoted as ‘humanity’ 
or ‘the United Nations’ – as was indeed proposed at a certain point16 – against 
Nazi-Germany, but as: 
!e United States of America, !e French Republic, !e United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and !e Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – against 
– Hermann Wilhelm Goering, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop …(etc).17
Nor were any judges appointed from other allied or neutral countries:18 only the 
US, France, the UK and the USSR conducted the trial. When in $(-, additional 
12 Judgment of the International military tribunal for the trial of German major war criminals: 
!e Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Available online at http://avalon.
law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.asp.
13 Rabkin ($((() )$-(&, there )-.
14 !e promulgation of the International Military Tribunal Charter was ‘the exercise of 
the sovereign legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally 
surrendered’, Judgment, O9cial Documents of the Tribunal, Vol. $, $,$.
15 ‘!e law of the Charter’, in: Judgment of the International military tribunal for the trial of 
German major war criminals: !e law of the Charter. Available online at http://avalon.law.yale.
edu/imt/judlawch.asp.
16 John Laughland, Travesty. !e trial of Slobodan Milosevic and the corruption of international 
justice (Michigan: Pluto press, #%%,) &%; Rabkin ($((() )$-(&, there ),. 
17 Available online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/count.asp.
18 Laughland (#%%,) &,.
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alleged war criminals were tried in Nuremberg19 – this time by the United States 
alone –, the judges, drawing on the Charter of the IMT and the jurisprudence 
of the original trial, further recalled that: 
On ' June $(-' the Allied Powers announced that they ‘hereby assume supreme 
authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the 
German Government, the High Command, and any state, municipal or local 
government or authority’ 20 (…)
And that:
On # August $(-' at Berlin, President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin, and Prime 
Minister Attlee, as heads of the Allied Powers, entered into a written agreement 
setting forth the principles which were to govern Germany during the initial 
control period. 
Quoting a number of ‘modern scholars of high standing in the "eld of inter-
national law’, the judges found that these scholars had agreed that
the situation at the time of the unconditional surrender resulted in the transfer 
of sovereignty to the Allies.21 
!ey furthermore asserted that ‘by virtue of the situation at the time of un-
conditional surrender, the Allied Powers were provisionally in the exercise of 
supreme authority, valid and e+ective until such time as, by treaty or otherwise, 
Germany shall be permitted to exercise the full powers of sovereignty’, and that 
‘We sit as a Tribunal drawing its sole power and jurisdiction from the will and 
command of the Four occupying Powers’.22
!e tribunal went on to declare that ‘[the] universality and superiority of 
international law does not necessarily imply universality of its enforcement’ 
and that ‘within the territorial boundaries of a state (…) a violator of the rules 
of international law could be punished only by the authority of o9cials of that 
state. !e law is universal, but such a state reserves unto itself the exclusive 
power within its boundaries to apply or withhold sanctions’.23 
19 !e defendants were Josef Altstoetter, Wilhelm von Ammon, Paul Barnickel, Hermann 
Cuhorst, Karl Engert, Guenther Joel, Herbert Klemm, Ernst Lautz, Wolfgang Mettgenberg, 
Guenther Nebelung, Rudolf Oeschey, Hans Petersen, Oswald Rothaug, Curt Rothenberger, Franz 
Schlegelberger, and Carl Westphal. !e indictment is available online at http://www.mazal.org/
archive/nmt/%*/NMT%*-T%%%$.htm.
20 Trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal under Control Council Law 
No. .-, Volume III, Case no. *, ‘!e Justice Case’, United States against Josef Altstoetter, et al. 
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing O9ce, $('$) ('(: ‘Under Source of authority of C.C. 
Law $%’. Available online at http://www.mazal.org/NMT-HOME.htm.
21 Trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal under Control Council Law 
No. .-, Volume III, Case no. *, ‘!e Justice Case’, United States against Josef Altstoetter, et al. 
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing O9ce, $('$) (&#. Available online at http://www.
mazal.org/NMT-HOME.htm.
22 ‘!e Justice Case’, (&*-(&-. 
23 ‘!e Justice Case’, (&*-(&-. 
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!e point was thus once again made that the power the Allied forces had 
assumed in Germany upon its unconditional surrender was ‘a power which 
no international authority without consent could assume or exercise (…)’.24 
!e contrast could not be greater with the Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) – which was based on the idea, as the "rst ruling of the 
ICTY Trial Chamber asserted, that ‘the sovereign rights of States cannot and 
should not take precedence over the right of the international community to 
act appropriately as they [i.e., the crimes against humanity] a+ect the whole of 
mankind and shock the conscience of all nations of the world’.25 
It is not surprising, therefore, that former Nuremberg prosecutor, Walter J. 
Rockler, has pleaded not only against the legality of the war in Kosovo but also 
against the legality of the Yugoslavia tribunal,26 and lamented that
As a primary source of international law, the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
in the $(-'-$(-& case of the major Nazi war criminals is plain and clear. Our leaders 
o:en invoke and praise that judgment, but obviously have not read it.27
Nor is it surprising that, for the most elementary reasons of self-interest, the 
Nuremberg tribunal was not set up as a universal court, trying whatever horri"c 
deeds might have been committed in the name of any government or army 
whatsoever, but only those committed by Nazi-Germany; nor that it explicitly 
connected the crimes against humanity with crimes against the peace. !e 
London agreement between the Allied forces, which gave birth to the Tribunal, 
was concluded two days a:er the ‘Little Boy’ nuclear bomb had been dropped 
on Hiroshima and a day before ‘Fat Man’ was dropped on Nagasaki – instantly 
killing an estimated $%% thousand civilians. !e British and American air raids 
on German cities, moreover, had been examples of deeply questionable allied 
actions, and had cost an approximate total of '%% thousand civilian lives – far 
more than the German bombings of Britain had cost.28 
Moreover, one of the main allied powers – the Soviet Union – had itself 
been Nazi-Germany’s ally for several years, and had collaborated in waging an 
aggressive war, helping itself, as John Laughland puts it, ‘to chunks of eastern 
24 ‘!e Justice Case’, (,%-(,$.
25 Quoted by Laughland (#%%,) &*-&-. Laughland gives the following reference (footnote $(): 
‘Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Trial chamber decision on the defence motion on jurisdiction, $% 
August $((', paragraph -#; this passage was quoted and rea9rmed by the Appeals Chamber in 
its own decision in Tadic on the defence motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction on # 
october $((', at paragraph '(’.
26 Laughland (#%%,) &).
27 Walter J. Rockler, ‘War crimes applies to U.S. too’, in: Chicago Tribune, #* May $(((.
28 J. Friedrich, Der Brand. Deutschland im Bombenkrieg .,2--.,26 (München: Propyläen 
Verlag, #%%#). Cf. Telford Taylor, !e anatomy of the Nuremberg trials. A personal memoir (New 
York: Alfred J. Knopf, $((#) *#&; Laughland, A history of political trials. From Charles I to Saddam 
Hussein (Oxford: Peter Lang, #%%)) $$,.
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Poland, the Baltic states and Bessarabia under the terms of the secret protocol 
of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed on #* August $(*(’.29 Laughland claims 
that the Nazis even ‘provided their Bolshevik allies with huge quantities of fuel, 
food and war materiel for the purposes of conquering and occupying eastern 
Poland.’30 A:er the Red Army’s advance into Germany, it is certain that the Soviet 
soldiers looted for days on end and mass-raped the female population – clearly a 
war crime of tremendous proportions.31 And so for all these reasons, the charter 
plainly stated that a tribunal would be set up
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the major war criminals of the European 
axis32
– and not for any others.
In order, however, to prevent the defense of tu quoque (to which Hermann 
Goering nevertheless resorted), the ‘charges against the Germans for having 
launched air attacks on British cities were removed: Goering, head of the Lu:-
wa+e, was not indicted for this.’33 As prosecutor Telford Taylor remembers: ‘!e 
great city air raids of the war – Hamburg, Berlin, Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, 
and Nagasaki – had been conducted by Britain and the United States, which 
made it most unlikely that the prosecution would make a big thing out of the 
Germans’ earlier raids which, destructive as they were, paled by comparison’. 
Taylor concludes that it is therefore ‘not surprising that Goering’s responsibility 
for the German attacks (…) played no part in the Tribunal’s judgment’.34
!e tribunals in the countries occupied by Nazi-Germany, meanwhile, had 
extraordinary jurisdiction, usually installed under a special post-war law – but 
in each case by the national government. !ese tribunals speci"cally dealt with 
crimes committed by the national collaborators under the German occupation.35
In contrast, the ICC has been set up without a speci"c war to condemn 
or a speci"c regime to judge. !is implies great di9culties, and in any case 
makes the ICC a very di+erent institution from the Nuremberg tribunal.36 !e 
legitimacy of the ICC should not be judged by the legitimacy of the Nuremberg 
trials;37 the ICC is fundamentally di+erent from the Nuremberg tribunal, and 
29 Laughland (#%%,) &%-&$.
30 Ibidem.
31 Cf. Antony Beevor, Berlin. !e Downfall .,26 (London: Viking Penguin, #%%#); Antony Beever, 
‘!ey raped every German female from eight to )%’, in: !e Guardian ($ May #%%#), available 
online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/#%%#/may/%$/news.features$$.
32 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. $, London Agreement of August )th $(-'.
33 Laughland (#%%,) &$.
34 Taylor ($((#) *#&.
35 Cf. Laughland (#%%)) ,,+.
36 Cf. Michael Lief, H. Mitchell Caldwell, and Benjamin Bycel, Ladies and Gentlemen of the 
Jury: Greatest arguments in Modern Law (New York: Simon & Schuster, $(()).
37 Cf. Chantal Delsol, Unjust justice, against the tyranny of international law (Delaware: ISI 
Books, #%%)) '#-'*, who voices the same view but from a di+erent perspective: ‘!us, Nuremberg 
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it should be considered on its own account. What follows is an examination of 
its supranational capacities.
Currently, the Court has $$& member states;38 though this may seem a very 
large number, many of the states that have decided not to ratify the Rome 
Statute are important ones, for example, the United States, Russia, China, India, 
Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran. Many other countries that are likely to be involved 
in serious armed con8icts in the near future have also decided not to join the 
ICC, such as Iraq, Kazakhstan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria, 
Israel, Morocco, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Sudan, North Korea and South Korea.39 
!at is not surprising. !e ICC’s supranational powers are vast, and it is 
uncertain what direction its rulings will take, even though formally the Court 
has jurisdiction over ‘the severest crimes of international concern’ only.40 As 
article ' of the Rome Statute reads:
$. !e Jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole. 
It continues:
!e court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the 
following crimes:
 (a) !e crime of genocide;
 (b) Crimes against humanity;
 (c) War crimes;
 (d) !e crime of aggression.
Note that ‘crimes against humanity’ have now become independent of the ‘crime 
of aggression’ (while the two had been connected at the Nuremberg tribunal). 
Moreover, paragraph # of article ' decrees that the Court would not exercise 
jurisdiction over the ‘crime of aggression’, until it would have been ‘properly 
de"ned’ at a later stage. An attempt to do so was undertaken at the Review 
Conference held in Kampala, Uganda, in #%$%, but it was also decided there 
that the jurisdiction of the ICC over the ‘crime of aggression’ should have to be 
reviewed once again a:er #%$,.41 Not that the other three crimes, (a), (b), and 
represents a unique instance in which all the requisite circumstances for an unprecedented trial 
came together, including an unwritten law that condemned those who had followed a written 
law. !e trial was made possible only by an act of conscience and by the remorse of an entire 
culture. (…) It seems to me, then, that if Nuremberg was justi"ed by the remorse that a culture 
felt when confronted with its own development, the European tribunal that recently judged the 
massacres of Rwanda cannot claim the same legitimacy. In the absence of its own conscientious 
remorse, we see here a sanction applied from the outside to a people who do not understand it’.
38 !at is, as of June, #%$$.
39 http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/.
40 Article ' of the Rome Statute.
41 !e resolution was adopted on June $$th, #%$%. Available online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.&-ENG.pdf.
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(c) are that ‘properly de"ned’ either. Articles &, ,, and ) attempt to provide more 
precise de"nitions, but hardly succeed. 
When article , (de"ning ‘crimes against humanity’) for example declares 
that ‘torture’ is punishable, it leaves the judges with the task of de"ning what 
counts as such. Although it is true that the terms used in these articles were 
mostly borrowed from treaties already in force (such as the Convention against 
torture, and the Geneva Conventions), their interpretation remains disputable. 
Paragraph # of article , tries to present a guideline for the notions presented in 
this article (such as ‘torture’), but does not make it much clearer:
(…) (e) ‘Torture’ means the intentional in8iction of severe pain or su+ering, 
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of 
the accused [i.e., the accused before the ICC]; except that torture shall not include 
pain or su+ering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;
What exactly is ‘severe pain or su+ering, whether physical or mental’? What 
is the reach of the ‘lawful sanctions’ that can exonerate the accused? Or take 
article ) (de"ning ‘war crimes’). It says that 
war crimes means: 
(…)
(iii) Willfully causing great su+ering, or serious injury to body or health;
(…)
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justi"ed by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful con"nement;
Here again, the meaning of terms such as ‘willfully causing’, ‘great su+ering’, ‘seri-
ous injury’, ‘extensive destruction’, ‘not justi"ed by military necessity’, ‘unlawful 
deportation’ is certainly not self-evident and needs interpretation. But what is 
even more worrying is that some – if not most – of these deplorable actions are 
probably unavoidable by any of the parties involved in an armed con8ict (the 
problem of ‘collateral damage’42).
42 !e prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, has commented on this problem in 
statement made on ( February, #%%&. ‘Under international humanitarian law and the Rome 
Statute, the death of civilians during an armed con8ict, no matter how grave and regrettable, 
does not in itself constitute a war crime. International humanitarian law and the Rome Statute 
permit belligerents to carry out proportionate attacks against military objectives, even when it is 
known that some civilian deaths or injuries will occur.’ Moreno-Ocampo goes on: ‘A crime occurs 
if there is an intentional attack directed against civilians (principle of distinction) (Article )(#)(b)
(i)) or an attack is launched on a military objective in the knowledge that the incidental civilian 
injuries would be clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage (principle 
of proportionality) (Article )(#)(b)(iv).’ Obviously, this only transposes the question to de"ning 
‘intentional attack’, ‘clearly excessive’ and ‘anticipated military advantage’. Available online at 
http://www#.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F'(&D%)D-D)$%--*A#-((BB-B)((B(C'BCD#/#,,-##/
OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_(_February_#%%&.pdf.
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Sub (v) of the above mentioned article ).#, sums up the acts that could lead 
to prosecution. It includes:
Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means (…), buildings which are undefended 
and which are not military objectives;
A plausible reading of this article could suggest that NATO was guilty of ‘war 
crimes’ when bombing Serbia’s civil infrastructure in the spring of $(((, or that the 
United States were guilty of ‘war crimes’ when striking a pharmaceutical factory 
in Sudan on February #%th, $(() in retaliation for the bombings of American 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania which killed ##- people (of which twelve 
American nationals) and injured ',%%% others.43 !e factory, Sudan’s primary 
source of pharmaceuticals, covering the majority of the Sudanese market, was 
claimed to have been instrumental in the production of chemical weapons, 
but evidence of this has never been made public. !e German ambassador to 
Sudan between $((& and #%%%, Werner Daum, estimated that the attack prob-
ably caused tens of thousands of civilian deaths.44 Yet both the Clinton and the 
second Bush administrations have refused to o+er apologies to the Sudanese 
government, and it is not unthinkable that the ICC would have been interested 
in asserting jurisdiction (had the United States, of course, been a member). 
!e President of Sudan even called for ‘the international prosecution of the US 
o9cials behind the airstrike’.45
In such a case, the United States might then be asked to prove that the factory 
was rightfully thought to be a military objective (the burden of proof lying clearly 
on the side of the defendant in this case46). !e Pentagon would have to present its 
sources, which would be evaluated by the Prosecutor under the superintendence 
43 Cf. Michael P. Scharf, ‘!e ICC’s jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party states: a critique 
of the US position’, in: Law & Contemporary Problems, vol. &-, issue $ (Winter #%%$) &,-$$).
44 Werner Daum, ‘Universalism and the West. An agenda for understanding’, in: Harvard 
International Review, vol #* (#) (Summer #%%$) $(-#*.
45 Scharf (Winter #%%$) &,-$$).
46 Cf. the $(#, Lotus Case of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), which is o:en 
referred to in international law discourses as having set a ‘precedent’ (even though the Court at 
the time was divided by six judges in favor and six against, and the President of the Court had to 
decide the case, and indeed even though the very concept of ‘precedent’ itself is questionable in 
classical international law). In this case, however, it was held that when a state seeks to withhold 
jurisdiction from another state, the burden of proof is on the state claiming that such jurisdiction 
is indeed lacking; not on the state asserting jurisdiction. !is principle has been used in later 
years to expand the scope of international law, as jurisdiction was assmed to exist, as Michael 
Scharf noteds, ‘unless it can be shown that this violates a prohibitive rule of international law’. 
He continues: ‘So long as states have a legitimate interest in establishing such an arrangement, 
the question is not whether international law or precedent exists permitting an ICC with this 
type of jurisdictional reach (…), but rather whether any international legal rule exists that would 
prohibit it’. Case of S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), $(#, P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. $%. Cf. Michael P. Scharf, 
‘!e ICC’s jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party states: a critique of the U.S. position’, in: 
Law & Contemporary Problems, vol. &-, issue $ (Winter #%%$) &,-$$), there ,#-,-.
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of the world press and the secret services of other states. Even though the Court 
may decide that certain evidence be presented or witnesses be heard behind 
closed doors, this is a situation that no great power would ever accept.
It was also agreed that the ICC will amend (and possibly extend) the list 
of crimes under its jurisdiction.47 !is happened for instance at the review 
conference in Uganda in #%$% (as mentioned above). Some states desire to add 
terrorism and drug tra9cking to the list of crimes covered; so far, the member 
states have been unable to agree on a de"nition of terrorism and it was decided 
not to include drug tra9cking as this might overwhelm the Court’s limited 
resources. India lobbied to have the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD’s) included as war crimes, but did not succeed in 
this (and did not join the ICC).48
!ese, then, are the "rst important observations concerning the ICC that 
undermine the claims to political impartiality or the non-political nature of the 
court: the vagueness of the crimes that fall within its jurisdiction, the fact that 
those crimes are surely next to unavoidable in any military dispute, and the 
great consequences for national security that producing evidence could entail.
A further question concerning the ICC is not what it will prosecute, but 
who. !e ICC has discretionary powers in deciding who should be prosecuted, 
as article $' denotes:
$. !e Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu [i.e. on its own initia-
tive] on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
(…)
*. If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with 
an investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for 
authorization of an investigation (…). Victims may make representations to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
-. If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the supporting 
material, considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investiga-
tion, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall 
authorize the commencement of the investigation (…).
Article $&, then, enables the Security Council to defer an investigation or 
prosecution for a period of $# months with the possibility of renewal. To do so 
would however require a majority in the Security Council (( out of $' votes), 
and requires that none of the permanent "ve Security Council members (i.e. 
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Russian Federation, and 
China) use its veto power. 
47 Cf. articles $#$ and $#* of the Rome Statute.
48 Geert-Jan Knoops is one of the many who criticize the fact that ‘the use of poisoned arrows’ 
is a war crime under the ICC, but the use of nuclear weapons is not: Geert-Jan Knoops, Blufpoker. 
De duistere wereld van het international recht (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans, #%$$) $%-.
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!e prosecutor of the ICC is elected by the Assembly of States for a nine-
year term. As is o:en the case with such international appointments, they 
serve political interests and are subject to diplomatic rather than professional 
considerations. !e current prosecutor, the Argentine Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
was elected, typically unopposed, in #%%*. Moreno-Ocampo has a long record 
of legal experience in trying state o9cials and in extradition cases. He has also 
been involved in some alleged scandals, amongst others an alleged rape-case on 
the a:ernoon of March #(th, #%%' in Cape Town.49 !e whistleblower, Christian 
Palme, who submitted the complaint to the President of the ICC, Philippe 
Kirsch at the time, was "red by Moreno-Ocampo a:er a panel of three judges 
dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of evidence, but on JulyA(th, 
#%%), the International Labor Organization (the Administrative Tribunal of 
which has jurisdiction over labor disputes of several international organizations 
including the ICC), ruled that Palme had had good reason to bring the case to 
the attention of the ICC, that Moreno-Ocampo was not justi"ed in discharging 
him, and Palme was awarded damages.50
!e way this incident was hushed up, even if the allegations were entirely 
false, is typical of the problems that a supranational organization "nds itself in: its 
top functionaries not being subject to the kind of power-balancing framework a 
national state provides for its appointments, elections o:en being political ones, 
and a shared international standard of decent behavior not existing. !e personal 
character of top-functionaries that would be relevant in national circumstances 
is not usually investigated due to political nomination.
!e pre-trial chamber, which has to consider if there is a ‘reasonable basis’ to 
proceed with an investigation, consists of six judges but is divided into groups of 
three judges deciding by majority vote. !us only two judges need vote in favor 
of an investigation for it to proceed. Currently (as of spring #%$$), the judges at 
the pre-trial chamber are:
  Sylvia Steiner (Brazil)
  Hans-Peter Kaul (Germany)
  Ekaterina Trenda"lova (Bulgaria)
  Sanji Mmasenono Monageng (Botswana)
  Cuno Tarfusser (Italy)
  Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi (Argentina) 
49 Moreno-Ocampo allegedly took the car keys of a South African journalist who had conducted 
an interview with him, and did not give them back unless she agreed to come to his room in the 
Lord Charles Hotel and have sex with him. !e scheduled meeting with the journalist was removed 
from his agenda a:er the incident, thus suggesting nothing had ever happened.
50 Palme v. ICC, International Labor Organization, Judgment No. #,',, $%'th session.
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Deciding on whether an investigation will proceed is thus in their hands. In the 
hands of Sylvia Steiner from Brazil, Hans-Peter Kaul from Germany, Ekaterina 
Trenda"lova from Bulgaria, Sanji Mmasenono Monageng from Botswana, 
Cuno Tarfusser from Italy, and Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi from Argentina. 
!e supranational structure makes it particularly di9cult to know who these 
people are. It is a question supranationalists evade by focusing on the technical, 
perceived non-political nature of the procedures and rules.51
But the same problems apply with regards to the other judges of the ICC. 
Currently $) in total (but the number is not "xed52), they are elected for a nine 
year period by the Assembly of States. !ey should be nationals of an ICC 
member state, and no two judges may be nationals of the same state.53 Further, 
‘the states parties shall’, according to article *&, paragraph ) (a): 
In the selection of judges, take into account the need, within the membership of 
the Court, for:
 (i) !e representation of the principal legal systems of the world;
 (ii) Equitable geographical representation; and
 (iii) A fair representation of female and male judges.
Now, these principles for selecting judges are certainly based on questionable 
philosophical principles. For does ‘the representation of the principal legal systems 
in the world’ not imply that there should be a number of judges representing 
countries that accept Sharia law? And does ‘equitable geographical representa-
tion’ and ‘fair representation of female and male judges’ provide the legal basis 
for a policy of a9rmative action? !ose are certainly worrying considerations.
And if we think of the procedures that surround appointments of judges in 
national situations – at least when it comes to the appointment of senior judges 
–, such as approval by a representative council (for instance in the United States 
a:er profound personal and professional investigations and several hearings and 
interviews by the Senate54), we should not take for granted that these appointed 
ICC-judges are necessarily competent to be the arbiters of military con8icts 
all over the world. Nor is it self-evident that these judges, put forward by the 
member states of the ICC, will ful"ll their jobs without personal or political 
agendas: this is even more so, while many member states of the ICC are not 
51 Cf. on the o:en misty and political selection of international judges: Ruth Mackenzie, Kate 
Maleson, Penny Martin and Philippe Sands, Selecting International Judges. Principle, Process and 
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, #%$%).
52 Rome Statute, article *&.
53 Rome Statute, article *&. !is contrasts with how judges function in national circumstances, 
where nominations are usually for life in order to safeguard their independence. Cf. Cliteur, P., ‘De 
onaIankelijkheid van de rechterlijke macht: acht vormen’, in: J.P. Loof (ed.), OnaHankelijkheid en 
onpartijdigheid. De randvoorwaarden voor het bestuur en beheer van de rechterlijke macht (Leiden: 
Stichting NJCM-boekerij *&, $((() (-*$.
54 Cf. Bork ($((%) #),+.
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only high on corruption lists55 but have a history of decades of dictatorial or 
totalitarian administration.
Apart from starting procedures on its own initiative, the ICC can also begin 
an investigation at the request of a member state.56 !is option follows from 
articles $* and $- of the Rome Statue. Article $#, paragraph # (a) adds that ‘the 
jurisdiction of the Court (…) can also be exercised if the state on the territory 
of which the conduct in question occurred (…) is a member of the ICC’.
!is means that the court can very well claim jurisdiction over nationals 
of a non-ICC member state if those nationals (e.g. soldiers) have committed 
acts that the ICC believes to fall under any of the ‘crimes’ it has jurisdiction 
over. Countries that have chosen not to recognize the ICC may in this way be 
submitted to its jurisdiction anyway. !is has motivated the United States to 
set up bilateral immunity agreements with other countries, and even to pass 
the American Service Members Protection Act as an amendment to the National 
Defense Authorization Act in August #%%#.57 !is document is also known as 
the ‘Hague Invasion Act’, because it authorizes the President to use ‘all means 
necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any US or allied per-
sonnel being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the 
International Criminal Court’.58
!e third and "nal way for the ICC of asserting jurisdiction is an even more 
remarkable instance of supranationalism, and follows from article $* (b) of the 
Rome Statute, reading:
!e court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in 
article ' in accordance with the provisions of this Statue if (…) a situation in 
which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to 
the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations;
!e Security Council of the United Nations can thus assign jurisdiction to the 
ICC if it deems so necessary, even if the alleged ‘crimes’ have not been perpe-
trated by an ICC member state nor even have been committed on the territory 
55 See for example the yearly statistics on corruption produced by nationmaster, available online 
at http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/gov_cor-government-corruption.
56 One example of this was in #%%&, when Uganda requested the ICC to prosecute members 
of the Lord’s Resistance Army, an insurgency that had been active in the northern regions of 
Uganda for over twenty years.
57 Available online at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/#*-#'.htm.
58 Cf. John R. Bolton, ‘!e risks and weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from 
America’s perspective’, in: Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. &-, no. $ (Winter #%%$) $&,-$)%. 
Available online at http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?&-+Law+&+Contemp.+Probs.+$&,+(
Winter+#%%$).
$%# .<74125 6/H5 
of a member state. !is happened in #%%', when the Security Council passed 
resolution $'(*,59 containing, amongst others, the following phrases:
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
$. Decides to refer the situation in Darfur since $ July #%%# to the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court;
#. Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the con8ict in 
Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court 
and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States 
not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States 
and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully;
Not surprisingly, the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, denied jurisdiction, 
but an international arrest warrant has in the meantime been issued against 
him. Before discussing questions related to this international arrest warrant, it is 
necessary to examine the inevitability of choice in whom to prosecute. !ere are 
actions that are obvious atrocities, such as those committed in #%%) in Darfur, but 
there are also actions that are open to several di+erent interpretations. Justi"ed 
retaliation or excessive use of force? Pre-emptive defense, or act of aggression? 
And the ICC has additional problems. For it is unsure what is ‘a reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investigation’, of the kind article $' sub $ of the Rome 
Statute provides as a legitimate ground for trying individuals.60 !e prosecutor 
and his pre-trial chamber may decide that although no knockdown evidence is 
ever likely to be produced, an investigation should be commenced anyway. As a 
result, the accused can be put under all kinds of restraints (including being held 
in custody in !e Hague) and will certainly be brought under a grave public 
shadow. Indeed, with the ICC, the accused is not innocent until proven guilty,61 
but, in the eyes of the world, guilty even when not proven guilty62). 
!ere is much to be said for the view that this is an inevitable hazard of any 
criminal prosecution. But unlike at the national level, there is at the supranational 
level no counterbalance to the discretionary powers of the prosecutors. States di+er 
greatly in their constitutional structures, but what most modern democracies 
share is some check – whether ultimately derived from a parliament, a senate, 
or a senior council of state – on these discretionary powers (the balance or 
dialectic of power, see chapter #). In the Netherlands, the executive power – in 
the person of the minister of justice – is ultimately responsible for the policy of 
59 !e resolution passed with the vote of $$ in favor and - abstentions, amongst which were the 
United States, and is available online at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/#%%'/sc)*'$.doc.htm.
60 Article $' sub $ of the Rome Statute.
61 Which is the o9cial position of the ICC, article && of the Rome Statute.
62 As happened to, for example, Milosevic, who was never convicted a:er six years of trial. I 
do not argue that he was innocent, but rather that he could have been innocent – as he was never 
convicted a:er six (!) years of trial. Cf. John Laughland, Travesty. !e trial of Slobodan Milosevic 
and the corruption of international justice (London: Pluto Press, #%%,) #.
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the prosecutor, and can be held accountable by parliament. Similarly, the Dutch 
law provides a procedure following article $# of the code of criminal procedure, 
which enables concerned parties to "le a complaint against the Prosecutor at the 
Court of Appeals. !ese sorts of checks and balances are fundamentally impos-
sible to realize at the supranational level as they presuppose the existence of a 
full state. As a result, supranational prosecution will necessarily remain arbitrary 
and the powers of such institutions necessarily unchecked by balancing powers.63 
Nor is it certain that the Court will accept justice done to ‘war criminals’ on 
national levels. For the ICC retains the ultimate authority to decide on whether 
that function has been adequately exercised,64 and, if it "nds that it has not been, 
the ICC can reassert jurisdiction.65 For example Charles Graner and Lynndie 
England were sentenced to, respectively, ten and three years imprisonment by 
Court Martial of the US army for crimes committed at the Abu Graib prison 
in Iraq. !e ICC could rule this punishment inadequate, and restart a criminal 
procedure against them (had the United States been part of the ICC, of course).
And this is a very serious point indeed. By becoming a member of the ICC, 
states have deputed their power to decide how to react to their own military 
troops committing mistakes or crimes, to the Prosecutor and his Pre-trial 
Chamber, to state requests, or to a majority in the Security Council. !e ICC 
may even declare national reconciliation procedures void, thereby taking from 
the parties involved the decision of what justice requires in the circumstances. 
A:er the abolition of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, for example, many 
former government o9cials were not punished for crimes committed in the 
name of the regime if they admitted them before a special tribunal.66 !e ICC 
might in the future overrule such a reconciliation settlement (as the Prosecutor 
has for example said in the spring of #%$$ that he would not accept immunity for 
Colonel Khada" as part of a cease-"re). Even when the ICC has not in advance 
given notice that it would not accept a particular reconciliation settlement, it 
may still begin investigations. Whether or not the ICC is going to do so can 
thus never be guaranteed in advance.67 !is may cause many regimes to refuse 
63 As Madison observed: ‘!e provision for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be 
made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. 
!e interest of man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a 
re8ection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to controul the abuses of 
government’. Hamilton, Madison and Jay, !e Federalist Papers (New York: Bantam Dell, $()#) 
*$&, Federalist no. '$ (Madison).
64 As provided by article #% of the Rome Statute.
65 Henry Kissinger, ‘!e Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction’, in: Foreign A<airs, vol. )%, no. - 
(July/August #%%$) ('.
66 See on this: Afshin Ellian, Een onderzoek naar de Waarheids- en Verzoeningscommissie van 
Zuid-Afrika (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal, #%%*).
67 Here, the example of General Pinochets peaceful resignation is also worth mentioning. 
!e agreement that he would not be tried was violated by the claim to universal jurisdiction, 
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reconciliation tribunals (and continue "ghting), as one cannot be sure that 
admitted crimes will not be used against one in !e Hague. An armed con8ict 
such as the aforementioned operation Desert Storm ($(($) might not have been 
concluded with an armistice if there had been a fair chance that Saddam Hussein 
would have had to face extradition to !e Hague.
Moreover, if the Court wants to be e+ective in its rulings its members will 
have to place their armies and police forces at the Court’s disposal, because the 
ICC does not have its own means of enforcing its decisions and warrants. !is 
implies the active participation of the ‘international community’ in the situations 
of armed con8ict the ICC has chosen to involve itself in.
A glimpse of what this might amount to is found in the aforementioned 
resolution $'(* on Sudan, when the Security Council urged all states to cooperate 
with the proposed prosecution of the Sudanese leadership by the ICC. A next 
step in supranational direction might be that the Security Council (of which 
we will come to speak in depth in chapter ' section #) decides that all states 
must cooperate. While these legal considerations are unlikely to cause much 
unrest among insurgency and terrorist groups, or among undemocratic regimes, 
Western states with their rule of law, an obedient police force and respect for 
international law and diplomacy will always be directly held accountable and 
easily criticized.
Yet, is it likely that the ICC would ever assert jurisdiction over powerful 
countries? One critic put it this way:
Today’s international criminal justice only punishes certain criminals, those who 
can be apprehended because they belong to countries that "nd themselves in a 
weak and dependent position. Even if China and Russia were to ratify the treaty 
establishing the International Criminal Court, would the court be able to judge 
Chinese authorities for what they have done in Tibet? Or put Putin in the dock 
for crimes committed in Chechnya? Of course not.68
It would, however, be quite likely that regimes may use the ICC to dispose of 
political enemies. Generals who become a threat to the internal power base of 
presidents may be handed over to the ICC; some have pointed with suspicion 
at the fact that Congo’s remarkable cooperation with the extradition of opposi-
tion leader Jean-Pierre Bemba to the ICC served the political interests of the 
president, his rival Joseph Kabila.69 
and this may set a precedent that may prevent future dictators from considering resigning from 
power (think of, for instance, Fidel Castro, who happened to be in Spain when the arrest warrant 
against Pinochet was issued – not surprisingly, Castro supported the former Chilean dictator in 
his objections to his prosecution).
68 Delsol (#%%)) xvii.
69 Daniel Howden, ‘International justice and Congo “warlord” on trial’, in: the Independent 
(#* November #%$%): ‘Mr. Bemba’s supporters in the DRC have accused the ICC of allowing 
itself to be used to remove the political rivals of the President Joseph Kabila.’ Available online at 
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To entrust all such matters to an international court is to entrust a great 
moral responsibility to the ‘international community’. To do so is not realistic, 
Saudi Arabia still being a recognized adherent to the Convention to Eliminate 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),70 as in #%%*, the Iraq 
of Saddam Hussein, then the only regime in place that had ever used weapons 
of mass destruction on its own population, was chairing the #'th anniversary 
Disarmament Conference in Geneva, assisted by co-chair Iran.71 !ese countries 
had recently been in a war with each other in which over a million people were 
killed. China claimed to be in full compliance with the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, while Amnesty International devoted more pages in its #%%& 
annual report to Human Rights abuses in Britain and America than to those 
in Saudi Arabia and Belarus.72 In addition, the UN Human Rights Commis-
sion (now reframed as Council) has not issued a single condemnation of the 
atrocities committed in Sudan in #%%) while it has repeatedly condemned 
Israel for its human rights violations, upon neglecting, largely, the abuses of its 
neighbours,73 and so on. Is this the ‘international community’ we are entrusting 
all these powers to?
Finally, within the ICC, the Prosecutor has discretionary competencies 
that can have enormous e+ects. !is became clear when in March #%%(, Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo openly requested an arrest warrant against the Sudanese 
president al-Bashir. But by openly doing so, Antonio Cassese argued,74 he 
implicitly warned al-Bashir that attempts at prosecution were at hand, and 
thereby reduced the ICC’s chances of ever trying him. Cassese even suggested 
that Moreno-Ocampo did in fact not sincerely attempt to further the case against 
al-Bashir, but might have had other motives.75 A prosecutor with so much power 
can only be supported if one accepts the supranational world-view, according to 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/international-justice-and-congo-warlord-
on-trial-#$-$$*'.html.
70 Rabkin (#%%-) $%,.
71 R. Roth, ‘Iraq to chair disarmament conference’, on: CNN.com, #( January #%%*. Available 
online at http://edition.cnn.com/#%%*/WORLD/meast/%$/#)/sprj.irq.disarmament.conference/.
72 Amnesty International Report #%%&. !e report can be found on Amnesty’s website, http://
www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/POL$%/%%$/#%%&. See for critical commentary also: ‘Many 
rights, some wrong’, in: !e Economist, March ##nd, #%%,.
73 #& of its *# condemnations have been against Israel: R. Farrow, ‘Beware of the U.N. Human 
Rights Council; Obama should be careful about lending legitimacy to bad actors’, in: !e Wall 
Street Journal, April 'th, #%%(.
74 Antonio Cassese, ‘Flawed International Justice for Sudan’, in: Project Syndicate, June $'th, 
#%%), available online at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/cassese-/English.
75 As he writes: ‘(…) if Moreno-Ocampo intended to pursue the goal of having al-Bashir 
arrested, he might have issued a sealed request and asked the ICC’s judges to issue a sealed 
arrest warrant, to be made public only once al-Bashir traveled abroad.’ Antonio Cassese, ‘Flawed 
International Justice for Sudan’, in: Project Syndicate, June $'th, #%%), available online at http://
www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/cassese-/English.
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which – and this is the recurring theme of this chapter – the question for political 
legitimacy never arises. It is only in nation states that powerful functionaries can 
be subjected to checks and balances. It is inherent in the supranational idea that 
these functionaries are installed without those checks, precisely because those 
checks can only exist within a state and form an integral part of the concept 
of statehood. For those checks require other elements of sovereignty that a 
supranational organization can never possess.
Collateral damage is, moreover, an unavoidable consequence of any military 
involvement in armed con8icts. !ough during operation ‘Desert Storm’ ($(($) 
it was announced that the era of ‘clean wars’ had commenced, it never, despite 
impressive technological improvements and conscious e+orts, quite arrived. 
Does this mean that all those who participate in military con8icts will run the 
risk of being tried by the ICC in the future?
!e International Criminal Court is probably not intending to prosecute 
UN Peacekeeping personnel when they may, as sometimes happens in wars, 
accidentally have bombed and devastated a village of innocent farmers and 
cra:smen. A comparable situation occurred for instance when NATO bombed 
Serbia in $(((. But the ICC would want to prosecute the dictator such as Milosevic 
who has acted similarly. It will prove almost impossible for the ICC to remain 
‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ while making such choices in military con8icts.
We have arrived at perhaps the most fundamental di9culty for an inter-
national court with supranational powers, which is the impossibility of neutrality. 
It may already be tremendously di9cult to decide which is the more legitimate 
military force in an armed con8ict; to decide on whether the amount of force 
used was ‘disproportionate’ or imposed too much harm on civilians is clearly 
a political matter. Why trust an outsider, or the ‘international community’ to 
decide such questions?
It was also this dilemma that caused Immanuel Kant to ultimately reject the 
idea of a supranational court, considering in the Metaphysik der Sitten ($,(,) that
No war of independent states against each other can be a punitive war (bellum 
punitivum). !e punishment occurs only in the relation of a superior (imperantis) 
to those subject to him (subditum), and states do not stand in that relation to 
each other.76
(…)
!e right of a state aAer a war, that is, at the time of the peace treaty and with a 
view to its consequences, consists in this: the victor lays down the conditions on 
which it will come to an agreement with the vanquished and hold negotiations 
for concluding peace. 
76 Immanuel Kant, !e metaphysics of morals. Translated and edited by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, $((&) $$, (par. ',).
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 !e victor does not do this from any right he pretends to have because of 
the wrong his opponent is supposed to have done on him; instead, he lets this 
question drop and relies on his own force. !e victor can therefore not propose 
compensation for the costs of the war since he would then have to admit that his 
opponent had fought an unjust war. While he may well think of this argument he 
still cannot use it, since he would then be saying that he had been waging a punitive 
war and so, for his own part, committing an o+ense against the vanquished.77 
Contrary to what is commonly believed, Kant had argued likewise in his well 
known essay on international relations, Zum ewigen Frieden ($,(').78 While 
stressing that ‘war is only a regrettable expedient for asserting one’s rights by 
force within a state of nature, where no court of justice is available to judge with 
legal authority’, Kant found that ‘neither party can be declared an unjust enemy, 
for this would already presuppose a judge’s decision’, and that it was the outcome 
of the con8ict itself that would determine ‘who is in the right’, and that for this 
reason, ‘a war of punishment between states is inconceivable, since there can 
be no relationship of superior to inferior among them’.79 Acknowledging that 
‘perpetual peace, the ultimate goal of the whole right of nations, is indeed an 
unachievable idea’,80 Kant, in his Metaphysik, goes on to discuss the possibilities 
for a congress of states, of the kind that ‘took place (…) in the "rst half of the 
present century in the assembly of the States General at the Hague’.81 !is, however, 
would not have supranational powers but would merely be accepted as ‘arbiter, 
so to speak’.82 Kant "nishes with the caveat that ‘by a congress is here understood 
only a voluntary coalition of di+erent states which can be dissolved at any time’, 
and which serves to aid the nations in ‘deciding their disputes in a civil way’.83 
!e tradition of organizing such an international conference of ‘arbiters’ 
continued until the Hague Peace Conferences of the beginning of the #%th 
century, and was surely one of the most important reasons why ‘the Dutch 
government, proud of its tradition of o+ering political asylum and of its respect 
for international law, resolutely refused to extradite the Kaiser when he sought 
asylum there’ a:er World War I.84 !e former head of the German state was to be 
tried by an international tribunal as demanded by the allies under the provisions 
77 Kant ($((&) $$,-$$) (par. ')).
78 Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf (Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam, #%%').
79 In Kant’s vision, the only way in which states could relate to each other in a peaceful manner 
was by mutual recognition of their sovereign equality. !is implied for him the impossibility of 
judgment of states’ behaviors, even in wartime: Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’, in: Political 
Writings. Edited with an introduction and notes by Hans Reiss. Second, enlarged edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, $(($) (& ("rst section, par.&).




84 Laughland (#%%)) ''-'&.
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of article ##, of the Versailles treaty,85 but found refuge in the Netherlands and 
died in Doorn in $(-$. 
!e aforementioned problems have plagued international tribunals ever 
since the rise of sovereign statehood (see also chapter $), and it becomes clear 
that the two are fundamentally irreconcilable.
-.#. T"# E>8&E#)9 C&>8( &' H>C)9 R$:"(% 
!e same idea as implied in the ICC – that supranational judges and functionaries 
should uphold abstract rules of ‘fundamental value’ – underlies human rights 
discourse. !is is evident generally from a great number of UN commissions 
as well as NGO’s labouring for increased ‘human rights protection’86 – and it 
has become manifest most obviously in the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR). At present, this Court is the only supranational Human Rights-
institution that may impose legally binding decisions, and therefore this 
section is primarily about the Strasbourg bench. However, it is necessary "rst 
generally to examine human rights discourse, or, as it has been called, ‘rights 
talk’,87 because deeper and largely neglected questions that should be brought 
to the fore lie underneath the speci"c questions related to the Strasbourg court.
!inking in terms of ‘human rights’ has gained enormous momentum in the 
past decades. Rights discourse usually distinguishes between three main categories 
of ‘human rights’: classical rights, social rights, and group rights. Rights that 
fall in the "rst category concern the negative freedoms of the individual, and 
include the freedom of speech, a fair trial, habeas corpus,88 freedom of religion, 
and so on. !ey require primarily abstention of the state from the arbitrary 
use of power. !e second category encompasses all those rights of which the 
enforcement requires an active role of the state. !ey are the rights to education, 
to an adequate standard of living, adequate food, clothing and housing,89 and 
so on. In more recent years, a third category of rights has been developed, the 
social group rights: people can claim rights because they belong to a certain 
group, for example an ethnic minority, a sexual minority, or even a generation 
85 Available online at http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh,/wwi/versa/versa&.html.
86 Examples are the UN Human Rights Council, the UN High Commissioner on Human 
Rights, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and so on.
87 Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk. !e impoverishment of political discourse (New York: !e 
free press, $(($).
88 !e principle of habeas corpus denotes the right not to be held prison without charges 
being pressed.
89 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ($(&&), article $$: ‘!e 
States Parties to the present covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard 
of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions’.
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(e.g. ‘youth rights’). !ese rights are what multiculturalism argues for, as will 
be discussed in chapter &.
Most advocates of all these universal ‘rights’, however, speak in metaphors 
rather than in factual terms. !ey mistake the wish for the reality. What is o:en 
meant – and this applies to all three categories – is not ‘rights’ in any juridical 
sense, but ‘humanitarian principles’, ‘Christian values’ or ‘natural law’ that ought 
to be installed as rights. ‘Human rights’ have become the umbrella concept to 
denote general principles of justice. It has become a habit to express disapproval of 
genocide, suppression, severe abuse of power, and so on, as violations of ‘human 
rights’ of some sort. We say, for instance, that in a war in Africa ‘basic human 
rights’ are infringed, or that the regime in Burma ‘gravely violates the human 
rights’ of its citizens. Sometimes it seems that modern man can only conceive 
of moral ideas when they are expressed as ‘rights’ of some sort. 
Nevertheless, as I said above, all such use of the term ‘human rights’ is 
metaphorical. Whoever uses the term does not refer to actually existing rights: 
for in order to do that, those ‘rights’ ought already to have been legislated and to 
be enforceable by a court. !e same goes for the great number of other ‘rights’ 
that are currently advocated – for instance ‘animal rights’ and the ‘rights of 
the environment’.90 For defenders of the 8ora and fauna of the world, the word 
‘rights’ has a completely di+erent meaning from that in the positive, legal sense. 
Animals are not legal subjects because they couldn’t possibly defend themselves 
in a court of law. To speak of – or even legislate – animal rights is ultimately 
about how we, as human beings, ought to treat animals, and certainly not about 
what one animal may do to – or invoke against – another animal, for instance.91 
Many national laws forbid certain forms of animal maltreatment, but however 
important these regulations may be, they amount to something entirely di+erent 
from considering animals legal subjects and bearers of individual, inalienable 
‘rights’, with an entitlement to enforce them in a court of law against any other 
mammal or reptile. !e same goes, a fortiori, for trees and the earth’s crust. 
!ose invoking supposedly universal ‘human rights’, ‘animal rights’ and the 
‘rights of the tree’ thus do not invoke any actually existing rights, but principles 
of justice, decent behaviour, responsible stewardship – expressed through the 
metaphor of ‘rights’.92
90 Cf. the French philosopher Michel Serres who defends the ‘rights’ of the ocean: Michel 
Serres, Le contrat naturel (Paris: François Boudin, $((%).
91 !e fact that some of such ‘animal rights’ have now been ‘recognized’, as has been done for 
instance in Spain, does not a+ect this.
92 To say that it is absurd – in the literal sense – to grant rights to non-rational actors is by no 
means to say that we are without duties towards them, of course. We are never free from duties 
towards children, mentally disabled or people su+ering from dementia. Nor are we even without 
duties towards non-living objects, for example a painting of Rembrandt. In fact, there is a good 
case to be made for the view that rights talk impoverishes moral thinking rather than enriching it. 
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!ough dating back to the second half of the eighteenth century,93 the several 
declarations of the universal rights of man have, to this day, never gained legal 
status either. !e United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights of $(-) 
has no legal validity, as it is a declaration and not a treaty.94 !e International 
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (both drawn up in $(&&) do not pretend to codify universal ‘human 
rights’, but a range of political themes so wide as to annul the very idea of a 
universal core of natural law. Rather, these treaties sum up the elements a wise 
government ought to take into account. Even the ominous right of prisoners for 
their ‘reformation’ is included, as well as the right of working mothers to ‘paid 
leave or leave with adequate social security bene"ts’, the ‘fundamental right of 
everyone to be free from hunger’ and the right to the enjoyment of ‘the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health’.95 
It is clear that these ‘rights’ do not indicate universal, ultimate boundaries 
which governments may not cross in any circumstances whatever. !ey may 
denote desirable policy proposals (although the ‘reformation of prisoners’ 
reminds one of the Gulag archipelago), but they are not universal and inalien-
able moral imperatives.96
Even more importantly, these rights cannot be claimed universally, as there is 
no world court – let alone a world police force to guarantee the enforcement of 
the rulings of such a hypothetical court. As a consequence, their interpretation 
will di+er from country to country. Countries like Bolivia or Ghana have di+erent 
standards of ‘highest attainable standards of health’ from those of Switzerland or 
Sweden; China and Saudi-Arabia mean something di+erent by the ‘reformation 
of prisoners’ than most Western states. In any event, there is no way of speaking 
of ‘universal’ human rights, based on any of the UN’s declarations and treaties.
Cf. Roger Scruton, Animal Rights and Wrongs (London: Continuum, #%%%), Glendon ($(($), and 
the excellent essay by !eodore Dalrymple, ‘!e demoralization of abortion’, in: Claire Fox (ed.), 
Abortion: whose right? (London: Hodder & Stoughton, #%%#). On page *), Dalrymple writes: ‘(…)
I have the right to buy a painting by Rembrandt, if I have enough money. Once such a painting 
is in my possession I have the legal right to destroy or deface it, if I so desire: but surely no one 
would argue by way of exculpation or even mitigation, were I to do so, that I had acted within 
my rights. My rights have nothing to do with the question. A woman who believes that she has 
a right to an abortion, which should require no further justi"cation than that she wants it, as 
an instance of her right to self-determination (the ‘it’s-my-body’ argument) overlooks morally 
important aspects of her own situation.’
93 A major source of inspiration being, of course, John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government 
($&(%). John Locke, !e second treatise of Government ($&(%) especially chapter XIX: ‘Of the 
dissolution of government’.
94 J.H. Burgers, ‘!e Road to San Francisco: the revival of the Human Rights Idea in the 
Twentieth Century’, in: Human Rights Quarterly, vol. $- ($((#) --,--,,.
95 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ($(&&) articles $%, $$ and $# respectively.
96 Cf. Cliteur, ‘Steeds maar nieuwe rechten. In8atie als juridisch probleem’, in: Cliteur, Tegen 
de Decadentie. De democratische rechtstaat in verval (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, #%%-) $&$+.
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But not only do universal human rights not exist because they have never 
been codi"ed and could never be enforced; in the hypothetical situation that 
we did codify and enforce them centrally, their application would hardly be 
unproblematic. 
Suppose we made the ‘right to life’ a ‘universal human right’ – applied univer-
sally by, in the last instance, a world court. Would that mean a ban on abortion 
and euthanasia? Many people – including many judges from all over the world 
– would say yes. Would it mean a ban on the death penalty? Overwhelmingly, 
European elites think so – while many Americans and Asians do not. Nor is 
it di9cult to reframe the right to life into a positive obligation of the state to 
provide the basic needs of all.97 Does standing by without providing a remedy 
while someone dies violate his right to life or not? Must this not mean that the 
welfare state follows necessarily from this ‘right to life’?
Or take the principle of non-discrimination. Again, this is something that 
sounds ‘fundamental’ and important. But consistent application of this principle 
could justify the prohibition of just about anything from hereditary monarchies 
to the constitutional rule that in order to become American president, a candi-
date has to have been born in the US and be at least *' years of age.98 Because 
no two individuals are entirely the same, the principle of non-discrimination 
is endless in its application – just as consistent application of the principle of 
‘equal opportunities’ would require a ban on private property and the dissolu-
tion of families. 
Likewise, the prohibition of discrimination inevitably clashes with classic civil 
liberties such as those of expression, conscience and religion.99 !e privileged 
positions that many states – for a variety of social, cultural and historical rea-
sons – preserve for a speci"c religious denomination, for instance the Anglican 
Church in Britain, or the Lutheran in Denmark, or clubs that discriminate on 
the basis of sex, are all in violation of this supposedly fundamental principle.100 
A recent Dutch case against the Christian Orthodox party SGP is an example of 
how arbitrary the application of the ‘fundamental principle of non-discrimination’ 
97 In the Case of Osman v. United Kingdom (Application no. 34/.,,4/34./.-35) Judgment 
Strasbourg #) October $((), the Court for instance ruled that ‘ArticleA# of the Convention may 
also imply in certain well-de"ned circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take 
preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk’ (B.#, par. $$').
98 !e unavoidability of discrimination will be discussed more extensively in chapter ) and (.
99 A comparable critique of the supposed universal ‘right to free speech’ has been given by 
Stanley Fish, !ere’s No Such !ing As Free Speech. And It’s a Good !ing, Too (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, $((-).
100 An example is the Dutch Commission for Equal Treatment (‘Commissie Gelijke Behandeling’) 
which found in June #%$$ that a café that organized a ‘ladies night’ was applying intolerable 
discrimination on the basis of gender, because women received "ve free consumptions. Cf. ‘Café 
berispt om ladies’ night-korting’, NOS, June *%th, #%$$, http://nos.nl/artikel/#'#-%*-cafe-berispt-
om-ladies-nightkorting.html.
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may in practice turn out to be, when on April (th, #%$%, the Dutch Supreme 
Court ruled that the Netherlands’ oldest political party had violated the ‘principle 
of non-discrimination’ by not allowing women to stand for election on behalf 
of their party. !e Dutch court considered, that:
!e prohibition of discrimination outweighs, in so far as it guarantees the franchise 
of all citizens (…) other constitutional rights involved.101
But why did the prohibition of discrimination outweigh other constitutional 
rights in this case? Well, because the Court thought so.102 And why was the SGP, 
which had been denying women the right to stand for election ever since it was 
founded in $($), only been prohibited from doing so in #%%(? Surely because 
our views on this subject have proven susceptible to change over time.
!e fundamental problem of ‘rights talk’ is thus that rights (all rights, in 
all circumstances) are always open to multiple interpretations. !eir precise 
meaning is never obvious. !e application of rights, to say the same thing in 
di+erent words, requires a political choice. !is is evident from the situation 
in the United States too, where judicial appointments to the Supreme Court 
are in practice political appointments. !rough their jurisprudence, these 
judges may indeed take decisive political decisions in areas such as national 
security (qualifying practices at Guantanamo Bay as torture), ethics (allowing 
or prohibiting abortion and euthanasia), criminal justice (capital punishment), 
immigration (permitting or prohibiting the rejection of asylum seekers), and 
international law (declaring treaties unconstitutional).103 American presidents 
nominate judges with views consistent with their own.104 !e Senate, which 
must ratify the appointments, can oppose the nomination when the majority 
has a di+erent political opinion (as happened in $(), when Ronald Reagan’s 
101 ‘[Het] Discriminatieverbod weegt, in zoverre het de kiesrechten van alle burgers waarborgt 
(…) zwaarder dan de andere grondrechten die in het geding zijn’: LJN:ABK-'-,,AHoge Raad, 
%)/%$*'-, ruling of ( April #%%(.
102 To arrive at its conclusion, the Court interpreted article ,a of the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which had already been entered into 
force in $()$, in a particular way. Cf. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm.
103 Another example is the way the American Supreme Court has over time stretched the 
meaning of the right to free speech, now also encompassing incitement, sedition, and obscenity. 
Cf. Stanley Fish, !ere’s No Such !ing As Free Speech. And It’s a Good !ing, Too (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, $((-), Ronald Dworkin, ‘Why must Speech be free?’ and ‘Pornography and 
Hate’, in: Ibidem, Freedom’s Law. !e moral reading of the American Constitution (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, $((&) $('-##&, as well as Milos Forman’s movie !e people vs. 
Larry Flynt ($((&).
104 Cf. Bork ($((%); Stephen Breyer, Making our democracy work. A judge’s view (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, #%$%); Erwin Chemerinsky, !e conservative assault on the constitution (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, #%$%); Je+rey Toobin, !e Nine. Inside the secret world of the supreme 
court (New York: Anchor Books, #%%,).
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candidate Robert Bork was rejected105). Americans know where the judges of 
the Supreme Court stand and weigh their chances to push for certain political 
changes when a judge is replaced. Democrats are currently hoping that during 
Barack Obama’s term some Republican judges will be replaced by Democrats 
(and that, for instance, this may lead to the abolition of the death penalty).
!ere are thus already considerable problems related to ‘rights talk’ on 
a national level. But the larger the juridical scope of a court, the greater the 
di9culties, as di+erent countries arrange their a+airs di+erently. If the writ of 
the US Supreme Court also ran in Canada, Mexico, Guatemala and Venezuela, 
the situation would soon get out of hand. !erefore, the application of rights 
on a supranational level multiplies the problems. What is more, the powers of 
the US Supreme Court are held in check by the legislature, which may provide 
countervailing legislation if it does not agree with the court’s rulings. !at is 
the idea of constitutional checks and balances: ‘ambition must be made to 
counteract ambition’, and di+erent bodies of the state must keep one another 
in check.106 !is does not – and cannot – exist on the supranational level, as it 
requires a full state.
It is, however, also an option constitutionally to forbid judges from applying 
‘fundamental rights’ to democratically passed legislation, and so tackle the danger 
of politicized ‘rights talk’. !is has traditionally been the Dutch approach.107 
!e argument against constitutional review is that reviewing laws on their 
constitutionality implies interpretation of the constitution, and interpretation 
of the constitution is inherently political.108 !e more fundamental the rule in 
question, the vaguer its application by de"nition becomes. !erefore, critics 
argue, allowing constitutional review will over time lead to a weakening of the 
105 Cf. for a critical account of the events surrounding the nomination, Ronald Dworkin, 
‘Bork: !e Senate’s Responsibility’, ‘What Bork’s Defeat Meant’, and ‘Bork’s own Postmortem’, in: 
Ibidem ($((&) #&$-*%'.
106 ‘!e provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the 
danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. !e interest of man must be 
connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a re8ection on human nature, that 
such devices should be necessary to controul the abuses of government’. Alexander Hamilton, 
James Madison and John Jay, !e Federalist Papers (New York: Bantam Dell, $()#) *$&, Federalist 
no. '$ (Madison).
107 Cf. on the Dutch view: Paul Cliteur, Constitutionele toetsing, met commentaren van 
R.A.V. van Haersolte, J.M. Polak en T. Zwart (’s Gravenhage: Geschri: ,- van de Prof. mr. B.M. 
Teldersstichting, $(($) $,(+.
108 !ere have been many political thinkers who have opposed constitutional review, ranging 
from Hegel to Henry Steele Commager, and from James Bryce to Maurice Cranston. For an 
overview, see Paul Cliteur, Rechts+loso+e. Een thematische inleiding (Amsterdam: Ars aequi 
libri, #%%$) $,(+. For the arguments of John Marshall in the US supreme court case of Marbury 
v. Madison ($)%*), see Bork ($((%) #%+. Cf. William J. Brennan, jr., ‘Why have a Bill of Rights?’, 
in: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. (, no. - ($()() -#'---%; and Antonin Scalia, A matter of 
interpretation. Federal courts and the law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, $((,).
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primacy of politics in deciding political questions and to a colonization of the 
neutral territory of the law by political bias.109 
It is with this concern in mind that judges in the Netherlands – though allowed 
to review the constitutionality of lower (e.g. municipal or provincial) legislation 
as well as decisions of the executive (‘royal resolutions’) –, cannot review laws 
passed by the national parliament. Article $#% of the Dutch constitution forbids 
a direct appeal to fundamental rights to negate a national legal provision. !e 
idea is that political primacy should lie with the democratically elected Second 
Chamber – held in check through all kinds of constitutional balancing powers 
such as the Senate, the Council of State, the Queen, elections, the free press, the 
public debate, and so on – and that the Dutch court does not rule on the inter-
pretation of fundamental rights, which is regarded as being inherently political. 
!e framers of the Dutch constitution thus chose to have the constitutional bill 
of rights as a reminder for the legislator to take into account the principles of 
justice they point to, and not as ‘trumps’ in the hands of citizens or judges to 
enforce their views through undemocratic means.110 It is largely for this reason 
that the Dutch Supreme Court has, over the years, managed to maintain a fairly 
apolitical pro"le.111 
But this immediately brings us to the European Court of Human Rights. 
Contradictory to the original philosophy of the Dutch constitution, the Council 
of Europe, an organization itself installed by the Treaty of London, on May 'th, 
$(-(, drew up the Convention of Human Rights in $('% including provisions 
for the setup of a fundamental rights court.112 It entered into force in September 
$('*, counting $- member states at the time.113 Today, the Council of Europe 
has -, member states.114
109 As, indeed, the development of the United States Supreme Court seems to show.
110 !ough J.R. !orbecke himself was, oddly enough, a defender of Constitutional review; 
J.R. !orbecke, Bijdrage tot de herziening van de Grondwet ($)-)).
111 Cf. on the Dutch debate, Joost Sillen, ‘Tegen het toetsingsrecht’, in: Nederlands Juristenblad, 
vol. -* ($% december #%$%) ##*$-#,-).
112 Counting $% formative states, namely, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Winston Churchill had (Especially 
in his speech of $( September $(-& in Zurich) promoted the idea of this organization as a means 
to bring reconciliation to Europe a:er the devastation of the World Wars. Article $(a) of the 
Statute explains that ‘!e aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its 
members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their 
common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress’.
113 New members were: Greece ($(-(-%)-%(), Turkey ($(-(-%)-%(), Iceland ($('%-%*-%(), and 
West-Germany ($('%-%&-$*).
114 Austria ($('&-%--$&), Cyprus ($(&$-%'-#-), Switzerland ($(&*-%'-%&), Malta ($(&'-%--#(), 
Portugal ($(,&-%(-##), Spain ($(,,-$$-#-), Liechtenstein ($(,)-$$-#*), San Marino ($())-$$-$&), 
Finland ($()(-%'-%'), Hungary ($((%-$$-%&), Poland ($(($-$$-#&), Bulgaria ($((#-%'-%,), Estonia 
($((*-%'-$-), Lithuania ($((*-%'-$-), Slovenia ($((*-%'-$-), Czech Republic ($((*-%&-*%), 
Slovakia ($((*-%&-*%), Romania ($((*-$%-%,), Andorra ($((--$%-$%), Latvia ($((--$%-$%), Albania 
($(('-%&-$*), Moldova ($(('-%&-$*), FYR Macedonia ($(('-$$-%(), Ukraine ($(('-$$-%(), Russia 
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!e convention recognizes a wide range of rights, complemented by a 
number of protocols containing additional rights. !e rights guaranteed in this 
code can go pretty far. Take the example of protocols & and $*, which establish 
the prohibition of the death penalty. It is clearly questionable how universal, 
nonpolitical such a prohibition is. Not only from the standpoint of political 
theory,115 but also democratically. A recent poll showed that more than half of 
the European population is in favor of capital punishment in speci"c, unusually 
severe cases.116 Nevertheless, it has now been declared a violation of ‘fundamental 
human rights’ in all circumstances whatever.117
!e Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, upon state submission, 
installs the judges of the Court. Each member state nominates three nationals 
(who do not need to have worked as judges in their national legal system), and the 
Assembly then decides who it likes best. With one judge for each member state, 
Monaco and Azerbaidjan have as much say in the European Court of Human 
Rights, as do Germany and Britain (although whatever is said during delibera-
tions must obviously be translated, with judges from -, di+erent countries). 
Applicants from all di+erent member states (both citizens and non-citizens) 
may "le a complaint for an alleged violation by any of its member states of the 
rights recognized in the Convention and protocols. !e conditions for admiss-
ability of the case are formal: domestic remedies should have been exhausted 
(art. *' sub $ ECHR), no complaint may be anonymously "led, et cetera – but 
these conditions do not con"ne the jurisdiction of the Court to for instance ‘the 
severest cases only’. !rough its jurisprudence, the Court has in recent years 
also assumed jurisdiction over behavior of its member states’ military forces in 
occupied territories. !us the United Kingdom was convicted, for instance, in 
($((&-%#-#)), Croatia ($((&-$$-%&), Georgia ($(((-%--#,), Armenia (#%%$-%$-#'), Azerbaijan 
(#%%$-%$-#'), Bosnia and Herzegovina (#%%#-%--#-), Serbia (#%%*-%--%*), Monaco (#%%--$%-%'), 
and the most recent one, Montenegro (#%%,-%'-$$).
115 Cf. Paul Cliteur, ‘Afscha9ng van de doodstraf als nationale folklore’, in: Ibidem, Moderne 
Papoea’s. Dilemma’s van een multiculturele samenleving (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, #%%#) 
$%&-$*&. Cliteur discusses the great body of political theory in support of the death penalty, as well 
as such a case as that of Adolf Eichmann, who was hanged, to the general approval of many, in $(&#.
116 Facts on this are abundant. See for instance Prague Daily Monitor, July $*th, #%%(, ‘Poll: almost 
two-thirds of Czechs support capital punishment’; A. Moravchik, ‘!e new abolitionism: why 
does the U.S. practice the death penalty while Europe does not?’, in: European Studies (September 
#%%$), writes: ‘European public opinion, and that of other advanced industrial abolitionist nations, 
views the death penalty positively. In France, for example, President Mitterrand abolished the 
death penalty in $()# despite &#; percent of the French being retentionists; only last year did 
poll support dip for the "rst time below '%;. Two-thirds of the German population favored the 
death penalty at the time of its abolition. Today &'-,%; of Britons, nearly ,%; of Canadians, a 
majority of Austrians, around '%; of Italians, and -(; of the Swedes favor its reinstatement.’
117 Cf. J.M. Marshall, ‘Death in Venice: Europe’s Death-penalty Elitism, in: !e New Republic 
(July *$, #%%%). 
$$& .<74125 6/H5 
#%$$, a:er Iraqi nationals "led a complaint in Strasbourg against the conduct of 
British soldiers in the Iraqi province of Basrah during a night patrol.118
Given the Dutch tradition of withholding from judges the power to interpret 
constitutional principles, it is not surprising that many government o9cials 
in the Netherlands were reluctant to embrace the idea of a Court of Human 
Rights in the "rst place. Prime Minister Drees resisted the individual complaints 
mechanism of the court until the last moment. Amongst his objections was the 
fear that it would make it impossible for the Dutch state to defend itself against 
disruptive individuals within its territory (especially, national-socialists and 
communists),119 because defence against them would sometimes compel the 
state to take measures infringing the ‘rights’ such a Court might want to uphold 
for them.120
In the end, the Dutch government rati"ed the convention a:er the advice 
of several experts in international law who proclaimed that none of the laws of 
the Netherlands were in contradiction with the Convention.121 !e Council of 
State, however, was unremitting in its rejection of the Convention. It clearly saw 
the problems posed by the infringement of the country’s sovereignty inherent 
in the ECHR, and held that should the Netherlands become part of the court, a 
reservation on the right to individual applications should be made. In any case, 
accession to the ECHR should, according to the Council of State, be regarded 
as a constitutional treaty and would thus have required a quali"ed majority.122
But the Council of State and the Prime Minister were overruled by the 
enthusiasm of the Dutch Parliament for the Convention, and the Netherlands 
joined the ECHR in $('- upon unquali"ed (and uncounted, but generally as-
sumed) majority vote in Parliament.123
In the discussion of its legitimacy, the "rst argument defenders of the ECHR 
use is that the Court will help emerging democracies such as Bulgaria, Russia and 
Turkey to function properly. !e Court would protect the freedom of expression 
118 Grand Chamber judgement in the Case of Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom 
(application no. '',#$/%,). For a comparison with previous cases concerning extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of the ECHR (most notably the case of Bankovic and others v. Belgium & Others – 
'##%,/(( [#%%$] ECHR )(%, $# December #%%$), see: Alasdair Henderson, ‘Al-Skeini v. United 
Kingdom (, july #%$$)’, in: Human Rights and Public Law Update ($- July #%$$), available online 
at http://www.$cor.com/$*$'/?form_$$''.replyids=$-%#.
119 !e actuality of this argument is illustrated by the way some Islamist radicals use Human 
Rights to continue their terrorist activities unhindered, as described in: Melanie Phillips, Londonistan 
(London: Gibson Square #%%&) &* and further.
120 Y.S. Klerk and L. van Poelgeest, ‘Rati"catie a contre Coeur: de reserves van de Nederlandse 
regering jegens het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens en het individueel klachtrecht’, 
in: RM !emis ' ($(($) ##%-#-&.
121 Most notably prof. dr. François and mr. Eijssen, see on this: Klerk and Van Poelgeest ($(($) 
##%-#-&.
122 Klerk and Van Poelgeest ($(($) ##%-#-&.
123 Ibidem.
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and right to a fair trial of journalists and opponents of these governments; it 
would help to improve living conditions of prisoners, and the position of women.
It is true that the Court frequently slaps those countries on the wrist (though 
its rulings are o:en ignored – either because the awarded indemni"cations are 
not paid, or because the demanded amendments to legislation are not made124). 
However, the Court does much more than that. It o:en focuses on Western 
Europe and forces mature democracies with a properly functioning rule of law 
to revise democratically established policies. !e ECHR interferes not only 
with torture and disappearances, with clandestine state practices and incipient 
ethnic cleansings in Eastern Europe, but also with everyday issues such as the 
voting rights for prisoners,125 provisions for public education,126 policies concern-
ing homebirth,127 regulations with regards to house searchings,128 and police 
interrogations.129 Moreover, the Court also interferes with important national 
questions such as political asylum and immigration,130 national security, and 
the combating of terrorism.131
!e question why the judges from Strasbourg should be allowed to impose 
their views on these issues to the rest of Europe is pressing – even in the view of 
the ECHR itself. Acknowledging that they are surely an extremely small group 
that is outside the control of national parliaments, a doctrine of a ‘margin of 
appreciation’ has been developed by the Court, that would help it to distinguish 
between ‘fundamental’ questions that would fall under its jurisdiction, and less 
fundamental or everyday ones that should be le: at a national level. According 
to the doctrine of the ‘margin of appreciation’, the Court should perform a 
‘marginal’ check only and thus function merely as an ultimate ‘watchdog’ of 
124 As of yet, no systematic quantitative research on the compliance with judgments of the 
ECHR has been undertaken. However, several studies have pointed at the lack of compliance of 
for instance Russia with the ECHR’s rulings. See for instance Julia Lapitskaya, ‘ECHR, Russia, 
and Chechnya: two is not company and three is de"nitely a crowd’, in: International Law and 
Politics (NYU, Vol. -*, #%$$) -,(-'-,.
125 Case of Hirst v. !e United Kingdom (no. #) (Application no. 42-/6/-.), Judgment Strasbourg 
& October #%%'.
126 Case of Lautsi v. Italy (Application no. -3.2/-1) Judgment Strasbourg * November #%%(; and 
Grand Chamber: (Application no. 5-3.2/-1) Judgment Strasbourg $) March #%$$.
127 Case of Ternovszky v. Hungary (Application no. 14626/-,) Judgment Strasbourg $- December 
#%$%.
128 Case of Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. !e Netherlands (Application no. 53//2/-5) Grand Chamber 
Judgment Strasbourg $- September #%$%.
129 Case of Salduz v. Turkey (Application no. *&*($/%#) Judgment Strasbourg #, November #%%).
130 For instance through interim measures preventing the expulsion of asylum seekers in 
October #%$%. Cf. MSS v. Belgium & Greece (application no. *%&(&/%() Judgment Strasbourg #$ 
January #%$$. Remarkable in this case was the scarcity of evidence the applicant provided for the 
inhumane situation in Greece he allegedly had been in.
131 Case of Kelly and others v. !e United Kingdom (Application no. 5--62/,1) Judgment 
Strasbourg - May #%%$.
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the most basic natural law.132 In the words of the Dutch judge at the ECHR, 
Egbert Myjer, the Court is the guarantor of ‘European minimum standards’.133
But the problem with this is that it is the Court itself that decides the width 
of the margin of appreciation. As a result, we have seen the ECHR appropriate 
more and more jurisdiction to itself.134 ‘In practice’, as the former British high 
court judge Lord Leonard Ho+mann argued, ‘the Court has not taken the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation nearly far enough. It has been unable 
to resist the temptation to aggrandise its jurisdiction and to impose uniform 
rules on Member States’.135
!e ECHR has for instance, as mentioned before, ruled against Britain for its 
refusal to grant the right to vote to convicted criminals while they are in prison. 
Although the British High Court had considered that:
if an individual is to be disenfranchised that must be in the pursuit of a legitimate 
aim. (…) As [the counsel for the Secretary of State] submits, there is a broad 
spectrum of approaches among democratic societies, and the United Kingdom falls 
into the middle of the spectrum. In course of time this position may move, (…) but 
its position in the spectrum is plainly a matter for Parliament not for the courts.136
!e Strasbourg Court, however, thought di+erently. ‘A general, automatic and 
indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right must be 
seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation’, it held with the 
vote of twelve in favor to "ve against.137 !e Court considered, amongst other 
things, that ‘there is no evidence that parliament has ever sought to weigh the 
competing interests or to assess the proportionality of a blanket ban on the right 
of a convicted prisoner to vote. (…) It may perhaps be said that, by voting the 
way they did to exempt unconvicted prisoners from the restriction on voting, 
parliament implicitly a9rmed the need for continued restrictions on the voting 
rights of convicted prisoners. Nonetheless it cannot be said that there was any 
substantive debate by members of the legislature on the continued justi"cation 
in light of modern day penal policy and of current human rights standards for 
132 Cf. Jeroen Schokkenbroek, ‘!e Basis, Nature and Application of the Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights’, in: Human Rights Law Journal, 
vol. $(, no. $ (April $(()) *%-*&, as well as the other articles in this particular issue of the Journal, 
which was dedicated entirely to the doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation.
133 ‘Zolang als u maar niet door de Europese minimumnorm zakt’, in Buitenhof, ' December #%$%.
134 In this respect, the Public Choice !eory is interesting, as it provides models for understanding 
the ever-expanding nature of institutions.
135 Leonard Ho+mann, !e Universality of Human Rights (Judicial Studies Board Annual 
Lecture, $( March #%%(), available online at www.shrlg.org.uk/wp-content/plugins/download…/
download.php?id=$'.
136 Case of Hirst v. !e United Kingdom (no. /) (Application no. 42-/6/-.) Grand Chamber 
Judgment Strasbourg & October #%%'.
137 Ibidem. !e Chamber had ruled unanimously against the UK in #%%-.
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maintaining such a general restriction on the right of prisoners to vote’.138 It 
is remarkable, to put it no higher, that a supranational court is here not only 
assessing the legal system of one of its member states, but also goes at some 
length evaluating the deliberations of its parliament. 
In #%$%, the ECHR, noticing that the UK had not amended its provisions 
concerning the prisoners’ voting ban, recon"rmed its views on the matter, and 
concluded that: 
the respondent State must introduce legislative proposals (…) within six months 
of the date on which the present judgment becomes "nal.139 
Days before this ruling, the British Prime Minister David Cameron had declared 
that the idea of prisoners having the right to vote made him ‘physically sick’,140 
and he was backed by an overwhelming majority in Parliament resisting to 
review the provisions in the British criminal code. In February #%$$, the British 
Parliament voted with #*- to ## votes to continue the ban on prisoners’ voting 
rights. In April #%$$, the ECHR rejected (by an anonymous panel of "ve judges) 
the British application for appeal to the Grand Chamber, thus making the 
previous judgment "nal and so bringing an obligation on the United Kingdom 
to change its laws before $$ October #%$$.141
It was not the "rst time that the Court had had views regarding punishments 
con8icting with those of the United Kingdom. More than thirty years earlier, in 
the Tyrer v. UK case of $(,), the Court had already interfered with practices on 
the Isle of Man, which ultimately came down to declaring all forms of corporal 
punishment to juveniles a form of ‘degrading’ punishment prohibited in article * 
(although it remains questionable if any child is ever brought up without having 
received an occasional slap by his parents). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice considered:
I have to admit that my own view may be coloured by the fact that I was brought 
up and educated under a system according to which the corporal punishment of 
schoolboys (…) was regarded as the normal sanction for serious misbehaviour, 
(…). Generally speaking, and subject to circumstances, it was o:en considered by 
the boy himself as preferable to probable alternative punishments such as being 
kept in on a "ne summer’s evening to copy out '%% lines or learn several pages of 
138 Ibidem.
139 Case of Greens and M.T. v. !e United Kingdom (Applications nos. 1--2./-3 and 1--62/-3) 
Judgment Strasbourg #* November #%$%.
140 Cameron declared this on November *rd, #%$%, in a debate in Parliament. Cf. B. Quinn, 
‘Prisoners’ voting rights: government loses "nal appeal in European court. European court 
of human rights rules UK must draw up proposals to end ban on prisoners voting within six 
months’, in: !e Guardian, Tuesday $# April #%$$. Available online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
politics/#%$$/apr/$#/prisoners-vote-government-loses-appeal?&.
141 !is information is provided by the British Parliament itself, available online at http://www.
parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/brie"ngs/snpc-%$,&-.pdf.
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Shakespeare or Virgil by heart, or be denied leave of absence on a holiday occa-
sion. (…) Yet I cannot remember that any boy felt degraded or debased. Such an 
idea would have been thought rather ridiculous. !e system was the same for all 
until they attained a certain seniority. If a boy minded, and resolved not to repeat 
the o+ence that had resulted in a beating, this was simply because it had hurt, 
not because he felt degraded by it or was so regarded by his fellows: indeed, such 
is the natural perversity of the young of the human species that these occasions 
were o:en seen as matters of pride and congratulation, – not unlike the way in 
which members of the student corps in the old German universities regarded 
their duelling scars as honourable – (though of course that was, in other respects, 
quite a di+erent case).142 
It was also in this Tyrer case, that the Court for the "rst time declared that ‘the 
Convention is a living instrument which (…) must be interpreted in the light 
of present-day conditions’ – which meant that in theory, the Court was now no 
longer restrained by a strict, literal interpretation of the text of the Convention.143 
As a result, ever since this ruling, the Court has given new – and expanding 
– interpretations to the rights under its jurisdiction. ‘!e Strasbourg court has 
taken upon itself an extraordinary power to micromanage the legal systems of 
the member states of the Council of Europe’, Lord Ho+mann observed in #%$$.144 
In #%%,, for example, the ECHR ruled that the Somali asylum seeker Salah 
Sheekh could not be expelled from the Netherlands because expulsion would 
infringe his right not to be tortured. !e Dutch government’s agency on im-
migration had concluded beforehand that Salah Sheekh did not run the risk of 
torture. Dutch national immigration policy, established a:er extensive public 
debate and sanctioned by the democratically elected parliament, has thus been 
overruled.145 Following this case, the Chamber of the Court decided in the case 
of A. v. the Netherlands of in July #%$%, that a Libyan asylum seeker, who was 
regarded a threat to national security by the Dutch secret services (AIVD) and 
142 Case of Tyrer v. !e United Kingdom (Application no. 6361/4/) Judgment Strasbourg #' April 
$(,). !e Court has also referred to a ‘European consensus’, a ‘trend’, an ‘international consensus’ 
(Case of Christine Goodwin v. !e United Kingdom (Application no. /3,64/,6) Judgment Strasbourg 
$$ July #%%#), all of which being not even remotely clear in their de"nition. Should a ‘consensus’ 
develop that the Court "nds unwelcome – for instance concerning opposition to gay-rights, a 
viewpoint that a great serious number of member states of the Council of Europe indeed seem 
to increasingly share – it is unclear what the Court would do. Cf. K. Dzehtsiarou, ‘Consensus 
from within the Palace Walls: UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. -%/#%$%’ (September $,, #%$%) available online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol*/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=$&,)-#-.
143 Case of Tyrer v. !e United Kingdom (Application no. 6361/4/) Judgment Strasbourg #' 
April $(,).
144 Leonard Ho+mann, ‘Foreword’, in: Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Bringing Rights Back Home. 
Making human rights compatible with parliamentary democracy in the UK (London: Policy 
Exchange, #%$$) ,.
145 Case of Salah Sheekh v. !e Netherlands (Application no. .,23/-2) Judgment Strasbourg $$ 
January #%%,.
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later by the Dutch government and the courts as well (due to active participation 
in a jihadist network), could not be expelled because, so the Court believed, he 
might be tortured in Libya.146 
It were precisely such cases that were feared by those who objected to grant-
ing the Court the right to receive individual complaints – and it was precisely 
with such cases in view, that guarantees were given to the Netherlands before 
accession, that its decisions in these matters would not be interfered with.147
!e examples are abundant, and the potential contradictions between national 
preferences and the momentary moral whims of a human rights court are endless. 
In Lautsi v. Italy, the ECHR initially ruled that cruci"xes in Italian public schools 
were a violation of the fundamental right to freedom of religion (article ( of the 
Convention) taken together with article # of the second Protocol, that requires 
that ‘the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and 
teaching in conformity with their own religions and philosophical convictions’, 
and sentenced Italy to pay ',%%% euros ‘non-pecuniary damage’.
!e ruling was unanimous, and the wording of the ruling strict and highly 
critical of Italy:
!e Court considers that the presence of the cruci"x in classrooms goes beyond 
the use of symbols in speci"c historical contexts.
(…)
!e Court acknowledges that, as submitted, it is impossible not to notice cruci"xes 
in the classrooms. 
(…)
!e presence of the cruci"x may easily be interpreted by pupils of all ages as a 
religious sign (…). What may be encouraging for some religious pupils may be 
emotionally disturbing for pupils of other religions or those who profess no religion. 
!at risk is particularly strong among pupils belonging to religious minorities.148
But in appeal, the Court reversed its conclusion. With a great majority of ":een 
votes to two, the court all of a sudden concluded that, in fact, no violation of the 
convention had occurred. While ‘the decision whether or not to perpetuate a 
tradition falls in principle within the margin of appreciation of the respondent 
State’, the Court considered that ‘a cruci"x on a wall is an essentially passive 
symbol’. In addition, it concluded that:
!ere is no evidence before the Court that the display of a religious symbol on 
classroom walls may have an in8uence on pupils and so it cannot reasonably be 
asserted that it does or does not have an e+ect on young persons whose convictions 
are still in the process of being formed.
146 Case of A. v. !e Netherlands (Application no. 2,--/-1) Judgment Strasbourg #% July #%$%.
147 Klerk and Van Poelgeest ($(($) ##%-#-&.
148 Case of Lautsi v. Italy (Application no. 5-3.2/-1) Judgment Strasbourg * November #%%(.
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!e Court also reminded the plainti+ that she ‘retained in full her right as a 
parent to enlighten and advise her children, to exercise in their regard her 
natural functions as educator and to guide them on a path in line with her own 
philosophical convictions’.149
Two other examples of the Court’s ambivalence are the case of Pye v. UK and 
that of Hatton v. UK. In Pye v. UK, the Court considered the extent to which 
British limitations on land ownership claims were contrary to the ‘right to 
protection of property’ (Article $ of the "rst Protocol). Initially, the Court ruled 
that there was indeed a con8ict, but the Grand Chamber then considered that 
England was within its right to decide for itself on these matters.150 In Hatton 
and others v. UK, the Court ruled with ' to # votes that night 8ights regulations 
concerning Heathrow Airport, decided upon by the British Secretary of State 
upon an assessment of the national economic interest concerned, were a violation 
of the right to respect for the privacy of those living in the area of the airport. 
!e Grand Chamber overruled this decision again with the vote of $# to '.151
If the two chambers of the Court could di+er so greatly, how ‘universal’ then 
could the fundamental principles on which they decided the case have been? Is 
it not a basic assumption of a supranational Human Rights court – and was it 
not a basic assumption of the ECHR in Strasbourg – that it would merely deal 
with principles of basic justice (‘self-evident’ principles, as it were152) that we all 
agreed with?153 !e whole point of a supranational court of Human Rights is that 
there are some ‘fundamental’ values that we all agree upon – and that we have 
a Court to make sure they are protected – while more ordinary or disputable 
questions remain within the competence of national politics. 
But it is becoming increasingly clear that the European Court of Human Rights 
does not aim to perform that role. In a signi"cant number of cases, the Court 
hardly performs ‘marginal’, ‘subsidiary’ interpretation of otherwise universal 
principles, immediately recognized by any civilised nation. While the Court 
was set up to pass judgment on gross violations of undisputed matters only, it 
is gradually applying the European Convention of Human Rights as law to the 
149 Case of Lautsi and others v. Italy (Application no. 5-3.2/-1) Grand Chamber Judgment 
Strasbourg $) March #%$$.
150 Case of J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. !e United Kingdom (Application no. 225-//-/) Judgment 
Strasbourg $' November #%%'; and Grand Chamber Judgment Strasbourg, *% August #%%,.
151 Case of Hatton and others v. !e United Kingdom (Application no. 51-///,4) Grand Chamber 
Judgment Strasbourg, ) July #%%*.
152 As the American declaration of independence famously denotes such basic principles.
153 For not only did the Grand Chamber rule completely opposite to the Chamber, the votes 
of the judges itself show serious discord as well. While the Chamber judgment had unanimously 
held that there had been a violation, the Grand Chamber again overwhelmingly voted (with $' 
to #) that in fact there had not been such a violation. 
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cases brought before it – thus accepting the panel of international judges coming 
from -, countries as the ultimate authority in increasingly ordinary disputes.154 
One of its judges has even considered in a dissenting opinion that speed 
limits might be a violation of a universal human right, considering that ‘it is 
di9cult for me to accept the argument that hundreds of thousands of speeding 
motorists are wrong and only the government is right’.155 In other cases, the 
Court interferes not with its member states’ governments, but with its member 
states’ judges. !us the ECHR overruled the German Supreme Court’s decision 
to allow the publication by the press of pictures of the Princess of Hannover and 
her children, stating that such publication would violate her right to privacy 
(Article ) of the Convention). !e Court thought the disputed pictures made 
no ‘contribution (…) to a debate of general interest’, while Germany, aware 
of its particular history of curtailing free expression in public, had thought it 
best to allow such a publication.156 !e judge from Slovenia in his concurring 
opinion rose to the occasion to present his own philosophical position on the 
freedom of speech:
I believe that the courts have to some extent and under American in8uence made a 
fetish of the freedom of the press. (…) It is time that the pendulum swung back to 
a di+erent kind of balance between what is private and secluded and what is public 
and unshielded. !e question here is how to ascertain and assess this balance …’157
Apart from the unusual liberty assumed here by Judge Zupancic to express 
his views on the alleged American ‘fetish’ of the freedom of the press and the 
undoubtedly political viewpoint that ‘it is time that the pendulum swung back’, 
it is important to note that he believed it was the task of the ECHR to ‘ascertain 
and assess’ this issue.
But not only does Strasbourg – as we have seen in these examples – assume 
jurisdicton in increasingly far-reaching and political questions, in practice its 
rulings reach even further, since the rights of the convention and the jurispru-
dential course of the Court are also applied by national judges in national courts, 
as if they were precedents.
154 Sometimes, the European Court also seems to use its Convention as the Constitutional 
appeal of a supposed ‘Federal State of Europe’. As indeed acknowledged by the Court itself in the 
Loizidou-case (Preliminary objections, March #*, $(('), when the Court described the European 
Convention on Human Rights as ‘a constitutional instrument of European public order’. See R.A. 
Lawson and H.G. Schermers, Leading cases of the European Court of Human Rights (Leiden: Ars 
Aequi $((') vii.  
155 Case of O’Halloran and Francis v. !e United Kingdom (Applications $')%(/%# and #'&#-/%#) 
Judgment Strasbourg #( June #%%,.
156 Case of Von Hannover v. Germany (Application no. 6,5/-/--) Judgment Strasbourg #- June 
#%%-.
157 Concurring opinion of Judge Zupancic, Case of Von Hannover v. Germany (Application no. 
6,5/-/--) Judgment Strasbourg #- June #%%-.
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We are already seeing that all kinds of articles of domestic law are being 
interpreted according to the European Court’s jurisprudence. A recent example 
from the Netherlands was the decision of the Court of Appeal of !e Hague, which 
declared new legislation concerning the eviction of illegal squatters a violation of 
the European Court’s interpretation of the right to family life.158 On November 
)th, #%$%, the mayor of Amsterdam, Eberhard van der Laan, was thus prevented 
from executing democratically passed new legislation on the matter.159 We have 
also seen the principal of precedent being applied in the Dutch jurisprudential 
interpretation of freedom of speech, which was extensively reviewed in the 
light of Strasbourg jurisprudence during the trial of Geert Wilders, as if it were 
authoritative law applying directly to the Dutch case.160 
In Salduz v. Turkey, the Court decided that there must be no police interroga-
tion of suspects without the presence of a lawyer. !is case created a precedent 
for the Dutch criminal justice system that has traditionally allowed interrogation 
of suspects immediately a:er arrest.161
It is possible that there will soon be an Islamic interest group that will 
challenge the French ban on the burqa in Strasbourg by invoking the right to 
freedom of religion. Or the Swiss minaret-ban. What will the Court say? !omas 
Hammarberg, who works as a ‘commissioner for human rights’ at the Council 
of Europe, has already announced on July #%th, #%$$, that he saw such a ban 
as ‘a sad capitulation to the prejudices of xenophobes’, and Erdogan, the prime 
minister of Turkey – which is also a member of the Council of Europe – has 
declared that to his mind, this ban violated the ‘freedom of religion’.162 Perhaps 
158 Gerechtshof ’s-Gravenhage, November )th, #%$%, published November $$th, #%$%; LJN:ABO*&)#, 
#%%.%,&.&,*/%$. !e decision was supported by the Supreme Court on October #), #%$$.
159 !e anti-squatting law had been initiated by three members of Parliament, Ten Hoopen 
(Christian-Democrats), Slob (Christian party)Aand Van der Burg (Liberal Party). !e Second 
Chamber passed it in October #%%(, and the Senate passed it in June #%$%. More information 
available online at http://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/*$'&%_initiatiefvoorstel_ten.
160 Rick Lawson, ‘Wild, wilder, wildst. Over de ruimte die het EVRM laat voor de vervolging van 
kwetsende politici’, in: NJCM-Bulletin, vol. **, no. - (#%%)) -)$. Cf. !ierry Baudet, ‘De vrijspraak 
van Geert Wilders is uniek in Europa’, in: Trouw, #' June #%$$. !e article has been translated as 
‘Geert Wilders, a Voltaire for our times?’, and is available online at http://www.presseurop.eu/en/
content/article/,-*,'$-geert-wilders-voltaire-our-times; it was criticized by Rick Lawson, ‘Werd 
Islamcritici de mond gesnoerd? Helemaal niet’, in: Trouw, #) June #%$$; which was again answered on 
the weblog Dagelijkse Standaard, ‘Professor Rick Lawson nu zelf onzorgvuldig’, $ July, #%$$, available 
online at http://www.dagelijksestandaard.nl/#%$$/%,/professor-rick-lawson-nu-zelf-onzorgvuldig.
161 Cf. Alexander de Swart, ‘Toch nog een raadsman bij het politieverhoor? Enkele ontwikkelingen 
na Salduz/Panovits’, in: Nederlands Juristenblad, no. -, #( January #%$%, ##*-##&; Alexander 
de Swart, ‘Update Salduz-doctrine. Toch nog een raadsman bij het politieverhoor? Part II’, in: 
Nederlands Juristenblad, no. -#, - December #%$%, #&(#-#&('.
162 Quoted in: ‘Council of Europe blasts burqa ban’, in: www.euractiv.com (#% july #%$$) available 
online at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/culture/council-europe-blasts-burqa-ban-news-'%&&)(. 
Cf. ‘Penalising women who wear the burqa does not liberate them’, in: !e Council of Europe 
Commissioner’s Human Rights Comment, #% July #%$$. Available online at: http://commissioner.
cws.coe.int/tiki-view_blog_post.php?postId=$',.
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that a ban on the burqa or on new minarets will indeed be found to be in con8ict 
with the ‘human rights’ of immigrants, nobody can know in advance, but there 
is now a fair chance in almost any legal dispute that involves moral questions to 
win your case in Strasbourg. !e Court has a waiting list approaching #%%.%%% 
cases, growing everyday.
-.*. T"# I9(#89)($&9); C&>8( &' J>%($?#
!e International Court of Justice has become one of the leading fora for 
international dispute settlement since its installation simultaneously with the 
founding of the United Nations.163 In principle, it is not a supranational court 
because referral of disputes by states to it is always on a voluntary basis. Article 
*& par. $ reads: ‘!e jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the 
parties refer to it’. And it takes two to tango.164
Yet, the possibility exists for a state to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ in 
any international dispute it may have, and it is then obliged to accept the ruling 
of the Court. !is possibility is given in par. # of the same article *&. It reads: 
!e states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize 
as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other 
state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal 
disputes (…).
Making such an article *& declaration makes the ICJ a supranational institution 
for that state and for the type of disputes that have been declared to be falling 
under the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. An impressive range of states 
has accepted this compulsory jurisdiction: && in total.165
Yet if we look at the provisions in the declarations of these && states, we 
understand that this acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction is o:en merely pro 
forma: most states have made extensive lists of exceptional circumstances in which 
they do not recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ – circumstances 
such as border disputes, disputes concerning armed con8icts, disputes where, in 
163 !e ‘introductory note’ to the Charter of the United Nations reads: ‘!e Statute of the 
International Court of Justice forms an integral part of the Charter of the United Nations.’
164 !ough the ICJ itself goes so far as to denote itself as the ‘world court’, http://www*.icj-cij.
org/jurisdiction/index.php?p$='. !e Permanent Court of International Justice has also been 
denoted as such, see for instance Michael P. Scharf, ‘!e ICC’s jurisdiction over the nationals of 
non-party states: a critique of the U.S. position’, in: Law & Contemporary Problems, vol. &-, issue 
$ (Winter #%%$) &,-$$), there ,*.
165 As of Spring #%$$. Information is available online at http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/
index.php?p$='&p#=$&p*=*.
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the case of states such as India, ‘other commonwealth or former commonwealth 
states’ are involved, and the like.166
Moreover, just as with the ICC, most states that are likely to be involved in 
serious armed con8icts in the near future have not recognized this compulsory 
jurisdiction, for example China, Russia, United States, France, Israel, Iran, and 
others.
What we see in the ICJ is therefore an international organization with 
embryonic supranational powers. !ere have been worrying examples of what 
these capabilities may amount to, however. One is the $()& case of Nicaragua v. 
the United States.167 In this case, the US was condemned to pay indemni"cation 
to Nicaragua for its aggression in supporting rebels who opposed the pro-
communist Nicaraguan regime at the time. !e United States had agreed to accept 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under article *& (be it with a number of 
important reservations). !e Security Council then proposed a resolution to 
demand that the United States comply with the rulings of the ICJ. !e United 
States was able to veto this resolution. But if a non-veto power had been in the 
position of the United States in this case, it might have been obliged to comply 
with the ruling of an international court that it did not accept (following this 
a+air, the United States withdrew its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of 
the ICJ under article *& and has never restored it).
166 !ese and other countries’ declarations can be found online at http://www.icj-cij.org/
jurisdiction/index.php?p$='&p#=$&p*=*
167 Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports $()&.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
'.$. T"# W&8;= T8)=# O8:)9$I)($&9
!e World Trade Organization (WTO) is a supranational organization that 
is concerned with the rules of trade between its member states. It is based in 
Geneva and currently has $'* member states. As the successor of the General 
Agreement on Tari+s and Trade (GATT), it was founded in $((' at the end of 
the so-called ‘Uruguay Round Agreements’.
!e GATT system, in turn, had been part of a series of developments that 
followed from the international conference on rebuilding the global economic 
system a:er the Second World War, held in the "rst three weeks of July $(-- at 
the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, a village in New Hampshire. 
During this conference, special attention was paid to the prevention of what 
was considered an important cause of the Second World War: the collapse of 
the international "nancial and trade system in the Great Depression (from 
$(#( onwards). Moreover, one of the driving forces behind the initiatives at this 
conference was the United States, which had an interest in the dissolution of the 
European empires that o+ered favorable trade positions to its colonies and client 
states and in taking over global economic hegemony through worldwide free 
trade and the establishment of the dollar as the international reserve currency.
In any case, at this conference in Bretton Woods, initiatives for three new 
international institutions were launched: the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, 
later becoming part of the ‘World Bank Group’), and the International Trade 
Organization (ITO).
!e main functions of the IMF were (and still are) three. !e "rst is the 
installation of an international system of economic surveillance, involving 
the monitoring of global economic and "nancial developments, and provid-
ing policy advice for states that ask for it, aimed especially at the prevention 
of "nancial crises. !e second function of the IMF is lending to countries 
with balance of payments di9culties, and advising or imposing economic 
policies aimed at correcting the underlying problems (the so-called Structural 
Adjustment Programmes). And the third function of the IMF is to provide 
countries with technical assistance and training in its areas of expertise, such 
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as currency devaluations. !us, however powerful the IMF may be, it possesses 
no supranational powers.1
!e IBRD, now part of the World Bank Group, provides loans to developing 
countries. It thus di+ers from the IMF in that it does not lend just to restore the 
"nancial stability of a country, but to help it develop. !e IBRD thus functions 
as a form of development aid system. (!e "rst country to receive a loan from 
the IBRD was France, #'% million US dollars in $(-&2). !us, the World Bank 
Group does not possess any supranational powers either.3
!irdly, there was the plan to set up an International Trade Organization 
(ITO). !is plan was not further developed at the Bretton Woods conference, 
but, as such an organization was considered a necessary supplement to the 
IMF and the IBRD, talks concerning it continued between $(-' and $(-(. !e 
organization was to have been placed under the aegis of the UN, and was to 
have a broad regulatory mandate, covering international trade as well as national 
employment regulations and business practices. 
!e United States Congress, however, did not ratify the treaty that was 
eventually dra:ed, and the ITO therefore never came into being (the US of 
course being at the time by far the most important economy).4 At the same time, 
however, a number of countries that had been present at the ITO negotiations 
(most notably, at the conference in Havana in $(-)) had dra:ed a provisional 
program for the regulation of international trade, called the General Agreement 
on Tari+s and Trade (GATT).5 !is was not much more than an interim solution, 
but it turned out to be long lasting.
 A:er the initial round of negotiations, new rounds followed, encompassing 
more tari+ reductions on a wider range of products, attracting more and more 
states to become a party to GATT. A particularly comprehensive round, that of 
Uruguay, lasting from $()& until $((*, established a permanent international 
organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO). !is WTO were to cover 
a wider range of trade issues and to provide an umbrella institution of which 
1 Cf. http://www.imf.org/external/about/whatwedo.htm.
2 !e Marshall Plan was set up alongside the IBRD, as at that time, IBRD revenues were 
insu9cient to supply all European aid.
3 See also the website of the Worldbank, available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/%,,pagePK:'%%%--$%~piPK:*&&%#~theSitePK:#(,%),%%.html.
4 See on the ITO for instance: Claude E. Bar"eld, Free trade, sovereignty, democracy. !e future 
of the World Trade Organization (Washington DC: IAE Press, #%%$) #%-#$.
5 !ere was no separate rati"cation by the US Senate required for the implementation of the 
commitments of GATT, because American adherence to it was already authorized under the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), a pre-war US statute. !ere were initially twenty-
three countries party to these agreements, namely: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, 
Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, the Czechoslovak Republic, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.
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GATT would now become a part,6 together with the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS).7
Any member of the WTO would automatically be part of GATT, GATS, and 
TRIPS. A new round of negotiations was started at the ministerial conference 
at Doha in #%%$, but this round is still in progress.
In some ways, the establishment of the WTO might be seen as the ful"lment 
of the promise of GATT (and certainly the WTO can be seen as the answer 
to the expectations that the failure of the ITO had raised). Yet there are two 
essential changes in the transformation of GATT to the WTO, which make 
the WTO not only a permanent forum for negotiating trade agreements, but a 
supranational organization. 
Firstly, GATT had been an agreement with – and between – ‘parties’. !is 
meant that every rule that was binding on the parties was necessarily accepted 
by all of them individually. !is had the e+ect that GATT lacked supranational 
powers. !e WTO, by contrast, is an international organization, with ‘members’. 
While, like GATT, WTO rulings are also to be accepted by unanimity, and article 
IX under $ of the WTO treaty determines that the ‘WTO shall continue the 
practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT $(-,’, article 
IX under # reads:
In the case of an interpretation of a Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex $ 
[i.e. the speci"c trade rules on goods], they [the ministerial conference] shall 
exercise their authority on the basis of a recommendation by the Council [i.e. 
the General Council, a governing body of the WTO] overseeing the functioning 
of that Agreement. !e decision to adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a 
three-fourths majority of the Members.
A three-fourth majority vote (each country counting for one) is thus su9cient 
to re-interpret existing agreements and thus possibly to change their scope. 
But not only can the WTO interpret previous agreements, it can also amend 
them. Article X of the WTO treaty provides that ‘Any Member of the WTO 
may initiate a proposal to amend the provisions of this Agreement (…) by 
submitting such proposal to the Ministerial Conference’. It continues that ‘If 
consensus is not reached at a meeting of the Ministerial Conference within 
the established period’,
6 Until that moment, there had been six rounds, the Annecy Round ($('%), the Torquay Round 
($('$), the Geneva Round ($(''-$('&), the Dillon Round ($(&%-$(&#), the Kennedy Round ($(&--
$(&,), the Tokyo Round ($(,*-$(,().
7 Since that moment, many additional agreements, for instance the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
(ADA), and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS), have been added to this.
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the Ministerial Conference shall decide by a two-thirds majority of the Members 
whether to submit the proposed amendment to the Members for acceptance.8
Following this, again a three-fourths majority is needed to make those amend-
ments binding on all members if they are considered to ‘alter the rights and 
obligations of the members’.9 States that do not agree with such an amendment, 
will be o+ered either the possibility of withdrawing from the WTO, or of ac-
cepting it anyway. 
In practice, it has so far been impossible to reach this three-fourth majority, 
and it is unlikely that the WTO, with its $'* members with highly diverging 
agendas, will do so in the near future. Moreover, as European countries are still 
among the world’s most powerful trading nations, it is unlikely that a three-fourth 
majority of member states of the WTO will vote against one of the European 
member states’ wishes. Still, it is a fact that the WTO possesses this power, and 
there can be no doubt it is a supranational power.
!e second change in function between GATT and the WTO is in the settle-
ment of disputes between its states. In a situation in which con8ict arose over the 
interpretation of certain trade agreements, GATT rules provided no institution 
that could pass judgement – and thus did not contain any provisions to place itself 
above the states that were party to the agreement. GATT functioned as a means 
to facilitate international trade agreements; it did not have its own mechanism 
of interpreting provisions and accumulating jurisprudence through precedents. 
Article XXIII of GATT stated that ‘If any contracting party should consider 
that any bene"t accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being 
nulli"ed or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement 
is being impeded as the result of (…) the failure of another contracting party 
to carry out its obligations under this Agreement (…)’,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, 
make written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties 
which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall 
give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
Paragraph # of this article of GATT then continued:
If no satisfactory adjustment is e+ected between the contracting parties concerned 
within a reasonable time, (…) the matter may be referred to the contracting parties.
Under GATT, then, the contracting parties – i.e. all the states that were parties 
to GATT – would have had unanimously to agree that a state had violated an 
agreement – which meant that a single state, including the state involved in the 
dispute in question, could block such a declaration. Furthermore, this declaration 
8 WTO agreement, article X under $.
9 Ibidem.
 3H457071=/07G /5E70=J71=/03 $*$
was all GATT could provide. It did not have any means of its own to enforce 
its agreements, and the ultimate sanction for non-compliance was retaliation 
from states that felt injured or wronged. !is form of retaliation rested on the 
decision of the states that wished to employ it. !ere was no supranational 
decision-making involved.
!e WTO system amended this procedure on two points. Firstly, while under 
GATT, states could only be judged by consensus, meaning that a single objection 
could block the conviction; the rulings of the arbitration panel were now, under 
the WTO, automatically adopted unless there was a consensus to reject them. 
Secondly, a permanent judicial body was installed under the understanding 
on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes, to which states could 
appeal decisions of the arbitration panel: the Appellate Body (AB). !is AB would 
not consist of three ad hoc arbiters, appointed by the disputing states (as was 
the case under GATT), but of seven ‘members’, appointed by the assembly of 
states for a period of four years (with the possibility for one reappointment). 
Member states have agreed not to retaliate if they do not agree with the decision 
of the abitration panel (as would have been possible under GATT), but to bring 
their issues before the AB.
!e "rst important problem this poses, is that it actually places serious 
restrictions on the exercise of foreign policy, limiting the freedom to install a 
trade blockade. In history, trade sanctions o:en played an important role in 
enforcing foreign policy, coming between mere diplomatic pressure and actual 
military engagement. As a result of rules governing the WTO, therefore, the 
possibilities for imposing economic sanctions have been severely limited.10
But there is yet more. At its very "rst ruling,11 the United States – Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, the appellate body declared a standard 
of review for the provision of article *, paragraph # of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), that reads: 
!e dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing 
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. !e Members 
recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under 
the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements 
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
10 It is true that under article XXI (b) ‘security interests’ may allow such a trade blocade, and 
that article XXI (c) gives members of the WTO the right to comply with UN trade sanctions. 
But when no UN sanctions have been agreed and no direct ‘security interests’ are involved, or 
when member states in their trade sanctions violate the proportionality test that is included in 
the AB’s standard of review (as will be discussed further down this section), member states thus 
violate WTO rules.
11 !e actual "rst case to be brought under the Appellate Body, Malaysia – Prohibition of Imports 
of Polyethylene and Polypropylene, did not result in a ruling as the complainant, Singapore, withdrew.
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According to the AB, these ‘customary rules of interpretation of public inter-
national law’ were also to encompass article *$ of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, which states that the interpretation of treaties should be 
led by what is called the ‘ordinary meaning’ of terms. Indeed, this was declared 
by the AB to be 
a rule of customary or general international law. As such, it forms part of the 
‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ which the Appellate 
Body has been directed, by Article *(#) of the DSU, to apply …12
!e curious thing is not that this rule is thought to be itself problematic. Nor 
that the application of this article was of decisive impact on the outcome of the 
dispute. What is curious, is that the United States – which was the defending 
party in this dispute – had never rati"ed the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (and still hasn’t13). In other words, the defendant in this dispute was 
not a party to the treaty held by the AB to be ‘a rule of customary or general 
international law’. A court that is capable of doing such a thing might very well 
expand its powers in other cases even more.
An occasion to do so was provided in $((,. India, Malaysia, Pakistan and 
!ailand brought a joint complaint before the AB stating that the United States 
had violated article XI of GATT, which is concerned with eliminating import 
restrictions. 
According to the complainants, these restrictions resulted from Section &%( 
of US Public Law $%$–$%#, enacted in $()(, which obliged shrimp "shers to 
use "shing nets equipped with so-called Turtle Excluder Devices (TED’s), thus 
ensuring that sea turtles would not get caught (and possibly killed) in the pro-
cess of shrimp "shing. Additionally, this law prohibited the selling on American 
markets of shrimp (or of shrimp products) that were caught with nets not using 
those TED’s. In its defence of the prohibition, the United States invoked article 
XX, paragraph g of GATT, that reads:
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforce-
ment by any contracting party of measures (…) relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made e+ective in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption;
Both the initial arbitration panel, and the Appellate Body, held that the US 
legislation was in violation of free trade provisions of GATT, because of ‘its 
intended and actual coercive e+ect’. 
12 Available online at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=;#);-%met
a;'FSymbol+WT;FCDS#;FC;#A;#(&doc=D;*A;#FDDFDOCUMENTS;#FT;#FWT;#
FDS;#F#;#D$%A,;#EWPF;#EHTM&curdoc=*&popTitle=WT;#FDS#;#F$%;#FAdd;#E,.
13 !e fact that US Courts as well as the US Department of State have routinely invoked the 
Vienna Convention does not alter the principles at stake here.
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!e AB went on to say that the American regulation of Section &%( was ‘in 
e+ect, an economic embargo which requires all other exporting Members, if they 
wish to exercise their GATT rights, to adopt essentially the same policyA…’.14 
!is was the case, because, according to the AB: 
the e+ect of the application of Section &%( is to establish a rigid and unbending 
standard by which United States o9cials determine whether or not countries will 
be certi"ed, thus granting or refusing other countries the right to export shrimp to 
the United States. Other speci"c policies and measures that an exporting country 
may have adopted for the protection and conservation of sea turtles are not 
taken into account, in practice, by the administrators making the comparability 
determination.15
Ultimately, the AB ruled that the US was allowed to require compliance with 
certain environmental protection laws of its own, as long as it would not only 
apply them on a non-discriminatory basis (as is prescribed by the chapeau of 
article XX), but also as long as the US would perform:
Ongoing serious good faith e+orts to reach a multilateral agreement
on the protection of sea turtles. !is meant that there was now a positive 
obligation on the United States to lobby actively (and continue to do so with 
‘ongoing serious good faith’) for a multilateral agreement to uphold the same 
environmental standards as it had legislated for itself. Indeed, 
Section &%( of Public Law $%$-$&# (…) is justi"ed under Article XX of the GATT 
$((- as long as the conditions stated in the "ndings of this Report, in particular 
the ongoing serious good faith e+orts to reach a multilateral agreement, remain 
satis"ed.
It has also become clear that the AB applies the principle of precedent in its 
rulings,16 amounting to the accumulation of legislation.17 !e precedent that 
this ruling concerning shrimp restrictions sets, for instance, is that multilateral 
agreements set an international standard. !is seems to suggest that in "elds 
where such a multilateral agreement has been reached, the WTO may actually 
enforce it – a power of considerable implications, as states might otherwise not 
have given it a direct e+ect into their national jurisdiction. 
Nor need the WTO hesitate to declare those treaties directly applicable to 
states that decided not to become a party to them (as was the case, for instance, 
with the US concerning the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). It is 
14 WT/DS')/W, consideration $&#.
15 WT/DS')/W, consideration $&*.
16 For example in consideration $'% of the dispute WT/DS'), United States – Import Prohibition 
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: ‘As we stated in United States – Gasoline …’.
17 !e momentous importance of precedent has also been discussed in the previous chapter 
concerning the ICC, the ECHR and the ICJ.
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easy to imagine this principle being applied to Human Rights treaties,18 such as 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, to labor 
standards following from treaties or conventions of the International Labour 
Organization, and even to the Kyoto Protocol: indeed, consistent application of 
this principle may ultimately have such wide-ranging e+ects, that it would make 
the WTO, over time, almost preponderant in domestic legislation and litigation.19
!is point has even become more real, as the AB allowed amicus curiae 
briefs in the already mentioned shrimp case.20 Amicus curiae briefs are requests 
from third parties, like non-governmental organizations or multinationals, 
which may contain additional complaints or evidence (or both). By granting 
locus standi to non-state parties, the WTO opened the door to the more active 
enforcement of the entire body of international law, and far outgrew its stage of 
a mere court of arbitration between two states having di+erent interpretations 
of certain trade agreements.21
Several trade disputes have, over the years that followed, caused ‘consider-
able controversy’, in the words of expert Peter van den Bossche.22 !ey in any 
case clearly show how the existence of a permanent body dealing with trade 
issues can have the practical e+ect of speaking out over an increasing number 
of political questions. 
In September #%%,, for instance, the WTO’s appellate body ruled that EU 
rules banning genetically modi"ed organisms (GMOs) from their food-markets 
needed amending. !ey ruled that
18 Cf. Elisabeth Burgi, !omas Cottier and Joost Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International 
Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, #%%').
19 See on this: Yasmin Moorman, ‘Integration of ILO Core Rights Labor Standards into the 
WTO’, in: Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. *( (#%%$) '''; Robert Howse, ‘!e WTO 
and Protection of Workers’ Rights’, in: Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law, vol. * ($((() 
$*$; Steve Charnovitz, ‘!e moral exception in trade policy’, in: Virginia Journal of International 
Law, vol. 53 (Summer .,3,) &)&. A UN advisory body, the International Commission of Jurists, 
prepared a set of guidelines for implementing the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights in 
$((, (the so-called Maastricht Guidelines) which insisted, among other things, that signatory 
states must ‘ensure’ that the rights enumerated in the Covenant ‘are fully taken into account in 
the development of policies and programs’ of the WTO. !e Guidelines were published as ‘!e 
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Human Rights 
Quarterly, vol. #% (Summer $(()) &($-,*%. Cf. Gary P. Sampson (ed.), !e role of the World Trade 
Organization in global governance (New York: United Nations University Press, #%%$); Gary P. 
Sampson (ed.), !e WTO and global governance: future directions (New York: United Nations 
University Press, #%%)); Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall, Whose Trade Organization? Corporate 
Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy (New York: Public Citizen, $((().
20 Dispute WT/DS').
21 Although some have argued that allowing amicus curiae briefs would make it easier for 
non-state actors to in8uence WTO decision-making, and so bring about more balanced legal 
developments, the fact remains that the WTO is granting weight to non-state actors and so reduces 
the relative power the member states.
22 Peter van den Bossche, !e Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, #%%)) $&(.
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None of the safeguard measures at issue were based on a risk assessment.23
It is not relevant here to examine whether or not the AB was right in ruling 
that none of the European safeguards was based on such an assessment; nor 
is the point that restrictions on genetically modi"ed crops ought or ought not 
to be reinstalled. !e point, "rstly, is that it is now up to an international court 
to decide whether or not evidence is su9cient to suggest the danger of certain 
products.24 Whatever ‘risk assessment’ may have been felt to be su9cient, is thus 
no longer up to the national parliaments and governments to decide.
Secondly, it also shows that it is up to such an institution to decide that such 
evidence is necessary in the +rst place. !is is to say, that there might be other 
arguments, i.e. not evidence based ones (but, for instance, arguments of a religious 
or ethical nature, that are not ‘necessary for the protection of public morals’,25 
but merely felt to be preferable or desirable), that might incline a member of 
the WTO to restrict the entry of certain products into its (food) market. Given 
the controversy that exists over the use of GMOs, it is not surprising that the 
question of the legitimacy of the WTO to pronounce on such matters has 
repeatedly been raised.
Another example of the supranational power of the WTO is the so-called 
Gambling case 26 in which the question was examined whether US legislation 
against internet gambling was in the legitimate protection of ‘public morals’. As 
former NYU professor and clerk for US Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayer 
argued: 
Despite the need to constrain the scope of the public morals exception, Gambling 
went too far. !e decision, at least implicitly, suggests that States invoking a public 
morals defense will be expected to present evidence of similar practice by other 
states. Taken to an extreme, the Gambling doctrine might be read as implying that 
states cannot unilaterally de"ne public morals’.27
Comparable questions can be raised with regards to national legislation that 
limits the admission of foreign workers. !e WTO may easily turn out to present 
legislation contrary to what national preferences might be. 
23 Dispute WTO/DS#($/R, European Communities – Measures A<ecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products.
24 !e AB has made it clear that so far, it only marginally tests the undertaken risk assessments. 
But new jurisprudence may easily increase the criteria of such tests. Cf. Stefan Zleptnig, ‘!e 
Standard of Review in WTO Law: An analysis of law, legitimacy and the distribution of legal and 
political authority’, in: European Integration online Papers (EIoP), vol. &, no. $, (#%%#) #- October 
#%%#. Available online at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/#%%#-%$,.htm.
25 As is the text from article XX, sub (a) GATT.
26 Dispute WT/DS#)'/AB/R, United States – Measures A<ecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services.
27 Jeremy C. Marwell, ‘Trade and Morality: the WTO Public Morals Exception a:er Gambling’, 
in: New York University law review, vol. )$ (May #%%&) )%#-)-#.
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During the negotiations of new agreements in #%%', extensive debate was 
already devoted to the question whether Western countries should provide 
extended visa provisions to temporary professionals. ‘How did immigration 
wind up on the table at the WTO?’, one commentator wondered. He continued: 
Under the global trade body’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
governments can regulate the supply of services performed by foreigners. (…) 
!e wrangling over visas is just one more example of the WTO’s mission creep. 
Global trade rules are no longer aimed merely at eliminating tari+s on goods that 
cross borders. (…) And any domestic law, including public interest regulations, 
can be challenged under WTO rules as ‘an unfair barrier to trade’.28
Like aiming for a ‘level playing "eld’, the bringing about of which has allowed 
the EU to realize a virtually boundless expansion of its powers, the removal of 
‘trade barriers’ is theoretically endless in its application, and grants the WTO a 
limitless pretext for overruling whatever national policy it may "nd in its way.
Take for instance the WTO’s rulings on agricultural and technological subsidies. 
!e Appellate Body of the WTO decided on March *rd, #%%', in the case on US 
Cotton subsidies,29 that these Cotton subsidies were in violation of international 
agreements on agricultural support. Likewise, questions related to European 
agricultural subsidies may be brought before the WTO some time in the future. 
With regards to European subsidies for technological industries, this has in fact 
already happened. On May $)th, #%$$, the Appellate Body ruled that some of the 
European subsidies for Airbus had ‘adverse e+ects to the interests of the United 
States’, and that therefore the European Union ought to ‘take appropriate steps to 
remove the adverse e+ects or (…) withdraw the subsidy’.30 But surely the WTO’s 
agreements were not subscribed to with such rulings in mind? Moreover, is it in a 
world dominated by American giants like Boeing and Lockheed Martin – which 
received structural state-support in years preceding the WTO’s existence – not 
perfectly reasonable that European states support their own aviation industry?
Since it has been in operation, from January $st, $((', the AB has in the past 
$& years decided on well over *%% cases.31 !e whole dispute settlement body, 
including the decisions of the arbitration panels, comprises roughly the same 
amount. Not all of these cases have stretched the scope of the agreements or 
28 Sarah Anderson, ‘US immigration policy on the table at the WTO’, in: Global Politician, $# 
March #%%'. Available online at http://www.globalpolitician.com/#$--&-immigration.
29 Dispute WT/DS#&,/R, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton.
30 WT/DS*$&/AB/R, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures A<ecting Trade 
in Large Civil AircraA. Available online at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_catalogViewAllBottom.as
p?ct=DDFEnglish;#CDDFFrench;#CDDFSpanish&c#=@meta_Serial_Num&q#=$$-#-&#&c*=@
meta_Symbol&q*=;##WT;FCDS*$&;FCAB;FCR;##&c$=@meta_Language&q$=E.
31 Information from the website of the WTO, available online at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/intro$_e.htm.
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increased the power of the WTO. But with each decision or ruling that did, a 
precedent was created, and the jurisprudence was further tightenened. 
It is possible and indeed not unlikely that in the future other cases will be 
brought before the AB. !ese case may involve ethical or environmental issues, 
such as restrictions on bio-industried cattle, meat or crops from radio-active 
regions (such as Chernobyl), restrictions on ritually slaughtered meat (Halal), 
and commodities such as textiles produced by child-labour or by de facto (e.g. 
economic) slavery, as well as trade issues with countries that perform policies 
inimical to the values of Western countries that they may wish to install trade 
sanctions against.32 A policy of cultural protectionism – such as the French law 
that a certain percentage of songs broadcast on national radio ought to be of 
French origin – may also easily be found to be in violation of agreements on 
free trade. Whether or not all these policies are permissible, and whether or not 
nations have to accept full foreign participation on their national markets and 
national culture and public sphere is now ultimately in the hands of the WTO.
Now it is not the purpose of this chapter to defend any particular political posi-
tion. Rather it is to point out that none of the positions claimed by supranational 
organizations are themselvels universal, i.e. free of political choice. !rough the 
WTO, a neoliberal view has been institutionalized, and this view is certainly not 
undisputed. Protectionism is not indefensible and indeed not without intellectual 
support.33 Since the "nancial crisis of #%%), this point has even become more serious.
While the hostility of the WTO to protectionism may well be a respectable 
political position, it certainly is not a universal one. !e view that protectionism 
is no longer of this age is disputable. One can argue for it or against it. If it is 
the purpose of a national government to act in the interest of its population, it 
is not self-evident that a supranational organization should be allowed to make 
the assessment of whether the national market should be opened to foreign 
products or not.
It is o:en said, that for international trade to 8ourish, concessions are 
required, and that ‘we can’t have it all our way’. As Jeremy Rabkin puts it, ‘the 
claim that the WTO can impose binding “law” rests on the hope that interests 
within each country will support the organization and its authority, even if they 
are disappointed in particular rulings’.34 But economic ‘interests’ do not always 
trump others. !ere are many things that would, strictly speaking, be in our 
32 Cf. Jeremy C. Marwell, (May #%%&) )%#-)-#. 
33 Cf. Paul Krugman, Pop Internationalism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, $((,); Russel Roberts, 
!e Choice: A fable of free trade and protection. !ird Edition (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, #%%&); Tim 
Lang and Colin Hines, !e New Protectionism: Protecting the Future against Free Trade (London: 
Earthscan Publications, $((*), Ralph Nader et al., !e Case against “Free Trade”: GATT, NAFTA, 
and the Globalization of Corporate Power (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, $((*).
34 Rabkin (#%%,) ##(.
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economic interests, but that we still do not do. !e WTO imposes free trade by 
unfree choice, irrespective of either national policy or majority opinion, or both.
Whether or not there is a good rationale behind these ethical or cultural 
modi"cations of the free-play of merely economic forces is beside the point. 
!e point is that ethical and cultural considerations can play a role in the policy 
of a state, and that it is therefore not always a matter of evidence or e0ciency 
whether import restrictions should be upheld. Even if a certain measure will 
make the economy 8ourish, it can still be against the wish of the population, 
as could be the case with opening up markets to the products of industrialized 
farming, or opening borders to the import of cheaper products.
Nor would an alternative to the WTO have to be a return to full protectionism. 
In $($*, when no supranational organization existed that coordinated national 
trade barriers, there were proportionally more international investments being 
made than until well into the $((%s.35 As this shows, any trade agreement drawn 
by state parties, any form of international deal, might still be made without a 
supranational organization seeing to it. And there can surely be many middle 
ways between the global free-market as propounded by the WTO, and the 
isolationist extreme of the autarkic state.
'.#. T"# S#?>8$(@ C&>9?$;
In $)$&, Lord Byron wrote:
!e Psalmist number’d out the years of man: 
!ey are enough: and if thy tale be true, 
!ou, who didst grudge him even that 8eeting span, 
More than enough, thou fatal Waterloo! 
Millions of tongues record thee, and anew 
!eir children’s lips shall echo them, and say –
‘Here, where the sword united nations drew, 
Our countrymen were warring on that day!’ 
And this is much, and all which will not pass away.
!is poem, part of the Child Harold’s Pilgrimage ballad, refers to the battle of 
Waterloo where in $)$' a coalition of mainly British and Prussian armies defeated 
Napoleon and his dream of a uni"ed Europe. Referring to this poem, Winston 
Churchill suggested the term United Nations to Franklin D. Roosevelt when 
speaking of the Allied forces that were combating Nazi-Germany’s pan-European 
ambitions. On January $st, $(-#, at an international conference in the United 
States, the Allied coalition made a Declaration by United Nations, expressing 
35 Cf. Paul Bairoch, ‘European Trade Policy, $)$'-$($-’, in: P. Mathias and S. Pollard (eds.), 
Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. ), ‘!e industrial economies: the development of 
social and economic policies’ (Cambridge University Press: $()() $%*-$#&, ‘Colonial trade policies’.
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their determination to defeat the Axis powers and restore national sovereignty 
to the states of Europe.
!e allies continued to use the term, and a:er Germany and Japan had been 
defeated, a permanent international organization, successor to the League of 
Nations, was established in New York, and called the United Nations Organization. 
In many respects, the United Nations Organization (which was referred to 
from the $('%s onwards simply as ‘the United Nations’, as if it had ‘outgrown’ 
being merely an ‘organization’) was nothing new. Its main deliberative body, the 
General Assembly, was an extended version of the Assembly of the League of 
Nations – and the charters of both con"rmed the principles of classical inter-
national law (see chapters $ and #). Most of the work of the United Nations is 
concerned with streamlining international diplomacy and creating an arena for 
discussion in which global issues can be addressed.
!ere was, however, one very new idea involved at the inception of the 
United Nations, and that was the Security Council. For the "rst time since 
the birth of modern states, they have accepted that an international body can 
approve or disapprove their military interventions and that it can even call for 
the undertaking of military interventions in its own right. It was largely through 
the Security Council that the United Nations ‘was intended by its founders to 
be far more than “a method for carrying on relations between states”’.36 How 
was this major revolution in international politics possible?
!ere seem to have been at least two reasons. Firstly, a:er the devastation of 
the Second World War, the necessity for international cooperation was felt to 
exist. In the minds of many, it was at least partly due to the failure of the League 
of Nations that World War II broke out, and a stronger international governing 
body would therefore help prevent the occasion of further ‘untold sorrow’.37 
Secondly, the Security Council provided a uniquely powerful position in world 
a+airs for the permanent "ve members. Having won the Second World War, 
they were able to establish their power on a more permanent basis through the 
Security Council, taking up the role, in the words of Franklin D. Roosevelt, of 
‘global policemen’.38
If, under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council 
determines a situation to constitute a 
36 Rosemary Righter, Utopia Lost (New York: A twentieth century fund press, $((') #'. !e 
quote is from Alfred Zimmern, !e League of Nations and the Rule of Law, .,.3-.,56 (London: 
Macmillan, $(*&) $.
37 As the preamble of the United Nations Charter starts: ‘We the peoples of the united nations 
determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime 
has brought untold sorrow to mankind …’.
38 Quoted in Rosemary Righter, Utopia Lost ($((') #'.
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threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,39 
it may, ultimately, 
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.40
It is important to note that the "ve permanent members of the Security Council, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China, have a veto 
power in the Security Council. !is means that for those "ve members, the 
Security Council does not in fact have supranational powers. 
!e foundation of the UN’s system of international security is the members’ 
abjuration of the right to use force against one another. Article #, paragraph - 
of the UN Charter states that ‘All members shall refrain in their international 
disputes from the threat or use of force …’. Since in addition to that rule, the 
charter recognizes only the ‘inherent right of individual or collective self-defense’ 
(in article '$), it must follow that article -# of Chapter VII vests the Security 
Council with the only other right to the legitimate use of force.
!is means that a foreign policy decision by national executives or parlia-
ments to use force – not dictated by strict self-defense – would from now on 
be dependent on the approval of the Security Council. And this would include 
the power of the United States, Russia, China, the UK and France to block a 
resolution to this e+ect with a veto.
!e emergence of the Cold War soon a:er the end of the Second World War 
caused the Security Council to be constantly, and deeply, divided. As Rosemary 
Righter notes, the United Nations was ‘ill-constructed for the actual tensions 
of the post-$(-' world’.41 !at is why most Security Council resolutions were 
ine+ective or simply weren’t passed in the "rst forty years of its existence. 
Until the fall of the Berlin Wall, use of force was authorized only one single 
time by the Security Council, and that was when the Soviet delegate was 
absent: June #'th, $('% saw not only the invasion by North Korean troops of 
South Korea, but also an immediate session of the Security Council resulting 
in an ultimatum to North Korea to withdraw, and ultimately a UN sanctioned 
military intervention.42
But a:er this event, Russia never missed another session of the Security 
Council, and until the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Security Council did not issue a 
single resolution approving the use of force under Chapter VII (while consider-
able military con8ict certainly took place during those years). Indeed, there has 
39 UN Charter, article *(.
40 UN Charter, article -#.
41 Rosemary Righter ($((') -$.
42 UN Security Council resolution )#, June #'th, $('%, available online at http://daccess-dds-ny.
un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR%/%&-/('/IMG/NR%%&-('.pdf?OpenElement.
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been such a great number of military con8icts that it has been suggested that 
a:er so many years of disuse, the UN Charter had lost its legal standing (even 
if formally, the treaty had not been annulled or altered), on the principle of non 
usus, one of the oldest principles of contract law, formalized by the Romans. 
When a rule has not been practiced for years on end, it becomes customary 
law to ignore it.43 
If we look at the obvious violations of the prohibition to use force that have 
occurred without the condemnation nor the approval of the Security Council 
(the Russian interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the war in Vietnam, 
the Six Days’ War, the Yom Kippur war, the war between Iraq and Iran, the 
Russian invasion of Afghanistan, the Falkland War, and NATO’s intervention 
in Kosovo, to name but a few), it can hardly be said that throughout the second 
half of the twentieth century such a thing as ‘international law’ existed that had 
anything to do with the Security Council or its Charter.44
Nor could it be argued that military interventions since $(-' have always 
been in direct self-defense. !ree clear examples:
First, the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam in $(,), undertaken while the 
UN remained incapable of condemning or even of commenting on the mass 
killings that were being perpetrated from $(,' onwards by the Khmer Rouge in 
Cambodia (called Kampuchea at the time). !e Vietnamese government installed 
a puppet regime that put a stop to the killings. !e only response of the UN 
was on October $*th, $()%, when the UN General Assembly voted against the 
motion to remove the representative of the Khmer Rouge Regime (which had 
e+ectively lost power to the Vietnamese puppet regime) from its seat at the UN.45 
Second, the pre-emptive strike on Iraqi nuclear plants by Israel in $()$, which 
were believed by the latter (as well as by many others) to be manufacturing 
nuclear weapons. Israel was condemned by the Security Council for doing so 
in its resolution of June $(th, $()$, because Iraq was a signatory to the non-
proliferation treaty and the military attack by Israel was ‘in clear violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.’46 
43 As the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law de"nes Desuetudo: ‘A long continued non-
application of a legal norm. Although desuetude does not formally abrogate a law, the latter 
easily falls into oblivion and loses its force in practice. “Laws are repealed not only by the will of 
the legislator but also by disuse through the tacit consent of all men” (D. $.*.*#.$). In connection 
with the compilation of the Digest, Justinian ordered that laws which had vanished by desuetude 
should not be taken into consideration – In desuetudinem abide = to pass out of use.’ Adolf Berger, 
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law. New Series – volume -*, part # (Philadelphia: !e American 
Philosophical Society, $('*, reprinted in $()().
44 Cf. Franck, T.M., ‘Who Killed Article #(-)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of 
Force by States’, in: American Journal for International Law, Vol. &-, No. ' (Oct., $(,%) )%(-)*,.
45 Rosemary Righter ($((') *#&-*#,.
46 Security Council resolution -), ($()$), Adopted at its ##))th meeting on $( June $()$. 
Available online at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR%/-$)/,-/IMG/
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!ird, the US-led invasion on October #'th, $()*, of the small Caribbean 
Island of Grenada. At the time, Grenada was led by the communist Maurice 
Bishop, and according to United States intelligence, it was establishing a Cuban 
military base. A resolution ‘deeply deploring’ the armed intervention in Grenada, 
‘which constitutes a 8agrant violation of international law and of the independ-
ence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that State’,47 was adopted in the 
General Assembly by a vote of $## in favor to ( against, with #, abstentions (a 
similar resolution was debated in the Security Council, but not surprisingly it 
was vetoed by the United States).
None of these military interventions were indisputably unjust. One was car-
ried out in part to put an end to genocide; two were carried out by developed, 
Western democracies on the basis of an assessment of their vital national interests. 
It is unlikely that countries will refrain from such interventions in the future, 
while it is equally unlikely that the UN Security Council will carry them out 
as a collective body. It is therefore unlikely that the half-hearted interpretation 
of the prohibition of the use of force in the UN Charter will change in the 
foreseeable future.
However, a:er the collapse of the Soviet regime, there was a moment of 
dramatic optimism. On September $$th, $((%, George H. Bush announced a 
‘new world order’, in which international interventions would be sanctioned 
by the Security Council. Less than a year a:er the fall of the Berlin Wall, Bush 
declared in his speech to Congress, that: 
Clearly, no longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to stymie 
concerted United Nations action against aggression.48
Bush said that ‘a new partnership of nations has begun’, and that ‘we stand 
today at a unique and extraordinary moment. !e crisis in the Persian Gulf, as 
grave as it is, also o+ers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of 
cooperation. Out of these troubled times, (…) a new world order can emerge: 
A new era – freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and 
more secure in the quest for peace’. Bush expected the emergence of 
a world quite di+erent from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law 
supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared 
responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights 
of the weak. 
All of this was the case, according to Bush, because: 
NR%-$),-.pdf?OpenElement.
47 General Assembly resolution *)/, of $()*, available online at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/
doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR%/--*/((/IMG/NR%--*((.pdf?OpenElement.
48 George H. W. Bush, Toward a New World Order. Speech given to a joint session of the United 
States Congress, Washington DC, $$ September $((%.
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We’re now in sight of a United Nations that performs as envisioned by its founders.
!ese words surely re8ect a dream that lies at the foundation of much enthu-
siasm for supranationalism: a community of nations, all equally just, coming 
together to cooperate for the shared destiny of mankind. But a:er the ‘success’ 
in obtaining UN support for the invasion of Iraq, the a:ermath turned out 
to be as frustrating as in the other operations in which the UN had been in 
charge. Saddam Hussein continued to 8out the conditions of the cease"re. !e 
organization charged with overseeing the discontinuation of the Iraqi program 
of weapons of mass destruction, UNSCOM, reported time and again on the 
obstruction that prevented it from doing its work properly. Yet the UN failed 
to impose e+ective sanctions. 
Nor did the UN show leadership during the Rwandan genocide in $((-, and 
though the Security Council admitted responsibility in #%%% ‘for failing to stop 
the killings’,49 and the Undersecretary General responsible for peacekeeping 
operations at the time, Ko" Annan, later admitted that he ‘could and should 
have done more’,50 he was nevertheless appointed Secretary General in $((&.51
But in any case: the Security Council exercises two supranational powers: 
"rst, it can begin a war when it believes international peace and security have 
been threatened, and second, it can condemn the use of force by member states, 
ultimately by imposing sanctions on them and employing military intervention 
against them.
A third major power of the Security Council, however, is that it can also 
decide on the implementation of sanctions when it believes certain countries 
have seriously violated obligations under international law. An example is the 
Nicaraguan case before the International Court of Justice,52 in which the United 
States was condemned to pay indemni"cation to Nicaragua for its aggression 
in supporting rebels that opposed the pro-communist regime. But the United 
States had withdrawn from the case, rejecting the ICJ’s jurisdiction (see also 
chapter -.-). !e Security Council then proposed a resolution demanding that 
the United States comply with the rulings of the ICJ. Of course, the United States 
was able to veto this resolution. But if a non-veto power had been in the position 
of the US in this case, sanctions might have been imposed on it. And this is not 
con"ned to the deliberations of the ICJ, but may also be applied to rulings of 
49 Cf. the report of the Independent Inquiry into United Nations actions during the .,,2 Rwanda 
genocide, accepted by the Security Council on $- April, #%%%, available online at http://www.
un.org/sc/committees/($)/htm/&)-*e.html.
50 Ko" Annan, Speech at the memorial conference of /1 March /--2, New York. Available online 
at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/#%%-/sgsm(##*.doc.htm.
51 Cf. http://www.un.org/sg/annan.shtml.
52 Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports $()&.
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other arbitration mechanisms endorsed or recognized by the UN, for instance, 
the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization, or the 
Human Rights Council. Surely, this places an instrument of enormous power 
in the hands of its $' members.
Now, it is highly unlikely that the Security Council will rule against vital 
interests of Western states. !eir veto powers and strong alliances with one 
another will probably prevent the ‘international community’ from waging a 
war against any of them. But this is so only as long as they have their three 
veto powers (in the hands of the US, the UK and France). Should any of the 
‘reforms’ that are regularly being proposed be accepted, making, for instance, 
veto powers rotate on a periodical basis upon recommendation by the General 
Assembly, the Security Council will have supranational powers that will enable 
it to actually develop dangerously unpredictable policies.53
'.*. T"# E>8&E#)9 U9$&9
!e EU is the most complex of the supranational organizations discussed in 
this book. It has many di+erent levels of functioning and its internal structure 
has grown in a somewhat haphazard way, which, like an old city, leads to many 
surprising shortcuts, meandering pathways, and sudden dead-ends.54
!ere are, moreover, three ‘readings’ of the EU, of which only the third is 
the supranational one. First, there are those who argue that the current EU is, 
however imperfectly, a "rst step towards a ‘United States of Europe’, that is to say, 
a European federal state. !ey are therefore not, as I have explained, advocates 
of supranationalism, though of course they may in some cases accept the EU’s 
current supranationalism as a necessary intermediary stage between the old 
nation states and a new European nation state to come.55 !ey take what I call 
the ‘federal approach’ to the EU.
53 Yehuda Z. Blum, ‘Proposals for UN Security Council Reform’, in: !e American Journal 
of International Law, Vol. ((, No. * (July, #%%') &*#-&-(; Jacqueline London, ‘!e reform of the 
United Nations Security Council: What role for the European Union?’, Conference Working Paper: 
United Nations and Security Council Reform: Proposals for the future. (Madrid, INCIPE Assembly 
Hall, #(th June, #%%,) available online at http://www.incipe.org/UNSCreform.html.
54 See for example Luuk van Middelaar, De passage naar Europa (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, #%%(); Stanley Henig, !e Uniting of Europe. From discord to concord (London: 
Routledge, $((,). An insightful and more general account of Europe’s post-$(-' political history 
is Tony Judt, Postwar. A history of Europe since .,26 (London: Pimlico, Random House, #%%,).
55 An example is A.A.M. Kinneging, ‘United we stand, divided we fall, a case for the United 
States of Europe’, in: Ibidem (ed.), Rethinking Europe’s Constitution (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal 
Publishers, #%%,). Cf. K. Nicolaidis and R. Howse (eds.), !e Federal Vision, Legitimacy and 
levels of governance in the United States and the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, #%%$); A.G. Harryvan and J. van der Harst (eds.), Documents on European Union (London: 
Macmillan Press ltd., $((,).
 3H457071=/07G /5E70=J71=/03 $-'
!en there are those who see the EU as a project of primarily economic 
intergovernmental cooperation, conceptually not much di+erent from a free 
trade zone, who desire to minimize its supranational powers, like those related 
to the single currency and the open borders agreement of Schengen. I call this 
the confederal approach.
 Both the federalists and the confederalists do not advocate supranational-
ism in the sense that it is understood in this book. Both accept the logic of the 
traditional idea of sovereignty (as discussed in part I) – the "rst applying it 
on a larger scale, the second, though accepting minor supranational powers, 
attempting to retain it at the level of the member states. Moreover, for both 
federalists and confederalists the present EU is hardly satisfactory. While the EU 
does far more than merely streamline cooperation between its member states, 
and thereby antagonizes the confederalists, it o9cially professes no ambition to 
assume the full responsibilities of a federal state (though surely there are steps 
in this direction even if tentative and unsuccessful).
Indeed, by rejecting both federalism and confederalism – by renouncing 
sovereignty for itself while simultaneously denying it to its member states – the 
European Union is the quintessential supranational project. Its o9cial aim, as 
abundantly described and advocated by the national European elites that support 
it, is ‘the negation of the concept of statehood’;56 the EU exists not to create a 
European sovereignty, but to dissolve the borders, sovereignty and statehood 
of its members. !us in speeches and writings about the European Union, the 
phrases are o:en untoned that ‘the EU will never be a state’ and ‘we need a strong, 
united Europe’, as if there were not an obvious contradiction between the two.57
To be sure, there is nothing new or supranational in the acknowledgment of 
a shared European culture and a common European interest. Historically, the 
shared lot of the European peoples has been recognized from a very early stage 
onwards.58 In descriptions of the battle of Poitiers of ,*#, for instance, we already 
"nd references to ‘les gens d’Europe’, who see the tents of the invading Sarrasins, 
56 Karl Jaspers, Freiheit und Wiedervereinigung, (München: Piper, $(&() '*: ‘Die Geschichte 
des deutschen Nationalstaats ist zu Ende, nicht die Geschichte der Deutschen. Was wir als grosse 
Nation uns und der Welt leisten können, ist die Einsicht in die Weltsituation heute: dass der 
Nationalstaatsgedanke heute das Unheil Europas und nun auch aller Kontinente ist. Während 
der Nationalstaatsgedanke die heute übermächtige zerstörende Kra: der Erde ist, können wir 
beginnen, ihn in der Wurzel zu durchschauen und aufzuheben.’ See also: Wolfgang J. Mommsen, 
‘Varieties of Nation State in Modern History’, in: Michael Mann, !e rise and decline of the Nation 
State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, $((%).
57 See for example Robert Cooper, ‘Oorlog en vrede: de geboorte van de Europese identiteit’, in: 
Leonard Ornstein & Lo Breemer (eds.), Paleis Europa. Grote denkers over Europa (Amsterdam: De 
Bezige Bij, #%%,) ''-,&; Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, Speech for the European Week Eindhoven, #, May, 
#%%(; Glyn Morgan, !e idea of a European Superstate. Public Justi+cation and European Integration 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, #%%'), especially chapter &: ‘A postsovereign Europe’.
58 Cf. Rémi Brague, Europe. La voie Romaine (Paris: Gallimard, $((#).
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or who fear an ambush.59 !is sense of a common European identity (and not, 
as the legend has Bismarck say, as a merely ‘geographical concept’60), continued 
to exist throughout the centuries – from the coronation of Charlemagne to the 
crusades and the discovery of the ‘New’ World. !ough the Reformation and 
the religious wars that followed broke the political power of the Vatican, the 
battles of Vienna ($'#$) and Lepanto ($',$), and the siege of Vienna ($&)*), clearly 
inspired those living in the West to recognize their common Roman-Christian 
heritage. Pope Pius II wrote a book entitled Europe in $-'), describing this cultural 
sphere, and he advocated a new crusade against the Turks who had conquered 
Constantinople a few years before.61 !e Duke of Sully, minister of the French 
King Henry IV, likewise proposed the setting up of a ‘High Council’ in which 
the heads of the European states would come together, and which would meet 
in Venice. !e Council would take direct command of troops that would help 
the members defend themselves against the Ottoman Empire.62 
Napoleon went further. During his exile in St.-Helena, he re8ected that the 
terrible and endless wars he had brought to Europe had served the purpose of 
unifying the several states of the continent. His biographer and companion to 
St.-Helena, Emmanuel comte de Las Cases, noted that ‘what [Napoleon] had 
wanted for the prosperity, for the interests and for the well-being of Europe 
was the same principles, identical everywhere, a European legal code, a single 
European court of appeals, to correct all mistakes like our court of appeals 
corrects the mistakes of our district courts, a single currency, the same weights, 
the same measures, the same laws, etc.’.63 According to Las Cases, Napoleon 
expected Europe to
59 ‘les gens d’Europe voient les tentes du camp (…) les gens d’Europe craignent que, caches le 
long des sentiers, les Sarrasins ne tendent des embuscades.’ Jean-Henry Roy and Jean Deviosse, 
La Bataille de Poitiers. … October 455 (Paris: Gallimard, $(&&) #(-: ‘Extrait de l’Anonyme de 
Cordoue (Vers $*,& à $-*,)’.
60 Bismarck, November $),&, as quoted in: Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s name. Germany 
and the divided continent (London: Jonathan Cape, $((,) *),. Cf. Luuk van Middelaar, De Passage 
naar Europa. Geschiedenis van een begin (Amsterdam: Historische uitgeverij, #%%() *$.
61 Jacques Le Go+, !e Birth of Europe. Translated by Janet Lloyd (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
#%%') $)&.
62 Cf. Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise history of the law of nations (New York: !e Macmillan 
Company, $(&$) $$*+.
63 ‘Ce qu’il eût proposé pour la prospérité, les intérêts et le bien-être de l’association européenne: 
il eût voulu les mêmes principes, le même partout, un code européen, une cour de cassation 
européenne, redressant pour tous les erreurs comme la nôtre redresse celles de nos tribunaux, une 
même monnaie sous des coins di+érents, les mêmes poids, les mêmes mesures, les mêmes lois, etc’. 
As quoted in Marcel Dunan, ‘La veritable place de Napoléon dans l’histoire de l’Europe’, in: André 
Puttemans (ed.), Napoléon et l’Europe (Paris: Éditions Brepolis, $(&') $'#. !e classical source for 
Napoleon’s eurofederalist ideas is formed by his conversations on St.-Helena, written down by 
his companion: Emmanuel comte de Las Cases, Le Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène. Première edition 
intégrale et critique établie par Marcel Dunan (Paris: Flammarion, $('$). For a critical analysis of 
the historiography on Napoleon’s ideas, see Natalie Petiteau, ‘Débats historiographiques autour 
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soon become a truly single nation, and everyone, freely travelling the continent, 
would "nd himself always in the same fatherland.64
!ere was a lot of enthusiasm for a united Europe in the $(th century, too, 
though it has o:en been dismissed as ‘the nationalist century’. From Madame 
de Staël to Oswald Spengler, from Victor Hugo to Ernest Renan (see chapter 
*):65 all discussed the cultural unity of Europe and the possible future of the 
di+erent nations within a common framework. !ere remained, moreover, a 
common European aristocracy throughout the $(th century. !e major stylistic 
developments in the arts have been Europe-wide, and there was a European haute 
couture. European royal and aristocratic families routinely intermarried as well.66 
In $(#*, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi published a manifest called 
Paneuropa.67 In it, he argued for the political uni"cation of Europe because, a:er 
the First World War, the separate European states that together represented the 
European culture and way of life, were in his view not strong enough to stand 
up any longer to ‘den wachsenden aussereuropäischen Weltmächten’68 – and in a 
conversation with the Finnish foreign minister, R. Witting, on November #)th, 
$(-$, Adolf Hitler was recorded to have said that ‘it was gradually becoming 
clear that the nations of Europe belonged together like a great family of nations’ 
(see also chapter )).69
!e strong vision of a uni"ed Europe that the Americans, Churchill, the 
Alsatian Robert Schuman and the Frenchman Jean Monnet (as well as many 
others) had a:er the Second World War was therefore nothing new.70 In the 
original plans – the pre-supranational phase –, the idea of a federal United 
de la politique européenne de Napoléon’, in: Jean-Clément Martin (ed.), Napoléon et l’Europe. 
Colloque de la Roche-sur-Yon (Rennes: Presses Universitaires, #%%#) $(-*$, and Roger Caratini, 
Napoléon, une imposture (Paris: Michel Lafon, $(()).
64 ‘L’Europe, disait-il, n’eût bientôt fait de la sorte, véritablement qu’un même peuple, et chacun, 
en voyageant partout, se fût trouvé toujours dans la patrie commune’. 
65 Cf. Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Umrisse einer Morphologie der 
Weltgeschichte (Düsseldorf: Albatros, #%%,) $(&.
66 It is worth mentioning here as well the similar styles of dress across Europe, as well as the 
speed of communication of for instance scienti"c and other new discoveries.
67 !e movement that this manifest gave birth to gathered a great number of prominent 
followers, including Albert Einstein, Pablo Picasso, Sigmund Freud, !omas Mann, Paul Valery, 
and Guillaume Apollinaire. Cf. Christopher Booker and Richard North, !e Great Deception. Can 
the European Union survive? Second Edition (London: Continuum, #%%') $$.
68 Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, Paneuropa (Wien-Leipzig: Paneuropa Verlag, $(#&).
69 Walter Hewel, ‘record of conversation between Hitler and the Finnish foreign minister, 
R. Witting, #) November $(-$’, in: Walter Lipgens (ed.), Documents on the History of European 
Integration (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, $()') (-.
70 Although Churchill did not think the United Kingdom would be part of this. In his speech 
at the University of Zurich in $(-&, he declared: ‘We British have our own Commonwealth of 
Nations. (…) And why should there not be a European group which could give a sense of enlarged 
patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted peoples of this turbulent and mighty 
continent? (…) In all this urgent work, France and Germany must take the lead together. Great 
Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America and (…) Soviet Russia (…) must 
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States of Europe was prominent. Robert Schuman, in his speech on the (th of 
May, $('%, had said:
!e contribution, which an organised and living Europe can bring to civilisation, 
is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. 
(…) 
!e pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the 
setting up of common foundations for economic development as a "rst step in 
the federation of Europe.
(…)
!is proposal will lead to the realisation of the "rst concrete foundation of a 
European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace.71
Aiming at a European federation, Jean Monnet is said to have stated in a memo 
of * April $('#: ‘!e fusion (of economic functions) would compel nations to fuse 
their sovereignty into that of a single European State’. Already in $(-*, Monnet 
had argued that ‘!ere will be no peace in Europe if states are reconstituted 
on a basis of national sovereignty (…) Prosperity and vital social progress will 
remain elusive until the nations of Europe form a federation or a ‘European 
entity’ which will forge them into a single economic unit’.72
It was not only an ideal to proceed to a federal structure of a united Europe. 
It was also a felt necessity. As the Cold War deepened, a demilitarized Germany 
was gradually becoming impossible to sustain. !e re-militarization of Germany 
was combined with a plan to dilute the sovereignty of Germany, so that a new 
war between Germany and France would be, in Robert Schuman’s words, ‘not 
only unthinkable, but also impossible’.73 !e initial plan – the plan for a federal 
Europe – consisted in the establishment of three institutions: a coal and steel 
community, a defense community, and a political community.
First, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It established a 
common market for the two essential products of a war economy, coal and 
steel. A ‘High Authority’, based in Luxembourg, would ensure that the same 
prices were charged for these products in all member states, with no import or 
export duties or restrictions. 
be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its right to live and shine.’ 
Available online at http://www.peshawar.ch/varia/winston.htm.
71 Robert Schuman, Speech of , May .,6-, available online at http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/(-may/
decl_en.htm.
72 Note of ' August $(-*, Algiers. Reprinted in: Pascal Fontaine, Jean Monnet. A grand design 
for Europe (Luxembourg: O9ce for O9cial publications of the European Communities, $())) -$.
73 Schuman declaration, May (th, $('%. Cf. http://www.eppgroup.eu/Activities/docs/divers/
schuman-en.pdf.
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Second, a European Defense Community (EDC), to establish a supranational 
European defense force whose procurement and operations would be united.74
!ird, a European Political Community (EPC), that would establish a directly 
elected assembly (‘the Peoples’ Chamber’), a Senate appointed by national parlia-
ments and a supranational executive accountable to the parliament.
If combined, these three institutions would have formed an almost complete 
federal structure (thereby, in the terminology explained in earlier chapters of 
this book, ceasing to be ‘supranational’).75
!e least far-reaching of the aforementioned proposals, the ECSC, was the 
only one to be brought into existence. !ough both the EDC and the EPC treaties 
were dra:ed, the EDC was discarded a:er the French parliament – upon initiative 
by General De Gaulle’s patriotic party – began singing the Marseillaise in $('- 
when the EDC was presented.76 !e EPC treaty was not even debated further.
!e architect of the three treaties was Jean Monnet, an unschooled son of a 
Cognac producing family. He had dreamed of a united Europe from an early age, 
and acknowledged that the three treaties taken together would have produced 
the political integration of Europe (historical research also suggests that Monnet 
may have received covert support from the CIA77). Now that this project had 
obviously failed, Monnet devoted his energies to economic integration, resulting 
in the European Economic Community, founded by the Treaty of Rome in $(',.78
From then on, the ultimate goal of European integration became blurred. 
Jean Monnet himself, though he had previously been clear about the "nal form 
of the European project (i.e. a federal state), now professed an open future, into 
which it was even harmful to enquire, and the following quote is typical of the 
prose thenceforth produced by proponents of the European project:79
We want the Community to be a gradual process of change. Attempting to predict 
the form it will "nally take is therefore a contradiction in terms. Anticipating the 
74 Van Middelaar (#%%() #%&+.
75 Stanley Henig, !e Uniting of Europe. From discord to concord (London: Routledge, $((,) #'+.
76 !e position of Winston Churchill towards the EDC may not have been entirely without 
in8uence. He was recorded picturing ‘a bewildered French drill sergeant sweating over a platoon 
made up of a few Greeks, Italians, Germans, Turks, and Dutchmen, all in utter confusion over 
the simplest orders …’. Dean Acheson, Present at the creation. My years in the State Department 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, $(,%) ,&'.
77 Christopher Booker and Richard North, !e Great Deception. Can the European Union 
survive? Second Edition (London: Continuum, #%%') ),.
78 !e Treaty of Rome established a wide-ranging package of economic cooperation with 
supranational governance, to be unfolded in the decades to come. For instance, it arranged for a 
customs union within $# years a:er adoption.
79 !e vagueness of the prose of proponents of the European projects reminds of Mrs. Gradgrind 
in Charles Dickens’ novel Hard Times, who said when asked if she was in pain: ‘I think there’s a 
pain in the room, but I couldn’t positively say that I’ve got it’. Cf. for the deliberate manipulation 
of language for political purposes: Viktor Klemperer, !e Language of the !ird Reich (London: 
Continuum, #%%&).
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outcome kills invention. It is only as we push forwards and upwards that we will 
discover new horizons.80
It is no longer the o9cial aim of most advocates of the European Union to move 
ultimately towards a ‘United States of Europe’. !us Paul de Grauwe, former 
economic advisor to the European Commission’s President José Barroso, for 
instance said in an interview with the Belgian daily De Morgen on $) March 
#%%&, ‘With the exception of a Don Quixote like Guy Verhofstadt (…), I see 
nobody who is pushing the case for a political union’.81
Time and again, supporters of the EU argue for supranationalism, not 
federalism. !ey go to great lengths to make clear that ‘the European Union is 
not a state and (…) will never be one’,82 in the words of Robert Cooper, senior 
advisor to Javier Solana, in #%%,; that federalism is not the envisaged endpoint 
of the European uni"cation or that such an endpoint would be completely 
unrealistic;83 that, as the Dutch Queen Beatrix has said, ‘Europe is a development 
process of which the contours are not clearly de"nable in advance, nor even 
exactly predictable’; and that ‘the further uni"cation of Europe does not mean 
that national culture and national identity lose importance. On the contrary: 
national language, national culture, in short, singularity and self-consciousness 
are of vital importance.’84
According to those defending the current EU’s political arrangement, any 
country in Europe could become a member of this hybrid, supranational 
construction since the European Union ‘will never become a state’. !us Tony 
Blair in his speech to the European Parliament on June #*rd, #%%', spoke of 
‘the new rules to govern a Europe of #' and in time #,, #) and more member 
states’,85 and expressed his fear that Europe might stop expanding and con"ne 
itself to members that shared a cultural inheritance (thereby excluding Turkey), 
because, if so, ‘Europe will become more narrow, more introspective and those 
80 Pascal Fontaine ($())) #'.
81 http://www.free-europe.org/english/#%%&/%,/the-euro-will-collapse-without-political-union-
forecasts-top-adviser-to-commission-president-barroso/. Cf. Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, ‘National 
Sovereignty in the EU: an outdated concept’, in: M.K. Bulterman, L. Hancher, A. McDonnell and 
H. Sevenster (eds.), Views of European Law from the Mountain. Liber amicorum for Piet Jan Slot 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law, #%%() *#,-***, who writes that the EU ‘is not a state, nor a 
state in the making’.
82 Robert Cooper (#%%,) ''-,&.
83 Kemal Dervis, ‘Het ene Europa is het andere niet’, in: Leonard Ornstein & Lo Breemer 
(eds.) (#%%,).
84 HRH Beatrix, Queen of the Netherlands, Voorbeschouwing, in: Leonard Ornstein & Lo 
Breemer (eds.) (#%%,).
85 Tony Blair, Speech of /5 June, /--6, published on http://news.bbc.co.uk/$/hi/uk_politics/-$###)).
stm.
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who garner support will be those not in the traditions of European idealism 
but in those of outdated nationalism and xenophobia.’86 
!ere is even a European commissioner for ‘enlargement’. !e Finnish 
economist Olli Rehn, who held this position from #%%- till #%%(, perhaps not 
surprisingly given his job to focus on ‘enlargement’, expressed a desire that 
Europe should continue expanding. In his speech of April #)th, #%%(, he said: 
If the positive experience of the $# Central and Eastern new member states is 
anything to go by, then clearly the future potentially holds equally bene"cial 
developments for the Western Balkans and Turkey.87 
!e EU has not taken steps to take over entirely the national sovereignty of its 
member states, but ‘to pool their sovereignty’88 (as if sovereignty could be pooled 
without being destroyed).
Also remarkable in this context is that the (th of May, the day on which Robert 
Schuman delivered his speech calling for a ‘united Europe’, has now become 
‘Europe day’, the annual day of the collective celebration of the European Union. 
Yet in order to illustrate that the ideal of a ‘United States of Europe’ – of which 
Schuman had dreamed – has been abandoned, the slogan of that day is: ‘Unity 
in Diversity’ – thereby immediately contradicting the idea of something that 
would ‘unite’ the Europeans (as the only thing that unites them is apparently 
their ‘diversity’ – a logical impossibility89). 
Nor is there in the speeches and documents of most European politicians 
and policy makers much reference to the shared culture, to the shared history, 
indeed to anything that would provide any kind of new national identity for a 
united Europe;90 the enthusiasm for Turkey’s accession into the EU is an excellent 
illustration of this.91 Questions of cultural resemblance, social cohesion, sense of 
belonging, political allegiance, are all brushed aside, for Europe would not become 
a state itself, nor merely be an international, intergovernmental organization. 
86 Ibidem.
87 And he continued: ‘So what’s next? Even the fastest scenario for the next accession of a new 
member state, likely to be Croatia, is clearly slower than the slowest envisaged scenario for the 
rati"cation of the Lisbon Treaty. Time is on our side: we can pursue deepening and widening 
in parallel. !is has been and still remains the best recipe to build a strong and united Europe. 
Today Europe is truly whole and free. Let us keep it that way.’ Olli Rehn, Speech of /3 April /--,, 
Berlin, available online at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/%
(/#%'&format=HTML&aged=%&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
88 !is has been repeated time and again. For instance: Bruno Water"eld, ‘Barroso hails the 
European “empire:”’, !e Telegraph, July $)th, #%%,.
89 And standing in great contrast with the American slogan, ‘e pluribus unum’.
90 Striking is in this respect the discussion over recognizing in the European Constitutional 
treaty of #%%', a reference to the shared ‘Judeo-Christian’ or the ‘Classical-Humanistic’ traditions 
of the European culture.
91 Roberto de Mattei, Turkey in Europe: bene+t or catastrophe? Translated by John Laughland 
(Herefordshire: Gracewing, #%%().
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Europe would be something in between, of its own kind: sui generis. And so 
the integration has proceeded, the EU has acquired more members, and new 
treaties have marked the next steps in this increasingly self-con"dent project 
of economic, though allegedly not political, integration.92 
Yet strangely enough, the rhetoric of political integration continues to pop 
up every now and then, as if arising, like the British Empire once allegedly had, 
in a "t of absence of mind.93 A remarkable conference of the European Council, 
held in Stuttgart in $()*, amounted to a so-called ‘solemn declaration of the 
European Union’, containing such phrases as:
!e Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Com-
munities meeting within the European Council resolved to continue the work begun 
on the basis of the Treaties of Paris and Rome and to create a united Europe, which 
is more than ever necessary in order to meet the dangers of the world situation, 
capable of assuming the responsibilities incumbent on it by virtue of its political 
role, its economic potential and its manifold links with other peoples (…)
And:
!e Heads of State or Government, on the basis of an awareness of a common 
destiny and the wish to a9rm the European identity, con"rm their commitment 
to progress towards an ever closer union among the peoples and Member States 
of the European Community.
!ere is an obvious contradiction between this ‘solemn declaration’ and the 
continuous e+orts of political leaders to stress that Europe will never become a 
federal state. !e ‘European identity’ that ought to be ‘a9rmed’, the ‘ever closer 
union’ and the ‘political role’ of a ‘united Europe’ are irreconcilable with the 
claim that no such uni"cation was ever on the agenda in the "rst place. 
92 As Ernst B. Haas, whose work will be further discussed below, put it: ‘Federalism was 
the initial watchword. European unity was hailed with glowing phrases by Winston Churchill, 
Léon Blum, Alcide de Gasperi, Salvador de Madariaga. A “European Movement” was formed 
that sought to achieve federation by stressing the cultural unity of Western civilization and that 
drew heavily on the misery of Europe, overshadowed by the new giants of East and West. !e 
pan-European ideal "rst enunciated by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi in $(#*, extolling Europe 
to seek survival in a world increasingly dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, 
was hailed once more. !e result was failure: no federal institutions were created, no uniform 
enthusiasm for federation could be mobilized in equal measure on the continent, in Britain, and 
in Scandinavia. !e record of failure stretched from the creation of the far-from-federal Council 
of Europe through the defeat of the European Defense Community treaty to the burial of the 
European Political Community project in $('-. Something else happened instead. Not cultural 
unity but economic advantage proved to be an acceptable shared goal among the Six. !e failure 
of the federalist European Movement saw the rise of the “functionalist” school of techocrats led 
by Jean Monnet (…)’. In: Ernst B. Haas, !e Uniting of Europe. Political, social and economic forces 
.,6--.,64 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, $(&)) xix: ‘Author’s preface, $(&)’.
93 Sir John Robert Seeley, !e Expansion of England ($))*), ‘We seem, as it were, to have 
conquered and peopled half the world in a "t of absence of mind’.
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One explanation for this contradiction lies in the functionalist approach to 
institutions, which is a philosophy that studies ‘processes’ and indeed ‘functions’ 
rather than accountability and democratic mandates, and is speci"cally designed 
to evade questions of legitimacy.94 As Ernst Haas, one of the key analysts of this 
approach, wrote in $(&): ‘… the fact of the matter is that Europe did not have a 
Bismarck in $(-) or $('%. In the absence of the statesman who can weld disparate 
publics together with the force of his vision (…) we have no alternative but to 
resort to gradualism, to indirection, to functionalism if we wish to integrate a 
region’.95 (Who is the ‘we’ here, one may ask? And is the whole of Europe implicitly 
being compared to the German states before their uni"cation?)
Haas continues: ‘the functionalist who relies on gradualism and indirection 
in achieving his goal must choose a strategy that will unite many people and 
alienate few. He can only move in small steps and without a clear logical plan, 
because if he moved in bold steps and in masterful fashion he would lose the 
support of many’.96 
!ough present-day advocates of the EU believe, or profess to believe, that 
concerns over sovereignty are largely irrelevant, and that there is no essential 
di+erence between ‘statehood’, ‘intergovernmental cooperation’, ‘internationalism’, 
‘supranationalism’, and ‘federalism’97 – because what matters is the goals that 
are to be achieved, not the institutional structures by which they are achieved98 
– Ernst Haas nevertheless makes no mistake in the inevitable outcome of the 
‘gradual’ and ‘indirect’ strategy, and recognizes that following the ‘functionalist’ 
path would make integration ‘nearly automatic’ and culminate from ‘a mere 
customs union to an economic union and a political entity’.99
!is seems to have been entirely accurate. !ere has been an exponential 
growth of EU competencies over the past decades. Protecting the common 
market has proved an excellent pretext for the most far-ranging rules and 
harmonization. !e EU has issued tens of thousands of regulations and direc-
tives concerning such matters as safety regulations for cars, rules for bed and 
breakfasts, speci"cations for cheese and wine, social standards for laborers, the 
maximum sound grass-mowers may make, the kind of warning systems required 
94 Cf. Ernst B. Haas, !e Uniting of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, .,6--.,64 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, $(')); Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation state: Functionalism 
and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, $(&-). 
95 Haas ($(&)) xxiii-xxiv: ‘Author’s preface, $(&)’.
96 Haas ($(&)) xxiii-xxiv: ‘Author’s preface, $(&)’.
97 Essential, therefore, in supranationalist writings is the term ‘governance’, which, in 
contradistinction to ‘government’, is used to denote a form of administration that, like the EU, 
does not have an organized and recognized form of opposition.
98 See for instance !omas O. Hueglin, ‘From Constitutional to Treaty Federalism: a comparative 
perspective’, in: Publius (Fall #%%%).
99 Haas ($(&)) xxv-xxvi: ‘Author’s preface, $(&)’.
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to assess swimming conditions in open water, and so on.100 In the near future, 
it may even legislate mandatory safety jackets for cyclists all through Europe.101
!e trick is that safeguarding a ‘level playing "eld’ can be used to declare every 
"eld of national policy within the administration’s reach.102 Indeed, similarly to 
protecting ‘fundamental human rights’, the wish to establish a ‘level playing "eld’ is 
potentially limitless. Like setting out to achieve absolute ‘equality of opportunity’ 
or complete ‘non-discrimination’, it is endless in its application. Meanwhile, the 
European Court of Auditors has refused to approve the budgetary estimates of 
the EU in February #%%( for the $-th successive time.103
But it is not only the EU politicians in Brussels that have expanded the power 
of the EU. As with the rise of state power in the Middle Ages (as discussed in 
chapter $), it is to a large extent through law that the EU has tightened its grip 
on member states. !e Luxembourg Court’s expansion of power began with 
the Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands case ($(&*), when it declared that ‘the 
Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the bene"t of 
which the states have limited their sovereign right, albeit within limited "elds’, 
and ruled that states must apply community law as if it were national law.104 
In the Costa v. Enel case ($(&-), it ruled that Community law overrides any 
national law that con8icts with it.105 In the case of Simmenthal v. Commission 
($()%) the Court then reinforced this ruling. !ough under Italian law, only 
the Constitutional Court can declare a national rule void, it was nonetheless 
decided by the ECJ that ‘every national court must (…) apply Community law 
in its entirety (…) and must accordingly set aside any provision of national 
law which may con8ict with it (…). A national court, according to the ECJ, ‘is 
under a duty to give full e+ect to [Community law], if necessary refusing (…) 
to apply any con8icting provision of national legislation’.106 In the Von Colson v. 
Nordrhein-Westfalen Case ($()-), moreover, the Court held that ‘the domestic 
court should interpret all national laws in the light of directives, even if the law 
100 Hendrik Vos and Rob Heirbaut, Hoe Europa ons leven beïnvloedt, *de geactualiseerde druk 
(Standaard, Antwerpen, #%%)).
101 !e report calling for such legislation was adopted by the European parliament on #$ June, 
#%$$. Information available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/
#%$$%&/#%$$%&#,ATT##&*%/#%$$%&#,ATT##&*%EN.pdf
102 While it could also simply have meant opening up the borders between the member states, 
letting them decide for themselves whether and how to adjust their regulations. !e resulting 
competition would have enabled member states to decide for themselves which measures they 
would adopt to make it attractive (or unattractive, depending on their interests) for foreign investors 
and labor forces to move there. !e current EU policy of abolishing restrictive measures could in 
theory mean the abolition of the di+erent languages of the EU member states.
103 According to the Court of Auditors the estimates continue to lack transparency to an 
unacceptable extent. NRC Handelsblad, $- May #%%(.
104 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (Case #&/&#); [$(&*] ECR $.
105 Laminio Costa v ENEL (Case &/&-)[$(&-] ECR ')'.
106 Simmenthal S.p.A. v Commission of the European Communities (Case #-*/,)) [$()%] ECR #*($.
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in question was not based on the directive’.107 !e examples are endless, and the 
recurrent theme is the gradual expansion of "elds of in8uence, with little or no 
institutional developments.
!us the remarkable thing is that although the European Union started as 
an attempt at the federalization of Europe, it is now a partial unitary state which 
micromanages for example the economy, but does not have the essential features 
of sovereignty, such as an army, or a foreign policy, or powers of direct taxation. 
Still less has it developed much of a democratic or even constitutional 
structure. !e Commission’s powers are not limited to speci"c tasks and the 
principle of subsidiarity has been used to centralize – not decentralize – ever 
more aspects of policy. 
!e Court in Luxembourg has interpreted the EU regulations in such a 
way as to arrogate to itself maximum power, and it has always interpreted such 
regulations to apply analogically to an ever-wider number of circumstances. 
!e European Parliament, while formally ‘democratic’, in reality is completely 
disconnected from the political debate in the countries it professes to represent. 
One simple reason for this is that the powers of the Parliament are still severely 
limited, and that it does not have an opposition. But there is a more structural 
reason as well, which is that for linguistic reasons if for no others, a European-wide 
public debate is inconceivable, and the European Parliament therefore operates 
in a political vacuum. It is odd, to put it no higher, that in the continent of its 
origin, representative and limited government should be so comprehensively 
undermined as they are in the present EU.
Nor is this situation even widely noticed let alone criticized by most who 
involve in discussions on the European Union. Although many claim to be 
‘severe critics’ of the EU’s legal expansion, very few actually desire their country 
to leave this supranational mega-project. Moreover, if we consider the three 
major spheres in which the EU operates – the common market, the common 
currency and acting as a bloc on the global scene – it is unquestionably assuming, 
very gradually, very stealthily, the responsibilities of statehood. !is is the case 
because of at least three reasons.
Firstly, a common market with open internal borders requires, ultimately, 
a common immigration policy and defense of external borders, as national 
decisions to allow immigration have direct consequences for all member 
states. When Spain granted a ‘general amnesty’ to some ,%% thousand illegal 
immigrants in #%%', or decided to accept former Guantanamo Bay detainees, the 
whole of Europe had to accept their right to reside anywhere in Europe. In the 
R. v. Bouchereau case ($()$),108 the criteria for the legal deportation of non-EU 
107 Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Case $-/)*)[$()-] ECR $)($.
108 R. v. Bouchereau (Case *%/,,) [$(,,] ECR $(((.
$'& .<74125 6=D2 
citizens for an EU country were laid down. From now on, it was declared that 
‘free movement of persons’ ultimately meant that the ECJ decide whether there 
was ‘a genuine and su9ciently serious’ threat to public order if states desired to 
disrupt such free movement of persons.
Secondly, the monetary union has now been shown to necessitate a common 
budgetary policy and therefore a powerful European ministry of Finance. !e 
"nancial crisis and the situation in Greece demonstrated this clearly in the "rst 
half of #%$$. As Christian Noyer, the president of the Bank of France said in an 
interview with Le Figaro in July #%$$: ‘It is necessary to go further and strengthen 
integration for the proper functioning of a monetary union’. He continued that 
the European Commission was working on it at the moment. In other words, 
a body of functionaries without any democratic credentials whatsoever was 
preparing a "nancial government for *'% million people.109
And thirdly, to act as one on the global scene requires a common foreign 
policy. Not surprisingly, the EU has begun to establish a diplomatic service 
and has appointed a ‘high representative of the union’ on foreign relations. 
Meanwhile, steps are constantly being taken to increase the possibilities for 
European armies to operate jointly.
!us, we may conclude that while most advocates of the EU profess not 
to be striving for a united, federal Europe, what is in fact coming to pass is 
undoubtedly just that (if, of course, the project does not fall apart). !e EU 
proves that the idea of supranationalism is untenable if brought to its logical 
conclusion, and inevitably leads back to sovereign statehood (but translated to 
a vast conglomerate).
109 Bertille Bayart and Jean-Pierre Robin, ‘Pour Noyer, la crise doit conduire à renforcer 
l’intégration "nancière de l’Europe’, in: Le Figaro (#-* July, #%$$) ##: ‘Il faut aller plus loin et 
renforcer l’intégration pour le bon fonctionnement d’une union monétaire. La Commission 




In the previous two chapters, I have attempted to show, in a general overview, 
the extent to which supranational developments already dilute the sovereignty 
of European states. Supranational courts and organizations have, in their several 
ways, surreptitiously expanded their powers, taking over more and more elements 
of national policy and law. !ese supranational courts and organizations form 
a web of institutions that, even though each might still be limited in its powers, 
in their totality severely – and increasingly – limit national self-government.
Many present-day academics and politicians see no essential problem in 
these supranational tendencies – on the contrary, they are embraced, if not as a 
relief from ultimate national responsibility, then as ‘inevitable’. As the American 
commentator George F. Will remarked: ‘European elites believe that Europe’s 
nations are menaced by their own sovereignty’.1 !ere are interesting intellectual 
roots to this idea. But before we take up this discussion and examine both the 
background and the merits of the supranational idea, we will discuss multicul-
turalism, because it is a manifestation of the same world-view, and an integral 
part of the assault on borders. Indeed: supranationalism and multiculturalism 
are not only consistent with one another, but in fact logically connected. It is 
impossible to defend supranationalism without supporting multiculturalism, 
while multiculturalism is perfectly compatible with supranationalism.
But it is important to de"ne multiculturalism carefully, as it is to be distin-
guished from the multicultural nationalism that I defend in this book. Moreover, 
even more than supranationalism, multiculturalism has touched a raw nerve in 
our societies. Its supporters o:en brand those who question it as racist, because 
opposition to multiculturalism is confused with multiracialism. However, the 
accusation is itself genuinely racist, for it assumes that race and culture are 
coterminous.2 
!e modern world brings us all in contact with much cultural and ethnic 
diversity: globalized economic activity, migration, the liberty of di+ering life 
1 George F. Will, ‘!e Slow undoing: the Assault on, and Underestimation of, Nationality’, 
in: Irwin Stelzer (ed.), Neoconservatism. Edited with an introduction by Irwin Stelzer (London: 
Atlantic Books, #%%-) $*#.
2 Cf. Christopher Caldwell, Re*ections on the Revolution in Europe (Allen Lane, Penguin 
Books, London, #%%() #&,-#&).
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styles, and so on. To some extent, this diversity has always existed. As discussed in 
chapters $ and *, the socially cohesive nation state is a fairly recent phenomenon, 
and there is nothing intrinsic in its philosophy that opposes a pluralist society. 
Di+erences between people in the countryside and the cities have always 
existed as well. And no doubt the gastronomic varieties within nation states have 
increased beyond imagination in the past decades. All this ‘multiculturality’– 
in the sense of diversity in a pluralist, modern society – is wonderful and not 
what is addressed in this chapter. !e ideal of a multicultural nationalism that I 
support, also explicitly acknowledges this. As H.E. Baber writes: 
Critics of multiculturalism get bad press because the common perception is that 
we object to these harmless customs and practices. !at is not what is at issue. 
When it comes to the harmless, super"cial features of culture – food, costume, 
music and dance, language, entertainment, and cra:s – the more the better.3 
Interesting societies are always to some extent a melting pot of cultures and 
practices, seeking to cherish ‘the best that has been thought and said’.4 !at 
is also why I propose a multicultural nationalism in the concluding chapters 
of this book – a diverse and pluralist society, held together nevertheless by a 
monocultural core. 
Proponents of multiculturalism, on the contrary, do not seek to merely 
defend such pluralism. !ey make it clear that their philosophy is not simply 
the recognition of the empirical fact of diversity (in which case almost everyone 
would be a ‘multiculturalist’), or the applauding of a greater choice in what to 
have for dinner. On the contrary, multiculturalism, its defenders explain, is a 
quite speci"c, and indeed novel thing.5 
Multiculturalism, properly understood, denies that society has or should 
have a Leitkultur, a dominant culture – a set of core values, a shared common 
ground. Multiculturalists believe that ‘the idea of national culture makes little 
sense, and the project of cultural uni"cation on which many past societies and 
all modern states have relied for their stability and cohesion is no longer viable 
today’.6 It is the view of society that emphasizes the di+erences between people 
within a state, instead of their similarities.7 It tends towards legal pluralism 
3 H.E. Baber, !e multicultural mystique. !e liberal case against diversity (New York: Prometheus 
Books, #%%)) -*.
4 !e phrase comes from Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy ($))#) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, #%%&).
5 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism, examining the politics of recognition, Edited and introduced 
by Amy Gutman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, $((-). Bikhu Parekh, Rethinking 
Multiculturalism, Cultural Diversity and Political !eory (Palgrave, #%%&). Will Kymlicka, 
Multicultural Citizenship, A liberal theory of minority rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
$((&), Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press $(($).
6 Parekh (#%%&) ).
7 See on this for example: Baber (#%%)) *&-*,: ‘… multiculturalists reject assimilation as an 
ideal, holding instead that multiethnic societies should support the persistence of cohesive ethnic 
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based on the presence of people of di+erent cultural backgrounds and legal 
traditions, and applauds the eBorescence of di+erent cultures at the expense 
of the shared national cohesion.
In his book Culture and Equality, Brian Barry concludes that for Bhikhu 
Parekh and other multiculturalists ‘group identities and group loyalties have 
primacy over any broader, society-wide identity and loyalty’.8 On this de"nition, 
multiculturalism would be a new phenomenon, previously unknown to political 
science. As Bikhu Parekh writes: 
As a political movement [multiculturalism] is just over thirty years old, and as a 
theoretical exploration of it only half as old.9
Parekh however polemicizes with Brian Barry concerning the precise meaning 
of the doctrine:
Barry takes me to be an ‘excellent example’ of the preposterous view that ‘group 
identities and group loyalties have primacy over any broader, society-wide identity 
and loyalty’ (p. *%$). He o+ers no evidence and there is none. I take this view to 
lie at the basis of the Ottoman millet system and its contemporary analogues, and 
explicitly reject it.10
Parekh then goes on to explain that rather than establishing either the primacy 
of group loyalties over a society-wide identity, or establishing the primacy of 
a single, society-wide identity over group loyalties (as Brian Barry proposes), 
multiculturalists take an all-inclusive approach, recognizing the importance of 
both. ‘Multiculturalists cherish intercultural exchanges and fusions at all levels, 
propose policies and institutional structures conducive to them, and expect the 
state to play a judicious and supportive role.’11 He continues: 
Although political obligations generally override ethnic and religious obligations, 
this is not always the case.12 
communities, which coexist peacefully and interact without coalescing. !ey hold immigrants 
and members of ethnic minorities should not be expected to assimilate to the dominant culture 
and reject the melting pot in favor of a salad bowl model of cultural diversity’. 
8 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, An egalitarian critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, #%%#) *%$.
9 Parekh (#%%&) *-(.
10 Parekh (#%%&) *'#. !e Millet system o+ered a dhimmi status to Christians and Jews in 
the Ottoman empire, who were then allowed to conduct their a+airs and solve their legal issues 
through their own courts and representative organs.
11 Parekh (#%%&) *'%.
12 Parekh (#%%&) *'#. !e whole quotation is a follows: ‘What I maintain is that citizenship 
represents one of the individual’s several identities, and does not automatically trump others. As 
human beings, we have moral obligations to people outside our political community, and these 
may modify, limit and in exceptional circumstances override our obligations as citizens. Although 
political obligations generally override ethnic and religious obligations, this is not always the case. 
If the state were to require me to betray my parents and friends, spy on or malign my ethnic or 
religious community, or convert to another religion, I would "nd its demands unacceptable. !is 
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!e trouble is that what Parekh precisely means by ‘generally’ and what by 
‘not always’ remains unclear. And we are le: in the dark as to the meaning and 
origins of ‘ethnic’ obligations (for what obligation could one possibly derive 
from one’s ‘ethnicity’?). Moreover, what Parekh is pointing at is something with 
which no one could really disagree. Clearly, this cannot mark the fundamental 
divide between advocates and critics of multiculturalism: for who would deny 
that political obligations can sometimes be overridden by other obligations?
According to Parekh, who seems to recognize this point, and goes on to 
admit that ‘Barry and the multiculturalists then agree on many of the substan-
tive issues thrown up by a multicultural society’,13 the important ‘theoretical 
di+erence’ is, he says, that 
Barry does not appreciate the value of cultural diversity and dialogue as I do. Nor 
does he see the importance of the right to cultural self-expression as Kymlicka, 
I and others do.14
!ough Parkeh suggests that this is a ‘theoretical’ di+erence, in fact it is clearly a 
‘practical’ or gradual di+erence, and his de"nition of multiculturalism is therefore 
not very helpful in an attempt to understand multiculturalism conceptually. 
If the extent to which one values ‘cultural diversity and dialogue’ is what 
distinguishes multiculturalists from non-multiculturalists, then Parekh speaks 
of ‘multiculturalism’ in a sense di+erent from what is meant in this chapter. 
For if it is just a matter of valuing cultural diversity and enjoying cultural self-
expression or ‘dialogue’, then we would all be ‘multiculturalists’ the moment we 
enjoy the Chinese restaurant around the corner, play the Persian game of chess, 
or ‘dialogue’ about rap music.
Certainly, multiculturalists take a favorable position towards diversity. But if 
Parekh acknowledges the need for shared, national political obligations too, then 
multiculturalism means little more than just a nuance. If multiculturalists are 
simply those people who are ‘pro-diversity’ and who tend to take a positive view 
towards manifestations of ‘otherness’, than it hardly needed to be discussed here. 
Charles Taylor has given a di+erent and much clearer de"nition to multi-
culturalism, with obvious policy implications. In his much praised essay !e 
politics of recognition ($((#), Taylor advocates ‘the equal status of cultures and 
of genders’.15 Taylor also accepts that an opposing concept to multiculturalism 
is a very di+erent view to the one Barry ascribes to me’. But this is a problem of any government, 
always, and evades the particular questions of multiculturalism.
13 Parekh (#%%&) *''. It is typical for multiculturalists to confuse – or mix up – ‘society’ and 
‘state’ all the time.
14 Parekh (#%%&) *''.
15 Taylor ($((-) #,.
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exists – very useful if not indispensible when it comes to de"ning things16 – which 
is ‘nonrecognition or misrecognition’, through a form of ‘homogenization’.17 
With Taylor, we can say that the opposite of multiculturalism is some form 
of monoculturalism, which has also been described as the recognition of a 
Leitkultur:18 the attempt to de"ne and defend not only shared values but also 
a shared culture, a shared political loyalty, and ideas of legitimacy shared by 
all members of society, despite whatever di+erences may exist between them. 
!e question that multiculturalism poses is the extent to which it is desirable 
to share the same laws and customs within a single society (and not, as Parekh 
suggested, the extent to which we ‘enjoy’ or ‘value’ those di+erent customs). 
According to Taylor, and here he speaks for multiculturalism, ‘what is to be 
avoided at all costs is the existence of “"rst-class” and “second-class” citizens’ 
on the basis of di+erent cultural practices or backgrounds.19 Taylor continues: 
!e politics of di+erence o:en rede"nes nondiscrimination as requiring that we 
make these distinctions the basis of di+erential treatment. So members of aboriginal 
bands will get certain rights and powers not enjoyed by other Canadians (…) and 
certain minorities will get the right to exclude others in order to preserve their 
cultural integrity, and so on.20 
!e idea of equal citizenship of multiculturalists, then, is not to be understood 
as formal equality. On the contrary. Multiculturalism claims that no society 
has the right to impose cultural or social norms on other groups within its 
territory: and that the strength of future societies lies exactly in their lack of a 
shared culture or core values (except that a lack of core values itself is of course 
a value, if viewed as desirable). ‘Certain minorities will get the right to exclude 
others’, and ‘members of aboriginal bands will get certain rights and powers not 
enjoyed by other[s]’, as Taylor states.
Society: a community of communities. !e sense of shared membership of 
the state comes from the tolerance of the other’s otherness, not from recogni-
tion of the other’s kinship with oneself.21 !e o9cial slogan of the European 
Union, ‘United in Diversity’, is multiculturalism distilled (and is, as mentioned 
before, in complete contrast to that of the United States, ‘E Pluribus Unum’, out 
16 ‘Omnis determinatio negatio est’: it is only possible to de"ne something when you are also 
prepared to say what it is not. It is a fundamental problem of the ‘all-inclusive’ approach that both 
supranationalists and multiculturalists take, that by its very nature, it is di9cult if not impossible 
to clearly delineate what it means. I discuss this theme more extensively in chapter (.
17 Taylor ($((-) #' and ,$.
18 Cf. Bassam Tibi, Europa ohne Identität? Leitkultur oder Wetebeliebigkeit (München: Siedler, 
$(()); Bassam Tibi, Euro-islam: Die Lösung eines Zivilisationskon*iktes (Darmstadt: Primus 
Verlag, #%%().
19 Taylor ($((-) *&.
20 Taylor ($((-) -%.
21 See on group rights: Caroline Fourest, La dernière utopie: menaces sur l’universalisme (Paris: 
Editions Grasset, #%%().
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of many, one). Not ‘united despite diversity’, or ‘united on core issues, diverse on 
matters of secondary importance’; the feeling is that of belonging to a society as 
a ‘multicultural mosaic’ or even kaleidoscope.22 
In $(($, Charles Taylor proposed that Canadians ‘take the road of deep 
diversity together’,23 hoping that citizens ‘might "nd it exciting and an object 
of pride’ to work together to build a society founded on deep diversity.24 In this 
view, diversity is the basis of society, not just a fact about it. 
!is entails tension between multiculturalism and constitutional rights. 
Taylor acknowledges this, when he writes: ‘!ere would be no question of 
cultural di+erences determining the application of habeas corpus, for example. 
But [multiculturalists] distinguish these fundamental rights from the broad 
range of immunities and presumptions of uniform treatment that have sprung 
up in modern cultures of judicial review. [Multiculturalists] are willing to weigh 
the importance of cultural survival, and opt sometimes in favor of the latter.’25 
Politically, Taylor’s type of multiculturalism has two main consequences for 
social policy. First, it grants di+erent rights and obligations to people by virtue of 
their cultural background. !is leads to legal pluralism. Second, multiculturalism 
entails state sponsorship or support for expressions of minority cultures. !e 
state supports di+erent groups according to their size or alleged needs, in order 
to re8ect and preserve the variety of cultural identities within its territory.26
22 Charles Taylor, ‘Shared and Divergent Values’, in: Ronald Watts and D. Brown (eds), Options 
for a New Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, $(($), '*-,&.
23 Taylor ($(($) '*-,&.
24 Taylor ($(($) '*-,&. Discussed by Kymlicka ($((&) $(%.
25 Taylor ($((-) &$. Taylor does not specify exactly why there would be no question of the 
principle of habeas corpus to be mitigated according to the cultural traditions of a certain group.
26 It has been tempting for proponents of multiculturalism to suggest that the famous 
‘pillarization’ of the Dutch society was in fact a form of multiculturalism as well. While to some 
extent there may be truth in this suggestions, Arend Lijphart, one of the most eminent scholars of 
this phenomenon, has nevertheless argued that despite the great di+erences and even animosity 
between the several ‘pillars’ of Dutch society during the second half of the twentieth century, 
there was consensus on core issues and a desire to preserve the authority of the central state, as 
well as a certain amount of shared nationalism between the several pillars. Arend Lijphart, !e 
politics of accommodation. Pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, $(&)) ,)-,(: ‘!e Netherlands cannot be called a consensual 
society, not even by the most generous stretch of the imagination. Consensus exists within each 
of the subcultures rather than among all four blocs. No state can exist without some degree of 
consensus on matters of fundamental concern, however, and Holland is no exception. (…) In the 
Netherlands, both the degree and extent of political consensus are very limited, but one vitally 
important element of consensus is present: the desire to preserve the existing system. Each bloc 
tries to defend and promote its own interests but only within the con"nes of the total system and 
without the threat of secession or civil war. (…) !e most important factor behind this element 
of consensus is Dutch nationalism: the feeling of belonging to a common nation as well as to one’s 
own bloc. !e strength of this nationalism must not be exaggerated, but it certainly does exist. 
National independence was achieved at a relatively early date, and feelings of nationalism can be 
traced back to the early stage of the struggle for independence: the end of the sixteenth century. 
!e separate Catholic, Calvinist, and secular subcultures also had their origin in this period, but 
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!e "rst consequence of multiculturalism is the ‘stronger’ one, the second 
its ‘weaker’ one.27 It is easier to take a categorical position on the question of 
legal plurality, whereas state support for minority expressions is perhaps more 
a question of nuance. !e ‘weak’ form encompasses all sorts of appraisals for 
minorities’ ways of life and values, o:en combined with disdain for and even 
suppression of national customs – a practice Roger Scruton denotes as ‘oikophobia’, 
or fear of what is one’s own.28 Hence the typical reproach to those who do not 
share enthusiasm for multiculturalism as being ‘provincials’, ‘xenophobes’, ‘little 
Englanders’ in the British case29 or ‘cheeseheads’ in Holland. O9cial support for 
minority cultures encourages citizens to focus not on what they have in common, 
but on what they do not have in common.30 Over time, this may clearly reinforce 
the demand for legal pluralism; for not only will groups that have been granted 
di+erent rights continue to emphasize their distinctness from other groups or 
the majority of society; those who have been discouraged to integrate and so live 
separated from the rest of society, will come to think it only natural that they 
should have their own laws, too. Indeed, what does multiculturalism mean if it 
is not backed by a 8exible law that can provide di+erent remedies, in accordance 
with the di+erent cultural backgrounds of those invoking it? Nevertheless, it 
is important to investigate the two elements of multiculturalism separately, as 
will be done below.
the blocs did not become thoroughly organized until the nineteenth century. In other words, 
nationalism and the nation state antedated by several centuries the outburst of organizational 
di+erentiation by the various subcultures.’
27 Daniel I. O’Neill, ‘Multicultural Liberals and the Rushdie A+air: A Critique of Kymlicka, 
Taylor, and Walzer’, in: !e Review of Politics, Vol. &$, No. # (Spring, $((() #$(-#'%, writes on ###: 
‘Of course, the very term multiculturalism is a vexed one, so it is important to de"ne my use of it 
here. I want to distinguish two levels of commitment to multiculturalism. !e "rst I call “strong” 
multiculturalism, and is the position I associate with Kymlicka, Taylor, and Walzer. Strong 
multiculturalists are committed, in certain circumstances, to the defense of di+erential (or special) 
citizenship rights for minority groups based on their culture. Put simply, strong multiculturalists 
are willing to defend cultural rights. !e second level of multicultural argument I refer to (for lack 
of a better term) as “weak” multiculturalism. Weak multiculturalists do not argue for di+erential 
citizenship rights, but seek a range of di+erent goals. In the United States, these have included, for 
example, expanding the academic curriculum to re8ect more fully the contributions of minorities’.
28 Cf. Roger Scruton, A political philosophy. Arguments for Conservatism (London: Continuum, 
#%%&) #*+, and Roger Scruton, Green Philosophy. How to think seriously about the planet (London: 
Atlantic Books, #%$#) #-,+. An interesting organization that has taken up discussion on this 
phenomenon is the Alliance Générale contre le Racisme et pour le respect de l’Identité Française et 
chrétienne (AGRIF). AGRIF strives to curtail the anti-national and anti-French tendency in public 
debate, and objects to the extra protection that minorities’ cultural values enjoy as compared to that 
of the majorities’ values. 
29 Cf. Scruton (#%%&) #*+.
30 See on this: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., !e Disuniting of America, re*ections on a multicultural 
society, Revised and enlarged ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, $(()) $$).
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In a provisional decision in March #%%,, a judge in Frankfurt rejected the 
petition for summary divorce of a woman who had been severely maltreated 
by her husband. According to German divorce law,31 such a summary divorce 
is possible only if there is ‘Härtefall’: hardship. !e judge considered that the 
spouses came from ‘the Moroccan cultural sphere’, and that it was ‘not unusual’ 
for them, ‘that the man exercizes a right of corporal punishment against the 
woman’. She continued: ‘the German born petitioner had to take this into account 
when she married the Moroccan-born respondent’.32 
When the attorney of the woman complained against this provisional deci-
sion, the judge further explained her point of view. In a letter dated - February 
#%%,, the judge wrote that by concluding the marriage in Morocco, the spouses 
had accepted that they would be submitted to ‘the provisions of the Quran (…) 
and thereby also to Quran [verse] -.*-. Quran [verse] -.*- entails apart from 
the right of the man to discipline his disobedient wife also the recognition of 
the superiority of the husband over his wife’. She continued to say that to her 
mind, it followed from the Quran that:
!e honor of the man, simply put, is connected to the chastity of the woman; this 
is to say that basically, for a man who was raised as a Muslim, the life of a woman 
according to Western cultural standards is already a loss of honor.33
!is judgment caused international outrage,34 and the judge was replaced.35 
But it was not an isolated incident. Some of the reactions, such as those of 
Ali Kizilkaya, then president of the Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
31 !e disputed article was § $'&' of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.
32 ‘Dem marokkanischen Kulturkreis (…) nicht unüblich dass der Mann gegenüber der Frau 
ein Züchtigungsrecht ausübe’. (…) ‘Hiermit musste die in Deutschland geborene Antragstellerin 
rechnen als sie den in Marokko aufgewachsenen Antragsgegner geheiratet hat’. Correspondence 
of judge Christa Datz-Winter, Richterin am Amtsgericht, Frankfurt am Mainz, to the attorney of 
the woman demanding divorce, Barbara Becker-Rojczyk, dated January $#th, #%%,, Aktenzeichen 
-&% F (-%'/%&. I am grateful to Barbara Becker-Rojzcyk for kindly placing the correspondence 
at my disposal.
33 ‘Den Vorschri:en des Korans (…) und damit auch Koran -.*-. Koran -.*- enthält neben 
dem Züchtigungsrecht des Mannes gegenüber der ungehorsamen Ehefrau auch die Feststellung 
zur Überlegenheit des Mannes gegenüber der Frau’. (…) ‘[Dass] die Ehre des Mannes, einfach 
ausgedrückten die Keuschheit der Frau angebunden ist, d.h. im Grunde genommen für einen 
islamisch erzogenen Mann, das Leben einer Frau nach westlichen Kulturregeln bereits diesen 
Tatbestand der Ehrverletzung erfüllt’. Correspondence of judge Christa Datz-Winter, dated 
February -th, #%%,.
34 Following an article in Der Spiegel: Veit Medick and Anna Reimann, ‘Justiz-Skandal. Deutsche 
Richterin rechtfertigt eheliche Gewalt mit Koran’, in: Der Spiegel, #% March #%%,. Available online 
at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/%,$'$),-,#)-(,%%.html.
35 Because the judge, Christa Datz-Winter, was replaced, the whole procedure was delayed long 
enough for the ordinary divorce procedure to apply. Cf. Barbara Becker-Rojczyk, ‘Der “Koran-
fall” - Ein Erlebnisbericht’, in: Streit. Feministische RechtszeitschriA, vol. #*, no. * (*, #%%,) $#$-$#*.
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the Islamic council of Germany, were telling. Kizilkaya declared that ‘the physi-
cal disciplining of a woman by her husband is not supported by Islam’.36 !is 
was relevant because according to Kizilkaya, presumably, Islamic culture and 
religion now had a place in the German legal system. Not seeing the law as the 
expression of the shared national culture and therefore upholding it for every 
citizen in the same manner, the judge’s challenge became to "gure out what 
exactly was the cultural practice of those standing in court.
If it is not persons, but cultures, that are equal before the law, then the judges’ 
role becomes that of an anthropologist, deciding what is or is not customary 
within cultures. A judge, then, will also have to consider what constitutes ‘hard-
ship’ within di+erent cultures (as the Frankfurt situation demonstrates), for the 
experience of hardship is dependent upon expectations, which themselves are 
cultural.
Multicultural ideas were also applied a few months later in a case in Amster-
dam, on May #-th, #%%,. A Muslim woman who wore a burqa had been living 
on welfare, as she had been unemployed from April #%%& onwards. In the Dutch 
welfare system, the bene"t is conditional on the recipient searching actively for 
work and not declining suitable job o+ers, on pain of losing his or her bene"t 
for a period of three months. 
!e woman concerned applied for several jobs, mostly in the "eld of telephonic 
sales. Two companies showed an interest in hiring her. One, however, demanded 
that she remove her burqa, as the garment made communication with her col-
leagues impossible and would prevent the management from identifying her in 
person. !e other company, a telemarketeer, accepted the burqa, but demanded 
that she sell lottery tickets, which she considered to be against her faith.
As a result of the rejection by her of these two job o+ers, the social service 
withdrew her unemployment bene"t, upon which she "led a complaint in court. 
!e judge considered, in accordance with the regulations, that the withdrawal of 
the bene"t was justi"ed, the woman having declined ‘generally accepted work’. But 
the judge went on to consider that, since it was ‘a matter of common knowledge’ 
that ‘it is not permitted for Muslims to gamble’, it could not be expected of the 
petitioner, who was obviously a Muslim, ‘to provide an occasion for gambling 
through the sale of lottery-tickets’.37 
36 ‘Die körperliche Züchtigung einer Ehefrau durch ihren Mann wird nicht vom Islam gedeckt’. 
‘Gewalt in der Ehe. Richterin bedauert Koran-Verweis’, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 
##nd, #%%,. See also: Landler, Mark, ‘Germany cites Koran in rejecting divorce, New York Times, 
March ##nd, #%%,.
37 LJN:ABA&($,,ARechtbank Amsterdam , AWB %,/$&*' WWB, #--%'-#%%,. ‘De rechter acht van 
algemene bekendheid dat het voor moslims niet is toegestaan om te gokken. Van verzoekster, die 
moslima is, kan daarom ook niet worden verwacht dat zij gelegenheid gee: tot gokken door het 
verkopen van loten voor een loterij.’
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With regards to the other rejected job, in which it was demanded that the 
woman remove her burqa, the judge considered that it was ‘disproportional’ to 
punish the woman for declining this job, because the burqa was a ‘direct expres-
sion’ of the woman’s faith. A:er only two job o+ers, both of them objectioned to 
by her on religious grounds, there was not enough justi"cation for withdrawal 
of her welfare bene"t.38
!is is another example of the multicultural approach to law and politics. 
!e state now has to determine which religious or cultural practices are ‘direct 
expressions’ of faith or culture, and is then obliged to give legal weight or protec-
tion to them. !e woman in this case was clearly understood as belonging to a 
culture, who can therefore claim a di+erent set of rights and obligations from 
those who do not share her cultural (or religious) background. For non-Muslims, 
meanwhile, selling lottery-tickets is still considered ‘generally accepted work’.
!e question is what the precedent means. Would working in a non-halal 
butcher’s-shop, in a shop that sells alcohol, or indeed, working in any situation 
that is in contradiction with sharia law, now also not be considered ‘generally 
accepted work’ for Muslims? !e implication is there, and the problems that 
arise from it are potentially endless.
Even more interesting for our purpose is the remark that the burqa was a 
‘direct expression’ of the woman’s faith. It is generally held by Muslims that there 
is no o9cial rule in Islam obliging women to wear a burqa. !e fact that the 
judge acknowledged the burqa to be a ‘direct expression’ of the applicant’s faith, 
implies that not only the ‘o9cial’ rules of a religious group can be taken into 
consideration in deciding a case, but also traditions and customs that are peculiar 
to subcultures and branches or sects of religions. Indeed, the implementation of 
multiculturalism might lead to legal exceptions for almost any conduct, provided 
it was sanctioned by a ‘culture’.
A third example of legal pluralism consequent upon multiculturalism is the 
permission given to Dutch civil servants to deny gay couples the execution of 
their right to marriage by appeal to their Christian faith. !e Algemene Wet 
Gelijke Behandeling, the general law on equal treatment, provides the legal basis 
for this unequal treatment: civil servants can appeal to their ‘conscience’ and 
then do not have to contract the marriage. !is does not mean that any civil 
38 In translation: ‘Verweerders stelling dat verzoekster haar boerka zou kunnen afdoen om de 
bemiddeling naar arbeid (beter) te doen slagen, acht de rechter voorshands disproportioneel. Niet 
is gebleken dat de bemiddelingsmogelijkheden reeds in zoverre zijn uitgeput, dat van verzoekster 
kan worden gevraagd om afstand te doen van het kledingstuk dat voor haar een rechtstreekse 
uitdrukking is van haar godsdienstige overtuiging (vergelijk: Commissie Gelijke Behandeling 
#% maart #%%*, LJN: AN,-&-, m.nt. BPV). De rechter neemt hierbij tevens in aanmerking dat 
verzoekster haar boerka reeds droeg bij aanvang van het traject naar arbeid en dat dat gegeven 
haar destijds niet is tegengeworpen. De rechter acht het voorshands onredelijk om verzoekster 
dit nu – na slechts vier sollicitaties – te verwijten’.
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servant is now allowed to reject marrying gay couples. Only when they can refer 
to a cultural or religious background may civil servants do so: and so here we 
see yet another example of legal pluralism.
Many more examples can be given, of course, and it is not necessary to go 
into that at this point. We could look at family and inheritance law (where 
debates are ongoing on accepting some aspects of sharia law), mortgage law 
(where debates are ongoing of allowing an interest free mortgage to Muslims), 
and even penal law (as proposals have been made to approach honor killings 
more mildly and female genital mutilation leniently). 
More individual rights are not always the result. Freedoms of citizens who 
happen to have a certain cultural background are frequently curtailed as a result 
of multiculturalism. In her essay Is Multiculturalism bad for Women?, Susan M. 
Okin provides several examples of women’s individual rights and liberties being 
curtailed through the quiet permission of cultural practices that con8ict with the 
law.39 She discusses for instance the policy of the French state to allow multiple 
wives into the country, amounting to an estimated #%%.%%% de facto polygamous 
families now living in Paris – a situation the women in question ‘regarded as an 
inescapable and barely tolerable institution in their African countries of origin, 
and an unbearable imposition in the French context’.40
In the Netherlands, a young ex-Muslim was viewed with disdain (not only 
by people from his own community, but also, most remarkably, by the multi-
culturalist elites) when he spoke openly about his loss of belief in Islam.41 Many 
multiculturalists observed that one had to be more considerate with the sensitivity 
to apostasy in Islam, and implied that the ‘right to freedom of religion’ – which 
the ex-Muslim invoked –, did not apply unmitigated to immigrants.42 
!e London-based Centre for Social Cohesion published a report in #%%) 
which described how all through Europe, people from immigrant backgrounds 
were threatened and intimidated when they spoke out critical of their communi-
ties. !e report, entitled Victims of Intimidation, notes: 
When many of these individuals began to receive threats from members of their 
own communities and their co-religionists, many governments began to treat 
them not as full citizens who deserved the full support of the law but as a people 
39 Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? With respondents (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, $((().
40 Okin ($((() (-$%.
41 Eshan Jami, Het recht om ex moslim te zijn (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Ten Have, #%%,); Ibn 
Warraq, Weg uit de Islam: Getuigenissen van afvalligen. Met een inleiding van Afshin Ellian 
(Amsterdam: J.M. Meulenho+, #%%)).
42 Douglas Murray and Johan Pieter Verwey, Victims of Intimidation. Freedom of Speech within 
Europe’s Muslim Communities (London: Center for Social Cohesion, #%%)).
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apart; as people who are not expected to enjoy the same rights and freedoms as 
native Europeans …43
A curious shi: has thus occurred as a result of the multicultural mindset. No 
longer do minorities receive the right to integrate, but, instead, the right to 
maintain their own culture. ‘!e era that began with the dream of integration’, as 
columnist Richard Rodriguez observed, ‘ended up with scorn for assimilation’.44 
!is shi: in less than half a century from an ideal of emancipation to an 
ideal of segregation is very remarkable indeed. And it is quite unclear where the 
boundaries of the right to exercise one’s culture lie. What if, at some point in the 
near future, two-thirds of the civil servants reject gay marriages by reference to 
their faith? Or what if homosexual civil servants will start, as a counter reaction, 
to reject marriages of Christian fundamentalists? 
!e complications are certainly endless. !e legislative power having ef-
fectively been put aside, it is clear that the path of legal pluralism can easily 
go astray as claims to cultural traditions reign unchecked. As the Berlin-based 
attorney Seyran Ates has put the dilema: ‘We are at a crossroads, everywhere in 
Europe. Do we allow structures that lead straight into a parallel society, or do 
we demand assimilation into the democratic constitutional state?’45
&.*. C>;(>8); D$7#8%$(@
Legal pluralism is still rather an exception than a rule. Even though the extent 
to which sharia courts have already established de facto jurisdiction in certain 
areas and among certain parts of the population should not be underestimated,46 
legal plurality is still a marginal phenomenon and the national judges still hold, 
over all, a general authority for most of the European population. Most people 
believe that core constitutional values should be upheld for all, and that freedoms 
granted to native populations should not be withheld to immigrants.
!e second element of multiculturalism, by contrast, though theoretically not 
entirely separable from the "rst, can count on general applause. !e discourse 
of ‘diversity’, and the concomitant scorn for the national culture and traditions, 
has remained fashionable. Because of the in8ow of substantial numbers of im-
migrants with a di+erent cultural background into Europe over the past decades, 
43 Murray and Verwey (#%%)) ($.
44 Quoted in: Schlesinger ($(()) $$).
45 Quoted in: Matthias Bartsch, Andrea Brandt, Simone Kaiser, Gunther Latsch, Cordula Meyer 
and Caroline Schmidt, ‘German Justice Failures’ (Translated from the German by Christopher 
Sultan), in: Spiegel Online International, #, March #%%,. Available online at http://www.spiegel.
de/international/germany/%,$'$),-,-&#(-),%%.html.
46 Cf. Douglas Murray, ‘To what extent is sharia already operating in Britain?’, in: !e Times, 
December *%th, #%%(.
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the question now stands high on the agenda whether or not the national culture 
should be defended, propagated and thereby generally be upheld against the 
parallel claims of those immigrants. We see this for instance in the debates 
over national festive days, language, modes of behavior and standards of social 
interaction, but also much more pertinently in whole areas or neighborhoods 
becoming predominantly Moroccan, Algerian, Turkish, and native populations 
moving out.47
One way to avoid having to acknowledge this reality is to claim that no such 
thing as a ‘national identity’ existed in the "rst place, and therefore that immigra-
tion is not a+ecting any such thing as a national culture (because there is none). 
!ough this point of view is not in itself an argument for multiculturalism, it 
may clearly support it (as will be discussed in chapter )). 
!e tendency to move away from social cohesion and clear allegiance to the 
national state, towards a society that consists of multiple groups, not necessarily 
identifying themselves with one another, stands in any case at odds with the 
very idea of a national identity. Opposed to a common Leitkultur stands the 
image !eodore Roosevelt described in a speech in $($': ‘a tangle of squabbling 
nationalities, an intricate knot of German-Americans, Irish-Americans, English-
Americans, French-Americans, Scandinavian-Americans, or Italian-Americans, 
each preserving its separate nationality’. 
For Roosevelt, this was ‘the one absolutely certain way of bringing this na-
tion to ruin, or preventing all possibility of its continuing to be a nation at all’.48 
Arthur Schlesinger comments:
!ree quarters of a century later we must add a few more nationalities to T.R.’s 
brew. !is only strengthens his point. But what was a nightmare for T.R. is the 
dream of multicultural ideologues today. If that dream were ful"lled, if each of our 
manifold groups were huddled in its own enclave, holding itself apart from the 
rest in the sacred name of diversity, would this really be a more equable, peaceful, 
strong, uni"ed, happy country?49
As the chief rabbi of the British Commonwealth, Jonathan Sacks, puts it: 
‘Multiculturalism has led not to integration but to segregation. It has allowed 
groups to live separately, with no incentive to integrate and every incentive not 
to. It was intended to promote tolerance. Instead the result has been, in countries 
where it has been tried, societies more abrasive, fractured and intolerant than 
they once were’.50
47 !is is what Martin Bosma calls the ‘demographic turn-table’, or ‘demogra"sche draaischijf ’, 
in: Martin Bosma, De schijn-élite van de valse munters. Drees, extreem-rechts, nuttige idioten, Groep 
Wilders en ik (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, #%$%) ii.
48 Quoted in Schlesinger ($(()) $#-. A report of the speech is available online at http://query.
nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=$&res=((%$E%DD$#*(E***A#','%C$A(&&(D(-&-(&D&CF.
49 Schlesinger ($(()) $#-.
50 Jonathan Sacks, !e home we build together. Recreating Society (London: New York, #%%,) *.
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!e latest political developments suggest that Western politicians have 
abandoned the discourse of diversity. Over a period of a few months, several 
Western-European heads of government renounced multiculturalism. In #%%-, 
then opposition leader and president of the CDU Angela Merkel had already 
said that ‘multiculturalism has failed utterly’, and she was heavily criticized for 
saying so by amongst others the then Chancellor of the German Federal Republic, 
Gerhard Schröder.51 But when she repeated this statement in October #%$%,52 
Merkel found wide response. 
Former prime minister of Spain Jose Maria Aznar, British Prime Minister 
David Cameron, French president Nicolas Sarkozy, as well as Dutch vice-prime 
minister Maxime Verhagen all declared that multiculturalism had failed as well.53 
Nevertheless, the debate goes on. Support for multiculturalism and for the 
continuation of mass-immigration is still considerable in Europe. Nor is it certain 
that current leading politicians will not be outvoted in upcoming elections, 
rendering power again to those defending multiculturalism. For instance, when 
David Cameron spoke out against multiculturalism, he was openly criticized 
by a large number of public intellectuals, artists and politicians, amongst whom 
at least two MP’s, declaring that ‘We believe David Cameron’s statement that 
multiculturalism has failed was a dangerous declaration of intent. (…) David 
Cameron is attempting to drive a wedge between di+erent communities by link-
ing Britain’s multicultural society with terrorism and national security. (…) !e 
prime minister is aping attacks by other European leaders like France’s Nicolas 
Sarkozy, who passed legislation banning the veil, and Angela Merkel, who has 
also made statements denouncing multiculturalism in Germany. We believe our 
multicultural society and the respect and solidarity it is built on is a cause for 
pride, and reject any moves by this government to undermine and destroy it.54 
Multiculturalism thus remains a major theme of political disagreement and is 
likely to continue to be so over years to come.
51 Cf. ‘Integrationsdebatte. Schröder warnt vor Kampf der Kulturen’, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Sonntagszeitung, #$ November #%%-. Available online at http://www.faz.net/artikel/C*%$)(/
integrationsdebatte-schroeder-warnt-vor-kampf-der-kulturen-*%$())(-.html.
52 Matthew Weaver et al., ‘Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has ‘utterly failed’. 
Chancellor’s assertion that onus is on new arrivals to do more to integrate into German society 
stirs anti-immigration debate’, in: !e Guardian, $, October #%$%. Available online at http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/#%$%/oct/$,/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed.
53 Cf. ‘Nicolas Sarkozy declares multiculturalism had failed. French president Nicolas Sarkozy 
on !ursday declared that multiculturalism had failed, joining a growing number of world leaders 
or ex-leaders who have condemned it’, in: !e Telegraph, $$ February #%$$; http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/)*$,-(,/Nicolas-Sarkozy-declares-multiculturalism-had-
failed.html.
54 Available online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/#%$$/feb/%(/more-division-over- 
multiculturalism.
CONCLUSION
Over several decades now, the dominant trend in politics and academia has 
been to defend supranationalism and multiculturalism. In the previous three 
chapters, I have attempted to sketch what this means in practice, by pointing out 
the powers of three supranational courts and three supranational organizations 
that have been installed over the past decades, as well as the extent to which 
multiculturalism has manifested itself in society and to what consequences this 
may lead. 
In their several ways, supranational institutions take away from their member 
states elements of national sovereignty. As a result, member states can be bound 
by rules or decisions they never intended to or have never agreed upon, that 
may go against their interests or their preferences. 
Not all of these decisions are of landmark importance. Nor are all supra-
national institutions necessarily powerful and wide-ranging. !e WTO has a 
limited "eld of competence. !e ECHR has few means of enforcing its dicta. But 
seen in their totality, each of them taking away perhaps only a small portion of 
the national power to decide in certain "elds of policy, a web of supranational 
commitments has been spun up in the past decades, that, viewed in its entirety, 
now performs a signi"cant part of all political and judicial decisions that have 
e+ect in European states. 
All these organizations emerged fairly recently and their powers are still 
relatively limited. But if nothing changes, they will continue to expand their 
hold over their member states, and ultimately may come to dominate national 
law and overshadow national policies for years to come. Forming a network of 
decision making institutions, the supranationalism these organizations exercize 
poses problems of several kinds. 
Firstly, it implies that national governments can be outvoted by majorities of 
other nations. Secondly, it implies that non-national judges are entrusted with 
decisions on matters of law and morals that national judges are not anymore. 
!irdly, these supranational majorities and non-national judges are not, and 
cannot, be submitted to the kind of checks and balances that national parlia-
ments and judges are, as long as no integrated political structure, i.e., a world 
state, exists.
While this supranationalism has increasingly become a reality, most Western 
states have embraced to a smaller or larger extent a policy of multiculturalism 
accompanying the in8ux of considerable numbers of immigrants from di+erent 
cultural backgrounds since the $(&%s and ,%s. As a result, national cohesion and 
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the idea of a national identity has now become questionable in most of these 
countries. While proposals for legal pluralism are still limited, in practice there 
have already been set up informal sharia courts and other parallel systems of 
solving con8icts that pass by the national laws. 
Moreover, there is a general tendency to applaud cultural diversity and to 
stress the equal value of separate communities within nation states. As a con-
sequence, as will be discussed more in depth in chapter ), it has now become 
questionable even whether ‘such a thing as the Dutch identity exists’1 – or, for 
that matter, the Frenchman, the German, or the Dane. 
My argument in this book is that these developments are, despite all their 
resonance of bringing people together and respecting others, ultimately incom-
patible with representative government and the rule of law. 
It may be important to stress once again that although I have gone in some 
length to describe the actual functioning of the several supranational institutions 
and the policy of multiculturalism, my argument against supranationalism and 
multiculturalism is not dependent on any currently existing arrangements; the 
problems related to them are conceptual and apply to their very nature. I have 
attempted to present a 8avor of the developments European countries have 
involved themselves with, and to point out the extent to which these organiza-
tions and courts may override national preferences, as well as the extent to which 
multiculturalism may – and does – dilute national cohesion.
It also seems worthwhile to stress one more time that the idea that borders 
should be e+aced is to be distinguished from the idea that the nation state should 
enlarge its scope. Supranationalism and multiculturalism do not amount to the 
belief that, as economic interests span present borders, and national di+erences 
diminish, peoples of di+erent national origins may over time recognize neigh-
bors as members of their own tribe and join into new, more encompassing, i.e. 
larger nation states. !is would mean a continuation of national sovereignty, 
but applied on a larger scale.
By contrast, supranationalism and multiculturalism are the philosophies of 
abolishing borders altogether, not of expanding them. Moving beyond borders 
means leaving the whole idea of a nation state behind in favor of a political 
system of overlapping loyalties and jurisdictions, of communities, double or 
even triple or quadruple passports, and ‘deep diversity’.
!is confusion seems to bring together commentators of entirely di+erent 
persuasion under the thesis that ‘the nation state is "nished’. Take the example 
1 Princes Máxima, Speech of /2 September /--4, ‘(…) “de” Nederlandse identiteit? Nee, die 
heb ik niet gevonden’. Available online at http://archief.koninklijkhuis.nl/Actueel/Toespraken/
Toesprakenarchief/#%%,/Toespraak_van_Prinses_Maxima_#-_september_#%%,.
 ./0.GH3=/0 $,*
of Kenichi Ohmae and Henry Grunwald, who both subscribe to the view that 
‘the nation state will have to dissolve’.
Ohmae, a frequent writer for the Wall Street Journal, Foreign A<airs, and !e 
Economist, and the author of such works as !e Borderless World and !e End 
of the Nation State: !e Rise of Regional Economies, wrote in his $((* essay, !e 
Rise of the Region State: 
!e nation state has become an unnatural, even dysfunctional, unit for organizing 
human activity and managing economic endeavor in a borderless world.2
A borderless world. Indeed, that is the idea of supranational multiculturalism: 
not enlarging borders, but removing them. !e late political commentator 
Henry Grunwald, in a January #%%% op-ed for !e Wall Street Journal entitled 
A World Without a Country?, predicted that the ‘nation state will undergo sharp 
limitations of its sovereignty’ and that ‘just as the old, petty principalities had 
to dissolve into the wider nation state, the nation state will have to dissolve into 
wider structures.’ 
!ese two ideas, though seemingly bearing much resemblance, are funda-
mentally di+erent. !e "rst is in line with the assault on borders, the second is 
simply a continuation of national sovereignty, but on a larger scale. Although 
we will come to speak of problems of scale, that is not the essential theme of 
the dispute. 
Firstly, the dispute is about whether any form of national sovereignty should 
be maintained or pursued (as could be the case with a future ‘United States 
of Europe’), or whether, as we have witnessed the results of multiculturalism 
and supranationalism, centralized decision-making and relatively harmonious 
sociological communities should be abandoned on the whole. To begin answering 
that question, we will now commence discussing representative government 
and the rule of law.




THE NEED FOR BORDERS
Representative Government and the Rule of Law
Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of di!erent 
nationalities.





As pointed out in part II, national sovereignty has been undermined by supra-
nationalism, and national identities have been weakened through the policy of 
multiculturalism. !e ideal of political independence has been replaced by an 
ideal of political interdependence. Supranational policy-making has increased, 
at the cost of national self-government, and multiculturalism has promoted the 
idea that the societies of the future should not be united through a set of shared 
values, but – in the words of Charles Taylor – through ‘deep diversity’ and solely 
the acknowledgment of the ‘radical otherness’ of others.1
We will now reconsider sovereignty and national loyalty as well as their 
opposites, supranationalism and multiculturalism, from the perspective of 
representative government and the rule of law. I will argue that representative 
government and the rule of law require centralized decision-making and social 
cohesion, i.e. sovereignty and nationality, and that therefore, supranationalism 
and multiculturalism are, in their very principle, irreconcilable with them.
,.#. R#E8#%#9()($&9
Every form of organization, including political organization, implies a mecha-
nism of representation. !e salesman who sells co+ee machines represents his 
company when he makes a deal; the army commander who waves the white 
8ag represents the soldiers under his command; the teacher represents the 
university when he grades an exam, and so on. Division of labor, a characteristic 
of every organization, requires an acknowledgement of the individual agent as 
a pars pro toto. 
In this sense, a political leader is by de"nition a ‘representative’ of the people 
under his solicitude. An example S.E. Finer discusses is that of the emperor of 
China who ‘represented’ the people of China at the international scene: ‘Clearly’, 
Finer writes, ‘this view of “representation” does not require the representative to 
1 Taylor ($(($) '*-,&. !is ultimately amounts to an attempt to move beyond thinking in 
terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, the logical consequence of borders. Cf. Carl Schmitt, who saw it as the 
essential characteristic of ‘the political’, ‘Der Begri+ des Politischen’, in: Carl Schmitt, Frieden oder 
Pazi+smus? (Berlin: Ducker & Humblot, #%%').
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be elected; anyone performing a function on behalf of a group is a representative 
of that group’.2
To understand representation in this strictly formal sense tells us something 
about the representation with regards to external parties only. !e salesman, the 
army commander, the teacher and the dictator are representatives of, respectively, 
their business, their army, their school or their country – but only for those 
outside their group: the business partner, the enemy’s army, the student, or 
other states and international organizations.
What is therefore not included in this understanding of ‘representation’ is 
internal ‘representativeness’: the extent to which the conduct of the dictator may 
be viewed as representative of the desires or opinions of his people. In political 
a+airs, representation must enable, as Finer puts it, a small group or a single 
individual to ‘somehow stand for a larger collectivity’.3 Representation in this 
sense poses the question of legitimacy. An army commander may be the external 
representative of his army – and so bind his soldiers to decisions he makes on 
behalf of them –, but these decisions may not be ‘representative’ of the views of 
the soldiers nor even be experienced as legitimate by them. Ultimately, they may 
no longer feel ‘represented’ by him. !e same goes for the dictator who may rule 
against the ideas of the people, making it obvious for some or many of them to 
say, as did Nasawiya, a group of feminist activists in Lebanon in February #%$$, 
that the then "rst-lady of Egypt, Suzan Mubarak, ‘does not represent Egyptian 
women’.4 When speaking of representative government in this sense, we mean 
legitimate government. 
!eoretically, this could be entirely undemocratic,5 taking again the example 
of the army commander – this time a successful one: he is unelected, but may 
be experienced as an entirely legitimate ‘representative’ of the interests of the 
soldiers. When it comes to government, it is however quite unlikely that without 
the subjects having a say in the policies pursued, the politicians will endurably be 
considered as representative and legitimate.6 !is also brings us to what seems 
to be underlying in every conception of representation, which is the need for 
2 Finer ($((,) vol. II, $%*#. !is is to be distinguished from Eric Voegelin’s conception of 
‘existential representation’, as explored in Volume IV of Order and History: !e Ecumenic Age 
(Baton Roughe: Louisiana State University, $(,-).
3 Finer ($((,) vol. II, $%#'. Finer adds that ‘this is not a su9cient condition for what we would 
call “representative government” today, but it is a necessary one’.
4 Website of Epress.am, #* February #%$$. Available online at http://www.epress.am/en/#%$$/%#/#*/
suzan-mubarak-does-not-represent-egyptian-women-egypts-coalition-of-womens-ngos/.
5 As David Apter analyzes, for instance, in: ‘Notes for a theory of nondemocratic representation’, 
in: J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds.), Representation. Yearbook of the American Society for 
Political and Legal Philosophy (New York: Atherton Press, $(&)) #,)-*$,.
6 Cf. Hamilton, Madison and Jay, !e Federalist Papers. With an introduction and commentary 
by Garry Wills (New York: Bantam Classics, $()#).
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social cohesion among those who are to be represented. But we will come to 
speak of that below.
R.H. Lord argues that ‘the development of the representative system and of 
parliaments’ was ‘one of the greatest achievements of the Middle Ages’.7 According 
to most observers, the kind of political representation that we are familiar with 
today did not exist before Medieval times: the Greeks and the Romans are generally 
regarded to have known ‘something like “delegated” or “vicarious” government’ 
– enabling only direct agency for concrete purposes (and not the general kind 
of representation for all sorts of purposes known at present).8 !omas Bisson 
writes that ‘the uniqueness of the medieval evolution is not in doubt; historians 
agree that the circumstances and forms of European representation bear little 
resemblance to those known in antecedent or non-European societies’.9 Lord 
continues on the rise of the modern form of representation in the Middle Ages: 
!e hallmark of it is the fact that the power of the crown was then more or less 
extensively limited by that of assemblies, in part elective, whose members, though 
directly and immediately representing only the politically active classes, were 
also regarded as representing in a general way the whole population of the land.10
Finer argues that ‘during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (…) there 
sprang up a multitude of conciliar bodies to give consent to but also – by the 
same token – to exert some control over their rulers’.11 !eir names di+ered 
from country to country, 
some countries, like England, Ireland, Scotland, Sicily, the Papal States, and the 
great Kingdom of Naples called them parliaments or parlamenti. In the Iberian 
peninsula they were called cortes or corts. In France and the Lowlands they went 
under the name of Estates- or States-General. In Germany they were called landtage, 
in Denmark and Norway the assembly was the Rigsdag, in Sweden the Riksdag, 
and in Poland the Sejm.12 
In his $)'$ book entitled Histoire des origines du gouvernement representatif en 
Europe, the French statesman and historian François Guizot wrote that ‘almost 
everywhere [in Europe], the representative form of government is demanded, 
allowed, or established’. He connected this to the development of central power, 
7 R.H. Lord, ‘!e Parliaments of the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period’, in: !e Catholic 
Historical Review, Vol. $&, No. # (July, $(*%) $#'-$--. Cf. P. Spu+ord, !e origins of the English 
Parliament: Readings (Longman, London, $(&,) #$.
8 Finer ($((,) vol. I, *)%-*)$. An exception is J.A.O. Larsen, Representative government in 
Greek and Roman history, Sather classical lectures, vol. /3 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, $('') )&+.
9 T.N. Bisson (ed.), Medieval representative institutions. !eir Origins and Nature (Illinois: !e 
Dryden Press, $(,*) $.
10 Lord (July, $(*%) $#'-$--.
11 Finer ($((,) vol. II, $%#-.
12 Finer ($((,) vol. II, $%#-.
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as ‘the "rst movement towards a representative government appear[ed] at the 
same time with the e+orts of a central power which aims at becoming general 
and organized (…)’.13 Ample re8ection shows that this is entirely in line with 
logic: for without organized, centralized power, it is impossible to conceive of 
political representation. If representative bodies do not possess sovereignty, they 
have nothing to be representative about.
But the analytical question remains what exactly is to be understood by 
‘representation’. We may further our understanding of this di9culty by distin-
guishing representation from two related concepts: that of delegation, and that 
of mandation.
Delegation is the – in principle temporary – transfer of concrete decision-
making powers, authorizing the delegate ‘to act only in accordance with speci"c 
instructions, or a speci"c ideology’.14 States send ‘delegates’ to the assemblies of 
the United Nations, for instance, to lobby in accordance with speci"c instructions 
from the minister of foreign a+airs. Delegates also appear on behalf of interest 
groups at national legislative bodies to in8uence legislation or processes of 
decision-making. A delegate has less freedom of operation than a ‘representative’. 
As Burke suggested: 
A delegate merely mirrors and records the views of his constituents, whereas a 
representative is elected to judge according to his own conscience.15 
It is an interesting discussion whether, due to modern party rule, members of 
parliaments may have come to resemble more the characteristics of a delegate 
(of their party), to the detriment of their representativeness of the people at 
large.16 Nevertheless, the idea of representative government is that parliaments 
consist of members with the individual capacity to make decisions, rendering 
their freedom of action wider than that of a delegate.
13 François Guizot, ‘European History as the history of representative institutions’, in: Bisson 
($(,*) (-$#.
14 Scruton, !e Palgrave Macmillan dictionary of political thought. *rd Edition (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan #%%,) $&) under ‘delegation’.
15 Quoted in: Scruton (#%%,) '($ under ‘Representation’.
16 Cf. Frank R. Ankersmit, ‘De hedendaagse politieke partij, van representatie van de kiezer 
naar zelfrepresentatie’, in: Jaarboek DNPP /---; M. Gallagher et al., Representative Government in 
Modern Europe, *rd edition (Boston: McGrall-Hill, #%%$); Gerhard Leibholz, Strukturprobleme der 
Modernen Demokratie (Karlsruhe: Verlag C.F. Müller, $(')); Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and 
Party Systems, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, $((-); Arend Lijphart, Democracy in the Twenty-
First Century: can we be optimistic?, (Wassenaar: NIAS, #%%%); J. Steiner, European Democracies, 
(London & New York: Longman Inc., $()&); J.J.A. !omassen, Kiezers en gekozenen in een 
representatieve demokratie (Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom, $(,&); E. Witte, Politiek en democratie, 
omtrent de werking van de westerse democratieën in de .,de en /-ste eeuw (Brussel: VUB press, 
$((%). I have explored the subject in relation to the Dutch situation: !ierry Baudet, ‘Tegen de 
partij-oligarchie’, in: Joop Hazenberg, Farid Tabarki and Rens van Tilburg (eds.), Dappere Nieuwe 
Wereld. /. jonge denkers over de toekomst van Nederland (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, #%$$) $$,-$#-.
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A mandate, then – originating from the Latin mandare, i.e. to instruct – may 
mean two things. It may imply a concrete command to do something. For instance 
in a mandate to buy goods up to a certain amount at an auction; or, in the case 
of the army commander again, the mandate to use a certain type of weaponry. 
Yet the word is also used to denote the authority to act: as in a ‘mandate of an 
electorate’. Representatives need such a ‘mandate’ of their electorate for their 
actions to be perceived as legitimate. 
To clarify this second understanding of representation – in the sense of 
a mandate from an electorate –, J. Roland Pennock distinguishes between 
a delegate and a trustee. ‘For a representative to act purely and simply as a 
delegate would be to make him functionless most, if not all, of the time, for 
it is seldom clear precisely what a constituency, or even its majority, wishes’.17 
On the contrary, indeed, the representative is entrusted to make decisions on 
behalf of his constituents in their name but not necessarily with their consent. 
!e mandate, then, pertains to the period of entrustment, but – and here arises 
di9culty – also to the content of the general concern of the representative. Surely, 
many would consider it a breach of the ‘mandate of the electorate’, if a politician 
was voted in o9ce because of a strong opposition to, say, immigration or transfer 
of sovereignty, but then promoted the bringing about of either.
Another approach to this di9culty can be found in Edmund Burke’s famous 
speech delivered on November *rd, $,,-, when he had been elected as one of 
the representatives of Bristol in the British parliament. Burke contended that ‘to 
be a good member of parliament is (…) no easy task; (…) all [the] wide-spread 
interests must be considered; must be compared; must be reconciled, if possible’,18 
and he went on to argue that:
It ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative to live in the strictest 
union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with 
his constituents. !eir wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion, 
high respect; their business, unremitted attention. It is his duty to sacri"ce his 
repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs; and above all, ever, and in all 
cases, to prefer their interest to his own.19
Burke then continues: 
But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he 
ought not to sacri"ce to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. !ese he does 
not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. !ey 
17 J. Roland Pennock, ‘Political Representation: an overview’, in: R.J. Pennock and J.W. Chapman 
(eds.), Representation. Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy (New 
York: Atherton Press, $(&)) *-#,, there $'.
18 Edmund Burke, ‘Speech to the Electors of Bristol’, in: Ibidem, Speeches and Letters on American 
a<airs. Introduction by very rev. Canon Peter McKevitt (London: J.M. Dent & Sons LTD, $(%), 
reprinted in $(&$) ,-.
19 Burke ($(&$) ,#.
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are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your 
representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, 
instead of serving you, if he sacri"ces it to your opinion. (…) Parliament is not a 
congress of ambassadors (…) but parliament is a deliberative assembly (…) you 
choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not member of 
Bristol, but he is a member of parliament.20 
Burke thus emphasizes the autonomous judgment a representative is entitled, 
indeed required, to make. Because the direct form of representation has become, 
in practice, impossible in modern times, this seems necessary for any form of 
democracy in advanced societies. Organization implies a hierarchy:21 this is what 
Robert Michels calls the ‘iron law of oligarchy’.22 ‘Rule by the people’ – the literal 
meaning of ‘democracy’ – is therefore necessarily dependent upon the Burkean 
idea of representation. But again this poses the problem of social cohesion in 
the relation between constituents and representatives. 
For representative government presupposes two things. !e "rst is the 
possibility of the people to be actively involved in the government through 
periodical, free elections among a wide franchise, and the possibility to partake 
in political decision making, to stand for election, and to have freedom of 
expression in political debate. I call these "rst presumptions of representative 
government its ‘formal’ prerequisites. Concerned only with the institutional 
reality, these could be installed on every level: municipal, national, European, 
global; or anything in between.
Yet representative government also presupposes something else, which I call its 
‘material’ prerequisites. !is is the experience of representation in governmental 
institutions, requiring not merely a right to vote as well as all the other formal 
institutions that allow political participation, but also a collective identity that can 
be represented as a whole. !e term democracy may easily be understood as a 
formal, legalistic arrangement. However, to speak of ‘representative government’ 
leads to the question of what it is that can be represented. It poses the question 
of collective identity since it poses the question why a majority decision would 
be experienced as legitimate. !is ‘material’ aspect of representation proves far 
more problematic than its formal aspect.
For it is self-evident that formal representation can exist in any central body 
where decisions can be made. As John Stuart Mill writes in his Considerations 
on Representative Government: ‘the meaning of representative government is, 
that the whole people, or some numerous portion of them, exercise, through 
20 Ibidem.
21 Cf. the works of Moisey Ostrogorski, who has written about the depth of experienced loyalties 
among members of political parties.
22 Cf. James Burnham, !e Machiavellians (Chicago: !e John Day Company, Inc., $(-*) esp. 
$)%+: ‘!e iron Law of Oligarchy’.
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deputies periodically elected by themselves, the ultimate controlling power …’. 
He continues: ‘!is ultimate power they must possess in all its completeness.’23
!e point Mill here makes is evident. If the national government is tied to 
all kinds of supranational entanglements, such as the ones described in the 
previous part of this book, there is no guarantee that the laws and policies it 
has to enforce are representative of its people’s wishes or perceived interests. It 
must be clear where and by whom rules and decisions have been made or could 
be made for representative government to be able to exist.
But a deeper question related to representative government is: who are the 
people? Why could an elected supranational structure, such as the European 
Parliament, not attain the same level of representation? !is leads to the material 
aspect of representative government: the experience or perception of representa-
tion. It refers not just to the institutional reality, but to the social reality. Ronald 
Dworkin presents an instructive thought-experiment on this subject in a chapter 
entitled ‘Who are the People?’, in his book Justice for Hedgehogs (#%$$). ‘One 
day’, he imagines, ‘Japan grants equal voting rights to the citizens of Norway 
so that they can elect a small party of Norwegians to the Japanese Diet if they 
wish. !en the Diet by majority vote levies taxes on Norwegian oil and directs 
its transfer to Japanese re"neries.’ Obviously, this would not satisfy the criteria 
for representative government. Dworkin concludes:
If some form of majoritarian process is to provide genuine self-government, it 
must be government by a majority of the right people.24
!e question who are the right people comes down to a more simple one: who 
are ‘the people’? Who fall in the group considering themselves represented, and 
who fall out of it? !is question is of a sociological nature, and depends on the 
experience of membership: ‘we’ are the people, if we believe we share the same 
identity and the same loyalty. And it was this, that we identi"ed as ‘the nation’ 
in the "rst part of this book. 
When it comes to the experience of membership, the famous $(#) !omas 
theorem applies: ‘if men de"ne situations as real, they are real in their con-
sequences’25 – meaning in this case that whatever subjective experience of 
membership exists, determines the reality of material representation. 
Should the Scots regard their political representation threatened by governing 
together with the English, then that is a fact one has to deal with. !is could 
change of course, depending on political climate, "nancial stability, economic 
23 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (New York: Prometheus 
Books, $(($) (,: Chapter V, ‘Of the proper functions of representative bodies’.
24 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, #%$$) *)%.
25 W.I. !omas and D.S. !omas, !e child in America: Behavior problems and programs (New 
York: Knopf, $(#)) ',$-',#.
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and cultural factors, and so on. Defending representative government could 
therefore mean supporting a return to govern on a smaller scale than the scope of 
current nation states; equally, it could mean the rendering of full sovereignty to 
a federal United States of Europe: provided the material experience of member-
ship is in place. For while representative government can well go hand in hand 
with a division between matters of regional importance and matters of national 
importance;26 it can also mean moving on to an even larger scale (in this case to 
that of a European representative federation). Yet then again, the point becomes 
evident that a European-wide social cohesion – a continental collective identity 
– would be required. In both cases, therefore, the experience of membership 
provides the material ‘representativeness’ of the formal representation.
But as government encompasses more than merely parliamentary rule, 
there is also more to representative government than merely parliamentary 
representation. !e entire political structure, with its balance of powers and 
several di+erent branches, requires rootedness in a collective identity. !is is 
especially problematic when it comes to judges, typically unelected o9cials of 
the state, as we will see in the next paragraph. For what is the role of judges in 
representative government? What is required of them to "t in the scheme of 
representative government? And what may it imply, to have a body of judges 
appointed by di+erent national governments, as is the case in the ECHR?
,.*. L)F
Rule of law is in place when at least three principles are applied to the govern-
ment of a society:
 $. In its actions, the state is bound by the law; 
 #. In passing laws or changing the law, the state is bound by procedural 
prerequisites;
 *. !ere is an impartial judiciary applying the laws.
!e "rst criterion ensures that state action is not arbitrary but that the law provides 
for the state’s competencies. It also implies that a subject, ‘however placed, [may] 
enforce that law’, even against the state itself.27 In this way the state, however 
powerful or encompassing its rule may be, can be held accountable under the 
same laws as it applies to its citizens, in the same courts, by the same judges.
26 Cf. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on representative government (New York: Prometheus 
Books, $(($) #)&+: Chapter XV, ‘Of local representative bodies’.
27 Scruton, !e Palgrave Macmillan dictionary of political thought. *rd Edition (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, #%%,) &$$ under ‘rule of law’.
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!e second principle forbids that arbitrary changes in the law be made; laws 
must be enacted before they become valid, and have to be debated in public and 
voted upon by a legislative assembly. 
An important element in both these aspects of the rule of law is that it helps 
to realize ‘legal certainty’. For it means that no judgment is binding unless based 
on a previously encoded law. In passing laws or changing the law, the state must 
be bound by certain procedural prerequisites, and legislation must not have 
retrospective e+ect.28 But it is precisely at this point, however, that it becomes 
increasingly clear why the whole concept of the rule of law already implies a 
nation state. For in practice all legal certainty is dependent on the predictability 
of legal judgments, which in turn depends, to speak with Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
on ‘the prophecies of what the courts will do’.29
Without some degree of certainty about the judges that will administer the 
law, people grope in the dark as to the content of the law.30 !erefore, legal 
certainty in reality implies being judged by judges who understand the o:en 
vague terms of the law in a foreseeable way. !e rule of law for that reason does 
not merely mean the rule of previously issued rules (a merely formal meaning), 
but also some extent of uniformity and trust in how they may be understood 
(a material meaning).
!is is partly realized through the third criterion: the impartial judiciary 
branch, which ensures that the courts reach their decisions autonomously. But 
the ‘impartiality’ or ‘autonomy’ of the judiciary is as much restrained by their 
connection to a shared sense of community. While the law that rules is, naturally, 
the law of society, the judges that administer it are for that reason supposed to 
be a part of that society.
In principle, one might say, there should be no reason why di+erent judges 
should not come to the same conclusions in a given dispute; for what is ‘legal’ 
should be subject to the abstract and neutral logic of the profession. But in 
reality, the vaguer – or more ‘fundamental’ – the principles concerned, the 
more leeway judges have.
Take as an example the ‘right to life’. Many people would say that this right is 
among the most fundamental principles of justice, and that respect for it should 
lie at the core of any sensible notion of the ‘rule of law’. But what does it mean in 
practice? What are the boundaries of police action, for instance, when dealing 
with terrorists or armed criminals? Or what positive obligation to protect life 
28 See on this: Scruton, ‘Rechtsgefühl and the Rule of Law’, in: J.C. Nyiri and B. Smith (eds.), 
Practical Knowledge: outlines of a !eory of Traditions and Skills (London: Croom Helm, $())) &$+.
29 Oliver Wendell Holmes, jr., ‘!e path of the law’, in: Harvard Law Review vol. $%, no. ) ($)(,) -',.
30 Cf. Benjamin N. Cardozo, !e nature of the judicial process (New York: Dover publications, 
#%%').
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follows from the ‘right to life’? What may this mean in the future concerning 
abortion and euthanasia? And concerning access to healthcare and medicines? 
Indeed, if we take the ‘right to life’ seriously, should certain political measures 
curtailing the welfare state not be regarded as a violation of it? Leaving someone 
starving or freezing to death on the street without providing a remedy amounts 
to murder, a random collective of judges might say.
Or take the principle of non-discrimination. Again something that sounds 
‘fundamental’ and important, but that can impossibly be neutrally administered. 
For consistent application of this principle should mean the prohibition of just 
about anything, for example the abolition of all hereditary monarchies, as well 
as the constitutional rule that to become American president, one has to be 
born in the US. !e privileged position that many states – for a variety of social, 
cultural and historical reasons – preserve for a speci"c religious denomination, 
for instance the Anglican Church in Britain, or the Lutheran in Denmark, or 
clubs that discriminate on the basis of sex: all may theoretically be found to be 
in violation of this principle. Because no two people are entirely the same, the 
principle of non-discrimination is endless in its application (just as ‘equal oppor-
tunity’ would theoretically require a ban on private property and the dissolution 
of families). !e prohibition of discrimination in any case, inevitably clashes 
with classic civil liberties such as those of expression, conscience and religion. 
!is is by no means a theoretical discussion only. Consider the dissenting 
opinion of judge Pavlovschi in the case of O’Halloran and Francis v. the United 
Kingdom at the European Court of Human Rights in #%%,,31 who believed speed 
limits were a violation of fundamental human rights:
In my opinion, if there are so many breaches of a prohibition, it clearly means that 
something is wrong with the prohibition. It means that the prohibition does not 
re8ect a pressing social need, given that so many people choose to breach it even 
under the threat of criminal prosecution. And if this is the case, maybe the time 
has come to review speed limits and to set limits that would more correctly re8ect 
peoples’ needs. We cannot force people in the twenty-"rst century to ride bicycles 
or start jogging instead of enjoying the advantages which our civilization brings. 
Equally, it is di9cult for me to accept the argument that hundreds of thousands 
of speeding motorists are wrong and only the government is right.32 
As this example shows, judges can – and will – easily stretch the rights and 
principles they rule upon to cover the most far-reaching phenomena; their 
task is not con"ned to merely applying the law to presented facts. !ere are 
many obvious examples from the United States as well.33 From the Dred Scott 
31 Case of O’Halloran and Francis v. !e United Kingdom (Applications .63-,/-/ and /61/2/-/) 
Judgment Strasbourg #( June #%%,.
32 Ibidem, dissenting opinion of Judge Pavlovschi.
33 Cf. Bork ($((%).
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v. Sandford case ($)'&), in which the Supreme Court ruled that people of Af-
rican descent, whether former slaves or not, were not citizens as meant in the 
Constitution;34 to the Roe v. Wade case ($(,*), in which the right to abortion 
was found implicit in a person’s rights (Fourteenth Amendment); to the Regents 
of the University of California v. Bakke case ($(,)), in which a0rmative action 
was found constitutional (and therefore not in violation of the constitutional 
right of equality).35 
!e freedom judges have is precisely the reason why becoming one is 
o:en a very selective process, and why nominations for supreme courts are 
almost everywhere political decisions (by royal resolution upon nomination by 
Parliament, for example, in the Netherlands36). American presidents nominate 
judges with views consistent with their own. !e Senate, which must ratify the 
appointments, can oppose the nomination when the majority has a di+erent 
political opinion (as happened in $(), when the candidate of Ronald Reagan 
was rejected). Americans know where the judges of the Supreme Court stand 
and weigh their chances to push for certain political changes when a judge is 
replaced. Democrats hope to replace Republican judges, and vice versa (as has 
been discussed in chapter -.#).37 
Now, precisely because di+erent judges may interpret the same rules dif-
ferently, legal certainty is threatened when di+erent judges, from a di+erent 
nation, are invited to pass judgment. It is unpredictable what di+erent judges will 
say. While it is certainly true that di+erent judges of the same nation may also 
disagree, placing the judiciary outside the national context no doubt multiplies 
this problem exponentially.
But there is also another side to this point. For legal certainty not only requires 
that the conduct of the judges is to a large extent predictable; it also presupposes 
that the expectations of those subjected to the same laws are to a large extent 
congruent. Ordinary people do not have profound knowledge of jurisprudence; 
they act on the basis of a Rechtsgefühl that certain things may be expected from 
34 ‘… We think they [people of African ancestry] are … not included, and were not intended 
to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the 
rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United 
States …’. (Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, speaking for the majority).
35 ‘… Race or ethnic background may be deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s "le, yet 
it does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available 
seatsA…’. (Justice Powell, Speaking for the Court).
36 Cf. Articles $$, and $$) of the Dutch constitution.
37 At present, of course, debates are raging as to the proper role of the supreme court. Cf. 
Stephen Breyer, Making our democracy work. A judge’s view (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, #%$%); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, !e conservative assault on the constitution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
#%$%); Je+rey Toobin, !e Nine. Inside the secret world of the supreme court (New York: Anchor 
Books, #%%)).
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others, and certain corresponding duties demanded.38 If you and I have entirely 
di+erent ideas of what ‘equity’ means, or what constitutes a threat to my ‘honor’ 
or ‘good name’, then there can be no legal certainty between us in our ordinary 
interactions (unless we constantly consult our lawyers). 
Moreover, as the courtroom is never more than an ultimate remedy, the ‘rule 
of law’ really implies that the individuals in a society generally have a shared, 
internalized idea of morality and that they live more or less according to it. 
!is also works the other way round. For how could a judge determine what 
equity or ‘good faith’ or ‘grave reasons’ or ‘casting a slur on a person’s honor’ 
(legitimizing self-defense) mean, if he could not refer to a general – dominant, 
Leitkulturliches – viewpoint or tradition in society?39 
For these reasons – the need for congruence in both the viewpoints of judges 
and in the expectations of the people – the content of the law itself is in practice 
mostly congealed culture. However abstract legal reasoning may be, and however 
intellectual the arguments may be: properly understood, the rule of law is only 
the tip of the iceberg of social cohesion. !e very idea implies a Leitkultur. 
To be a judge is therefore inescapably a representative function on behalf 
of a community. !e judge has been granted the con"dence of the members of 
the community to voice and co-determine their way of life.40 Even the admin-
istration of ‘fundamental’ values requires a judge to choose position: between 
being reserved and being activist, between keeping in line with past cases or 
changing course, between de"ning racism in the strict etymological meaning 
or in a more wide-ranging, ‘cultural’ sense; or between interpreting the right to 
life as prohibitive of the death penalty, of abortion or of assisted suicide.
Judges cannot give arbitrary opinions, and the aim is to give a judgment 
that would win the consent of other independent rational observers. But this 
does not remove all subjective elements from the activity of judges.41 As David 
Pannick writes: ‘However knowledgeable judges may be about their biases, we 
cannot expect them to give other than an informed and intelligent but never-
38 Cf. Scruton ($())) &$+. 
39 As indeed multiculturalism has shown, it becomes increasingly di9cult for judges to condemn 
so-called ‘honor killings’ as these acts were sanctioned by a culture that had been granted the 
same rights as the dominant national culture (See chapter &).
40 It is precisely because of this proper function of judges, that a portrait of the Queen is 
present in every Dutch courthouse: to emphasize that judges bear the authority of the majesty, 
and that the duty of obedience arises from that in which all Dutch citizens are represented – the 
sovereign. If judges did not have such authority, the losing party should have no reason to accept 
their verdict. Who would those men and women in gowns be to tell them what they should or 
should not do? Again: ‘What right have you, a foreigner, to come to me and tell me what I must 
do?’ Ernest Hemingway, For whom the bell tolls (London: Vintage Books, #%%') $,.
41 See on this: Arie-Jan Kwak, ‘Het (on)persoonlijke gezicht van het recht; de rechter tussen 
objectiviteit en gezag’, in: Trema (Special #, #%%)) -#)--*$; Arie-Jan Kwak (ed.), Holy Writ: 
Interpretation in Law and Religion (Surrey: Ashgate, #%%().
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theless subjective view of the facts and the law. It is therefore a matter of great 
importance who is appointed to the Bench’.42
!eir role as a counterweight against mere majority rule,43 may thus easily be 
perceived as a ‘tyranny of the minority’. His decision can only have authority, if 
the judge is recognized and accepted by the parties seeking a remedy through 
him. Although his ‘impartiality’ is an important feature for him, it is only ‘im-
partiality’ as to the con8icting parties; he has to be at the same time recognized 
by both as part of the community; as part of their ‘we’. In this way, tyranny of 
the majority and tyranny of the minority are the Scylla and Charybdis a wise 
constitutional system has to navigate its way through.44 
!is observation is also relevant for our discussion of multiculturalism. 
For the national judges can only be accepted as such by cultural and religious 
minorities, if there is a sense of shared community that gives the judge in 
question his authority and enables him to speak in this particular case (hence 
the enthusiasm of some Muslim communities for Sharia courts with their own 
judges, see also chapter (.*). !us in fact, a judge is not so much supposed to be 
‘objective’ as to be ‘authoritative’: and that can only be the case when he is part 
of a larger whole, of which the con8icting parties are also members. And only 
the nation provides the territorial context for such authority.
42 David Pannick, Judges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, $(),) -- (and back8ap).
43 Cf. J. Hampton, ‘Democracy and the rule of law’, in: Ian Shapiro (ed.), !e Rule of Law: 
Nomos XXXVI. Yearbook of the American society for Political and Legal Philosophy (New York: 
New York University Press, $((-) $*---.
44 Cf. !ierry Baudet, ‘De achilleshiel van de rechtsstaat’, in: NRC Handelsblad, $& December, #%$$. 

CHAPTER EIGHT
THE FALLACIES OF UNIVERSALISM
).$. N& M&8# W)8
!ree fallacies accompany the assault on borders. I call them the fallacies 
of universalism. !ey return time and again at defences of supranational or 
multicultural projects. !e "rst is, that the First and Second World Wars have 
taught us that ‘nationalism’ is inherently war bound, and that supranational – 
universalist – projects, such as the EU, are the answer to that inherently bellicose 
nature of man, dangerously surfacing through national democracies, which 
must therefore be curtailed.
!e second is, that the universal society, based solely on abstract principles of 
justice that all people could agree with, could be an actuality. At least since the 
Enlightenment, this idea has been fashionable among liberal philosophers, and 
those adhering to it have thenceforth dreamed of superseding the particularities 
of di+erent cultures and of installing a world government that would make such 
arbitrary national arrangements obsolete.
!e third fallacy is the idea of the all-inclusiveness (or, which amounts to 
the same thing, the non-exclusiveness) of political loyalties, suggesting that it 
is entirely unproblematic to hold several passports; to feel loyal to several dif-
ferent states; and to have, generally, no particular attachment to any particular 
nation, but rather to subgroups or even virtual communities, that may transgress 
borders, as in the philosophy of multiculturalism. 
Serving as arguments to legitimize the assault on borders, these fallacies of 
universalism are being brought forward regularly by advocates of supranation-
alism or multiculturalism. !is chapter attempts to show why they are in fact 
fallacies, commencing with the "rst: that nationalism is inherently war bound.
To be sure, one of the leading themes of the second half of the #%th century 
was ‘Nie wieder Krieg’: never again the loss of lives and the destruction that 
the First and the Second World Wars had brought about. It was widely felt that 
nationalism had been one of the primary causes of these wars, and this makes 
it hardly surprising that European intellectuals have taken a sceptical approach 
towards national sovereignty. !e nation state seemed to produce nationalism, 
which had, in turn, produced war, destruction, and the holocaust. !e German 
philosopher Karl Jaspers wrote in $('$ that it was the task of the ‘great’ German 
nation to ‘negate’ nationality. Apparently oblivious to the obvious contradiction, 
he contended that ‘the history of the German nation state has come to an end. 
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As a great nation we can do but one thing for us and the world: to make people 
realize that today the idea of the nation state spells disaster for Europe and all 
the other continents’. He concluded:
!e idea of the nation state is today a destructive force in the world of mighty 
proportions. We may begin to lay bare its roots and e+ect its negation.1
His perspective was widely shared by European elites, and still is until this day. 
!e former French president François Mitterrand received a great applause, for 
instance, when he announced in $((' that ‘le nationalisme, c’est la guerre!’2 Ten 
years later, in #%%', Tony Blair warned the European Parliament that if Europe 
would cease its expansion and stick with the members that shared some cultural 
inheritance (by for instance excluding Turkey), it would ‘become more narrow, 
more introspective’, and what would await Europe was ‘outdated nationalism 
and xenophobia.’3
‘Nationalism was identi"ed as the problem’, concludes the British journalist 
Douglas Murray, ‘and as the nation was responsible for nationalism, it was 
obviously the cause of the problem.’4 It was precisely from this perspective, 
that the former President of the European Parliament ($((--$((,), the German 
Klaus Hänsch,5 said: ‘Never again must a state be so sovereign that it can decide 
between weal and woe, between war and peace.’6 !is is a clear attack on the 
idea of sovereignty itself, of course, and as such illustrative of the supranational 
idea – which does not aim at creating a new sovereign entity, but, as I have 
explained, at negating the concept of sovereignty altogether.
At the time of the &%th anniversary of the end of World War II, EU Com-
missioner Margot Wallström tried to persuade the people to vote for the 
European constitutional treaty, arguing that ‘politicians who resisted pooling 
national sovereignty risked a return to Nazi horrors of the $(*%s and $(-%s’.7 In 
her speech, not coincidentally organized at the site of the former concentration 
camp !eresienstadt (Terezin) in the Czech Republic, she blamed the Second 
World War on 
1 Jaspers ($(&() '*: ‘Die Geschichte des deutschen Nationalstaats ist zu Ende, nicht die Geschichte 
der Deutschen. Was wir als grosse Nation uns und der Welt leisten können, ist die Einsicht in 
die Weltsituation heute: dass der Nationalstaatsgedanke heute das Unheil Europas und nun auch 
aller Kontinente ist. Während der Nationalstaatsgedanke die heute übermächtige zerstörende 
Kra: der Erde ist, können wir beginnen, ihn in der Wurzel zu durchschauen und aufzuheben.’
2 François Mitterrand, Speech of .4 January .,,6 at the European Parliament, available online 
at http://www.lours.org/default.asp?pid=*,'.
3 Tony Blair, Speech of /5 June /--6, published on http://news.bbc.co.uk/$/hi/uk_politics/-$###)).
stm.
4 Douglas Murray, Neoconservatism: why we need it (London: Social A+airs Unit, #%%') $,).
5 Klaus Hänsch presided the European Parliament from $((- till $((,.
6 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, $& October $((', as quoted in Laughland ($((,) ,,.
7 ‘Vote for EU Constitution or risk new Holocaust, says Brussels’, Daily Telegraph, ( May #%%'.
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nationalistic pride and greed, and (…) international rivalry for wealth and power. 
According to Wallström, the EU had replaced such rivalry with an historic 
agreement to share national sovereignty.8
Two years later, in #%%,, when the EU was celebrating its '%th birthday, the 
motto was: ‘!e EU: '% years of peace’, indeed suggesting that there was a causal 
connection between the two. In his speech to the University of Washington 
(Seattle), deputy spokesperson for the European Commission to the United 
States, Mattias Sundholm, remembered that ‘some &' years ago, the world was 
in 8ames (…) Europeans fought each other, and in the rest of the world people 
were starving and millions of people died’. 
What a contrast with the summer of #%%&, Sundholm contended, when 
Germany was hosting the World Soccer Championship. He was struck by people 
coming ‘from all over Europe, with the common currency – the Euro – in their 
pockets, travelling there without passports – because those are not needed in a 
Europe without borders – and waving their own respective national 8ags – and 
this without violence or holding grudge against each other’. Coming to his 
conclusion, Sundholm said:
Now, how did all this happen, and in only some '% years? Well, to a large extent it 
is thanks to an economist from Cognac in France, Robert Schuman (…).9 [never 
mind that it was the brandy salesman Jean Monnet who came from Cognac, while 
Schuman, the economist, was an Alsatian]
Imaginatively as it may be presented (although one may doubt the lack of 
‘grudge’ to be found in football supporters) the question of congruence with 
reality is pressing. How true is all this? What is really the connection between 
the Second World War and nationalism? And to what extent can the EU – and 
other supranational projects – be credited for whatever ‘lasting peace’ may have 
come about since $(-'?
8 Ibidem.
9 ‘Let me start o+ by brie8y sharing two pictures with you: Some &' years ago, the world was in 
8ames, to a large extent because of and orchestrated from Nazi-Germany and Berlin. Europeans 
fought each other, and in the rest of the world people were starving and millions of people died. 
And this was not the "rst time the very same European countries were "ghting each other; some 
of them had been in war at least * times in the last ,' years. Please keep this picture in your 
heads for a second. Last summer, the very same country – Germany – and its capital – Berlin – 
hosted the World Soccer Championships. People came from all over Europe, with the common 
currency – the Euro – in their pockets, travelling there without passports – because those are 
not needed in a Europe without borders – and waving their own respective national 8ags – and 
this without violence or holding grudge against each other. Now, how did all this happen, and in 
only some '% years? Well, to a large extent it is thanks to an economist from Cognac in France, 
Robert Schuman, who later became French foreign minister and who said that “Europe will not 
be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements 
which "rst create a de facto solidarity.”’ Available online at http://www.eurunion.org/eu/#%%,-
Speeches-and-Press-Conferences-/THE-EUROPEAN-UNION-CELEBRATING-'%-YEARS-OF-
PEACE-PROSPERITY-AND-PARTNERSHIP.html.
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Was Nazism even a form of nationalism? !ough generally contended, 
this view is not entirely undisputed either. One historian who has questioned 
the all too quick identi"cation of Nazism with nationalism is the renowned 
Oxford historian and Special Operations veteran of the Second World War, 
Hugh Seton-Watson. In his classic account on Nations and States, Seton-Watson 
analyzed that ‘it may be argued that Hitler was himself a nationalist, resolved 
to perfect the union of all Germans which had been le: incomplete in $),%’.10 
Hitler succeeded in 
annexing the great majority of ‘unredeemed’ Germans in $(*) without war (Austria 
and the Bohemian borderlands of Czechoslovakia), but he was unable to annex 
the million and a half Germans of Poland and the city of Danzig without going 
to war with the Poles, and this let loose a European war which in turn became a 
world war. 
Giving further credit to this ‘standard’ view of history, Seton-Watson continues 
that it can well be argued, that ‘a series of con8icts, concerned with the status of 
unsatis"ed nations (Croats and Slovaks) or of divided nations (Hungarians in 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania; Bulgarians in Yugoslavia, Romania 
and Greece), created in Central Europe an atmosphere of mutual hatred between 
states which caused each in turn to succumb either to the blandishments or 
to the aggression of Hitler’.11 Seton-Watson concludes that ‘!us, nationalism 
played an important part.’ He nevertheless goes on to say that:
It is equally clear that Hitler’s aims were not limited to anything which, even if the 
phrase be stretched to the utmost, can be described as German nationalism. His 
aim was to conquer all Europe and a good deal more besides. Mussolini aimed to 
create a new Roman empire in the Mediterranean, the Japanese a Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere embracing hundreds of millions who were not Japanese.12 
Seton-Watson thus emphasizes the important distinction between nationalism 
on the one hand, and imperialism on the other. !ough the latter may follow 
from the former, they are not identical phenomena. 
In his polemical work !e tainted source, John Laughland goes further, and 
analyzes the eurofederalist tendencies inherent in Fascism and Nazism itself. 
‘It is false’, he writes, ‘to say that the ideology of European uni"cation (…) 
post-dates the Second World War, or even that it was only ever conceived in 
opposition to its worst excesses. On the contrary, not only the Nazis, but fascists 
and collaborators from many European countries, made very widespread use of 
10 Seton-Watson ($(,,) -&,--&(.
11 Seton-Watson ($(,,) -&).
12 Seton-Watson ($(,,) -&(.
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European ideology’.13 Joseph Goebbels, for instance, asserted in a speech entitled 
‘Das Europa der Zukun:’, that
European peoples are realizing more and more clearly that many of the issues 
between us are mere family quarrels compared to the great problems that today 
require to be solved as between continents.14 
(…)
I am convinced that in ":y years people will no longer think in terms of countries 
– many of today’s problems will have faded into obscurity, and there will be little 
le: of them.15
In a conversation with the Finnish foreign minister, R. Witting, held on November 
#)th, $(-$, Adolf Hitler was recorded to have said that ‘it was gradually becoming 
clear that the nations of Europe belonged together like a great family of nations. 
France, too, would come to realize this, and he hoped that England, too, would 
recognize this; it was to be hoped that it would not be too late. England had to 
realize that the only group of powers which had an interest in maintaining the 
British Empire was Europe and never America.’16
He [the Führer] did not belong to those who were ready to leave to circumstances 
a very di9cult task with which they had been confronted. !e task of bringing 
together the European family had to be performed now. With modern military 
technology small nations could no longer exist independently. In a time when 
&%% km could be covered by an airplane in an hour, a great territorial integration 
of nations was necessary. 17 
In a memorandum, probably written for the Nazi top-diplomat Cecil von 
Renthe-Fink, the NSDAP journalist and secretary Karl Mergele developed a 
number of guidelines on Europe, which included the observation that
!e new order in Europe will largely remove the causes that have led to internal 
European wars in the past. !e nations of Europe will no longer be one another’s 
enemies. !e age of European particularism will be gone for ever.18
!e memo concluded that
!e new Europe will be tolerant in matters of religion and personal philosophy. 
It will permit each and everyone.19
13 Laughland ($(()) $#.
14 Goebbels, ‘“Das Europa der Zukun:”: speech to Czech intellectual workers and journalists’, $$ 
september $(-%, reprinted in: Walter Lipgens (ed.), Documents on the History of European Integration 
(Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, $()') ,*. Discussed and analyzed by Laughland ($(()) #'.
15 Ibidem.
16 Walter Hewel, ‘record of conversation between Hitler and the Finnish foreign minister, R. 
Witting, #) November $(-$’, in: Lipgens ($()') (-.
17 Ibidem.
18 Karl Mergele, ‘European themes’, probably autumn $(-$, reprinted in Lipgens ($()') ('.
19 Ibidem.
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Von Ribbentrop, too, wrote in a note in $(-* that ‘I am of the opinion that, as 
already proposed to the Führer in my previous minutes, we should at the earliest 
possible date, as soon as we have scored a signi"cant military success, proclaim 
the European Confederation in quite a speci"c form.’20 
Mussolini had already announced in $(** that ‘Europe may once again grasp 
the helm of world civilization if it can develop a modicum of political unity’,21 and 
several thinkers who were also charmed and fascinated by Fascist, corporatist 
or national socialist initiatives, such as Bertrand de Jouvenel and Pierre Drieu 
la Rochelle, supported a European federalist cause.22
Others have argued that these references to a United Europe were primarily 
a matter of propaganda.23 Propaganda may certainly have played an important 
part in fascist and national-socialist references to a ‘united’, a ‘peaceful’ and a 
‘tolerant’ Europe, but to regard it all as merely that is not an entirely satisfactory 
explanation. For not only were references to a united Europe o:en not made 
in public but rather in private conversations and memoranda, the enthusiasm 
was also generally shared among not only political leaders but also intellectual 
supporters.
Whatever is the case, however, the point here is not that what Nazi’s and 
fascists had in mind with the future of Europe was necessarily the same as 
what Jean Monnet and his followers desired. !e point is that it is certainly not 
self-evident that fascism and Nazism were ‘nationalisms’. !eir pan-European 
plans were much more imperialisms than strict nationalisms. 
It may furthermore be emphasised, as Laughland quite rightly does, that 
racialism ‘as a form of materialist determinism’, of the pseudo-scienti"c kind 
expounded by Nazi-theorists such as Alfred Rosenberg,24 ‘is a non-national 
20 Ribbentrop, ‘European Confederation’, #$ March $(-*, reprinted in Lipgens ($()') $##-$#*. 
Discussed and analyzed by Laughland ($(()) **.
21 Benito Mussolini, ‘Discorso pre lo stato corporativo’, in: Eduardo and Duilio Susmel (eds.), 
Opera omnia, XXVI: Dal Patto a Quattro all’inaugurazione della Provincia di Littoria (Florence: 
La Fenice, $(')) ($, quoted in Laughland ($(()) -,.
22 Bertrand de Jouvenel authored a book in $(*% entitled Vers les États Unis de l’Europe; in the 
following years, he joined the Parti Populaire Francais, an anti-parliamentary party led by Jacques 
Doriot, and partly funded by the Italian fascists. Pierre Drieu la Rochelle wrote an essay in $(#), 
entitled Genève ou Moscou (Paris: Gallimard, $(#)), in which he advocated strong European 
cooperation, and he supported the collaboration with Germany from $(-# onwards. Cf. Daniel 
Knegt, ‘Ni droite, ni gauche? Debatten over het Franse fascisme’, in: TijdschriA voor Geschiedenis, 
$#-.* (#%$$) #%&-#$(. !ere was also considerable support among communist thinkers for the 
European idea; Altiero Spinelli is an example. Indeed, the very core idea of Jean Monnet – that 
cultural unity follows economic unity – is essentially Marxist.
23 As is done for example by Christopher Booker and Richard North, in !e Great Deception. 
Can the European Union survive? Second Edition (London and New York: Continuum, #%%') ##--%.
24 Alfred Rosenberg, Der mythos des /-. Jahrhunderts. Eine Wertung der Seelisch-geistigen 
Gestaltenkämpfe unserer Zeit (München: Hoheneichen-Verlag, $(*%).
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concept’.25 Indeed, ‘race transcends the boundaries of the nation and of the state, 
and racialist theory is thus, by de"nition, an international doctrine’.26 
Nationalism in the sense that we have de"ned it in chapter * – as an imagined 
and territorial loyalty, to be distinguished from universal loyalties on the one 
hand, and tribal loyalties on the other – is in any case certainly not easily con-
nected to some of the more obscure doctrines of Nazism, such as its emphasis 
on ‘Aryan’-supremacy. As Tzvetan Todorov writes, for nationalism ‘the notion of 
the stranger (…) says nothing about the physical characteristics of the designated 
individual’.27 Indeed, from a nationalist point of view, strangers are simply those 
‘who are not citizens’, Todorov recognizes.28 Opposed to this is the viewpoint 
of the racist, as illustrated by how the Ku-Klux-Klan approaches African- or 
Jewish-Americans:
!e racist (…) sees the man, not the citizen: the blacks or the jews in America 
partake in the same nation as the member of the Ku-Klux-Klan, but are not part 
of the same ‘race’. We can change our nationality, not our race (the "rst notion is 
moral, the second physical).29
If we take that view, thus, Nazism was not even a nationalism. But even when 
taking the view that Nazism grew out of a pathological kind of nationalism as-
sociated in chapter * with national humiliations (as the German nation clearly 
had to face a:er the dictate of Versailles), it is clearly not easily understood as a 
defense of national sovereignty – but rather, as mentioned above, as imperialism. 
It seems safe to contend indeed, as does Seton-Watson, that ‘Hitler’s aims were 
not limited to anything which, even if the phrase be stretched to the utmost, 
can be described as German nationalism’.30
Apart from references to the Second World War, mention is o:en made of 
the First World War as an example of the atrocities committed in the name of 
nationalism. But again the German objective in the First World War was not only 
to defend or expand the German nation state, but also to establish a German 
imperial yoke on non-German parts of Western Europe. 
As Seton-Watson notes, the First World War ‘started by a con8ict between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which was directly caused by the unsatis"ed move-
ment of the South Slavs for national unity’.31 Serbia had been recognized as an 
25 Laughland ($((,) $'.
26 Ibidem.
27 Todorov ($()() ***: ‘la notion d’étranger (…) ne dit rien des caractéristiques physiques de 
l’individu incriminé’. 
28 Ibidem: ‘qui ne sont pas citoyens’.
29 Ibidem: ‘Le raciste, en revanche, voit l’homme, non le citoyenA: les Noirs ou les juifs américains 
appartiennent à la même nation que le membre du Ku-Klux-Klan, mais non à la même «AraceA». 
On peut changer de nation, non de race (la première notion est morale, la seconde physique)’.
30 Seton-Watson ($(,,) -&).
31 Ibidem.
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independent state at the Congress of Berlin of $),), but a large proportion of the 
Serbian population remained under the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires.32 
!e southern part of Serbia was won from the Ottomans at the "rst Balkan 
war of $($#-*, but attempts to reunite the Habsburg parts of Serbia – especially 
Bosnia – failed, motivating a group of ‘Young Bosnians’ to plan the assassination 
of archduke Franz Ferdinand upon his visit to Sarajevo in June $($-. !is was 
carried out by Gravilo Princip on the #)th of that month.
But the Serbs were certainly not the only nationalities within the Habsburg 
empire to strive for more recognition or even independence. ‘Di+erent national 
aspirations began to clash head on’, writes Oliver Zimmer.33 !e nationalisms in 
the Habsburg Monarchy, according to Seton-Watson, ‘had been largely provoked 
by the policy of the Hungarian government which sought to create a single 
Magyar nation out of several other nations by a policy dictated from above’.34
Again Zimmer:
Magyarisation – the cultural nationalism of the Magyar majority that dominated 
the state – was ‘motivated by a sense of cultural superiority’ on the part of the 
dominant group. Its impact was particularly marked in education, where the 
laws of $),(, $))*, $)($ and $)(* made Hungarian the o9cial language in state 
and confessional schools. Another pillar of Magyarisation was electoral politics: 
Magyars took over (% per cent of parliamentary seats, while Romanians, Slovaks 
and Serbs remained grossly under-represented. A law of $)() determined that 
each town or village could have only one o9cial (Magyar) name, to be approved 
by the Minister of the Interior. !e tombstones of local cemeteries had to be 
engraved in Magyar.35 
!e di+erent nationalities were widely considered to be problematic,36 and 
‘Hungary’s state-building nationalism caused considerable resentment among 
the economically and culturally less advanced ethnic minorities in the border 
areas’.37 
!us while it is undoubtedly true that nationalism has been important in the 
origins of the First World War, it seems equally true that ‘forcible repression of 
national aspirations has also been’,38 and indeed this has been one of the major 
lessons that many observers drew from the First World War. An example is 
32 A. Sked, !e decline and fall of the Habsburg Empire, .3.6-.,.3 (London: Pearson, #%%$) esp. 
#$&-###.
33 Oliver Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe, .3,--.,2- (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, #%%*) '&.
34 Seton-Watson ($(,,) -&).
35 Zimmer (#%%*) '&.
36 Cf. E. Niederhausen, ‘!e national question in Hungary’, in: Teich and Porter (eds.), !e 
national question in Europe in historical context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, $(()) 
#-)-#&(.
37 Zimmer (#%%*) '(.
38 Seton-Watson ($(,,) -&(.
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Woodrow Wilson, whose ‘principle of self-determination’ implies respect for 
the di+erent nationalities rather than the desire for their dissolution.39 
Going back further in history, moreover, it is clear that it was a:er the humili-
ation of $),%-$ that the pathological kind of nationalism emerged in France in 
which the Dreyfus a+aire became possible; or that it was right a:er the march of 
the French armée underneath the Brandenburg gate in $)%&, that Fichte called 
for the German nation to gather militarily, and that Herders ethnic nationalism 
grew to great popularity (as discussed in chapter *). It is true that nationalism has 
been a potent force in modern political history: but it has only been responsible 
for war if it was confronted with an imperial (or supranational) power, or when 
it turned into imperialism itself, which, again, only seems to have happened 
a:er national humiliation (again, by other imperial or supranational powers).
Another question is to what extent the EU can be credited for a supposed 
lasting peace a:er $(-'. It is widely claimed that this is the true novelty that 
European integration has brought. Although there can be no doubt that the 
First and Second World War were of unprecedented horror, it is not self-evident 
that the time before $($- was equally insecure, violent and con8ict bound. !e 
contrast between pre-$($- and post-$(-' is not as big as it is o:en presented.
A:er the battle of Waterloo and the Vienna Congress, Western Europe has 
experienced three serious armed con8icts in the $(th century: the Franco-Austrian 
war of $)'(, the Prusso-Austrian war of $)&&, and the Franco-Prussian war of 
$),%. !ere have been several wars with external parties, of course, such as the 
Balkan wars, the Russo-Turkish wars, the Crimean war, and several wars in the 
colonies; but external wars have also occurred regularly since $(-'. 
All three intra-European wars of the $(th century were, moreover, relatively 
limited in scale and losses. !e Franco-Austrian war of $)'(, which would amplify 
the Italian uni"cation, lasted only a few months, and although bloody at times 
– the atrocities at the battle of Solferino even inspired Henri Dunant to found 
the International Red Cross – the number of casualties remained limited. !e 
Prusso-Austrian war lasted even shorter: only seven weeks, between July and 
August $)&&. !e war took no more than a total of approximately $%% thousand 
casualties, and resulted in Prussian hegemony in the German lands as well as an 
enlargement of the territory of Italy at the cost of Austria. !irdly, there was the 
Franco-Prussian war of $),%-$, which was the longest and most bloody con8ict 
on European soil since the Napoleonic wars. It lasted about ) months, and took 
an approximate total of *'% thousand casualties. 
!e casualties of these wars are lamentable, but international involvement 
remained limited and much of European life went untouched by it. For most 
39 Cf. Henry William Brands, Woodrow Wilson (New York: Henry Holt and Company, #%%*) 
esp. )%-)$.
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Europeans, then, the period between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the 
First World War had been a century of peace. While the three wars of the $(th 
century certainly infused nationalistic pride among the populations of the bel-
ligerents (although Napoleon III for instance was heavily criticized by his own 
people as well), the wars were initiated not by the people but by undemocratic 
rulers – Napoleon III, Bismarck – who sought, in the words of Seton-Watson, 
‘to make their states dominant on the European continent’.40
!e Napoleonic wars, which had followed almost immediately on the French 
Revolution and the downfall of the ancien régime, spanned almost twenty years 
and took several millions of casualties – from Western as well as Eastern European 
countries, from Russia and from northern Africa. Were these wars inspired by 
nationalism? Was it ‘nationalistic pride and greed, and (…) international rivalry 
for wealth and power’ that infused this horror?41 Quite the contrary.
!e Napoleonic wars were inspired not by some nationalist particularism, 
but by the universalist ideals of the Enlightenment and the dream to build a new 
imperium romanum. !e Napoleonic wars were non-nationalistic, and precisely 
in that quality resided their limitless character. Napoleon aimed to bring the 
whole of Europe under his Enlightened empire (as has been discussed in chapter 
'.*), an objective so unattainable that constant war was the result.
Preceding the revolutionary wars – that is to say, in the $)th century and 
before – few standing armies existed and a universal dra: was unheard of. Wars 
were for that reason by de"nition limited in scale. !e view was that glory could 
be obtained on the battle"eld, and as territorial gain still formed a realistic 
perspective (since states were not national states, see part I), the general idea 
of war was not necessarily negative: indeed, warfare was the primary means for 
aristocrats to prove their honor, and glori"cations of conduct on the battle"eld 
form a major part of world literature. From Caesar’s De bello gallico to the Duke 
of Saint Simon’s descriptions of Louis XIV’s quest ‘pour la gloire’ and Napoleon’s 
memoir, lay two millennia of enthusiasm for the virtues of the battle"eld and 
the importance of military might. Anyone visiting Paris or London or any other 
major European capital will be struck by the abundance of military monuments, 
statues of former army leaders, streetnames referring to military victories or 
"elds of combat, and so on.
Moreover, because of premodern technological limitations, wars were 
incomparably less destructive in the $)th century and before, than a:er. Indeed, 
‘war’ in the twentieth century is an entirely di+erent thing from what it used 
to be in the past. Although of course it is true that destruction of villages and 
lives occurred on a tremendous scale during the religious wars of the $&th and 
40 Seton-Watson ($(,,) -&,.
41 ‘Vote for EU Constitution or risk new Holocaust, says Brussels’, in: Daily Telegraph, ( May #%%'.
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$,th centuries: these were so problematic largely because they could hardly be 
called wars properly but rather civil wars. And it were precisely these wars that 
led to the birth of modern statehood in order to prevent them in the future (as 
discussed in chapter $). !us: to say that the EU should have coincided with a 
stop to some horri"c historical continuity caused by ‘nationalism’ is to make a 
hollow claim; to say that the EU should have even caused this, is simply grotesque, 
and reminds of the more obscure forms of African shamanism in which rain is 
believed to result from hallucinating dances around a "re.
But there is yet more. For to emphasize constantly that the countries of the 
European Union have experienced half a century of peace is to miss out on one 
essential reality: that the countries of the European Union were for most of that 
time at war with the Soviet Union – the expression, itself, of a ‘post-national’ 
philosophy par excellence: communism. !e fact that members of the European 
Union have not engaged in a war against each other, then, since the end of the 
Second World War, is a bit like being surprised that members of the same soccer 
team did not commit violations against one another. !e countries of the European 
Union were major allies in a deadly and global nuclear con8ict; of course they 
would not bother to "ght amongst themselves! Nor was it the European Union 
that provided an adequate response in this war; it was the NATO alliance and 
the presence of formidable American weaponry on every bordering country 
in Europe (brought about, as I have explained, without supranational powers, 
see Part II, Introduction).
Nor should we attribute the deterring power of nuclear bombs to the European 
Union, or to a fading of ‘nationalism’. !e fact is that with the invention of the 
atomic bomb, full-scale wars between countries have become impossible. !is 
is not only the case for the atomic bomb speci"cally, but also for the whole 
of modern warfare as "rst deployed in the First World War.42 !e scale of 
destruction brought about through modern warfare is unbearable – and since 
modern architecture has declared it impossible to rebuild destructed houses 
and city-centers but has consistently replaced them with the most horri"c 
building-blocks in Novosibirsk-style, it is clear that no one is prepared to pay 
the price of war anymore.
And it is connected with all these considerations that Germany has, a:er so 
much destruction, settled – at least for the time being – for its present borders 
and gave up its envy of Alsace-Lorraine. !is may also be due to the fact that 
since the Second World War, population growth has stagnated in Europe and 
42 !is is also one of the reasons why the First World War took such an incredible number 
of casualties. !e generals were unfamiliar with the new reality of the battle"eld and combat 
strategies did not take into account, for instance, that one machine gun can cover an entire valley 
(such as the Somme). 
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therefore, there is absolutely no economic possibility to have a massive war 
anymore either.
In short, the claim that nationalism inherently leads to war, and that the EU 
has caused lasting peace is untrue for "ve reasons. Number one, the contrast 
between pre-$($- and post-$(-' political life is not so great as to legitimize the 
self-congratulation. A hundred years of mostly peace had passed in Europe 
before the outbreak of World War I, while of course no EU existed during the 
$(th century. Two, there is no reason to believe that the First World War, as well 
as the wars of the $(th century, came about more because of the glori"cation of 
nationalism than because of the suppression of it. !ree, the Second World War 
may have been triggered by national humiliation, but Nazism is certainly not 
easily classi"ed as a ‘nationalism’ and the aims of the Axis powers far exceeded the 
possible scope of a nation state. Four, the fact that Western-European countries 
have not been engaged in a war with each other is clearly connected to the Cold 
War and the NATO alliance, rather than with the regulations from Brussels.43 Five, 
what really makes war increasingly impossible is the unbearable destructiveness 
of modern weaponry. Combined with a highly prosperous population with, 
moreover, declining birth-rates, as well as the horrors of modern architecture 
that can surely be expected to replace every destructed building, there is simply 
no impetus to militarily solve problems anymore.
But there is yet another element to be mentioned. Far from being inherently 
con8ict bound, aiming for national sovereignty is in fact the only stable and 
inherently peaceful political form. !e only types of wars nation states can – by 
their very nature – aim for are defensive. !is could be understood in terms of 
direct or collective self-defense, or of defense of interest or spheres of in8uence. 
If they aim for national leadership, however, the governments of nation states 
will not "ght wars of territorial conquest, there being no reason for them to wish 
to expand their territory beyond the borders of their nation.
).#. T"# U9$7#8%); S&?$#(@
!e idea to move beyond borders implies, as we have seen, the assumption 
that no preconceived social condition of membership is needed for legitimate 
political decisions. As defenses of national loyalty and sovereignty are logically 
connected – so are defenses of supranationalism and multiculturalism. Both 
supranationalism and multiculturalism take root in the idea of the universal 
43 Cf. Carl Schmitt, Das politische Problem der Friedenssicherung (Wien: Karolinger Verlag, 
$((*). In this essay, Schmitt poses the question what – if peace is the opposite of war – a state 
of peace really means. He states that the current ‘pax Americana’ in e+ect means that the world 
complies with American wishes. As soon as rivalling powers arise, the pax Americana will turn 
out to be a bellum Americanum, Schmitt argues.
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society, of rational individual agents and abstract, ‘objective’ criteria of justice. 
In opposition to the particularism of the nation state, supranationalism and 
multiculturalism can only be properly understood when we take into ac-
count the Enlightenment conception of the social contract. As we shall see, 
the philosophy of the social contract provides a means to legitimize political 
decisions entirely separated from social – national – preconditions, and indeed 
introduces, through its strong emphasis on natural law, a test to the legitimacy 
of existing arrangements. 
Social contract theory is ‘a general label for views which try to found all ideas 
of legitimacy and political obligation in a contract’.44 ‘!e essence of this view’, 
Scruton continues, is that ‘since to contract is to put oneself under an obligation, 
the grounds of political obligation would be objectively determined if all such 
obligations could be traced to a contractual promise’.45 !e philosophy of the 
social contract thus teaches that the order of society relies solely on rational 
self-interest; that it is not in a shared identity, in shared ideals, but in a shared 
individual rationale that man decides to join into society with others. 
!is obviously implies that there is no foundation for the existence of di+erent 
states, as the terms of the contract are – at least in the most pure form of social 
contract theory – supposed to be universal and to apply to the conditions of 
human nature, not to any speci"c needs of the Frenchmen or the Germans.46 
Moreover, social contract theory also diminishes the legitimacy of existing states 
as their sole task as well as their sole reason of existence is supposed to be their 
realization of the individual’s interests.
!ough born in stages, the understanding of the state as the result of some 
form of contract was ingrained in the very theory of the modern, centralized 
state. Jean Bodin takes as his initial premise, as we saw in part I, a ‘war of all 
against all’,47 and so does !omas Hobbes. When the latter wrote his Leviathan 
($&'$), it was in many respects a logical follow-up of earlier works scrutinizing 
the relation of man to nature, and man to man.48 Hobbes worked, in the typical 
Enlightenment manner, ab initio. One source of inspiration for this had been, 
of course, the works of the Dutchman Hugo Grotius ($')*-$&-'), who in his De 
44 Scruton (#%%,) &-$ under ‘Social contract’.
45 Ibidem.
46 Or indeed to the Alsatian, the Bavarian, or the Saxon: a generalization already implied in 
the idea of nationality.
47 Bodin ($((') book I, ch. VI, '(-&%: ‘Reason and common sense alike point to the conclusion 
that the origin and foundation of commonwealths was in force and violence (…) such being 
the origin of commonwealths, it is clear why a citizen is to be de"ned as a free subject who is 
dependent on the sovereignty of another.’
48 Cf. !omas Hobbes, !e Elements of Law. Natural and Politic ($&-%).
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jure belli ac pacis ($&#') had already discerned fundamental principles of natural 
law that applied to the individual vis-à-vis the state (i.e. ‘inalienable’ rights).49
For Hobbes, the most threatening political situation was the anarchy in the 
state of nature. In the "rst part of Leviathan, Of Man, Hobbes sets out his view 
of needy human nature and the state of war of all against all (bellum omnium 
contra omnes) when there is no su9ciently powerful state. In the second part, 
Of Common-wealth, he then proceeds to sketch the outlines of what would have 
to be required to let man step out of this state of nature and into the civilized 
condition. Essential for this stage would be, according to Hobbes, the loss of 
virtually all natural rights. !erefore, although Hobbes accepts the premise of 
the social contract, the outcome does not deligitimize the existing political order.
In many ways his successor, John Locke ($&*#-$,%-), took Hobbes’ treaty 
as the basis, but added, in the second part of his Two treatises on Government, 
inalienable rights that are derived from man’s natural entitlements in the state 
of nature, but that continue to apply even a:er having entered into the civilized 
state. Locke acknowledges that ‘wherever (…) any number of men are so united 
into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, 
and to resign it to the public, there, and there only, is a political, or civil society’.50 
But he adds that the aim of entering into civil society is to set up 
a judge on earth with authority to determine all the controversies and redress the 
injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth 
in order that the member’s ‘life, liberty and estate’ be protected.51 Locke warns 
for the ‘breach of trust in not preserving the form of government agreed on, 
and in not intending the end of government itself, which is the public good and 
preservation of property’. Should this happen indeed, then 
a king has dethroned himself and put himself in a state of war with his people.52 
In such a case, the legislative power ‘reverts to the society, and the people have 
a right to act as supreme, and continue the legislative in themselves; or erect a 
new form, or under the old form place it in new hands, as they think good’.53
It was the French writer Jean-Jacques Rousseau ($,$#-$,,)), then, who 
introduced the concept of the ‘volonté générale’ in his Enlightenment work Du 
Contrat Social. !e ‘general will’, he contended, could decide whether there was 
49 Grotius, !e rights of war and peace, including the law of nature and of nations. Translated 
from the original Latin (New York: M. Walter Dunne, $(%$). !is has been discussed in chapter $.
50 Locke, !e second treatise of Government ($&(%) chapter VII: ‘Of political or civil society’, 
par. )(.
51 Locke ($&(%) chapter VII: ‘Of political or civil society’, par. ),.
52 Locke ($&(%) chapter XIX: ‘Of the dissolution of government’, par. #*(.
53 Locke, !e second treatise of Government ($&(%) chapter XIX: ‘Of the dissolution of 
government’ , par. #-*.
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such a violation of rights described by Locke. According to Rousseau, society 
was to be an expression of the continuing redrawing of the social contract: ‘the 
people, who are subjected to the laws, should be their author’.54
And this contributed decisively to the view of society that dominated the 
French Revolution. In the words of Raymond Aron, ‘the French Constituents 
wrote that the aim of all political associations is the preservation of the natural 
and inalienable rights of man’.55
Supranationalism and multiculturalism take root in the universal social 
contract as laid out by these Enlightenment doctrinaires. As a result, both 
supranationalists and multiculturalists hold an unproblematic conception of 
what a society is: a society of man, not of people. As T.S. Eliot sarcastically 
voiced the Enlightenment view of political society in $(*-: we are ‘dreaming of 
systems so perfect that no one will need to be good’.56 
!is is evident in the writings of Bernard de Mandeville, who suggested that 
‘private vices’ lead to ‘public bene"ts’,57 as well as in those of Kant, who argued 
that the perfect laws would even turn devils into good citizens – thus leaving 
no room for the individual to be either good or bad.58
While the Enlightenment introduced this idea of the universality of human 
desires and the rationality of self-interest, it was romanticism that gave rise to the 
worship of cultural identities that we see in multiculturalism. As the romantics 
54 Du contrat social, II, &. Cf. L.G. Crocker, Rousseau’s social contract. An interpretive essay 
(Cleveland: Press of Case western reserve university, $(&)) ,*.
55 Raymond Aron, ‘Is multinational citizenship possible?’, in: Social Research. An international 
quarterly of the social sciences, Volume -$, no. - (Winter $(,-) &*)-&'&, there &-$.
56 ‘Why should men love the Church? Why should they love her laws? / She tells them of Life 
and Death, and of all that they would forget. / She is tender where they would be hard, and hard 
where they like to be so:. / She tells them of Evil and Sin, and other unpleasant facts. / !ey 
constantly try to escape / From the darkness outside and within / By dreaming of systems so 
perfect that no one will need to be good. / But the man that is will shadow / !e man that pretends 
to be.’ T.S. Eliot, ‘Choruses from “the Rock”’ ($(*-), in: !e complete poems and plays of T.S. Eliot 
(London: Book Club Associates, $(,,) $'(: ‘VI’.
57 Bernard de Mandeville, !e fable of the bees, or, private vices, public bene+ts ($,$-). 
58 Kant held that a good organization of the state forces the human agent ‘to be a good citizen 
even if not morally a good person’: ‘… es [kommt] nur auf eine gute Organisation des Staats an 
(…), jener ihre Krä:e so gegeneinander zu richten, das seine die anderen in ihrer zerstörenden 
Wirkung auIält, oder diese auIebt: so dass der Erfolg für die Vernun: so ausfällt, als wenn beide 
gar nicht da wären, und so der Mensch, wenngleich nicht ein moralisch-guter Mensch, dennoch 
ein guter Bürger zu sein gezwungen wird. Das Problem der Staatserrichtung ist, so hart wie es 
auch klingt, selbst für ein Volk von Teufeln (wenn sie nur Verstand haben) au8ösbar und lautet 
so: “Eine Menge von vernün:igen Wesen, die insgesamt allgemeine Gesetze für ihre Erhaltung 
verlangen, deren jedes aber insgeheim sich davon auszunehmen geneigt ist, so zu ordnen, und ihre 
Verfassung einzurichten, dass, obgleich sie in ihren Privatgesinnungen einander entgegenstreben, 
diese einander doch so auIalten, dass in ihrem ö+entlichen Verhalten der Erfolg eben derselbe 
ist, als ob sie keine solche böse Gesinnungen hätten’. Kant (#%%') *$, Zweiter Abschnitt. Die 
de"nitivartikel. Erster Zusatz. As is noticed by Harry van der Linden, Kantian ethics and Socialism 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, $())): ‘A more fundamental consideration is that 
intelligent devils realize that coercion is a rational response …’.
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tended to ethnic conceptions of nationality (as discussed in chapter *), they 
were also quick to regard the culture of immigrants as something ‘inalienable’. 
Rousseau – with one foot in the Enlightenment, and one in Romanticism – has 
been important in this too, when he expressed the in8uential idea that l’homme 
est un être naturellement bon, aimant la justice et l’ordre.59 Indeed, the idea of 
the natural goodness of man – itself admittedly as old as civilization and the 
conception of loss of innocence in the garden of Eden60 – rises to a level of 
general acceptance in the eighteenth century, and as the idea of original sin is 
discarded, and evil is no longer taken to come from man himself, but from the 
bad arrangements of society, it becomes possible to conceive peace as a far more 
natural condition of man to live in, than war.61
With this idea that man is good out of himself, and that it is through the 
vested interests that he becomes corrupted, rather than through his own wicked 
nature, the necessity for Bildung loses much of its legitimacy. ‘Be yourself, no 
matter what they say’, has become the new creed.62 And just as the Enlightenment 
idea that a perfect system would even turn devils into good citizens, this belief 
in man’s natural goodness, too, easily results in the idea, that the particularities 
of each culture could happily 8ourish next to one another.
Having thus sketched the roots of the idea to move beyond borders as this 
combination of rationalism that can be found in the Enlightenment, and the 
conception of man’s natural goodness and cultural predetermination that was 
enshrined in much of Romanticist ideas, fast forward again to the #%th century. 
In an in8uential book in $(,$, A !eory of Justice, John Rawls formulated 
the ultimate consequences of these intellectual currents. In this book, Rawls 
59 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Lettre a C. de Beaumont’ ($,&*), in: Euvres completes (Paris: Pléiade, 
Gallimard, $(&-) (#'-$%#), there (*&: ‘Le principe fondamental de toute moral, sur lequel j’ai 
raisonné dans tous mes Ecrits, et que j’ai développé dans ce dernier avec toute la clarté dont 
j’étais capable, est que l’homme est un être naturellement bon, aimant la justice et l’ordre ; qu’il 
n’y a point de perversité originelle dans le coeur humain, et que les premiers mouvements de la 
nature sont toujours droits.’ 
60 See on this: Henri Baudet, Paradise on Earth. Some thoughts on European images of Non-
European man. Translated by Elizabeth Wentholt (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, $())) (+.
61 Compare in this respect: Oswald Spengler, ‘Ist Weltfriede möglich?’, in: Ibidem, Reden und 
Aufsätze (München, Beck Verlag, $(*,): ‘Der Friede ist ein Wunsch, der Krieg eine Tatsache (…). 
Das Leben (…) ist ein Kampf um die Macht, seinen Willen, Vorteil oder seine Meinung vom 
Nützlichen oder Gerechten durchzusetzen, und wenn andre Mittel versagen, wird man immer 
wieder zum letzten greifen, der Gewalt. (…) Wenn ganze Völker pazi"stisch werden, ist es ein 
Symptom von Altersschwäche. (…) So lange es menschliche Entwicklung gibt, wird es Kriege 
geben’. And Carl Schmitt, Das politische Problem der Friedenssicherung (Wien, Karolinger Verlag, 
$((*): ‘Heute erscheint uns eine Befriedigung der ganzen Erde praktisch nur dadurch möglich, 
dass mehrere Weltmächte sich verständigen. Sie müssten dann die Erde unter sich verteilen’. And: 
Carl Schmitt, ‘Machiavelli-Zum ##. Juni $(#,’, in: Kölnische Volkszeitung, Jg. &), No. --) (June #$, 
$(#,) $: ‘If men were good, my views would be wicked; but men are not good’, as quoted in: Joseph 
W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt, !eorist for the Reich (Princeton: Princeton University Press, $()*) ),.
62 Sting, chorus from the song Englishman in New York. 
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defended the idea – indeed a logical consequence of the aforementioned de-
velopments – that ‘di+erent conceptions of the good’ would not be a problem 
for joining into society together. A !eory of Justice forms the highpoint and 
the standard reference for the new approach to borders: limitless universalism, 
and limitless particularism combined. !is, as we have observed now, stands 
opposed to the compromise of universalism and particularism that the nation 
state seeks to make, in which the law is universal in the sense that it applies to 
all citizens, yet particularist in the sense that it is the expression of this particular 
people, living on this particular territory, with this particular history and set of 
values and customs. 
Rawls explains in the introductory chapter of his A !eory of Justice that he 
sets out to devise a theory of justice that applies to every society. His aim is to 
sketch the contours of justice as it is in every time and every place. To do so, 
Rawls takes the idea of the social contract, ‘as represented by Locke, Rousseau, 
and Kant’,63 and sets out to ‘generalize it’ and to carry it ‘to a higher order of 
abstraction’,64 of such a nature, that ‘a theory can be developed that is no longer 
open to the more obvious objections o:en thought fatal to it.’65 
With these ‘obvious objections’, Rawls means the fact that people from a 
di+erent starting situation will prefer di+erent contractual arrangements. To 
overcome this problem, he invents the ‘original position’, a "ctional condition 
in which all contractual parties will not only be equal, but also aBicted with a 
‘veil of ignorance’ over the position in society that will be theirs. Rawls contends 
that by applying this principle consistently, we will be able to retrieve those 
arrangements that make a universally just society possible. 
However attractive this idea may be, there is one premise in the whole 
undertaking that is easily overlooked, but deeply problematic. !at premise is 
of course that in order for Rawls’ project to work, it should be possible that all 
di+erences between human agents, be it of social, economic, cultural or religious 
nature, be included in a single society. 
Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in 
society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.
So far so good: Rawls is presenting some system of distribution of wealth and 
of social arrangements within an existing society that one can agree or disagree 
with.66 But then he continues: 
63 John Rawls, A !eory of justice (Clarendon Press, Oxford, $(,#) preface, vii.
64 Rawls ($(,#) viii.
65 Rawls ($(,#) viii.
66 Even though quite what kind of arrangement never becomes even remotely clear, as has 
been convincingly argued by: Brian Barry, !e liberal theory of justice: a critical examination 
of the principle doctrines in: A theory of justice by John Rawls (Oxford: Clarendon Press, $(,*); 
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I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or 
their special psychological propensities.67 
Indeed, for Rawls to come to just terms, ‘they are to presume that even their 
spiritual aims may be opposed, in the way that the aims of those of di+erent 
religions may be opposed.’68 It becomes clear, that Rawls is really not talking so 
much of a particular distribution of wealth for an already in-place society, but 
rather setting up the principles of the universal society (though he always talks 
of ‘a’ society, as though of one among several).69
!e contractual parties in the original position, he stresses once more, ‘do 
not know, of course, what their religious or moral convictions are, or what is 
the particular content of their moral or religious obligations as they interpret 
them (…) the parties do not know how their religious or moral views fare in 
their society, whether, for example, it is in the majority or the minority.’70
All those who follow, in their several ways, this Rawlsian idea, be it on the 
social-democratic side, the liberal side, or the libertarian side (as such wide-
ranging social-economic arrangements have been defended in its name),71 
will naturally come to view borders as obstacles, as impractical, inherently 
illegitimate and outdated residues that do not serve any particular interest in the 
sense that rational contemplation can bring forth higher principles of universal 
justice, and therefore there being no need for divisions. In line with Eleanor 
Roosevelt, they contemplate the ‘Magna Carta for all mankind’,72 rather than 
that of speci"c peoples. 
And it is certain that not only a generation of politicians and philosophers 
has grown up on this idea; social contract theory as a universal system of justice 
is presently by far the most important philosophy on the theory of statehood 
taught and discussed in schools and academic curricula,73 so much so that it 
Brian Barry, !eories of justice. A treatise on social justice, Vol. $ (London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 
$()(); N. Daniels (ed.), Reading Rawls: critical studies on Rawls’ A theory of justice (Oxford, $(,'); 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, state, and utopia (New York: Basic Books, $(,-); J.H. Wellbank (ed.), 
John Rawls and his critics; an annotated bibliography (New York, $()#).
67 Rawls ($(,#) $#.
68 Rawls ($(,#) $-.
69 !e fact that in his later publication, !e law of peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, $(((), Rawls simply assumes the existence of nations without questioning them, does not 
a+ect this.
70 Rawls ($(,#) #%&.
71 M.J. Trappenburg analyzes the di+erent political views that can be defended on the basis 
of the ‘original contract’, in: Trappenburg, M.J., ‘John Rawls’, in: Cliteur, P.B., Van der List, G.A. 
(eds.), Filosofen van het hedendaags liberalisme (Kampen: Kok Agora, $((%) ($-$%'.
72 Eleanor Roosevelt, Speech for the United Nations at the announcement of the Universal 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, ( December $(-). Available online at http://www.udhr.org/
history/ergeas-).htm.
73 See for instance Will Kymlicka’s widely used handbook of political philosophy. Kymlicka, 
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, #%%#).
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seems to many now impossible to conceive of legitimate statehood and just 
political arrangements in other than contractual terms.74 As has been discussed 
above, all versions of social contract theory, as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and 
others in their several ways argue, ignore the question of community, as they 
start with a gathering of random people agreeing on the terms of a contract by 
which all of them will be bound – we already saw this. Yet this universalistic 
idea that is implicit in every form of social contract theory (as it is implied in 
its very premise of a ‘precontractual phase’ and the rational principles on which 
a society is supposed to have to be founded if it is to be ‘just’) presupposes a 
shared idea of community.
Roger Scruton has analyzed that if the people that are drawing up a contract 
‘are in a position to decide on their common future, it is because they already 
have one: because they recognize their mutual togetherness and reciprocal 
dependence, usually as a result of an already common past,75 which makes it 
incumbent upon them to settle how they might be governed under a common 
jurisdiction in a common territory.’ !erefore, Scruton suggests a social experi-
ence of cohesion (i.e. nationality) that precedes the discussion over dividing 
rights and duties and of redistributing wealth. He continues: 
In short, the social contract requires a relation of membership, and one, more-
over, that makes it plausible for the individual members to conceive the relation 
between them in contractual terms. !eorists of the social contract write as 
though it presupposes only the "rst-person singular of free rational choice. In 
fact it presupposes a "rst-person plural, in which the burdens of belonging have 
already been assumed.76
Once the idea had caught ground that a society could be formed by any human 
agent reasonable enough to come to a certain rational understanding of his 
self-interest, the presupposed social experience of membership became easily 
neglected. Basically anyone, it was now held, would agree with the principles 
of a wise social contract. However, to sit together at a table and decide on a 
common future requires a loyalty preceding that political reality: a ‘we’ that is 
not de"ned as self-interest rightly understood, but, quite the contrary, in the 
words of Raymond Aron, 
Individuals cannot become citizens of the same state unless they feel a common 
destiny.77
74 Even though impressive critique on this idea has been formulated by equally modern political 
philosophers, for example by Burke in his Re*ections on the Revolution in France, by Hegel in his 
Philosophy of Right, and by Michael Oakeshott in Rationalism and Politics.
75 Compare Renan and Fustel de Coulanges on the ‘nation’ in chapter *.
76 Scruton, England and the need for nations (London: Civitas, #%%-) (.
77 Raymond Aron, ‘Is multinational citizenship possible?’, in: Social Research. An international 
quarterly of the social sciences, Volume -$, no. - (Winter $(,-) &*)-&'&, there &''.
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Because this ‘common destiny’, this ‘we’, not de"ned by rational self-interest, 
is necessary – there being otherwise no reason to accept the political say of 
others – social contract theory is ultimately in need of a preceding fundament. 
Whatever claims to economic redistribution or social justice one may justify 
on the basis of a theory of social contract: it always presupposes the experience 
of membership and could therefore not be used to legitimize whatever world 
government may be desired.
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A third fallacy that serves to defend supranationalism and multiculturalism is 
that it is possible to have multiple political loyalties. In this view, it is not the 
compulsory blueprint of universalism that seeks to delegitimize the nation state, 
but quite the contrary: the supposed non-contradictory nature of particularities. 
If there is no reason to defend the membership of one particular nation at the 
cost of another, what legitimacy does the idea of a ‘Leitkultur’ still possess? 
Usually, two arguments are presented preliminary to this viewpoint, which 
are, however, internally contradictory: "rst, that no national ‘core identity’ 
exists, and second, that it is impossible to ‘turn back the clock’. An example of 
how these contradicting arguments are presented is the speech of the Dutch 
crown princess Máxima, held in #%%,, at the presentation of a report by the 
WRR, the Scienti"c Council for Government Policy in the Netherlands. !e 
report was called Identi+cation with the Netherlands.78 It addressed the problems 
related to national identity that have arisen in the past decades ‘as a result of 
internationalization and mass-immigration’.79
Princess Máxima declared that ‘the Dutch identity does not exist’,80 and quoted 
with sympathy her father in law, the late Prince Claus, husband of the Queen of 
the Netherlands, who had allegedly spoken the remarkable words: ‘I have several 
loyalties and I am a citizen of the world, a European, and a Dutchman’.81 !e 
78 WRR, Identi+catie met Nederland (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press #%%,).
79 WRR (#%%,) #--#&. !e WRR makes a di+erent kind of distinction, though, recognizing 
four developments: ‘Globalisation, Europeanization, Individualisation and Multiculturalization’.
80 Princes Máxima, Speech of /2 September /--4, ‘Zo’n zeven jaar geleden begon mijn zoektocht 
naar de Nederlandse identiteit. Daarbij werd ik geholpen door tal van lieve en wijze deskundigen. 
Ik had het voorrecht met veel mensen kennis te maken. Heel veel te zien, te horen en te proeven 
van Nederland. Het was een prachtige en rijke ervaring waarvoor ik enorm dankbaar ben. Maar ‘de’ 
Nederlandse identiteit? Nee, die heb ik niet gevonden’. Available online at http://archief.koninklijkhuis.
nl/Actueel/Toespraken/Toesprakenarchief/#%%,/Toespraak_van_Prinses_Maxima_#-_september_#%%,.
81 Ibidem: “‘Eén vraag die heel moeilijk te beantwoorden is en die mij herhaaldelijk gesteld 
werd, is hoe het voelt Nederlander te zijn. Mijn antwoord is: “Ik weet niet hoe het is Nederlander 
te zijn. Ik heb verschillende loyaliteiten en ik ben wereldburger en Europeaan en Nederlander.” 
Woorden die ik nooit ben vergeten. Om de identiteit en loyaliteit van een mens zijn geen hekken 
te plaatsen. Ik denk dat veel mensen het zo voelen.’
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princess, who mentioned that she was trained as an economist,82 stressed that 
the world has ‘open borders’,83 and that 
it is not either-or. But and-and’.84 
!is plea for ‘and-and’ was largely in lines with the positions defended in the 
report of the scienti"c council. Proposing to move away from the idea of ‘one 
national identity’,85 the council pointed at three ‘perspectives’ on national 
‘identi"cation’: functional, normative, and emotional. 
With ‘functional identi"cation’, the Council denoted the kind of identi"ca-
tion that results from utilitarian interaction. Typical areas in which this can be 
realized, according to the academics of the WRR, are ‘neighborhoods, working 
places, and schools’.86
With ‘normative identi"cation’, the authors of the report denoted the 
importance not only of adaptation ‘to the norm’, but also meant to stress that 
there should be room and platform for newcomers to e+ect ‘adaptations of the 
norm’, ultimately in the political arena as well.87 
‘Emotional identi"cation’, "nally, is what the authors call ‘a sense of belong-
ing’, on which according to them the public debate had focused too much in 
recent years. As a result, according to the council, instead of amplifying this 
emotional identi"cation, newcomers had been discouraged, and retreated into 
their culture of origin.88
82 Ibidem: ‘Daarom zeg ik ook als econoom: het is goed als je organisatie mensen in huis hee: 
die van elkaar verschillen. Diversiteit loont’.
83 Ibidem: ‘Het rapport van de WRR gee: veel aandacht aan functionele identi"catie. Dat betekent 
heel simpel: elkaar leren begrijpen omdat je samen een belang deelt. Denk aan een sportclub. 
Of een bedrijf. Of een school. Of een buurt. Het goede daarvan is dat de nadruk niet ligt op de 
zichtbare verschillen tussen mensen. Maar op het gezamenlijke doel. En op ieders persoonlijke 
kwaliteiten. Zo kunnen vooroordelen wegsmelten. Samen spelen. Samen studeren. Samen werken. 
Dat gee: jonge mensen met verschillende achtergronden een gezamenlijk perspectief. Dat is 
enorm belangrijk in een wereld van open grenzen’.
84 Ibidem: ‘We vervallen gemakkelijk in zwart-wit denken. Maar daarmee doen we onszelf 
en anderen te kort. Mensen hebben altijd méér dimensies. Mensen veranderen ook. Dat is wat 
mensen zo bijzonder maakt: het vermogen zich te ontwikkelen. Het is niet ‘of, of ’. Maar ‘en, en’.’
85 WRR (#%%,) $(&+. ‘De raad kiest op basis van zijn bevindingen echter voor een nieuwe 
benadering en bepleit een wisseling van het perspectief waarin één nationale identiteit centraal 
staat, naar een perspectief waarin wordt onderkend dat het bij vragen van identiteit altijd gaat 
om meervoudige processen van identi"catie.’
86 WRR (#%%,) #%-.
87 WRR (#%%,) #%&, ‘Normatieve identi"catie houdt in dat mensen de mogelijkheid hebben voor 
hen betekenisvolle normen te volgen, publiekelijk te articuleren en dat er voldoende gelegenheid 
is om con8icten over die normen democratisch op te lossen. Het aanpassen aan de norm gaat 
in de meeste gevallen vanzelf. Het veranderen van normen is veel lastiger. De ruimte om dat te 
kunnen doen en andere normen in te brengen in de publieke arena is echter wel een noodzakelijke 
voorwaarde voor identi"catie en is ook belangrijk om processen van disidenti"catie te voorkomen.’
88 WRR (#%%,) #%,, ‘Emotionele identi"catie gaat over gevoelens van verbondenheid met 
anderen en in abstractere zin met Nederland, over een ‘sense of belonging’. We hebben laten zien 
dat burgers in een veranderende samenleving zoals de Nederlandse meerdere loyaliteiten hebben 
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All things viewed together, the WRR stated that ‘with our plea for an and-and 
approach, we presuppose the existence and importance of multiple identities and 
identi"cations’.89 According to the authors,90 no core identity exists in societies or 
in individuals: on the contrary, societies and individuals alike are in a constant 
8ux. !is may be true to a certain extent, but it is quite something else to conclude 
from this that no national identity exists, no such thing as ‘the Dutchman’. By 
drawing that conclusion, the authors obviously attempted to thwart criticism 
of multiculturalism. For if no original national culture existed – how could one 
oppose the presence of new cultures? 
Further down, however, the authors of the report, while attempting to score 
a rhetorical success, were apparently unaware of fundamentally contradicting 
themselves: 
As if the Netherlands still have a realistic option to withdraw from the world 
and from Europe, and to reverse the multicultural society. As if the Netherlands, 
through processes of globalization, Europeanization, and continuing immigration, 
would lose their own identity and perish their own core.’91
It seems to go largely unnoticed that this familiar argument in defense of 
multiculturalism – that we won’t ‘perish our core’ – is entirely incompatible 
with the aforementioned argument that ‘no core identity’ exists.92 If we follow 
the line of argument, the Netherlands, thus, do not have a realistic option to 
withdraw from the world and to reverse the multicultural society anymore, 
as one cannot ‘turn back time’; yet at the same time, however, the Dutch are 
zonder dat dat een probleem hoe: te zijn voor hun verbondenheid met Nederland. Van belang is 
dat deze hybride identi"caties erkend en gewaardeerd worden en niet onmiddellijk ter discussie 
worden gesteld. Juist als dat laatste wel gebeurt – zoals nu steeds vaker het geval is – wordt meer of 
minder expliciet een keuze geëist, een keuze die in een emotionele zin niet gemaakt kan worden, 
en die naar ons oordeel ook niet verlangd hoe: te worden.’
89 WRR (#%%,) #%%+: ‘Onderscheid maken betekent niet noodzakelijkerwijs dat er tegenstellingen 
zijn: wij en zij denken is iets anders dan wij of zij denken. Met dit pleidooi voor een én-énbenadering 
gaan wij uit van het bestaan en van het belang van meervoudige identiteiten en identi"caties.’
90 !e authors of this report were in fact a group of ‘experts’ under the presidency of a member 
of the council. !e president was prof. dr. Pauline Meurs, and the members of the group were 
drs. Dennis Broeders (who was also the coordinator of the project), dr. mr. Fouzia Driouichi, dr. 
Monique Kremer, drs. Erik Schrijvers and Fleur Sleegers.
91 WRR (#%%,) #%$+: ‘Alsof Nederland nog een reële optie hee: om zich terug te trekken uit de 
wereld en Europa, en de multiculturele samenleving zou kunnen terugdraaien. Alsof Nederland 
door processen van globalisering, europeanisering en voortdurende immigratie zijn eigen identiteit 
zou verliezen en zijn eigen kern kwijt zou raken.’
92 WRR (#%%,) &*: ‘In deze theoretische verkenning kwam naar voren dat in plaats van te 
spreken over nationale identiteit het vruchtbaarder is te spreken over meerdere vormen van 
identi"catie. Identi"caties kunnen dynamisch, sociaal, alledaags, nationaal en gelaagd zijn – denk 
bijvoorbeeld aan het onderscheid tussen functionele, normatieve en emotionele identi"catie. 
Maar er is nog een reden om te willen spreken over identi"catie (met Nederland) in plaats van 
over nationale identiteit.’
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apparently unrealistically worried, because the Netherlands is not in danger of 
‘perishing its own core’.
Must we conclude that the academics of the WRR think that "rstly, the 
Netherlands do not have a realistic option to withdraw ‘from the world and 
from Europe’ anymore, nor to ‘revert the multicultural society’, but secondly, 
that these processes do not threaten the Netherlands with the loss of its own 
identity and the perishing of its own core93? How can that be, when the WRR 
had argued that no such core existed in the "rst place?
It is clear that we simply can’t escape some positive de"nition of, as Samuel 
Huntington put it, ‘who we are’.94 In any case, to state that no ‘core identity’ 
exists while at the same time contending that multiculturalism does not a+ect 
that core identity, is logically inconsistent. 
!is was also the essence of the criticism that burst out upon the publication 
of the WRR-report (and the accompanying speech of the Argentinean Crown 
Princess of the Netherlands). !e historian Frank Ankersmit for example stated 
that thinking about national identity came up as a reaction ‘to the a-historical 
worldview of the Enlightenment. For the Enlightenment, people of all times and 
all places and all parts of the world are in principle equal; and that leaves indeed 
little or no room for national identity.’ !is is what we have been discussing in 
chapter * on the Enlightened approach to the nation, amongst others in the 
words of Sieyès. Ankersmit continued: 
Our national identity is not to be found in a certain set of general and unchange-
able characteristics that social scientists should be able to "nd in the conduct of 
the Dutch.
!is is also nothing new for us, having discarded the Romantic reaction to the 
Enlightenment, as Herder and Fichte and others have voiced it. Ankersmit then 
concludes: 
One only comes on track with that if one takes note of the big tracts of Dutch 
history (…) What our national identity actually consists in, is not "xed for ever. It 
is always a matter of debate. But the fact that we debate our national identity, does 
not mean that it doesn’t exist. !at is the mistake princess Máxima makes. For 
who reasons in such a way, should also have to abolish history itself. And moral 
norms and values, for those are also the subject of ongoing debates.95
93 WRR (#%%,)) #%$+.: ‘Nog los van het feit dat er weinig empirisch bewijs ter onderbouwing 
van deze stelling is, is zij ook weinig productief, want weinig toekomstgericht.’
94 Samuel Huntington, Who Are We: !e Challenges to America’s National Identity (Simon & 
Schuster, New York, #%%-). Cf. the works of Coos Huijsen, Robert Bellah, Rudiger Safranski, 
and many others.
95 Frank Ankersmit, ‘Prinses Máxima maakt denkfout’, in: NRC Handelsblad, # October #%%,, ‘(…) 
Onze nationale identiteit moet je niet zoeken in een bepaalde set van algemene en onveranderlijke 
eigenschappen die sociale wetenschappers zouden ontwaren in het gedrag van de Nederlanders. 
Nee, die komt men pas op het spoor door te letten op de grote lijn in de Nederlandse geschiedenis 
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Ankersmit chooses the third approach to nationality: it is open, but requires 
e+ort (and debate). It is the view of Renan and Fustel de Coulanges that I have 
also discussed in Chapter *. !e WRR tried to step over any positive de"nition 
of national identity because it believed this to focus on di+erences instead of 
bridging them. Yet what the WRR did not realize, is that it is logically impossible 
to talk about ‘a renewal of Dutch identity’ and a ‘core’ of Dutchness without 
presupposing the existence of such a thing. 
Moreover, far from a means to exclude newcomers, can a shared national 
identity in fact bridge the di+erences in a diverse and cosmopolitan society.96
!is is indeed contrary to what is generally believed, and probably the 
reason why defenders of multiculturalism go to such length to argue against 
national identity: they perceive it as something exclusive to newcomers, instead 
of something uniquely capable of including them. 
Now of course strictly speaking, nationality is not identical with citizenship. 
While citizenship involves for example the right to vote, nationality involves the 
right to a passport. !is is illustrated by the American Samoans, for instance, 
who possess the American ‘nationality’ and have a right to travel the US freely, 
but may not vote. !e same goes for the Dutch from Aruba, who do not posses 
the right to vote either. 
As these are exceptions to the general identi"cation of ‘citizenship’ with 
‘nationality’, however, in the following, as in the preceding chapter, the two will 
continue to be used as synonyms – as the WRR does as well. !e council, while 
contending that ‘an unjusti"ed mingling’ had occurred ‘between nationality and 
loyalty’, stated in its report that 
having one, two, or more passports in itself does not say anything about one’s 
loyalty to the Netherlands.97
Supporting the right to hold more than one nationality and thereby possess 
more than one passport98 while stating that this would not have to a+ect the 
en op wat historici daarover gezegd hebben. Wat onze identiteit is, ligt daarom niet voor eeuwig en 
altijd vast. Die is altijd inzet van debat. Maar het feit dat we onze nationale identiteit ter discussie 
stellen, betekent nog niet dat die niet zou bestaan. Dat is de denkfout van prinses Máxima. Wie 
zo redeneert, zou ook de geschiedenis moeten afscha+en. En ook alle normen en waarden, want 
daar discussiëren we ook eindeloos over.’
96 Following this article by Ankersmit, the weekly journal Opinio published a series of essays, 
mostly by historians, defending the same point of view. In this series were included analyses by 
amongst others Johan Huizinga, Hans Wansink, Willem Velema, A. !. Van Deursen, and H.W. 
von der Dunk. Opinio, $#-$) October #%%, (yr $, number *(), Opinio, --$% January #%%) (yr #, 
number $), Opinio, $)-#- January #%%) (yr #, number *).
97 WRR (#%%,) #%): ‘Er is een onterechte vermenging ontstaan tussen loyaliteit en nationaliteit. 
Het hebben van een, twee of meer paspoorten zegt op zichzelf niets over iemands loyaliteit aan 
Nederland.’ 
98 WRR (#%%,) #%): ‘Dit betekent dat de WRR hier een pleidooi houdt voor het formeel toestaan 
van dubbele nationaliteit door het laten vallen van de afstandseis.’
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‘loyalty to the Netherlands’, one would expect the WRR to believe one primary 
political loyalty to be desirable (for why bothering to disconnect loyalty from 
nationality otherwise?). Yet the report then intends to show ‘that citizens in 
a changing society like the Dutch have plural loyalties without this having to 
be a problem for their connection to the Netherlands’.99 !ey thus call upon 
citizens to disconnect nationality from loyalty, and yet to accept that both are 
non-exclusive, overlapping and ‘dynamic’. Apparently, the WRR thinks that it 
is perfectly possible to be a national without being loyal, and vice versa.
But is it really unproblematic to have no loyalty towards one’s nationality, or 
to hold several di+erent nationalities? Is there no logical – indeed necessary – 
connection between political loyalty and nationality? What is, in fact, required 
of a subject of a state? 
!e classical approach was that a citizen earned his ‘rights’, such as the right 
to partake in political decision-making, through the ful"llment of ‘duties’, such 
as paying taxes and partaking in the common defense. In the Greek Polis and 
the major part of the history of the Roman Empire, citizenship was regarded as 
a high responsibility, open and "t only for the privileged few.100 
In the modern, democratic state, the emphasis has strongly been placed 
on the rights of citizenship, rather than the duties. Generally, citizenship is no 
longer viewed as something that must be ‘earned’, nor is it regarded as a heavy 
responsibility. Until well into the nineteenth century, the right to vote, for in-
stance, was still con"ned to a small upper layer of society. Voting was regarded 
as a serious task that could be properly ful"lled only by those who belonged 
to the more or less "nancially independent and educated classes.101 Partly as a 
result of the discourse of ‘rights’ gaining worldwide momentum, amongst others 
through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the idea that citizenship 
implies "rst and foremost the ful"llment of duties rather than the entitlement 
to rights, was lost.102
Although the duties of the citizen have thus moved somewhat to the 
background, it is by no means certain that they are no longer to be upheld. On 
the contrary, it will be argued in the remaining part of this chapter that the 
99 WRR (#%%,) $&: ‘Dit rapport laat zien dat burgers in een veranderende samenleving zoals 
de Nederlandse meerdere loyaliteiten hebben zonder dat dit een probleem hoe: te zijn voor hun 
verbondenheid met Nederland.’
100 Cf. J.P.V.D. Balsdon, Romans and aliens (London: Duckworth, $(,().
101 See on this, for instance, Gerhard Leibholz, Strukturprobleme der Modernen Demokratie, 
(Karlsruhe, $(')) )%+; Burke ($(&$) $)&-#$%. Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques (Paris: $('$) 
-&&+. Concerning the Dutch situation: !eo J. Veen, De Staten-Generaal vertegenwoordigen het 
gehele Nederlandse volk (Nijmegen, #%%%) *-+. 
102 It is clear, too, that this development is consequent upon the view of political order as 
resulting from a mere social contract.
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ful"llment of duties continues to play a pivotal – however implicit – role in the 
well functioning of democratic states. 
!e discussion on this has focused for instance on whether ‘double passports’ 
should be allowed. In $(,&, the ‘passport o9ce’ of the American department of 
state published a report on !e United States Passport. Past, present, future.103 
Tracing the "rst mention of a passport to Nehemiah #.,,104 the report analyzes 
that the ‘development of formal travel documents [has] always been necessary 
(…) in the relationship among nations.’105
Until well into the nineteenth century, however, international travel was 
not very common. In a perhaps prophetic part of his Mémoires d’outre tombe, 
Chateaubriand wonderfully attached the rise of the passport to the coming of the 
modern world when he arrived on May $(th, $)** in Ulm, Baden-Wurttemburg: 
We were halted at the gate of a village; the gate opened; they investigated my 
passport and my luggage (…) !e vulgarity, the modernity of the customs and of 
the passport contrasted with the thunder, the gothic gate, the sound of the horn 
and the noise of the torrent (…)106
On his way to Prague, Chateaubriand arrived at the Austrian border village 
Waldmünchen two days later. However, his passage was refused:
– You will not pass.
– Pardon, I will not pass, and why? !e explication commences:
– Your details are not on your passport. – My passport is a passport for foreign 
a+airs. – Your passport is old. – It doesn’t have a date; it should therefore still 
be valid. – it has not been visa’d by the Austrian ambassador in Paris. – You are 
mistaken, it has. – It does not have the dry stamp. – !e embassy must have forgot-
ten; besides, you will see the visa of other foreign delegations. I have just travelled 
the canton of Bâle, the grand-duchy of Bade, the kingdom of Wurtemberg, the 
whole of Bavaria, without the slightest di9culty. Upon simply stating my name, 
they did not even inquire in my passport. – You are a public "gure? – I have 
been minister in France, ambassadeur of his Very Christian Majesty in Berlin, in 
London and in Rome. I am a personal acquaintance of your sovereign and of the 
prince of Metternich. 
– You will not pass …107
103 !e United States Passport. Past, present future (Department of State Publication ))'$, 
department and foreign service series $'*, released July -, $(,&).
104 ‘And I said to the king, “If it pleases the King, let letters be given me to the governors of the 
province Beyond the River, that they may let me pass through until I come to Judah”’. 
105 !e United States Passport ($(,&) $.
106 François-René de Chateaubriand, Mémoires d’outre-tombe (Paris: Classiques Garnier 
Multimédia, $(()) ##$: book *&, chapter &: ‘Nous étions arrêtés à la porte d’une ville; la porte s’ouvre; 
on s’enquiert de mon passeport et de mes bagages (…) La vulgarité, la modernité de la douane et 
du passeport contrastaient avec l’orage, la porte gothique, le son du cor et le bruit du torrent (…).’
107 Ibidem: ‘– Vous ne passerez pas. – Comment, je ne passerai pas, et pourquoi? L’explication 
commence: – Votre signalement n’est pas sur le passeport. – Mon passeport est un passeport des 
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For the most part of the second half of the $(th century ‘there continued the 
confusing practice by governments of issuing passports not only to their own 
subjects, but also to aliens traveling within the country’. Moreover, despite 
these troubles that Chateaubriand had ended up in, ‘many European countries 
abolished passport requirements by mutual agreement’. !is de"nitely changed 
with the First World War, ‘with the need for both belligerents and neutrals to 
determine the identity of travelers in their territories’.108 When the Great War 
had "nished, the League of Nations consequently organized a conference on 
Passports in Paris: the $(#% International Conference on Passports, Customs 
Formalities, and !rough Tickets.109
 !e conference would result in some general agreements on registering 
luggage, international train stations, and acceptance of foreign travel documents, 
and marks the global acceptance of the idea of the passport as, in the de"nition 
of the US passport o9ce, ‘a travel document (…) issued under the authority of 
the Secretary of State attesting to the identity and nationality of the bearer’.110
It is both with regard to the ‘nationality’ as well as to the ‘identity’ of the 
bearer that the supposed all-inclusiveness of passports proves inconsistent. 
Let us "rst discuss nationality as such. !e idea that multiple citizenship 
would only consist in an ampli"cation of rights, rather than a multiplying of 
duties, shows a lack of understanding of the meaning of rights.
It is in the ful"llment of duties, not in the enjoyment of rights, that citizen-
ship can only be attached to one state,111 as the Dutch constitutional scholar 
Twan Tak has argued.112 He said in an interview with the weekly Opinio that 
‘logically speaking, a double nationality is just as impossible as a double gender 
or a double religion. (…) Because let us not forget: having a nationality means 
being subject to a particular sovereign state.’113 He continued:
a+aires étrangères. – Votre passeport est vieux. – Il n’a pas un an de date; il est également valide. 
– Il n’est pas visé à l’ambassade d’Autriche à Paris. – Vous vous trompez, il l’est. – Il n’a pas le 
timbre sec. – Oubli de l’ambassadeA; vous voyez d’ailleurs les visa des autres légations étrangères. 
Je viens de traverser le canton de Bâle, le grand-duché de Bade, le royaume de Wurtemberg, la 
Bavière entière, on ne m’a pas fait le moindre di9culté. Sur la simple déclaration de mon nom, 
on n’a pas même déployé mon passeport. – Avez-vous un caractère publicA? – J’ai été ministre en 
France, ambassadeur de sa Majesté Très Chrétienne à Berlin, à Londres et à Rome. Je suis connu 
personnellement de votre souverain et du prince de Metternich. – Vous ne passerez pas …’.
108 !e United States Passport ($(,&) -.
109 Mark B. Salter, Rights of Passage: !e passport in International Relations (Colorado: Lynnie 
Rienner Publishers, #%%*) ,,+.
110 ## Code of Federal Regulations '$.$ (d).
111 Indeed, in terms of ‘rights’ it seems to be very convenient to have a second or even third 
passport. It makes it possible, for instance, to dispose of one passport and rely on the other, the 
duties of the one state are conceived as too heavy.
112 Bart-Jan Spruyt, ‘Dubbele Nationaliteit is een gedrocht¸ interview met Twan Tak’, in: Opinio, 
#* February #%%,.
113 Ibidem: ‘Een dubbele nationaliteit is logisch net zo onmogelijk als een dubbele sekse of een 
dubbele religie. En wat onmogelijk is, moet je niet per decreet alsnog voor mogelijk verklaren. 
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!e most important problem is con8icting duties. !e relation between state 
and subject does not only imply rights, but also duties. Who is the subject of a 
particular sovereign state, not only retrieves advantages from it, but also burdens 
and duties. With a double nationality, one can accumulate rights, but one has to 
take con8icting duties into account as well. For someone with a double nationality 
is subjected to two legal systems, with two systems of duties too.114
!is is most clearly seen in a situation of war, when the state may call upon its 
citizens to perform military duties.115 As Raymond Aron observed: ‘How could 
a citizen possibly belong to several political entities at once? (…) Surely, (…) 
one cannot claim the rights of citizenship without accepting its duties, such as 
military service’.116 
One possible reply to this would be that professional armies have to a large 
extent replaced military service. But it is not evident that this has been a permanent 
transition. It is, in any case, easy to doubt the political or moral advantages of 
a professionalized military. Again Raymond Aron:
I for one am not at all convinced that the replacement of a citizen army with a 
professional army represents any political or moral progress. It was the sending of 
a partially conscripted army to Algeria which foreshadowed the triumph of those 
in France who stood for an independent Algeria. In the United States it seems that 
popular demonstrations, if not popular indignation, died down as soon as college 
students were no longer being called up for service in Vietnam.117
But the state may assert its rights over its citizens in less extreme situations 
as well. Since citizenship means being subjected to the legal system of a state, 
the moment the two legal systems collide, the double citizen "nds himself in a 
di9cult situation. Imagine a French citizen who also holds a Turkish passport: 
Het is belachelijke onzin. Want laten we niet vergeten: het hebben van een nationaliteit betekent 
dat je onderdaan bent van één bepaalde, soevereine staat.’
114 Spruyt, ‘Dubbele Nationaliteit is een gedrocht¸ interview met Twan Tak’, in: Opinio, #* 
February #%%,: ‘Het belangrijkste probleem is een con8ict van plichten. De relatie tussen staat 
en onderdaan kent niet alleen rechten maar ook plichten. Wie onderdaan is van één bepaalde 
soevereine staat, ontleent daaraan niet alleen voordelen maar ook lasten en plichten. Je kunt bij een 
dubbele nationaliteit rechten gaan opstapelen, maar je moet ook rekening houden met botsende 
plichten. Iemand met een dubbele nationaliteit is immers onderdaan van twee rechtssystemen, 
met ook twee systemen van plichten. En dat leidt al snel tot botsingen. Een dubbele nationaliteit 
suggereert in feite dat het feit dat je onderdaan bent van land X geen consequenties hee: voor het 
feit dat je ook onderdaan bent van het land Y. Met andere woorden: je Nederlanderschap hee: 
geen consequenties voor de eisen die de Marokkaanse nationaliteit aan jou als onderdaan stelt.’
115 !e history of military service is – from the point of view of national identity – tremendously 
interesting indeed. As Carl Schmitt notices, the re8ections of the economist and sociologist Emil 
Lederer: ‘Wir können sagen, dass sich am Tage der Mobilisierung die GesellschaA, die bis dahin 
bestand, in eine GemeinschaA umformte’, in: Carl Schmitt, ‘Der Begri+ des Politischen’, in: Ibidem, 
Frieden oder Pazi+smus? (Ducker & Humblot, Berlin, #%%') #%-n,.
116 Raymond Aron, ‘Is multinational citizenship possible?’, in: Social Research. An international 
quarterly of the social sciences, Volume -$, no. - (Winter $(,-) &*)-&'&, there &*).
117 Aron (Winter $(,-) &*)-&'&, there &'&.
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there have been attempts in France to legally forbid denying the Armenian 
Genocide, whereas it is forbidden for every Turkish citizen – even to those liv-
ing abroad – to acknowledge it. Or imagine the Dutchman who also holds an 
American passport and may be prosecuted upon traveling to the United States 
because he has sold half a gram of Marihuana. 
Nor do states with a large immigrant population in Europe labour to free their 
former citizens from their nationality. !e Moroccan nationality is inalienable 
and will be passed on inde"nitely. While it is theoretically possible to give up 
Turkish nationality, for instance, those who do so can count on reprisals from 
the Turkish government such as no longer being allowed in for a family visit. 
In line with this, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan told the Turks in Europe 
on his visit to Germany in October #%$% that they should not assimilate into 
their new nations, and that ‘assimilation is a crime against humanity’.118 What 
is even more surprising is that Turkish Dutchmen are called up for an eighteen 
months military service in Turkey. !ey can buy themselves out for '.%%% euros, 
but cannot escape a #$-day stint, on pain of a prison sentence. Nor does Turkey 
turn a blind eye when it comes to breaches of the Turkish penal code committed 
by Dutchmen of Turkish descent in Holland.
As long as they are o9cially subjects of the Moroccan state, Rabat could similarly 
call up even those who have – for several generations now – been living abroad, 
to perform military service and claim jurisdiction over them. In theory, this 
could mean criminal prosecution for acts performed in the Netherlands, where 
no Moroccan interest was concerned, and which were entirely in compliance 
with Dutch law. Examples are criticizing the Moroccan king, the performance 
of an abortion, the use of so: drugs, homosexual behavior, or apostasy. 
We have so far discussed the problems of double nationality with citizens. 
But in the Netherlands, a vehement discussion burst out in #%%, on the question 
whether an executive o9cial may have a double nationality. Apart from the 
above-mentioned problems, which exist in the same degree for politicians and 
non-politicians, some additional questions remain when secretaries of state and 
other persons holding o9cial positions, have a double nationality. Even when 
the primary political loyalty may not be in question, it is especially problematic 
as a politician can be held accountable, in the last instance, by another state.
What is also at stake with the rights-based conception of citizenship is the 
in8ation of the passport as a guarantee of the issuing state that foreign govern-
ments can trust the holder of it. !is is the ‘identity’ question related to passports.
118 Erdogan had already said the same thing two years before, upon is visit in #%%): cf. ‘Erdogan’s 
Visit leaves German conservatives fuming’, in: Spiegel Online, # December #%%). Available online 
at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/%,$'$),'*-,#-,%%.html.
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Free passage and hospitality are o+ered as a gesture of friendship from the 
one state and its citizens to the other. !ere is no such thing as a ‘right’ to enter 
the territory of another state: quite the contrary, the rule is that strangers are 
forbidden to enter the territory of another state; through international agreements, 
however, states have mutually opened up their borders to friendly citizens. !is 
implies that the citizen holding a passport of the state whose citizens are allowed 
into a certain country can also to some extent be held accountable. When one 
state is at war with another, no travelers from that country are allowed in. Visas 
are not a right, but a gi:, granted under the trust that the guest will behave well.
If states have no idea who holds a passport of a certain state, other states 
have no idea who they are admitting into their country. What this could mean 
in extremis was shown in the mid-(%s, when the Oceanic state of Tonga o+ered 
its nationality for sale on the market. Anyone who paid a certain amount of 
money was o+ered Tongan citizenship and a passport. By doing this, the Island 
state hoped to attract foreign investors (and no doubt it o+ered low taxes and 
other business advantages), but as a result, many countries did not allow Tongan 
travelers to pass through their customs anymore. Once again, we discover that 
behind the legal formalities lie sociological and cultural preconditions that 
enable the formal legal approach in the "rst place. But once this legal formality 
is in place, we are easily led to believe that that is all that is needed.119 
And that observation also bridges us to another aspect of the passport, which 
is not legal but cultural. Its symbolic value. !e large numbers of immigrants from 
non-Western countries that European states have received in the last decades have 
led to serious pressure on its social cohesion. If immigrants retain the passport 
of their country of origin, this inevitably implies a conditional integration. !ey 
may always use the second passport to go back. !at is another reason why a 
double passport may be problematic. For representative government and the rule 
of law require not merely loyalty, but a loyalty to the exclusion of other loyalties, 
at least when they con8ict. !is will be further explored in the next chapter.
119 Cf. the ‘Nottebohm’ case of the ICJ (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, April &th, $(''), in which the 
ICJ ruled that ‘a genuine link’ must exist between a citizen and a state in order to claim nationality 
of a state and insist that other states recognize the claim.
CHAPTER NINE
THE PARTICULARISM OF CITIZENSHIP
(.$. L&@);(@
Life is not merely about the approximately eighty years the individual spends 
on earth. Although it may be true, that those eighty years are all there actually 
are, and that, as Sartre put it, at the end of the day we are all seul sans excuse,1 it 
is certainly not true that for the individual person, himself and his eighty years 
are all that matter.
Indeed, not only are we inherently historical beings, who derive meaning from 
being entrenched in a web of past and future, we are also inherently social beings, 
de"ning our lives in terms of what surrounds us. !at is why family histories are 
almost universally cherished, why procreation or ‘leaving something behind’ is 
in the top level of priorities in life, and why being disconnected from the world, 
even when it is in a very comfortable place, as it is in Dr. Johnson’s fable Rasselas2 
and in the story of Robinson Crusoe3 (or for example in reasonably comfortable 
prisons), is universally perceived as a terrible misfortune.
However, it is also true for all of us that these ties that reach beyond us and 
connect us to the larger realm of existence, constantly pose constraints and 
lead us into con8icts. It seems that an unrelenting e+ort is required to mediate 
between the con8icting demands of our individual desires and expectations, and 
those of the many associations we are part of; or between one of our associations 
and another (for instance a con8ict between an ancient family and the village 
council over claims on a certain piece of land).
!e common way out of these all too familiar con8icts is through a com-
promise: the importance of the individual’s demands are weighed against those 
of the family, or another group, and the desire to stick together as a whole, is 
rea9rmed through mutual concessions. !at is how, in everyday life, we manage 
1 Jean-Paul Sartre, L’Existentialisme est un Humanisme (Paris: éditions Nagel, $(-&) *&-*).
2 Samuel Johnson, !e history of Rasselas. Prince of Abissinia ($,'() (London: Oxford University 
Press, $(,$). Cf. !eodore Dalrymple, ‘Samuel Johnson ($,%(-$,)-)’, in: !ierry Baudet and 
Michiel Visser (eds.), Revolutionair Verval. En de conservatieve vooruitgang in de .3de en .,de 
eeuw (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, #%$$).
3 Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe. His life and strange surprising adventures ($,($) (London: 
!e Nonesuch Press, $(&)).
### .<74125 0=02 
to live together in a generally peaceful manner – and how, when this goes wrong, 
associations are destroyed (as, for example, in a family feud).4
Associations express a form of loyalty, and as discussed in chapter *, there 
are at least three types in which this loyalty can manifest itself politically: tribal, 
national, or religious. National – imagined and territorial – loyalty is by no 
means a given: indeed, in large parts of the world, people do not experience 
such a national loyalty – or at least not very strongly. !eir loyalties are o:en 
primarily tribal or religious (or a combination of the two) – and as a result, it 
has proven utterly di9cult to establish a political order in which minorities 
were accepted and civil wars were not incumbent, and in which representative 
institutions managed to speak for the whole. !is is not surprising: in situations 
where such non-national loyalties prevail, the individual is under constant 
pressure to submit to tribal or religious laws and customs; the free market will 
continuously be inclined to degenerate into a system of monopolized guilds 
and nepotistic favours;5 and the administration of politics and justice will be 
menaced by corrupted civil servants who prefer the moral codes of their tribe 
or creed to the ones of the state.
In Western Europe, to be sure, class-justice and a predominance of religious 
loyalties over national ones have continually existed throughout the centuries 
as well. Jews, for example, until well into the nineteenth century, were denied 
many citizens’ rights. Catholics, in protestant countries such as the Netherlands, 
were regarded as not to be trusted because of supposed ‘loyalties’ to Rome.6 
And exclusion on the basis of race remained a big issue in large parts of the 
United States until well into the $(&%s. !e development and 8ourishing of the 
territorial, imagined loyalty, that we have identi"ed as the national loyalty, was 
an achievement, realized at the cost of tribal and creedal ones, and demanding 
a constant e+ort. National loyalties have been taught and developed, in families 
and schools, through national festive days and commemorations, and they 
have been tamed, too, by the traumatic experiences that several over-a9rmed, 
imperialist nationalisms have rendered.
All this brings us to the problems concerning nationality again, and brings the 
much-debated concept of citizenship in view. For what is essential in this idea, is 
the recognition that the others with whom we live together on the same territory 
are essentially members of the same political project (and it is immediately clear 
4 See on this for instance Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: !e Illusion of Destiny (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, #%%&).
5 Cf. Andreas Kinneging, ‘Loyalty in the modern world’, in: Modern Age vol. -& (#%%-) &&-,*.
6 And not necessarily without reason, as William of Orange was, for instance, killed by the 
religiously inspired Balthasar Gérard in $')-. See on this: Cliteur (#%%,) $&-+, and: Jardine (#%%'), 
who writes on '$: ‘!is act of assassination was, it appeared, the deed of a solitary fanatic, a loner 
with an intense commitment to the catholic Church and a faithful upholder of the legitimacy of 
the rule of Philip II in the Netherlands …’. 
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that in this, sovereignty is implied too). Conceiving of ourselves as sharing the 
same nationality means that, despite all our di+erences in custom, religion, 
ethnicity, and background, we share a fundamental loyalty towards a territory 
and inherent therein, a loyalty towards the way of life on that territory (despite, 
of course, a great deal of di+erences). 
It is this that enables us to live together with all our di+erences. It provides 
a reason for being bound by the same laws; for treating one another equally in 
equal circumstances; for holding up public virtue and a sense of care for both 
the human and the natural environment.7 It is only with a constant reference 
to the shared nationality, that the "erce political debates in France are resolved; 
it was only because Barack Obama was experienced as a member of the same 
nation, that many Americans who had a di+erent ethnicity and may have had 
a di+erent religious background than him, nevertheless warmly accepted him 
as their president in #%%); and only in nation states would such a thing have 
been possible.
!e American and French Revolutions ($,,& and $,)( respectively) can 
be regarded as the de"nite breakthrough of the idea of a national citizenship. 
Instrumental in that development has been the change in how the people were 
understood: from being ‘subjects’ – who owe allegiance to the crown –, they 
became ‘citizens’, with a right to co-decide. As such a right to co-decide, however, 
is always – indeed by de"nition –, carried out in a collective form, it is implied 
in national citizenship that the citizen is not just an atomized individual, with 
‘inalienable rights’, but also part of a larger community or group. (Hence the 
birth of the idea of a ‘nation’ as discussed in chapter *). 
Indeed, it was with the French Revolution, that besides all the universalist 
ideals, the ‘principe des nationalités’ was introduced, which was the ideal that 
nations should have the right to political independence and self-determination. 
!e French National Convention, the legislative assembly established in $,(#, 
declared that it was ready to assist oppressed peoples to overthrow their rulers, a 
statement that caused much unrest in the pan-national empires of the Habsburgs 
and the Ottomans.8
But as we have seen throughout this book, European countries have now 
abandoned this ideal of a prevailing national loyalty. As a consequence, nation 
states are dissolving again into the pan-national empires that characterized the 
Middle Ages: internally divided, politically decentralized. 
7 See on the relationship between local attachment and care for the environment: !eodore 
Dalrymple, Litter: How other people’s rubbish shapes our lives (London: Gibson Square Books), 
and Scruton (#%$#).
8 Martin Lloyd, !e Passport, the history of man’s most traveled document (Sutton Publishing, 
Gloucestershire #%%') $,$. Not much later this principle was abandoned by the universalist imperial 
ambitions of revolutionary and Napoleonic France, as discussed in chapters *.#, *.* and ).$.
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A telling illustration of how national loyalties are upset in practice, is the 
way in which the Dutch tradition to commemorate those who died in the 
Second World War has been turned around in recent years. !e ceremony is 
traditionally carried out on the -th of May, the day before the German capitula-
tion of $(-'. Every year at #%:%% o’clock, the Dutch Queen lays a garland on 
the national monument on Dam square, whereupon the mayor of Amsterdam 
says a few words to announce two minutes of silence. On many other squares 
in Amsterdam and in other cities, and in almost every village in the country, a 
comparable ceremony is carried out: garments are laid down, and local dignitaries 
voice the purpose of the commemoration before the gathered people silently 
contemplate the dead. In $((', however, the National Committee 2 and 6 May9 
announced a shi: in accent: 
No longer only the victims of the Second World War are being commemorated, 
but also the Dutch people that have fallen in wars, armed con8icts, and peace 
operations a:er the Second World War.10 
At the commemoration on Dam square, the mayor of Amsterdam from now 
on announced that
we practice two minutes of silence for all – civilians and soldiers – who have 
perished in the Kingdom of the Netherlands or wherever else in the world since the 
outbreak of the Second World War, in situations of war and at peace operations.11
!e phrase ‘or wherever else in the world’ seems to mean that the Dutch are 
now, – in what appears to be an attempt to ‘universalize’ the national memorial 
–, commemorating the deaths of their national soldiers as well as the deaths 
of the ones those soldiers might have killed in combat. It reminds of the ‘and-
and-approach’ to loyalties of the WRR (as discussed in the previous chapter).
To have a universalist commemoration of the dead of armed con8ict, however, 
is impossible. As armed con8ict is necessarily about an adversary – a ‘them’ –, 
the attempt to include everyone in the commemoration will inevitably contra-
dict the very idea of such a commemoration in the "rst place. !e Committee, 
realizing that ‘since the end of the Second World War, worldwide not a day 
has passed without war’, and that ‘since $(-', more than #%% wars and armed 
9 !is is the committee that organizes the yearly commemoration. In Dutch: het Nationaal 
Comité 2 en 6 Mei.
10 From the website of the National Committee - and ' May: ‘Accentverschuiving. In de loop 
van de jaren is de herdenking verbreed. Niet alleen de slachto+ers van de Tweede Wereldoorlog 
worden herdacht, maar ook de Nederlanders die zijn omgekomen bij oorlogen, gewapende con8icten 
en vredesoperaties na de Tweede Wereldoorlog’. Available online at http://www.-en'mei.nl/
herdenken/achtergronden/achtergronddetail/_pid/kolom#_$/_rp_kolom#_$_elementId/$_(%&,&.
11 ‘Allen – burgers en militairen – die in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden of waar ook ter 
wereld zijn omgekomen sinds het uitbreken van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, in oorlogssituaties 
en bij vredesoperaties’.
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con8icts have been fought’, explained its reasons for the aforementioned shi: 
in accent as follows: 
In the Netherlands live many who have experienced these actual situations of 
war, suppression, and unfreedom. Especially for young people who lack historical 
reference to the Second World War, commemorating can relate to the present or 
the recent past.12
At the national commemoration on May -th, #%%*, some possible consequences 
of this all-inclusive approach became visible. In the Amsterdam neighbourhood 
De Baarsjes, a group of Islamic youth shouted ‘We must kill the Jews!’,13 during 
the two minutes of silence. On the Sierplein in the neighbourhood Slotervaart 
Overtoomse Veld, young Moroccans started playing soccer with the garlands. 
In the centre of Amsterdam, cars klaxoned in order to show disdain for the 
commemoration at the gay monument.
!e trouble is that based on a literal understanding of the ideas of the Com-
mittee 2 and 6 May, these immigrants were not entirely unjusti"ed to behave as 
they did. Many of them, it appears, regard Jewish people as the enemy (because 
of anti-Semitism in the Quran and in their culture, and because of the presence 
of the Jewish state in territories they perceive to be theirs, i.e. Israel), and some 
conceive the allied victory over Nazi-Germany as synonymous with the installation 
of Israel.14 Comparable confusion arose when a high school in Amsterdam-West 
wanted to hold two minutes of silence on the day a:er the terrorist attack on the 
Twin Towers in New York on September $$th, #%%$. !e school-children started 
rioting and said they would not commemorate the victims of this attack. !ey 
shouted: ‘Sorry for you! We have shown the Americans something!’. 
From the point of view of multiculturalism, they in fact had a point. If we 
accept the Committee’s commemoration of ‘all who have perished’, why com-
memorate the dead from the Twin Towers, and not commemorate Muhamed 
Atta and the other suicide terrorists indeed?15 Why mourn the fallen Dutch 
12 ‘De actualiteit gee: betekenis aan herdenken en vieren. Sinds het einde van de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog is er wereldwijd nog geen dag zonder oorlog geweest. Vanaf $(-' zijn er meer dan 
#%% oorlogen en gewapende con8icten uitgevochten. In Nederland leven ook velen die deze actuele 
situaties van oorlog, onderdrukking en onvrijheid aan den lijve hebben meegemaakt. Vooral 
voor jongeren zonder historisch referentiekader met betrekking tot de Tweede Wereldoorlog 
kan herdenken betrekking hebben op het heden of recente verleden.’
13 ‘Joden moeten we doden’.
14 ‘Had Hitler maar gewonnen, dan hadden de Palestijnen nu een leven gehad. Dat is wat je 
hoort in de klas’, in: ‘Juf, wordt het fout gerekend dat ik Joden vergeten ben!’, NRC Handelsblad, 
#( April #%%&.
15 ‘Marco Strang – leraar geschiedenis, voorheen sportschoolmedewerker, openlijk homo-
seksueel – keek er niet van op toen in mei #%%* een paar Marokkanen met bloemenkransen 
gingen voetballen. Maar hij was nog wel verbaasd toen zijn school – het Meridiaan College in 
Amsterdam-West – op de dag na $$ september twee minuten stilte zou houden voor de doden in 
de Twin Towers. “Er waren leerlingen die zeiden dat ze dat niet deden. Ze gingen herrie maken.” 
De euforie. De blik waarmee naar hem gekeken werd. Jammer voor jullie, nou hebben wij de 
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resistance "ghters and bring homage to the British and Americans who had to 
put out hundreds of thousands of Germans in order to liberate the Netherlands 
and other countries, while condemning those who killed only a few thousand 
Americans in an attempt to ‘liberate’ what they believed to be the ‘Palestinian’ 
lands, on September $$th, #%%$? If all cultures are equal, and if all con8icts are 
equally just, and if all victims equally deplorable – there should be no reason to 
make a distinction, should there? When the Dutch proclaim to commemorate 
all deaths, on all sides of con*icts, why should these immigrants not express 
their grief over the loss of the supposed ‘Palestinian’ lands? And given some 
anti-homosexual trends in much of Muslim culture, is it really surprising that 
when they are granted the moral right to commemorate whichever value they 
choose, they might choose a condemnation of gays? 
As a nation state, it is simply not possible to commemorate universally, as 
much as it is not possible to "ght on both sides of an armed con8ict.
!is mistake of the Committee should, however, not blind us to its good 
intentions. Its idea has clearly been to reshape the national commemoration in 
a way that may actually include immigrants. !ey supposedly wanted the -th 
and 'th of May to be more than a merely historical commemoration, but an 
actual, national commemoration. But what is necessary for that, again, is some 
positive formulation of values. A better rephrasing of the commemoration 
announced could have been:
We practice two minutes of silence for all – civilians and soldiers – who have 
perished in defense of the Kingdom of the Netherlands or its allies or its way of 
life since the outbreak of the Second World War.
!is too, is a universalistic approach to the nation, open to newcomers, yet 
living up to the need for particularism that is intrinsic in the whole concept of 
commemorating.
Nor was the Committee right in supposing that newcomers in the Dutch 
nation can have no connection to the ancestors who gave their lives in wars of 
the past. Because in fact these Dutch ancestors gave their lives for the national 
culture and the national territory, and by living on those grounds, and having 
membership of that same nationality, one enjoys precisely what they have 
fought for and died for – so not being heir to them by blood, is not a reason at 
all not to be grateful for their sacri"ce. It only shows the ethnic misconception 
of nationality. 
One "nal example of the mistaken approach of the Committee of 2 and 6 
May: the ‘theme’ of the commemoration of #%%( was ‘Freedom and Identity’. 
Why? Because: 
Amerikanen eens wat laten zien’, in: ‘Juf, wordt het fout gerekend dat ik Joden vergeten ben!’, 
NRC Handelsblad, #( April #%%&.
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it was shown in the Second World War how thoughts about identity can a+ect 
freedom. 
Conclusion, apparently: abolish national identity, and you will get unmitigated 
freedom.16
In France, a comparable debate about national commemorations and national 
identity exists. In an attempt to rea9rm the national spirit amongst the younger 
generation of Frenchmen, President Sarkozy announced shortly following his 
installation in the Elysée in May #%%,, that on October ##nd of each year, the 
letter of $, year old communist-resistance activist Guy Moquêt, written just 
before his execution in the prison camp in the French village of Chateaubriant, 
would be read out in every school class throughout France. 
On May $&th, Sarkozy went to the Bois de Boulogne, where the Gestapo had 
shot *' resistant "ghters in $(--, and announced:
I wanted to hold my "rst commemoration in my capacity as President of the 
Republic here, in this place where young Frenchmen were murdered because 
they could not conceive of France turning its back on all of its history and all of 
its values. I wanted to use the "rst day of my term to honour these young resistant 
"ghters to whom France was more important than their party or their church. 
I wanted to have the moving letter that Guy Môquet wrote to his parents on the 
eve of his execution read out loud. I wanted these things because I believe it is 
critically important to explain to our children what a young Frenchman is, and to 
explain how the sacri"ce of some of these anonymous heroes who have been le: 
out of the history books can show us the greatness of a man who devotes himself 
to a greater cause.17
!en he concluded: ‘Children of France, remember that admirable men have 
sacri"ced much to conquer the freedom that you enjoy.’18 
Analogous to this French – national – approach, the mayor of Amsterdam in 
the Netherlands could for example announce on the yearly Dutch commemoration 
on the -th of May: ‘Children of the oldest free Republic of the world, children 
16 ‘In de Tweede Wereldoorlog is gebleken hoe gedachten over identiteit de vrijheid kunnen 
aantasten.’
17 ‘Si j’ai tenu à faire ici ma première commémoration en tant que Président de la République, 
dans ce lieu où de jeunes Français furent assassinés parce qu’ils ne pouvaient pas concevoir que la 
France reniât toute son histoire et toutes ses valeurs, si j’ai tenu au premier jour de mon quinquennat 
à rendre hommage à ces jeunes résistants pour lesquels la France comptait davantage que leur 
parti ou leur Eglise, si j’ai voulu que fût lue la lettre si émouvante que Guy Môquet écrivit à ses 
parents à la veille d’être fusillé, c’est parce que je crois qu’il est essentiel d’expliquer à nos enfants 
ce qu’est un jeune Français, et de leur montrer à travers le sacri"ce de quelques-uns de ces héros 
anonymes dont les livres d’histoire ne parlent pas, ce qu’est la grandeur d’un homme qui se donne 
à une cause plus grande que lui.’
18 !e translation comes from the o9cial website of the Elysée, http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/
elysee.fr/anglais/speeches_and_documents/#%%,/speech_by_nicolas_sarkozy_president_of_the_
republic_at_the_memorial_ceremony_for_the_bois_de_boulogne_martyrs.,&&),.html. 
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of Holland, remember! Wherever you come from, whatever your religion or 
ethnicity … Remember! (etc.)’.
!is approach to the nation, once again, is open to all, to newcomers as well 
as to those who have been in the Netherlands for generations, and so complies 
with the criteria of an open concept of nationality, as defended by Ernest Renan 
and Fustel de Coulanges (see chapter *). Yet it does not jeopardize the idea of 
a shared community of which politics necessarily forms an expression if it is 
to remain representative and if a shared rule of law should continue to apply.
With Sarkozy’s speech, however, the complicated issue of patrimony comes 
into play as well. Patrimony is the cultural heritage of a society, and as ‘the 
freedom that [we] enjoy’ is not isolated from social context and history, it is not 
unconnected to political arrangements either. As whatever ‘freedom’ that may 
be enjoyed is inevitably part of the complex fabric of society, an understanding 
of patrimony comes close to what Edmund Burke meant when he explored the 
relationship between convention – custom – and law. While going so far as to 
say that ‘if civil society be the o+spring of convention, that convention must 
be its law’,19 Burke realized that whatever contract this society may be, it would 
inevitably be a ‘partnership not only between those who are living, but between 
those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born’.20 ‘!e 
state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement’, 
according to Burke, as living together – and governing together – implies shar-
ing a common culture, from which the political order and the law come forth. 
If the state is the representative of the people that live on the territory over 
which it claims jurisdiction – which (as argued in part I) is the pretention of 
the nation state – it is natural for the state to conceive of itself as the herdsman 
of the culture, the customs, and in general the particular form of life that has 
taken shape on it.
(.#. T"# P>D;$? SE"#8#
!is has consequences for what is commonly denoted as ‘the public sphere’. 
Although generally conceived as ‘neutral territory’ to which the state ought to 
be indi+erent, there is nevertheless an indisputable connection between the 
nation – and its history and identity – and this public sphere. A "rst element 
19 Edmund Burke, Re*ections on the Revolution in France. A critical edition. Edited by J.C.D. 
Clark (Stanford: Stanford University Press, #%%$) #$).
20 Burke (#%%$) #&$. !omas Paine did not agree with Burke on this, see !omas Paine, Rights 
of Man, being an answer to mr. Burke’s attack on the French Revolution ($,($) ). Available online 
at http://www.iowagrandmaster.org/Books;#%in;#%pdf/Paine--Rights;#%of;#%Man.pdf. Cf. 
Craig Nelson, !omas Paine. Enlightenment, Revolution, and the Birth of Modern Nations (New 
York: Viking, #%%&) $)$+: ‘Droits de l’Homme, ou Droits du Seigneur?’.
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of the public sphere that comes to mind is the language spoken. France poses 
an interesting example of state support for that element of the public sphere 
in the form of the Académie Française, founded in $&$- by Richelieu, who also 
defended, as we have seen, the importance of a national political loyalty. With 
the o9cial mission of ‘watching over the French language’,21 the academy has, 
in its own words, 
worked in the past to stabilize the language, in order to create a common patrimony 
for all Frenchmen and for all those who use our language.22
Especially the reference to the French language in the Academy’s mission state-
ment as ‘our language’ (‘notre langue’) is interesting: French is not conceived 
of as a neutral, utilitarian open source medium merely serving the exchange 
of information, but as the possession of a nation, and the expression of a way 
of life.23 To further support the French language worldwide, the French state 
founded the Organisation International de la Francophonie in $(,%, organizing 
conferences, supporting initiatives, and generally promoting the French language. 
In line with this, the French constitution reads that ‘the language of the Republic 
is French’.24 !is means that the French state openly speaks out for a particular 
language, and that it does not, by implication, just as happily see English or 
Arabic being spoken.
It is not surprising that nation states, seeking representative government 
and the rule of law, emphasize the importance of a shared language. For how 
would either be possible without such a shared means of communication? A 
national public debate is impossible amongst citizens who cannot understand 
one another, as it would be to follow the developments of government and 
parliament. Without a shared language, such institutions as national newspapers 
21 ‘Veiller sur la langue française’.
22 ‘Travaillé dans le passé à "xer la langue, pour en faire un patrimoine commun à tous les Français 
et à tous ceux qui pratiquent notre langue http://www.academie-francaise.fr/role/index.html.
23 Cf. the book of the current member of the Académie Française, Marc Fumaroli, Quand 
l’Europe parlait Français (Paris: Éditions de Fallois, #%$$) #&-#,: ‘La grammaire française, le lexique 
du français, don’t Voltaire n’avait pas peur de tourner en derision la relative pauvreté, la syntaxe 
française, la sémantique exigeante du français, sa versi"cation dont Walpole voyait bien les défauts 
un siècle avant la “crise du vers” diagnostiquée par Mallarmé, les genres où notre langue excellait, 
notamment les genres intimes, la lettre, le journal, la poésie de circonstance, les Mémoires, et ce 
genre littéraire oral qu’est la conversation entre amis, tout cet apprentissage di9cile avait le sens 
d’une initiation à une manière exceptionnelle d’être libre et naturel avec autrui et avec soi-même. 
C’était tout autre chose que de communiquer. C’était entrer “en compagnie”.’
24 Constitution Française, Article #: ‘La langue de la République est le français. L’emblème 
national est le drapeau tricolore, bleu, blanc, rouge. L’hymne national est la “Marseillaise”. La 
devise de la République est “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité”. Son principe est : gouvernement du 
peuple, par le peuple et pour le peuple.’ !e full text of the French constitution can be found at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/a9chTexte.do;jsessionid=&-C)%#,EBFD(CE%#B*%%CE&F%E-)A
C,F.tpdjo%(v_$?cidTexte=LEGITEXT%%%%%&%,$$(-&dateTexte=#%$$%'$). !e article was added 
to the constitution in $((#.
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and national television channels would have severe di9culties to function.25 
!ey refer to a national public debate and rea9rm the idea that a shared public 
interest exists. Parliament, supposedly the re8ection of the national debate and 
the place where the national interest is ultimately decided upon, needs to "nd 
reception in the nation in order to live up to its democratic claims.
!e French state, in addition, performs a wide range of other promotional 
activities not only of its language, but also of its culture. And the French state is 
by no means unique in this. Just as France has the Alliance française, Germany 
has a network of Goethe Institutes, organizing lectures, inviting speakers, and 
generally promoting the German culture in other countries worldwide26 – the 
Netherlands has a network of Dutch institutes, and so on. !e examples are endless.
When it comes to the content of the national culture, the French state 
again choses an interesting approach. While the state formally possesses strict 
‘neutrality’ towards all ‘cults’ (religions), it "nancially supports a great amount 
of church buildings, which are considered to be part of the patrimoine of the 
French nation. Indeed, in the years following the famous law of .,-6 that installed 
this secularism, the French state, having prided itself for centuries for being the 
+lle aînée de l’église, the oldest daughter of the church, and being covered, in 
the words of Sarkozy, by a ‘manteau de cathédrales’,27 realized an ‘absorption of 
the old diocese buildings by the historical Monuments’.28
With the exception, to this day, of Alsace and Lorraine, which at the time 
were not part of France and have never accepted the law of separation since 
their reunion, the French state is considered to be neutral towards all religions, 
yet at the same time to remain a defender of the cultural heritage of the French 
nation, in which the churches inescapably play a large role.29 In the course of 
the #%th century, a great number of additional laws have been passed bringing 
more and more elements of society – certainly not only religious ones – under 
the aegis of the French state. 
25 See on this for instance Benedict Anderson’s analysis of the importance of national newspapers 
in the developments of imagined communities: Anderson ($(($) *,+.
26 On its website the Goethe-institute announces: ‘!e Goethe-Institut is the Federal Republic 
of Germany’s cultural institution operating worldwide’; available online at http://www.goethe.
de/enindex.htm.
27 Nicolas Sarkozy said this at a Speech held on $* December, #%%,. Cf. Catherine Gouëset, ‘) ans 
d’idylle entre l’Elysée et les catholiques’, in: l’Express, ) October, #%$%. Available online at http://
www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/)-ans-d-idylle-entre-l-elysee-et-les-catholiques_(#'(-).html.
28 ‘L’Absorption des anciens édi"ces diocésains par les Monuments historiques’. A. Auduc, 
‘L’héritage des croyants devient patrimoine national’, in: Hommes et Migrations, vol. $#'(, ‘Les 
$%% ans d’une idée neuve, II. Culture(s), religion(s) et politique’, Dossier coordonné par Alain 
Seksig (janvier-février #%%&) ,%-,,.
29 Cf. Olivier le Roy, La laïcité face à l’Islam (Paris: Stock, #%%'); Gerard Noiriel, A quoi sert 
l’identité nationale? (Marseille: Agone, #%%,). When still a government minister, Nicolas Sarkozy 
also authored a book partly on this subject, La République, les religions, l’espérance (Paris: Editions 
du cerf, #%%-).
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In their several ways, almost all Western nation states have developed 
comparable means to support a particular patrimony. From a strictly universal-
ist perspective, then, they all discriminate. !ey discriminate "rstly between 
citizens and non-citizens; but secondly, they favor a particular culture, and a 
particular way of life. Whether in the form of a language, or through the upkeep 
of architectural heritage, rarely have states remained indi+erent to the way or 
ways of life of which they are the ultimate herdsmen. 
!is is not disconnected from the rule of law either. !e law itself – as I have 
attempted to show in chapter ' and & –, implies a choice for a particular law, and 
for particular values and approaches to such themes as free will, accountability, 
the relationship between men and women, the right form of punishment for 
criminal o+enses, and so on. If a state upholds the rule of law, it is always a 
particular law – and it is to be hoped that this law is perceived by all who are 
submitted to it, to be theirs. 
Underneath the discussion over the French protection of its Catholic heritage, 
lie, then, complicated questions concerning the right to confess one’s religion 
in public. For not only is freedom of religion understood to mean freedom of 
conscience, it has also come to mean the freedom to express one’s religion publicly. 
From that perspective, all faiths may be said to be equal. Yet at the same time, 
the churches and cathedrals in many European states are major anchor points 
of the national awareness. Since Chateaubriand, many have praised the church 
bells as possessing ‘undoubtedly a beauty of the "rst rank, that what artists call 
the great’,30 even when they are no longer practicing believers. !e bells have 
become a part, to some extend, of the cultural heritage of many nation states. 
!ey are reminiscent of an inherited religious tradition, of the great history and 
artistic achievements of Christian Europe; of a sense of provinciality, too, which 
many cherish as an antidote against modern hectic life.
To say that the state is the expression of a heritage is not to say, of course, 
that this heritage is "xed forever. However, to question the neutrality of the 
public sphere, and to regard it as an expression of a certain kind of heritage, is 
to understand it not only legally, but also sociologically. To see the public sphere 
as an expression of a certain social reality makes it self-evident that the social 
right to make a strong impact on the public sphere has to be ‘earned’. 
Again, France provides an interesting example, with the great mosque that 
was built in the centre of Paris in the $(#%s. It was the "rst mosque to be built 
in France, and its construction was decided upon a:er the battle of Verdun, in 
which more than '%.%%% Algerian Muslims had lost their lives while "ghting 
30 ‘Indubitablement une beauté de la première sorte: celle que les artistes appellent le grand’. 
Chateaubriand, Génie du Christianisme. Ou beautés de la Religion Chrétienne ($)%#) (Paris: Éditions 
Gallimard, $(,)) )(*: part -, book $, chapter $. Cf. Ernest Renan, ‘Souvenirs d’enfance et de jeunesse’ 
(Paris $))*), in: Henriette Psichari (ed.), Œuvres Complètes d’Ernest Renan II (Paris $(-(-$(&$) ,#*.
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on the French side. It was strongly felt that through their sacri"ces for the 
French nation, the Muslim community had earned the right to partake in the 
public sphere and so place a symbol of their culture and religion in the midst 
of French society. In any ordinary social situation, most people would regard 
this as a most common thing: to adapt to an existing social code, to a certain 
way of living, a certain architectural style, to gradually ‘earn’ the (social) right 
to in8uence the way things are done; these are amongst the immediate data of 
conscience, self-evident to all who have ever been a part of a society, a group 
of friends, a club, or a family.
Much abstract thought about rights, such as social contract theory of the 
kind expounded by John Rawls (as discussed in chapter )), while emphasizing 
the importance of the ‘neutrality’ of the state, neglects the social experience that 
is implied in every form of political organization. But while it may or may not 
do justice to their similarities and di+erences to classify Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam under the same word ‘religion’ (Tocqueville for instance believed 
there were ‘a thousand’ reasons not to do so31), to have an impact on the public 
sphere raises not only theological and legalistic, but also sociological questions 
– ultimately culminating in that most fundamental question of all: will the 
others be tolerated? If human history shows one thing, it is that accepting our 
di+erences is never unproblematic. As Arthur Schlesinger puts it: ‘!e hostility 
of one tribe for another is among the most instinctive human reactions’.32 A way 
to overcome this natural hostility is by creating a common point of reference 
– which in the past has o:en been a common enemy, but which can also be a 
common nationality, a common home. By emphasizing the shared nationality 
– an association that all members of society are a part of –, the di+erent tribes, 
races and religions can actually manage to live together in a peaceful manner.
What happens when this uni"cation around a shared nationality fails, is 
illustrated by the Dreyfus a+air that I have discussed in chapter *. Had the 
French self-image not been injured so fundamentally a:er the defeat in $),$, 
then it is unlikely that the fever to ‘purify’ the nation would have taken such 
a pathological shape. Moreover, hadn’t the German self-consciousness been 
crushed in Versailles, then the popular support for such resentful movements 
as the Nazi-party, is, if not unimaginable, at least highly improbable.
It is not implausible that contemporary disdain for the ordinary, peaceful 
national feelings of the European peoples may cause them to be charmed by 
intolerantly nationalist or ‘populist’ politicians today. !e all too severe emphasis 
31 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. #, book I, chapter '. Cf. Cliteur, Paul, ‘A Secular 
Reading of Tocqueville’, in: Raf Geenens and Annelien de Dijn (eds.), Reading Tocqueville: From 
Oracle to Actor (Houndmills, New York: Palgrave, MacMillan #%%,) $$#-$*#.
32 Arthur M. Schlesinger jr., !e Disuniting of America. Re*ections on a Multicultural Society. 
Revised and enlarged edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, $(()) $#.
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of mainstream politicians on abstract and universalist principles, has possibly 
caused them to insu9ciently accommodate the shared national identities of 
European states. Instead of debating the meaning of national identities, political 
fora have been permeated by what Mary Ann Glendon calls ‘rights talk’:33 the 
rephrasing of disputes in terms of abstract, universal rights. 
Especially the ‘universal human right’ to enjoy equal treatment proves to be 
problematic.34 Reminding us of John Rawls’ ideas of a just society, article # of the 
‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ condemns distinctions ‘of any kind, 
such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status’.35 !e European Convention on 
Human Rights has put it almost identically, outlawing ‘discrimination’ (in its 
article $-) ‘on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status.’36
!e Dutch constitution has a comparable formulation, expressed in its very 
"rst article:37 ‘All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal 
circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, 
race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted.’38
!e list is so extensive and explicitly mentions ‘all other forms’ (i.e. all possible 
forms) of discrimination, that the grounds of distinction that are to be combated 
according to the universalist worldview are unlimited (rendering signi"cant 
power to the judges at, for instance, Strasbourg to do so in accordance with 
their own political views). 
But since laws are ultimately not to be supported by force but by heartfelt 
endorsement by the community that they apply to, a society that condemns all 
forms of discrimination, ‘on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, 
race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever’, must necessarily implicate the 
citizens’ indi<erence towards those criteria. !e ideal citizen (for those who aim 
the banning of all forms of ‘discrimination’) is the one who says:
33 Glendon ($(($).
34 Cf. N. Lerner, !e U.N. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijtho+ en Noordho+ $(,%) -&.
35 !e Universal Declaration of Human Rights was issued by the United Nations General 
Assembly, on December $%th, $(-).
36 !e European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was 
dra:ed in Rome, on - November $('%. !is article got the heading “Prohibition of Discrimination” 
according to the Provisions of protocol $$ (ETS no. $''), $$ may $((-.
37 Since $()*.
38 !is is the o9cial translation of the Dutch text, provided by the Ministry of the Interior 
and Kingdom Relations, Constitutional A+airs and Legislation Department, in collaboration 
with the Translation Department of the Ministry of Foreign A+airs. www.minbzk.nl. !e Dutch 
text reads: ‘Allen die zich in Nederland bevinden, worden in gelijke gevallen gelijk behandeld. 
Discriminatie wegens godsdienst, levensovertuiging, politieke gezindheid, ras, geslacht of op 
welke grond dan ook, is niet toegestaan.’
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to me, any religion, belief, political opinion, race, sex, or really any di+erence 
between human beings is equal.
!e non-discriminatory citizen has become a universal human being, without 
preferences or particular attachments that he favors over others. !e Rawlsian 
society, that is indi+erent to any ‘conceptions of the good’ the citizens may have, 
has ceased to be a society. In the words of James Fitzjames Stephen: 
Complete moral tolerance is possible only when men have become completely 
indi+erent to each other – that is to say, when society is at an end.39
As ‘national identity’ is necessarily something particular, it implies also that 
certain forms of behavior or cultural practices are not part of it. A national 
identity implies, in short, a distinction, which is a form of inequality that con-
stitutes – strictly speaking – a form of discrimination.
It is implied in the modern conception of citizenship, which grants to all 
the right to partake in democratic decision making, that those with citizenship 
have a di+erent status than those without. Guests or temporary visitors may 
enjoy the hospitality of the community, but, as they do not bear the burdens of 
membership (nor are demanded to ful"ll the duties that go hand in hand with 
it), they do not have a natural entitlement to all of its bene"ts either.
Indeed, from this perspective, to demand equal treatment and non-
discrimination to strangers, implies denying the legitimacy of the sense of 
membership altogether. !at is why the universal prohibition to discriminate 
even to those who are not citizens – through the European Court of Human 
Rights –, if applied consistently, is contradictory to the very idea of citizenship. 
Or, put the other way round: citizenship necessarily discriminates between 
those who possess it, and those who don’t.
!e right to partake in democratic decision-making is granted to all citizens, 
yet, as a rule, denied to foreigners (though not always on the municipal level). 
Properly understood, all nation states say, as does the Spanish guerrilla "ghter 
Pablo in Ernest Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls: 
What right have you, a foreigner, to come to me and tell me what I must do?40
Much practice that is condemned as being ‘discriminatory’ concerns a di+erent 
treatment of immigrants as compared to natives. It is called ‘discrimination’, for 
instance, when an immigrant with an unfamiliar name is rejected at a job for that 
reason; or when Switzerland votes to ban the building of new minarets (while still 
allowing the building of for instance church towers). Whereas the experience of 
membership always poses demands on the members, the universal approach to 
39 James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity ($),-), quoted in: Roger Kimball, 
Experiments against reality. !e fate of culture in the postmodern age (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, #%%%) $'(.
40 Ernest Hemingway, For whom the bell tolls (London: Vintage Books, #%%') $,.
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the ‘fundamental rights’ of the individual has made it incumbent upon Western 
states to ignore that element of membership. In this way, it would be possible to 
understand the ‘non-discrimination’ project not as a demand for ‘equal rights 
in equal circumstances’, but of ‘equal rights in unequal circumstances’.
!e question whether these equal rights for di+erent groups and practices 
should in fact be given, leads to a discussion on the criteria of membership and 
the future of the identity of the community again. 
To demand equal treatment on the basis of race or ethnicity, moreover, 
is an entirely di+erent thing than to demand it on the basis of faith, religion, 
way of life, and ‘conceptions of the good’. For the former are not the result of a 
choice or a matter of moral signi"cance. !e latter, on the contrary, are subject 
to choice and imply a moral position. Rational beings can be held personally 
responsible for their ‘conceptions of the good’. By implying that nations do not 
have a right to resist certain ‘conceptions of the good’, the general movement 
against discrimination has become, over the past decades, a one-sided battle for 
minorities’ – and immigrants’ – rights, and thus a tool for the political project 
to abandon borders and weaken national identities.41
!ere is also a crucial role for symbols to be played in this. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, most modern nation states have a number of o9cial 
festive or memorial days. Usually there is a role for the national anthem and the 
national 8ag at the ceremonies that mark the beginning or conclusion of these 
happenings. In times of civil war, one of the very "rst things that the di+erent 
factions do is develop their own 8ag. It seems to be di9cult to have a political 
organization without such symbols. !e "rst observation that seems important 
in relation to this is that group identity expresses itself through symbols. Flags, 
anthems, signs, colours or special words can thus carry meaning for members 
of a social group and so express their loyalty to that group. 
A:er the publication of twelve cartoons that mocked the Islamic prophet on 
September *%th, #%%', in the Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten, Muslims felt 
that a symbol to which they were attached was desecrated and protested all over 
the world. Responses were, amongst others, the burning of the Danish 8ag. !ey 
were o+ended not by the mocking of themselves, but of their prophet; those 
who felt o+ended held the whole nation in which the publication had occurred, 
responsible. !us understanding the Danish nation as to some extent a collective 
identity, they responded by attacking the symbols of that nation, such as the 8ag.42 
41 See on this, for instance, Christopher Lasch, !e Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of 
Democracy (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, $((').
42 In contrast with many other countries, burning the 8ag is not illegal in Denmark. Section $$% 
(e) of the Danish penal code forbids to desecrate the 8ags or national symbols of foreign nations, 
while it doesn’t prohibit to burn Denmark’s own national 8ag. !e reason for this is that the burning 
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As a matter of fact, this attachment to symbols, as illustrated by the unrest 
that followed the publication of the Danish cartoons, is what we all live by on 
a daily basis. National festive days, the 8ag, the anthem, and so on, express the 
collective identity that is necessary for representative government and the rule 
of law to make sense. When a judge puts a person in the wrong, he must do so 
with a reference to a law that this person must, in order to accept the judge’s 
decision, also consider authoritative over him. !is provides an additional argu-
ment for the wearing of uniforms by judges and others involved with upholding 
the law, such as police o9cers and prison guards, too: they are not supposed to 
be individual agents, but representatives of a collective body.43
A "nal aspect of modern citizenship and the conception of ‘national identity’ 
that is implied in it is connected to the facilities of the welfare state: the national 
health care, national welfare, national pensions, national aid programmes and 
tax cuts for donations to national development programmes. All such forms of 
state-funded or fostered solidarity imply a sense of national loyalty that provides 
legitimacy for it. Indeed, it is very di9cult to imagine social democratic politics 
without presupposing the existence of a nation.44 !is is also the reason why 
many traditional le:-wing parties have taken a sceptical position towards im-
migration (whereas many right-wing parties have been wary of the idea of a 
national identity and defended global free trade and open borders45 – interestingly 
enough almost the exact opposite to the present!). But it cannot be denied that 
the welfare state rests upon a sense of national solidarity: a sense of community.
(.*. W$("&>( ) ‘W#’, I( W&9’( W&8J
Ultimately, representative government and the rule of law are thus dependent 
upon a territorial loyalty that is su9ciently imagined to allow newcomers in, 
yet not so universal that it leaves its members without shared symbols or objects 
of identi"cation. As national loyalty is connected to a collective identity, it is 
only natural that it also encompasses a certain claim on the public sphere. 
!e inevitable consequence of supranationalism and multiculturalism is the 
development of parallel loyalties that will challenge the unity of the state, and 
of foreign 8ags is a matter of foreign policy, as it could be understood as a threat to that country. 
In fact, according to Danish tradition, burning is also the proper way to dispose of a worn 8ag.
43 See on this for example Cliteur, ‘Ambtenaar en Politiek. Over de anarchie in ons openbaar 
bestuur’, in: Tegen de Decadentie, de democratische rechtstaat in verval (De Arbeiderspers, 
Amsterdam, #%%-)$-*+.
44 See on this for instance: Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism (London: Norton 
Publishers, #%%') )$.
45 Although John Stuart Mill already recognized the necessity for a ‘principle of cohesion’ 
amongst the members of a state, as discussed in the previous part.
 1<2 4751=.HG75=3L /6 .=1=J203<=4 #*,
thus hollow out representative government and the rule of law (as well as the 
preconditions for any form of state-initiated welfare).
!e WRR may be right that multiple loyalties – to religion, family, di+erent 
cultural backgrounds, and so on – will always exist. It is undesirable that the 
state should seek to eliminate this entirely; such a state would be a totalitarian 
state, recognizing only itself as a legitimate purpose in the lives of its subjects. 
Nevertheless, the opposite is undesirable to largely the same extent: if di+erent 
institutions and authorities consequently present alternatives to the national 
law – ultimately challenging the monopoly to the legitimate use of force of the 
state46 –, representative government and the rule of law will e+ectively be hol-
lowed out. !e double problem that may, moreover, be rising in Western Europe 
is this: while multiculturalism sets in motion a centrifugal tendency out of the 
national idea, supranationalism o+ers the tools to defend a non-national law. 
Most clearly in the form of the ECHR and the ICC, supranational law presents, 
at a deeper level, the ongoing example that ultimately, reference is not to be 
made to the national law, but to the universal rights that every single individual 
is supposedly always entitled to.
When taking the perspective of multiculturalism, emphasizing the equality 
of each cultural group, and the right to an equal share in the state’s cultural 
foundations, there is no reason why Muslims would not be encouraged to accept 
their form of non-national universal jurisdiction: sharia law. It is not unlikely that 
increasing numbers of Muslims, seeking a home in the modern world, will retreat 
into fundamentalism and derive from the language of universal jurisdiction the 
tools to defend divine commands. !en what may be evolving in the slipstream 
of the spread of ‘human rights’ is a concept of universal jurisdiction of the same 
nature as the religious jurisdiction that was "nally abandoned – a:er more than 
a century of devastating warfare – in the $,th century.47 !is is a problem related 
to ‘universal’ human rights that lies below their super"cial attractiveness. Not 
only do they seem to generate a rights- rather then a duties-based conception of 
citizenship (as discussed in chapter ).*), but they also bear an innate justi"cation 
of divine law, and thereby diminish the authority and indeed legitimacy of a 
shared, national law. 
And this applies not only to the European Court of Human Rights, or the 
human rights discourse generally, but to the entire supranational idea. Supra-
national – i.e. global, universal – jurisdiction actually nourishes the idea that 
national law is of no particular authority and could be easily overridden. !e 
46 As seems to be a tendency in the suburbs of many large European cities, from Paris and 
Amsterdam to Berlin and Marseille. 
47 Cf. Karin Jespersen and Ralph Pittelkow, Islamisten en Naivisten. Met een introductie van 
Afshin Ellian (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Nieuw Amsterdam, #%%)).
#*) .<74125 0=02 
weakening of national authority that this leads to is a dangerous development.48 
National loyalty is the common point of reference for the rule of law and rep-
resentative government, and provides the sense of home into which strangers 
can be welcomed.49 It is impossible to collectively deliberate and ultimately 
decide upon political questions, unless an assembly may speak for a collective 
whole: the people. It is unlikely that disputing parties will accept the verdict of 
a judge, if they do not experience both themselves and the judge as part of the 
same community. Globalization, migration, virtualization and so on pose great 
opportunities and chances. !e twenty-"rst century seems to become a most 
exciting and international century, full of exchanges and unexpected develop-
ments. Yet if we want to continue living under representative governments with 
a shared rule of law, political organization will have to continue to focus on 
strengthening national loyalties, for ‘without a we, it won’t work’.50
48 Again the French example is relevant. Each year on the morning of the fourteenth of July, 
in every French city and village, the inhabitants come together to play the Marseillaise, run 
their eyes over the lists of Morts pour la Patrie, and celebrate the hoisting of the 8ag. !e French 
$-th of July may be compared with the several national festivities and commemorations in the 
Netherlands: April *%th (Queen’s day), May -th (the national commemoration of the dead), 
May 'th (Liberation day). !e rituals attached to these festivities and commemorations can and 
should rea9rm the sense of membership, not only of particular communities, but also of the 
political whole, which ultimately comes down to the nation, which in turn is expressed through 
representative institutions and the shared rule of law. In France, of course, much (intellectual) 
weight is given to the French Revolution and the ideals that surfaced with it; but the celebrations 
on the $-th of July are not about the triumph of certain intellectual ideas. !is day is, just as the 
symbols of the 8ag and the anthem, clearly the expression of a common home.
49 Evidence from the European Value Studies suggests that for inhabitants of the EU, national 
loyalty still takes clear precedence over their loyalty to the union: ‘[F]or Europeans, nation comes 
"rst, then Europe. Europe has only been accepted in an instrumental and utilitarian way; no 
emotional or a+ective attachment exists towards the Union. Europeans perceive themselves "rst 
and foremost as French, Italian or Polish. !ey cherish their language, their habits and national 
culture” (Halman et al. #%%': $')’.
50 Paul Sche+er, Het land van aankomst (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, #%%,).
CONCLUSION
!is book has argued that representative government and the rule of law require 
nation states; or, put the other way round, that it is only in a nation state, that 
these institutions can properly function. 
!e signi"cance of borders lies in their ability to de"ne jurisdictions, and 
so separate one political community from another. In doing so, borders enable 
the formation and protection of a national loyalty as well as the exercise of 
sovereignty. Representative government and the rule of law need such a loyalty 
and such sovereignty. !e gradual dismantlement of borders, brought about 
by supranationalism from above, and by multiculturalism from below, dilutes 
sovereignty and weakens nationality, and so hollows out representative govern-
ment and the rule of law.
It is unfortunate that the signi"cance of borders has been neglected. Instead 
of the sovereign cosmopolitanism that I propose, a policy of supranationalism has 
been pursued. !ree supranational courts – the ICC, the ECHR, and the ICJ –, 
as well as three supranational organizations – the WTO, the Security Council 
and the EU – are unaccountable to the national community, while presenting 
the nation with law that is not from itself. Nor is this supranational law being 
administered, in the last instance, by the nation itself. In this way, the national 
sense of membership is weakened. !e law is no longer ‘ours’ or ‘from within’, 
but from ‘out there’. !e judges that administer the law are no longer from 
within either. !ey are out of the reach of the national balance of powers and 
the pressures of public opinion. !ese supranational judges may have di+erent 
ideas on how legal provisions should be interpreted, and their political persua-
sions are o:en unknown.
Indisputably, then, the national community has a limited say in the creation 
and application of supranational law. And while it inevitably becomes harder for 
the national community to accept the right of say of the supranational bodies as 
their powers increase, in the fact that no national assembly decides on the most 
important political decisions anymore, the rea9rmation of collective identity 
through collective decision-making is weakened as well.
Meanwhile, the response to mass-immigration has been one of multicultural-
ism, encouraging the di+erences between the diverse ethnic and religious groups, 
rather than their similarities. Instead of focusing on what the community of 
strangers may have in common, or should have in common, as in the ideal of 
a multicultural nationalism that I defend, multiculturalism advocates the lack 
of such a core-identity. While legal pluralism is still an exception, there can be 
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no doubt that this is a logical next step on the line that starts with denying the 
existence of a single, shared national identity. As a result of this, the sense of 
overarching membership that is required for representative government and 
the rule of law, is severely eroded.
If representative government and the rule of law are to be preserved, or 
restored, it is important to change course. Because representative government 
and the rule of law require a collective, national identity as well as political 
sovereignty, nation states should be rea9rmed. Powers should gradually be 
taken back from the supranational institutions that now possess and exercise 
them; and the importance of national loyalty in the face of the multiethnic and 
multireligious societies of today, should be thoroughly re8ected upon.
!ere are clearly many alternatives to current supranational entanglements. 
With regards to the World Trade Organization, the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the panels could be reversed, and the jurisdiction of the Appellate Body could 
be restricted, so giving back the power to ultimately interpret trade agreements 
to member states themselves. !e International Criminal Court could accept 
Security Council veto power over decisions to commence investigations. It 
could also narrow the scope of crimes it has jurisdiction over, to for instance 
genocide or the use of weapons of mass destruction only. !e European Court 
of Human Rights, too, could narrow its jurisdiction and restrict itself to what 
it was originally intended for: protecting individuals against the most basic 
injustices in terms of physical violence and gross cruelties, and standing up 
for the most elementary principles of democracy only, such as the liberty of 
the press and free elections. It could thus apply a more formalized principle of 
subsidiarity. Also, the ECHR could accept that a two-thirds majority should be 
reached amongst its judges before states can be convicted. An annual report 
with leading cases could be produced by the Parliamentary Assembly, which 
could then be reviewed and questioned by national parliaments.
One could easily go on in this fashion: the possibilities to reshape suprana-
tional organizations in a less supranational – more intergovernmental – way, or 
to curtail and limit their powers, are legion and the many possibilities deserve 
serious debate. A sovereign cosmopolitanism, exercised by nation states that 
are open to international cooperation and global developments, but retain the 
ultimate say in their obligations and policies, can take shape in many di+erent 
forms, too, and therefore merits further exploration.
To argue – as has been the main purpose of this book – that representative 
government and the rule of law can exist only within nation states, however, 
does not necessarily mean that those nation states that presently exist should 
also be held on to. !ere is nothing in this book that speci"cally defends current 
borders: it has been a defense of borders in general. For that reason, representa-
tive government and the rule of law would not necessarily be undermined by a 
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change of presently existing borders. !e states that today exist do not necessarily 
re8ect existing national identities, and the separation of Scotland from Great 
Britain, for instance, or the splitting up of Belgium into two nation states, may 
well improve the functioning of representative government and the rule of law, 
rather than undermine it. Nor is there in principle any objection to the merger 
of present-day nation states into larger nation states (the merger of Germany 
and Austria, for example, or, theoretically speaking, of even all European states 
into one United States of Europe). !e point is that sovereignty and nationality 
uniquely enable representative government and the rule of law – not that we 
should hold on stiBy to historically contingent boundaries.
Nevertheless, I have tried to point out – in chapters $, * and ( especially – that 
there are great di9culties connected to creating the national membership that 
is required for representative government and the rule of law. It is certain that 
the kind of national loyalties that – however imperfectly – exist today, have been 
shaped at tremendous costs, over a long period of time, and that European states 
have made a great e+ort in building them. !e idea that a European national-
ity could be created seems to me to be frivolous and completely out of touch 
with reality. !e di9culties that uniting East- and West-Germany in the $((%s 
already posed are illustrative: if uni"cation asked already such e+ort from two 
countries with the same history, language and culture, a:er only half a century 
of separation – how on earth could this be done on a European scale? And if 
a:er more than $)% years of existence as a state, still hasn’t led to the formation 
of a generally experienced Belgian nationality – what can we really, realistically 
speaking, expect from the packing together of Poles, Spaniards, Dutchmen, 
Frenchmen and Bulgarians?
!ere are, moreover, many plausible intergovernmental alternatives to the 
present supranational EU. !e powers of the European Union could be severely 
diminished by for instance reconsidering the interpretation of the common 
market, the Schengen-agreement on open borders, as well as the euro currency. 
Gradually dismantling the politico-economic structure of the EU and moving 
back to the idea of a free trade zone is not di9cult to imagine and might prove 
to be a stable format for European cooperation.
!is hypothetical intergovernmental Europe, an open network of intensively 
cooperating, yet sovereign states, would have many attractive elements. If border 
controls were restored, it would make cooperation with non-European countries 
much easier. One result could be the opening up of the old continent to the vast 
markets in the Middle East and Northern Africa. By granting these countries, 
which could include Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Russia, and even Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan, a status of ‘peripheral benevolent countries’, the richer and 
technologically more advanced (Western-) European countries could ensure 
access to cheap production in those countries, while maintaining control over 
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their national economies and immigration. As national sovereignty would be 
restored, European states would cease to be obliged to converge their several 
foreign policies. International relations would again be determined on the basis 
of the historical loyalties, the national interests, and the policy decisions of the 
elected national governments.
!e main argument against such an intergovernmental EU seems to be that, as 
the foreign policies of European countries could diverge, it would disable Europe 
to secure its ‘common’ global interests in the longer term (if there even exists 
such a thing). What some people fear is that by not installing an overarching 
political structure, the European states may become subject to policies of divide 
et impera by such great powers as India, China and the United States, thereby 
dwar"ng the political clout of the European continent on the international 
scene. Recent events suggest that this might indeed be the case. Gas contracts 
with Russia which will be given to only a limited number of European countries; 
Chinese trade deals and customs agreements denounced as a result of some 
European state’s critique on Chinese international geopolitical behavior; hardly 
are European political leaders being listened to in military con8icts around the 
globe; and so on. 
!e defender of an intergovernmental EU would argue that all these dif-
"culties are the problem of the European nations themselves; and that it is their 
challenge to deal with them, as a federal European Union is – for lack of a single 
European nationality – unattainable. !e European federalist, on the other 
hand, would argue that the formation of such a single European nationality is 
nevertheless possible. To form such a federal union, it would be necessary to 
transfer political sovereignty to the European political centre. Choosing this 
option would mean the end of the current, supranational EU and with it the 
thousands of regulations and directives that the Monnet method has produced, 
and the beginning of a new, democratic European nation state.
European foreign policy would have to converge. France would have to give 
up its permanent seat in the Security Council to be replaced by a common, 
‘European’ seat; Germany and France must accept the possibility of being 
outvoted by former Communist countries in the East of Europe when it comes 
to questions of foreign policy and support for American military interventions 
around the globe; the Italians would have to "ght in the same army as the 
Spaniards, the Germans, the Dutch and the Danes. !e signi"cantly less liberal 
majorities in Middle and Eastern European countries may outvote Dutch ideals 
on gay rights, abortion, euthanasia, drugs and so on. A European lingua franca, 
which will most certainly be English, would eclipse the importance of the great 
culture-languages of the continent. And so on.
As I have said, to my mind this is grotesque and indeed absurd, and I don’t 
see how this could possibly be believed to be a realistic scenario. Moreover, I 
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fear that going this way would incite an intolerant and closed nationalism – of 
the kind that also helped to bring about the explosion of Yugoslavia – rather 
than invoke enthusiasm for yet more ‘Europeanization’. But whether this is so or 
not, and whether the process of unifying Europe politically must therefore be set 
in motion or not, goes beyond the scope of this book. !e point here has been 
that the present, supranational ‘in between’ concept of European integration, 
with an EU that is stuck somewhere halfway between a federation and mere 
intergovernmental cooperation, is unsustainable. Sovereignty and national 
identity must coincide for representative government and the rule of law to exist.
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In dit proefschri: wordt de stelling verdedigd dat de democratische rechtsstaat 
voor haar functioneren aIankelijk is van het bestaan van een territoriale loyaliteit 
onder de bevolking – o:ewel, een gedeeld natiebesef. Deze nationale loyaliteit 
is een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor zowel democratie als rechtsstaat. Aan-
vaarding van deze stelling zou betekenen dat een grondige herbezinning op het 
in de afgelopen decennia nagestreefde supranationalisme en multiculturalisme 
noodzakelijk is.
In het onderzoek wordt aandacht besteed aan achtereenvolgens het ontstaan 
van moderne staten vanaf de vroege Middeleeuwen, aan de betekenis van het 
complexe en omstreden begrip ‘soevereiniteit’, en ten slotte aan de begrippen 
‘natie’ en ‘nationaliteit’.
Na aldus het begrip natiestaat – een politieke orde gebaseerd op nationale 
soevereiniteit – te hebben ontleed, bespreekt het boek achtereenvolgens het 
supranationalisme en het multiculturalisme dat in alle West-Europese staten 
inmiddels, zij het in verschillende mate, is omarmd of in elk geval aanvaard. 
Voor de overzichtelijkheid is het supranationalisme onderverdeeld in twee 
categorieën: supranationale rechterlijke instanties, en supranationale organisaties. 
Als rechterlijke instanties worden besproken: het Internationaal StraIof, het 
Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens, en het Internationaal Gerechtshof. 
Als organisaties worden besproken: de Wereldhandelsorganisatie, de Veilig-
heidsraad, en de Europese Unie.
Wat deze gerechtshoven en organisaties (het onderscheid is niet altijd mes-
scherp te maken en doet strict genomen ook niet ter zake) met elkaar gemeen 
hebben, is dat ze supranationale bevoegdheden bezitten en, gesteund door de 
supranationale wereldbeschouwing, deze bevoegdheden geleidelijk aan het 
uitbreiden zijn. Inmiddels is een netwerk ontstaan van supranationale wetgeving 
en besluitvorming, die zich onttrekt aan de democratische controle van nationale 
parlementen en die de lidstaten confronteert met recht dat niet van henzelf is, 
en met de interpretatie van regels die zij mogelijk heel anders zouden wensen.
Met name in het gezamenlijk presenteren van deze supranationale instanties 
– als bovendien onderdeel van één en dezelfde wereldbeschouwing –, komt 
het wetenschappelijk debat mogelijk verder. Dit is niet eerder op deze wijze 
gedaan, en door volstrekt uiteenlopende instellingen als het Europees Hof voor 
#&& 37L20D711=0E 
de Rechten van de Mens in dezelfde categorie te plaatsen als – bijvoorbeeld – de 
Wereldhandelsorganisatie, komt een nieuw perspectief tot leven.
Vervolgens wordt ook het multiculturalisme gepresenteerd als onderdeel 
van dezelfde antithetische tendens tegenover de natiestaat. Ook hierin is een 
nieuw perspectief gelegen. Het is namelijk betrekkelijk ongebruikelijk om het 
multiculturalisme te presenteren als onderdeel van in essentie dezelfde beweging 
als het supranationalisme.
Het derde deel van het boek bespreekt vervolgens de belangrijkste aspecten 
van de democratische rechtsstaat, en verdedigt de stelling dat deze voor haar 
voortbestaan aIankelijk is van precies de soevereiniteit en de nationale loyaliteit 
die supranationalisme en multiculturalisme ondermijnen. 
Het motto van het boek is ontleend aan Het land van aankomst van Paul 
Sche+er (#%%(), waarin de conclusie wordt getrokken dat ‘zonder “wij” gaat 
het niet’. Ik deel die conclusie. Omdat de democratische rechtsstaat zonder een 
‘wij’ niet werkt, eindigt het proefschri: met een pleidooi voor een multicultureel 
nationalisme gekoppeld aan een soeverein kosmopolitisme. In deze visie kunnen 
natiestaten nieuwkomers van harte verwelkomen, maar hen ook de voorwaarde 
stellen dat ze deel worden van het nieuwe nationale geheel; internationale 
uitdagingen addresseren zij voorts met een open blik, maar ze behouden zich 
niettemin het recht voor, in laatste instantie zelf hun zaken te mogen beslissen. 
Alleen zo hee: de democratische rechtsstaat toekomst.
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